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Abstract 
The Nazis' deployment of foreigners (Auslandereinsatz) between 1939 and 1945 
established one of the largest forced labour programs since the abolition of slavery 
during the nineteenth century. Foreign civilians from across Europe were deployed in 
Germany's war economy. Between 350,000 and 400,000 Belgian civilians were 
deployed in Germany during the Second World War- roughly half of these workers 
went to Germany voluntarily, but under a degree of pressure due to the Military 
Administration's economic policies in occupied Belgium. 
This thesis examines the implementation of the Nazi forced labour program 
through the analysis of the lives of Belgians who worked in Germany in the period 
1940-1945 and by using a variety of original sources, including the records of the 
German Military Administration in Belgium and German and Belgian labour 
officials and the accounts of those who lived and worked in Germany. This thesis 
proposes a social history of the Nazi foreign labour program with a strong focus on 
the history of everyday life, drawing extensively on records such as letters, diaries, 
photographs and personal accounts of Belgians who worked in Germany during the 
Second World War, as well as hospital, police and judicial records. The employment 
patterns and experiences of Belgians deployed in Germany are examined through 
detailed case studies of Berlin and Diisseldorf, industrialised cities where Belgians 
were deployed in significant numbers. 
The Nazi regime divided Belgium's population along linguistic lines: 
Belgians were officially subject to differentiated treatment based on whether they 
were Flemings or Walloons. Examining the treatment of Belgians by the Nazi regime 
and comparing Nazi racial policies and practice, this thesis emphasises the key role 
played by local authorities, employers and individual Germans in shaping the 
experiences of foreign workers. It is argued that an important distinction must be 
made in relation to the material advantages western European workers enjoyed due 
to their elevated position in the Nazi racial hierarchy and the benefits individual 
foreign workers were able to secure by virtue of their employment skills, linguistic 
skills and greater confidence. 
The experiences of Belgian workers are also compared and contrasted with 
those of other national groups and are related to the broader history of foreign labour 
in Nazi Germany. This study also examines the experiences of Belgian women. 
While Belgian women represented close to 15 percent of Belgians deployed in 
Germany, studies of Belgian labour in Germany have largely overlooked their 
experiences. Utilising the limited available sources, this thesis contributes to an 
understanding of women's experiences. 
By focussing on the social history of the Auslandereinsatz and the stories of 
individual Belgians, this thesis maps the varied experiences of Belgians in Germany 
during the Second World War, illustrating convergence and divergence from Nazi 
racial policy and the fundamental role ordinary Germans played. More importantly, 
however, this thesis shows that Belgian civilian workers were not just passive 
victims of the German occupation. The decision to go to Germany to work was a 
personal one for many Belgian volunteers, based on individual circumstances. In 
difficult economic times and with no end to the war in sight, Belgians sought to 
navigate the best course for themselves and their families. While conscripts were by 
definition not free, as western Europeans Belgians were afforded greater rights and 
legal protections, which ensured they had room for manoeuvre and were able to 
exercise a significant degree of control over their own destinies. 
Preface 
Translations are by the author unless otherwise specified in the footnotes. English 
translations for the titles of organisations and offices are used throughout the thesis, 
with German, French and Flemish titles provided in the list of abbreviations and 
glossary at the end of this thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Nazis' deployment of foreigners (Auslandereinsatz) between 1939 and 1945 
established one of the largest forced labour programs since the abolition of slavery 
during the nineteenth century. The deployment of large numbers of foreigners within 
the borders of the Reich was anathema to Nazi ideologues, and Nazi leaders made 
the decision to deploy such large numbers of foreigners only after the outbreak of the 
Second World War. While early military successes allowed the Nazis to delay the 
wide-scale deployment of foreigners, significant numbers of Polish and French 
prisoners of war (POWs) had been put to work in Germany after the defeat of Poland 
and France in September 1939 and July 1940 respectively, along with smaller 
numbers from Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg. Additionally, civilian 
workers recruited in Axis countries, such as Italy, were also deployed. Until the 
summer of 1941 the overwhelming majority of foreign civilians and POWs deployed 
in Germany worked in agriculture.' However, a labour shortage in Germany even 
before the outbreak of war, the failure of Blitzkrieg in the summer of 1941, and the 
reality that Germany was facing a drawn-out war of attrition, drove Nazi leaders to 
embark on a massive forced labour program. With little prospect of German soldiers 
returning from the front in the foreseeable future, the exploitation of foreign labour 
was essential to the German war economy: Germany could not maintain the 
necessary agricultural production to feed its population or produce the armaments 
necessary to wage war across Europe without foreign labour. 
Millions of workers from occupied territories, from the Soviet Union in the 
east to Belgium in the west, were deployed in Germany and 26 percent of the 
German labour force was foreign by September 1944.2 In addition to POWs, a total 
of 8.4 million foreign civilian labourers were employed in the German economy 
1 Ulrich Herbert, Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltanschauung: Ober Fremde und Deutsche im 20. Jahrhundert, 
Originalausg. ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1995), 124. 
2 Mark Spoerer and Jochen Fleischhacker, "Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany: Categories, Numbers, 
and Survivors," Journal of Interdisciplinary Hist01y 33, no. 2 (2002): 172. The last set of official 
statistics was issued by the Office of the Four Year Plan and the Plenipotentiary General for the 
Allocation of Labour in September 1944 in the official publication Der Arbeitseinsatz im 
Grofldeutschen Reich, no. 11/12. · 
during the Second World War - most of whom were brought to Germany by force. 
Almost half a million foreign civilian labourers died in Germany or were sent to 
concentration camps.3 While the deployment of POWs was common practice and did 
not contravene the Hague Convention of 1907, the conscription of millions of foreign 
civilians was a clear violation of the Hague Convention. 
Foreign workers were subject to differentiated treatment based on a strict 
multi-tiered racial hierarchy. Workers from northern and western Europe, in 
particular Scandinavian, Dutch and Flemish workers who were considered 
"Germanic" (deutsch-freundlich), were treated humanely, and received wages almost 
on a par with "native" Germans. At the bottom of the Nazi racial hierarchy, Poles, 
Sinti, Romanies, Jews and those from the Soviet Union had no civil rights and were 
considered expendable. These workers were to be worked as hard as possible, 
accommodated in squalid conditions and allocated rations that barely covered the 
minimum levels required for survival. Russians, Poles, Sinti, Romanies and Jews 
were generally subject to a policy that amounted to annihilation through work, and 
experienced an appallingly high mortality rate due to malnutrition, exposure, disease 
and violence. 
The German campaign to harness Belgian labour can be divided into three 
phases. From June 1940 until March 1942, recruitment for work in both Belgium and 
Germany was allegedly voluntary, although increasing pressure was applied to 
persuade Belgians to accept work assignments in Germany. Between March and 
October 1942, Belgians could be assigned jobs in Belgium, while work assignments 
in Germany continued to be voluntary. Finally, from October 1942 until the end of 
the German occupation in September 1944, Belgians were forced to accept jobs in 
Germany. A total of 350,000-400,000 Belgians worked in Germany during the 
Second World War- roughly half of whom went to Germany voluntarily, but under 
a degree of pressure due to the Military Administration's economic policies in 
occupied Belgium, which saw industries that were not critical to the war effort closed 
down thereby creating a pool of unemployed workers.4 According to official German 
3 Ibid., 186-8. 
4 Mark._Sp.oere~, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz: Ausldndische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene 
und Haftlmge 1m Deutschen Reich und im besetzten Europa 1939-1945 (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 
200 I), 61. 
2 
figures, there were approximately 30,000 Belgian women working in Germany in 
September 1944, representing 14. 7 percent of Belgian civilian workers. 5 Heavily 
industrialised Belgium promised much needed skilled industrial workers. The 
campaign to recruit Belgian workers was underpinned by Germany's need for skilled 
workers and most Belgians were deployed in industry. 
Encouraging Flemish separatism in order to divide Belgium's population 
along linguistic lines, Nazi leaders reinstated the Flemish politics (Flamenpolitik) 
practised by German leaders during their country's occupation of Belgium in the 
First World War. Belgian workers were subject to differentiated treatment: Dutch-
speaking Flemings enjoyed a more privileged status because the Nazis considered 
them to be members of a Germanic race; by contrast, French-speaking Walloons 
were considered to be lower in the racial hierarchy, and were grouped with French 
workers. The treatment of Belgian POWs illustrates the Nazis' Flamenpolitik at 
work. Flemish POWs were released soon after Belgium's capitulation, while 65,000 
Walloon POWs were sent to Germany to work. 6 It is unclear why the Germans 
released Flemish POWs. One possible explanation is that the release of Flemings was 
part of a calculated policy of dividing Belgium internally, playing Flemings off 
against Walloons. More plausibly, it has been suggested that Flemish POWs were 
released because the Germans considered them to be of Germanic stock. 7 What is 
less clear is how this policy of unequal treatment of Flemings and Walloons worked 
in practice and to what extent Flemish workers' privileged status as members of a 
supposedly Germanic race translated into concrete benefits and whether this changed 
over the course of the war. The treatment of Belgian workers in Germany therefore 
offers an opportunity to examine Nazi racial policies at work. 
1. Historiography 
In the immediate post-war years West German historians evinced little interest in 
forced labour in Nazi Germany - a tendency that persisted well into the 1970s. Most 
5 Ulrich Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign labour in Germany Under the Third 
Reich, trans. William Templer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 462. 
6 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 60. Cf. Edward L Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi 
Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 47. Homze suggests that the number of 
Walloon POWs sent to Germany was 80,000. 
7 This conclusion is supported by the fact that a large proportion of other so-called "Germanic" 
POWs, including Dutch and Norwegian POWs, were released after the cessation of hostilities, after 
agreeing to certain conditions. 
3 
hi~torical accounts of the forced labour program published in West Germany during 
the 1950s and 1960s were written by historians with close ties to German industry 
with the intention of refuting the charges of exploitation of foreign labour that were 
laid against German industrialists during the Nuremberg trials.
8 
Proponents of this 
view argue that the Nazi state was a totalitarian regime and left German industrialists 
with little room for manoeuvre; German industry could not therefore be held 
accountable for exploitation of forced workers. West German historians categorised 
Nazi policy towards foreigners as basically value-neutral and generally acceptable in 
terms of overall social policy.9 The one key exception to this early trend was Martin 
Broszat's study of Nazi policy in Poland, which included a detailed examination of 
the forced deportation of Polish workers. 10 By contrast, the forced labour program 
proved a favoured topic for East German historians who produced numerous 
monographs and documentary publications, generally interpreting the forced labour 
program from the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist theory.
11 
Industrial monopolies 
were viewed as the driving force behind the war and responsibility for the forced 
labour program was attributed to big business; the role of state and Nazi Party organs 
was viewed as secondary. 12 Later, West German contributors to this debate, such as 
Ulrich Herbert and Andreas Heusler, produced more nuanced studies. 
American historian Edward Homze's major study Foreign Labour in Nazi 
Germany was published in 1967. 13 Homze's work is the only comprehensive study of 
8 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 4. 
9 Key proponents of this view include: Otto Kranzblihler, Riickblick auf Niirnberg (Hamburg: Zeit-
Verlag, 1949).; Thilo von Wilmowsky, Warum wurde Krupp verurteilt? legende und Justizirrtum 
(Stuttgart: Econ-Verlag, 1950).; Hartwig BOiek, Die Zwangsarbeit im Friedensvolkerrecht (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,, 1952).; August von Knieriem, Niirnberg. Rechtlinie und menschliche 
Probleme (Stuttgart: Klett, 1953).; Werner-Otto Reichelt, Das Erbe der IG-Farben (DUsseldorf: Econ-
Verlag, 1956).; and Hans-Eckhardt Kannapin, Wirtschaft unter Zwang. Anmerkungen und Analysen 
zur rechtlichen und politischen Verantwortung der deutschen Wirtschaft und der Herrschaft des 
Nationalsozialismus, besonders im Hinblick auf den Einsatz und die Behandlung von auslandischen 
Arbeitskraften und Konzentrationslagerhaftlingen in deutschen lndustrie- und Riistungsbetrieben 
(Cologne: Deutsche Industrieverlag, 1966). Cf. Heusler who found that in Munich the impetus to 
employ foreign civilians and POWs came from businesses and employers. Andreas Heusler, 
Auslandereinsatz: Zwangsarbeitfiir die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945, vol. 1, Quellen und 
Forschungen zur Geschichte der Stadt MUnchen (Mlinchen: Hugendube1, 1996), 421. 
10 Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939-1945 (Stuttgart: 1961 ). 
11 For an overview of the literature on the Nazi forced labour program published by East German 
historians see: Lothar Elsner and Joachim Lehmann, DDR-literatur iiber Fremdarbeiterpolitik des 
lmperialismus: Bemerkungen zur Forschungsstand und Bibliographie. Fremdarbeiterpolitik des 
lmperialismus (Rostock: Wilhelm-Pieck-Universitat, Sekt. Geschichte 1979) 12 , • 
Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 4-5. 
13 Homze, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany. 
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the Nazis' foreign labour program published by a historian from the west before the 
1980s. Herbert observes that Homze's pioneering study was never published in 
German translation and was little known in Germany, suggesting that Homze's work 
came too early for German historians who did not take a great interest in social 
history until the l 970s. 14 Homze emphasises the contradictions between Nazi 
ideology and practice, concluding, "The foreign labour program was, after all, a 
microcosm of the Nazi world - a curious mixture of improvisation, ideology, and 
opportunism". 15 Homze argues that the forced labour program was underpinned by 
the need to reconcile the national and racial doctrines of Nazism with the need for 
millions of foreign workers - two contradictory demands that the regime ultimately 
could not reconcile. According to Homze, the Nazis did, however, satisfy some of 
their racial doctrines through discrimination and the attempted segregation of 
foreigners, particularly those from the Soviet Union, from the German population. 
The harsh treatment of the foreigner, argues Homze, was organised in part for the 
psychological benefit of the German worker. 16 Certainly, Nazi policy-makers often 
showed sensitivity to German popular opinion. 17 The discrimination to which 
foreigners were subject in daily life emanated not only from the directives of Nazi 
leaders; ordinary Germans also participated in the mistreatment of foreigners. Homze 
concludes that while relations between western Europeans and Germans can be 
characterised as normal, the case of the Ostarbeiter ("eastern workers" - those from 
the Soviet Union) was different. Homze observes, "Eastern workers received little 
sympathy from the German working class ... German behaviour toward the 
easterners was capricious, ranging from ferocity to affection". 18 Indeed, Homze 
stresses that the standard ofliving Germans enjoyed during the war came at the 
expense of foreign workers, and they were in this sense complicit in the maltreatment 
14 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 5-6. 
15 Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany, 311. 
16 Ibid., 291-2. 
17 A concrete example of how popular opinion helped shape Nazi policies towards foreigners is the 
fact that Martin Bormann, Head of the Party Chancellery, felt that it was necessary to inform the 
German population that improvements in the clothing and food provisions of Soviet POWs were only 
to improve their productivity. Jill Stephenson, Hitler's Home Front: Wiirttemberg under the Nazis 
(London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 269. Herbert's research also shows that in September 1941 
there was public criticism in Germany over the need to feed millions of Soviet POWs. According to 
the Security Service, the German population felt it was improper to accommodate the "Bolsheviks" in 
any way. Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 155-6. 
18 Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi'Germany, 294. 
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of foreigners. Later contributions to this debate, including that of Herbert, supported 
Homze's interpretation. 
Homze emphasises how the interplay between racial ideology and economics 
affected the treatment of foreign workers. Following swift victories over Poland, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, Germany had a large pool of POWs 
at its disposal. Despite a serious shortage of skilled workers, especially in the metals 
industry and mining, more than half of the western European POWs were deployed 
in agriculture. 19 Many POWs were engaged in jobs that native Germans did not wish 
to undertake, further reinforcing the German worker's superior position. POWs were 
not employed outside agriculture in greater numbers until summer 1941. Thus racial 
ideology hindered the effective utilisation of foreign labour in the first years of the 
war. The changing fortunes of the war brought a shift in priorities: 
When victory seemed imminent, the racial considerations were far more 
pronounced than the economic ones. However, as the war progressed and the 
economic needs became increasingly urgent, the ideological-economic 
conflict was resolved through the gradual erosion of the ideology. 
20 
As the war progressed, Nazi leaders were compelled to sacrifice racial policies and 
improve their treatment of foreign workers in order to gain maximum economic 
benefit from foreign workers, although victory in the war would no doubt have 
meant a return to the primacy of ideology. According to Homze, the Germans' 
growing reliance on foreign labour resulted in an increasing tendency to improve the 
conditions of foreign workers. The adoption of a more pragmatic approach eroded 
the Nazis' system of differentiated, treatment and "'eastern workers' status rose 
steadily from a place of marked inferiority to one of near-equality with western 
workers". 21 While the Nazis were prompted to improve easterners' conditions, 
westerners' conditions worsened during the war due to bombing and food shortages. 
Homze therefore concludes, "The foreign labour program was, then, throughout its 
existence a dynamic entity, evolving and changing with new problems and 
situations".22 It is, then, important to consider temporal shifts and avoid 
generalisations. However, it is clear the treatment of foreign workers deteriorated 
19 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 96. 
20 Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi Germanu 264 
'I '.l'' • 
- Ibid., 130. 
22 Ibid. 
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over time, with some of the worst treatment of foreign workers occurring in the later 
stages of the war at places like Dora-Mittelbau where slave labour was utilised for 
the construction of facilities and V-2 rocket production, and conditions were 
especially brutal and hazardous.23 
The first comprehensive study of the Wehrmacht 's (armed forces) murderous 
policies towards Soviet POWs, which included an examination of the deployment of 
Soviet POWs in German companies, was published by Christian Streit in 1978. Streit 
illustrates the close links between the forced labour program and the Nazis' policy of 
mass annihilation.24 Approximately 5.7 million Soviet soldiers fell into German 
hands between June 1941 and January 1945, 3.3 million of whom perished in 
German captivity- 57.5 percent of all Soviet POWs captured by Germans forces. 25 
The entire design of the campaign in the east, argues Streit, meant that large masses 
of prisoners were to be expected, and feeding the prisoners was not an inherently 
impossible task. Streit concludes that the more fundamental cause of the deaths was 
not the number of prisoners, but the war aims that were pursued in the east. Streit's 
study of the fate of Soviet POWs clearly illustrates how the Nazis were driven to 
adapt their policies due to the changing military situation. Following the collapse of 
Blitzkrieg, the German leadership decided to utilise large numbers of Soviet 
prisoners to alleviate labour shortages in October/November 1941. However, the 
greater proportion of Soviet POWs in Wehrmacht camps in the east had already 
perished and by the time Hitler and Hermann Goring gave approval for Soviet POWs 
and civilians to be deployed in Germany many of those still alive were too weakened 
to survive transport and subsequent deployment.26 While Hitler conceded that Soviet 
23 Laura J Hilton and John J Delaney, "Forced Foreign Labourers, POWs and Jewish Slave Workers in 
the Third Reich: Regional Studies and New Directions: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
August 2003.," German History 23, no. l (2005): 90. See Andre Sellier's study of Dora Mittelbau 
Andre Sellier, A History of the Dora Camp: The Untold Story of the Nazi Slave labour Camp That 
Secretly Manufactured V-2 Rockets, trans. Stephen Wright and Susan Taponier (Chicago: Ivan R Dee 
in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2003). Also see Christine 
Somerhausen, Les Beiges deportes a Dora et dans ses kommandos (Bruxelles: Centre Guillaume 
Jacquemyns, 1979). 
24 Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-
1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978). 
25 Christian Streit, "Soviet Prisoners of War in the Hands of the Wehrmacht," in War of 
Extermination: The German Military in World War 11, 1941-1945, ed. Hannes Heer and Klaus 
Naumann (New York; Oxford: Berghan Books, 2004), 81. 
26 Ulrich Herbert, "Labour as spoils of conquest, 1933-1945 " in Nazism and German Society, 1933-
1945, ed. David F Crew (London; New York: Routledge, 1994 ), 222-3. 
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labourers would require adequate nourishment, Nazi leaders were unwilling to 
reduce the amount of food available for the German population; the rations for Soviet 
prisoners were increased, but still remained below the minimum level required for 
survivaI.27 Thus while officially Soviet labourers were to receive adequate 
nourishment, in reality there was little meaningful improvement in their treatment. 
Detlev Peukert therefore contends, "The death rate among exhausted and 
undernourished Russians who were then deployed in Germany's armaments industry 
was so high that it can be viewed as an indicator of the continuation of the 
genocide".28 Only in the later stages of the war did Nazi leaders adopt a more 
rational economic approach and improve the treatment of Ostarbeiter substantively. 
Herbert observes that effective improvements in living conditions for Ostarbeiter 
were not realised until after the defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943.
29 
Streit's research 
also illustrated the pervasiveness of support for the Nazis' planned war of 
annihilation in the east within the ranks of the Wehrmacht, dispelling the myth of a 
"clean" Wehrmacht - the notion that the German military acquitted itself with 
honour during the Second World War and was not involved in the genocide against 
the Jews or other Nazi crimes. 
Setting a new agenda in forced labour studies, Herbert's groundbreaking 
study of the Nazis' forced labour program was published in 1985 and in English 
language translation in 1997.30 Herbert has published extensively on foreign labour 
in Germany.31 Earlier studies of the forced labour program traced the genesis and 
planning of the program, its development, political decision-making and the role of 
leading Nazis, such as Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment, and 
Albert Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production, as well as central 
agencies in shaping the foreign labour program. Herbert, by contrast, examines the 
27 Streit, "Soviet Prisoners of War in the Hands of the Wehrmacht " 87. 
~ ' Detlev Peukert, Volksgenossen und Gemeinschaftsfremde. Anpassung, Ausmerze und Aujbegehren 
unter dem Nationalsozialismus (Ko In Sund-Verlag, 1982), 155. 
29 Ulrich Herbert, "Der »Auslander-Einsatz« in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft," in Arbeit, Volkstum, 
Weltanschauung, 127. 
30 Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des "Ausliinder-Einsatzes" in der 
~rieg~wirtschaft des Dri~ten Reiches (JHW Dietz, 1985). Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers. 
Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Auslanderpolitik in Deutsch/and: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, 
Gastarbeiter, Fluchtlinge (Mlinchen: Beck, 200 I).; Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign labour in 
Ger'!'anY., 1880-1980: Seasonal Workers/Forced labourers/Guest Workers, trans. William Templer, 
Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1990).; and Herbert, Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltanschauung. 
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·foreign labour program firstly from the viewpoint of Nazi leaders, entrepreneurs and 
authorities, and then secondly from the perspective of the forced workers themselves. 
Herbert's study, which combined an examination of the political and social history of 
the forced labour program, established a model that was emulated in later studies. 
Herbert's work brought greater interest in the Nazi forced labour program in 
academic circles. Following the publication of Herbert's study of the Nazi forced 
labour program, professional historians have published major studies of foreign 
labour at regional and local level. Additionally, grass-root initiatives from history 
workshops and, in some cases, secondary school teachers and their students, have 
also led to a proliferation of research into local histories. 
According to Herbert, the situation of forced workers varied significantly 
from workplace to workplace, camp to camp, between industry and agriculture, and 
there were glaring differences in treatment and food provision, particularly after 
1942. Herbert argues that these differences indicate how much latitude individual 
employers had with respect to the treatment of their workers. By contrast with 
conservative West German historians, who argued that industrialists had little room 
for manoeuvre, Herberticoncludes that foreign workers' appalling living and working 
conditions cannot be attributed solely to binding directives from the authorities.32 
Moreover, he argues, "Initiative shifted more and more to the regional, local and 
factory-based representatives of the regime, a process that climaxed in the escalating 
violence of the final phase of the war".33 Local and regional studies have 
strengthened Herbert's contention that local and regional leaders and the employers 
of foreign workers exercised significant influence over the form that the 
Auslandereinsatz took. 
The greater interest in social history that emerged during the 1970s also led 
historians t~ examine popular opinion and the attitudes of the German population 
towards foreign workers. Foreigners were deployed in almost all corners of Germany 
and were a ubiquitous feature of wartime life. According to Herbert, in total there 
may have been more than 20,000 camps housing foreign workers in the Reich and 
around 500,000 Germans were directly involved in various functions of the 
32 Herbert, "Der »Auslander-Einsatz« in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft", 127. 
33 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 388. 
9 
organisation of the Ausliindereinsatz.34 There can be few Germans who did not 
encounter foreign workers in their daily lives - whether as fellow workers or as 
inhabitants of villages, towns or cities. Herbert concludes: 
The picture that emerges from the mosaic of individual cases is that, on the 
whole, the vast majority of Germans evinced little interest in the fate of 
foreigners. They neither took part in ill treatment and harassment nor 
sympathised with the foreign labourers around them: they had enough 
. 35 
problems of their own. 
Germans who turned a blind eye to the plight of foreign workers reflected a broader 
trend in Nazi Germany, as many Germans focussed on their individual interests 
during hard economic times. 36 Herbert stresses that foreign labour has been an 
important element of the modem German workforce for at least the last hundred 
years.37 Rather than a rupture with the past, he argues that the Nazi forced labour 
program had its roots in a long tradition of discrimination against foreign workers in 
which some German workers participated to a certain degree. 
38 
Herbert contends that 
"~ost Germans did not even question the presence of millions of forced and slave-
labourers in Nazi Germany, or their own position of racial privilege over these 
foreigners". 39 He therefore concludes, "The behaviour of the German population 
towards foreign labourers during the war indicates a tacit acceptance of national and 
'racial' identity".40 Nevertheless, Jill Stephenson emphasises that "where German 
civilians spoke in deprecating tones of Poles, for example, what they mostly 
displayed was less 'racial consciousness' than the xenophobic prejudice visible in 
virtually any community, then and now, as well as traditional German contempt for 
Poles".41 An important distinction must be made between traditional German racism 
and genuine support for Nazi ideological tenets and racial policies. 
;: Herbert, "Der »Auslander-Ei.nsatz« in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft," 126. 
Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 396. 
36 Martin RUther, Arbeiterschaft in Koln 1928-1945, Koiner Schriften zu Geschichte und Kultur 
(K~ln: Janus Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), 42. 
37 Herbert, A History of Foreign labour in Germany, 1. 
38 Herbert, "Labour as spoils of conquest." Stephenson similarly argues that the German industrial 
worker generally accepted and sometimes asserted his favoured position vis-a-vis foreign workers 
br~ught to Germany to serve for little reward, turning a blind eye to the degradation of fellow human 
?
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emgs whose basic humanity the regime had denied. Stephenson, Hitler's Home Front, 273. 
Herbert, "Labour as spoils of conquest," 220-1. 
40 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers 396. 
41 ' Stephenson, Hitler's Home Front, 273. 
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Heusler's study of the use of forced labour in Munich's war economy is an 
excellent example of the shift away from macro-histories towards geographically 
focussed studies in recent years. Heusler examines how the Ausliindereinsatz was 
implemented at a local level and the differences in how Nazi directives were 
implemented by large enterprises, on the one hand, and small and medium-sized 
enterprises, on the other hand. He argues that it was precisely in small and medium-
sized enterprises that a sense of loyalty to foreign employees could prevail, and 
foreign workers could be viewed as colleagues, thus relativising Nazi discrimination 
against racial aliens.42 According to Heusler, many managers in small and medium-
sized enterprises made an effort to correct what they often saw as inhumane 
directives with respect to the treatment and food provision for foreign workers 
through extra rations, and equally sought to alleviate their heavy burden.43 Heusler 
emphasises that the impetus behind these efforts was not only humanitarian reasons, 
but also pragmatism and consideration of productivity. In contrast to smaller 
enterprises, brutality and terror exercised by foremen, camp personnel and workplace 
security tended to go largely unchecked in larger concems.44 Heusler argues, 
however, that we should not simply assume that conditions in the camps and 
workplaces of large enterprises were thoroughly miserable and life-threatening, 
while idyllic living and working conditions reigned in small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Nevertheless, he finds that there is an obvious connection between the 
size and management structure of an enterprise and the living and working 
conditions of its foreign employees.45 Heusler's study reinforces Herbert's 
contention that businesses played a key role in shaping their employees' living and 
working conditions. Heusler also illustrates the inherent contradiction between 
ideological precepts and the need to exploit foreign labour fully: 
It was this contradiction between ideologically-founded defamation, 
exploitation and terrorisation, on the one hand, and economics driven by the 
need to maximise armaments production, on the other hand, that was the 
cause of the grim social reality and the in many ways inhuman character of 
the Auslandereinsatz.46 





46 Ibid., 419. 
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The combination of a system of differentiated treatment based on a strict racial 
hierarchy and pressure to exploit foreign labour fully made the lot of many forced 
workers harder. 
The need to maintain the labour of foreign employees also moved some 
employers to mitigate Nazi policies and improve the treatment of employees in 
substantive ways. As Heusler has shown, foreign workers employed in smaller. 
enterprises had a lower chance of suffering neglect or abuse because they were less 
anonymous. The work of Stephenson and John J Delaney on the use of forced labour 
in rural communities has shown that similar principles operated on farms in southern 
Germany.47 Nevertheless, Guillaume Jacquemyns' study of Belgian forced workers 
indicates that the experiences of those deployed in some of Germany's largest 
industrial concerns were not always negative. Some reported that their work 
environment was better in Germany than it had been in pre-war Belgium and even 
claimed that German employers treated them better and had greater respect and 
appreciation for their labour.48 Conditions in some German factories were amongst 
the most advanced and the management amongst the most enlightened. These 
examples illustrate that foreign workers' experiences varied signifidantly even within 
the same economic sector and demonstrate the need for specificity when examining 
their experiences. Another issue that must also be considered is how workers' skills 
levels affected their treatment. 
Stephenson researched forced labour as part of her broader study of 
Wilrttemberg under the Nazis. In her view, "There was a noticeable gulf between 
even the less inhumane versions of official policy and the attitudes of at least some 
sections of the popuJation". Despite the immense effort of political education from 
1933, contends Stephenson, the ideology of the "master race" did not permeate 
German consciousness to the extent that the regime had intended. 49 While a series of 
directives and decrees prescribed how the German population was to treat foreign 
workers, right down to the last detail, many Germans, especially in rural areas, were 
47 Ji~I St~phe~son, "Triangle: Foreign Workers, German Civilians, and the Nazi Regime. War and 
~oc1~ty m Wilrttember~'. 1939-1945," German Studies Review 15, no. 2 ( 1992).; John J Delaney, 
Racial Values vs. Religious Values: Clerical Opposition to Nazi Anti-Polish Racial Policy " Church 
History 70, no. 2 (200 I). ' 
48 
G Jacquemyns, la societe beige sous /'occupation allemande, 1940-1944: Les travailleurs deportes 
et leur Jami/le, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Bruxelles: Nicholson & Watson, 1950), 31-3. 
49 St h "T . I · ep enson, nang e: Foreign Workers, German Civilians, and the Nazi Regime," 341. 
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prepared to defy these injunctions.so Stephenson concludes that the treatment of 
foreign workers by German civilians in small towns and rural communities was 
underpinned by a combination of pragmatism, instinct (or "human nature") and 
conscious material self-interest.s 1 Reinforcing Heusler's contention that there was a 
correlation between the size of an enterprise and how workers were treated, 
Stephenson finds that, "A direct correlation is discernible between a farm's need for 
labour and the extent to which the foreigners were treated favourably rather than 
brutally". s2 The scarcity of labour, and the simple fact that Germans in rural 
communities had much in common with the foreigners assigned to work in 
agriculture, undermined Nazi racial policies. 
Delaney's study of the use of forced labour in small rural communities in 
Bavaria showed that, although they toiled in difficult working conditions and 
received artificially low wages, Polish agricultural labourers fared much better than 
their compatriots labouring elsewhere. s3 By contrast with Poles employed in other 
sectors, Polish agricultural labourers enjoyed some liberties, ate far better and even 
forged strong relationships within the peasant communities where they lived and 
worked. This point is supported by Stephenson's research, which shows that many 
foreign workers sought to protect their employers from the wrath of liberating 
forces. s4 Delaney concludes, "Clerical and peasant opposition made a very real and 
appreciable difference to the lives of thousands of Polish agricultural labourers". ss 
The fundamental conditioning factor at work in Catholic Bavaria's many villages, 
argues Delaney, was a confessional one.s6 The deployment of large numbers of 
foreigners prompted Nazi fears about the threat "subhuman" Poles posed to German 
racial integrity and led to a series of regulations designed to control Poles and limit 
their contact with Ostarbeiter. These measures later served as a model for policies on 
the treatment of Ostarbeiter. However, according to Delaney, rural clergy continued 
to exercise their traditional authority at local level, undermining efforts by local Nazi 
officials to enforce racial policies. Catholic clergy not only welcomed Polish workers 
50 Ibid., 342. 
51 Ibid., 343. 
52 Ibid., 343-4. 
53 Delaney, "Racial Values vs. Religious Values," 272. 
54 Stephenson, Hitler's Home Front, 290. 
55 Delaney, "Racial Values vs. Religious Values," 294. 
56 Ibid., 272. 
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into their congregations, allowing them to worship alongside German parishioners, 
but also extolled pious Poles as exemplary Catholics. Farmers and their families 
lived and worked at close quarters with foreign employees and their day-to-day 
experiences helped to dispel the claim that foreigners were ""racially inferior". In 
some cases this familiarity led to compassion and understanding for the plight of 
foreign employees.57 Foreigners deployed in agriculture were generally better treated 
than their compatriots in industry and consequently had a very high chance of 
survival. This point was later recognised in Germany's and Austria's compensation 
laws which excluded forced workers who had been employed in agriculture from 
' 
compensation. The proprietors of farms valued the labour of foreign employees and 
in many cases treated them relatively well in order to secure their cooperation and 
maximise the economic benefits of their labour. Additionally, traditional loyalty to 
the Church and pre-existing values, including humanitarian concern for fellow 
human beings, persisted. Ultimately, the campaign to win over the hearts and minds 
of the German population to the Nazi racial agenda seems to have failed in rural 
communities in southern Germany. 
Germany and Austria passed laws to compensate forced workers in the wake 
of Germany's reunification, in July and August 2000 respectively.
58 
The passing of 
compensation laws prompted a long overdue public debate about the forced labour 
program and financi.al compensation for former forced workers. The compensation 
laws also gave further impetus to research. 59 In recent years German archives have 
assigned priority status to unprocessed foreign labour records that have languished in 
their collections for many years. Regional archives played a key role in 
substantiating compensation claims.60 The compensation laws also served as a 
57 Stephenson, "Triangle: Foreign Workers, German Civilians and the Nazi Regime" 351 
58 • ' ' . 
For the background to these laws see Michael J Bazyler, "German Industry and Its Slaves," in 
Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America's Courts (New York: New York University 
Press, 2003 ). 
59 Aft~r the war all countries whose citizens were affected by Germany's forced labour program 
compiled evidence for compensation claims. However, in the London Debt Settlement of 1953 
Germany's government managed to postpone reparations to a future peace treaty. The issue of 
reparations did ~ot re-emerge until the 1990s when it came up as part of the Two-plus-Four 
Ag~eement, which paved the way for Germany's reunification. Mark Spoerer and Jochen 
Fle~s~hhacker? "~he Compensation of Nazi Germany's Forced Labourers: Demographic Findings and 
rooht1cal lmphcat10ns," Population Studies 56, no. I (2002): 6. 
An excellent brochure has been produced by the Landeshauptstadt Dilsseldorf detailing the methods 
and sources used by archivists in responding to enquiries from former forced workers. Hans-Joachim 
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catalyst for Mark Spoerer and Jochen Fleischhacker's groundbreaking work on the 
quantitative aspects of the forced labour program. 
The Ausliindereinslaz has been a subject of intense scholarly interest since the 
publication of Herbert's study; however, most research focused on qualitative aspects 
of the forced labour program. Spoerer and Fleischhacker observe, "When 
compensation for forced labourers emerged as a serious issue in 1998, the lack of 
quantitative data became painfully obvious". 61 According to Herbert, there were 7.6 
million civilians and POWs working in Germany in August 1944. However, 
estimates of the total number of forced workers (civilians, POWs and inmates) 
brought to Germany between 1939 and 1945 range from ten to fifteen million. These 
wide variations can be ascribed to some key constraints in the available sources. 
Firstly, the official statistics relate to specific reporting dates and do not take into 
account workers who had departed, those who went to Germany after a reporting 
date, double-counts or workers who were deceased. Moreover, the statistics do not 
include concentration camp inmates or other interned labourers. The available 
statistics therefore had significant shortcomings: all estimates were ad hoc and no 
study had ever compiled or calibrated the statistical evidence scattered across 
archives and existing publications. Spoerer and Fleischhacker sought to synthesise 
the statistical evidence in order to estimate the number of foreign labourers deployed 
in the German war economy and how many survived until mid-1945, thus providing 
an estimate of how many survived until mid-2000 when the German and Austrian 
governments passed compensation laws. According to Spoerer and Fleischhacker's 
findings, around eleven million forced workers survived the war and roughly a 
quarter, an estimated 2. 7 million, were alive when compensation laws were passed. 62 
Spoerer and Fleischhacker pointed to significant flaws in the German government's 
compensation system. Under the compensation scheme certain national groups were 
excluded from compensation, while the distribution of compensation among the 
foundations that represented national groups resulted in some groups receiving a 
higher share of the funding than would be expected from historical and demographic 
Neisser, "Zwangsarbeiter in der Stadt DUsseldorf: Langsam kommt Licht in ein dunkles Kapitel," 
accessed 9 May 2007, http://www.duesseldorf.de/thema/zwangsarbeit/pdf/zwang2.pdf. 
61 Spoerer and Fleischhacker, "Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany," 171. 
62 Spoerer and Fleischhacker, "The Compensation of Nazi Germany's Forced Labourers," 15. 
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evidence. Spoerer subsequently published a comprehensive study that provides an 
overview of the historiography and draws together the research findings. 
63 
The first studies of Belgian labour during the German occupation appeared 
soon after the war. In 1946 Piet Potargent published his study of the conscription of 
Belgian labour. Potargent had served as the director of the Tongres branch of the 
Belgian National Employment Service during the war and the Military 
Administration had subsequently interned Potargent in the Breendonk concentration 
camp. After the war Potargent headed a cabinet within Belgium's Ministry for 
Reconstruction. Potargent's study focussed on German labour policies in occupied 
Belgium and had a strong legal and political focus. 64 Sociologist Jacquemyns' major 
study of Belgium under German occupation was published soon after the war. 
65 
The 
third volume of Jacquemyns' study focuses on the material and psychological 
consequences of forced labour in Germany and the morale of workers and their 
families and is based primarily on letters that workers wrote to their families and oral 
accounts. 
The Centre for the Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary 
Society (CEGES/SOMA) led an initiative to document the experiences of Belgian 
deportees in the late 1960s and 1970s. Archivist Frans Selleslagh oversaw the 
completion of the Enquete Travail Obligatoire survey and a survey on the activities 
of the Young Christian Workers (KAJ) in Germany. Selleslagh published a general 
survey of Belgian labour in Germany and an edited volume containing documents 
relating to German labour policies in occupied Belgium. Selleslagh also published an 
article on the activities of the KAJ among deportees. 66 A number of studies of the 
German labour policies in Belgium appeared during the 1970s. Jean Culot and 
63 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz. 
64 P Potargent, De tewerkstelling van Belgische arbeidskrachten in het binnen- en buitenland tijdens 
de bezetting ( 1946). A French-language edition was published in 1948 as P Potargent, La mise au 
travail de la main-d'oeuvre beige dans le pays et a l'etranger durant !'occupation (Brussels: Edimco 
SA, 1948). 
65 Jacquemyns, Les travailleurs deportes. 
66 
Frans Selleslagh, ed., l 'Emploi de la Main D'Oeuvre Beige sous L 'Occupation 1940, vol. I, 
Documents (Brussels: Centre de Recherches et D'Etudes Historiques de Ia Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 
1970).; Frans Selleslagh, "L'emploi," in 1940-1945. la vie quotidienne en Belgique. [Exhibition 
catalogue: Bruxelles, Galerie CGER, 21decembre1984- 3 mars 1985}, ed. R Coolen (Bruxelles: 
CGER, 1984).; Frans Selleslagh, "De clandestiene KAJ in Duitsland ( 1942-1945)," in De KAJ, haard 
van verzet. Hun mooiste uur, ed. F Hugaerts, et al. (Gent: Reinaart Uitgaven-Het Volk, 1989). 
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Mathias Haupt produced theses on the forced labour program in Belgium.67 Erik 
Pertz published a study on the deployment of Belgians from Kortrijk in Germany.68 
Christine Somerhausen published a study of Belgian workers who were deported to 
the Dora-Mittelbau concentration camp. 69 Dirk Luyten emphasises that, in line with 
the dominant trend in Belgian historiography, the focus of these studies lay 
predominantly on the organisations. 70 
The fiftieth anniversary of the introduction of the compulsory labour draft in 
Belgium brought renewed interest and the publication of new studies. The published 
proceedings of a symposium organised by the CEGES/SOMA in 1992 to mark the 
fiftieth anniversary of the introduction of the compulsory labour draft shed greater 
light on a range of aspects of the forced labour program. 71 American historian 
Werner Warmbrunn also examined labour policy as part of his broader study of the 
German occupation of Belgium. 72 In 2001 Belgian historian Pieter Lagrou published 
an important comparative study of the legacy of Nazi occupation of western Europe. 
Lagrou examined the issue of labour conscripts within his study of national recovery 
and memory of the Second World War in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. 73 
Frank Seberechts published a Dutch-language study of the experiences of Flemish 
forced workers, which is based primarily on letters sent by Flemish workers to 
friends and family at home, in particular by members of the KAJ. 74 The Stichting 
Holla· nderei has published an edited volume on Dutch and Flemish forced workers, 
67 Jean Culot, "Le travail obligatoire des Beiges decrete par l'autorite militaire allemande d'occupation 
1940-1944" (Dissertation, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1968-1969).; Mathias Georg Haupt, "Der 
'Arbeitseinsatz' der belgischen Bevolkerung wahrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges" (PhD Dissertation, 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat zu Bonn, 1970). 
68 Erik Pertz, "La Mise au Travail des Cortraisiens en Allemagne ( 1940-1945)," Cahiers d'Histoire du 
Temps Present 4 ( 1976). 
69 Somerhausen, Les Beiges deportes a Dora et dans ses kommandos. 
70 Dirk Luyten, "Annotated Bibliography: Occupation in Europe. The Impact of National Socialist and 
Fascist Rule de !'European Science Foundation," (2004), accessed 11 August 2011, 
http://www.cegesoma.be/docs/media/Bibliographies/Bibliography_ESF. 
71 CEGES/SOMA, ed., De verplichte tewerkstelling in Duitsland =le travail obligatoire en 
Allemagne, 1942-1945 (proceedings of a conference held at the CEGESISOMA 6-7 October 1992 
(Bruxelles: CREHSGM/NCWO II, 1993). 
72 Werner Warmbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium 1940-1944 (New York: Lang, 1993). 
73 Pieter Lagrou, The legacy of Nazi occupation: patriotic memory and national recovery in Western 
Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 I). 
74 Frank Seberechts, Hier gaat al/es zijnen gewonen gang: de verplichte tewerkstelling in Duitsland 
tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Leuven: Davidsfonds, 2005). 
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concentration camp prisoners and POWs in Berlin.
75 
David M Watts produced a 
comparative history of German forced labour deportations during the two world 
wars. 76 More recently the CEGES/SOMA commissioned a project on the 
professional experiences of Belgian working women during the Second World War, 
which encompasses the experiences of Belgian women who worked in Germany. 
While much research has been undertaken into German labour policies and the 
development of the forced labour program in Belgium, much research into the 
experiences of Belgian workers in Germany and differentiated treatment of Flemings 
and Walloons is still needed. 
2. Towards a model for examining forced labour 
Firstly, it is necessary to devote some attention to the meaning of the term "forced 
worker", both generally and in the context of the Ausltindereinsatz. It is not easy to 
define who was a forced worker and, despite the large body of historiographical 
research surrounding the topic of forced labour, the term still has no generally 
accepted definition. The term encompasses a wide range of workers without 
differentiating between their vastly differing experiences. The term "forced labour" 
denotes, in the broader sense, labour that was "unfree". That is to say workers were 
denied normal freedoms and rights; they were bound to their employer and did not 
have the right to choose their place of employment freely or change their 
employment as they wished. Almost all workers in Nazi Germany, including 
"native" German workers, can be broadly defined as "forced workers" due to 
restrictions placed on changing employment. 77 A comprehensive model for analysing 
the experiences of forced workers is needed to allow for a meaningful discussion of 
the varied experiences of foreign workers in Nazi Germany. 
The Nazis referred to all involuntary workers as "Zwangsarbeiter" (forced 
workers). During the Nuremberg trials the term "slave labour" was used to describe 
the Nazi Ausltindereinsatz. The general term slave labour encompassed a wide range 
75 Stichting Hollanderei, ed., Nieder/tinder und Flamen in Berlin 1940-1945: KZ-Hafllinge, 
lnhaflierte, Kriegsgefangene und Zwangsarbeiter, vol. 126, Reihe Deutsche Vergangenheit (Berlin: 
Hentrich, 1996). 
76 David Michael Watts, "'Just like free labourers, but under police supervision': German forced labour r
1
olicy in Belgium, ~ 9.16-1917 and 1942-1944" (PhD, Brandeis University, 2002). 
German law proh1b1ted all workers from changing their employment without explicit approval from 
the labour office. 
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of experiences and failed to differentiate adequately between the various 
manifestations of the foreign labour program. The earliest historical accounts of the 
forced labour program recognised its complexity and the inherent problems with the 
use of the term "slave labour": 
Undoubtedly, there was "slave labour" in the concentration camps, and 
undoubtedly forced labour was an extermination device practised by the 
Nazis against peoples they considered inferior ... yet it would be a gross error 
to assume that the single term "slave labour" could accurately describe a 
complex and constantly changing labour program involving millions of 
workers over a six-year period. 78 
Emphasising the varieties of experience between different groups of foreign workers 
and temporal shifts, Homze argues that the stereotype of slave labour applied at the 
Nuremberg war crimes trials was too inclusive and imprecise. One point on which 
historians are in agreement is that an important distinction must be made between 
concentration camp inmates and other groups of forced workers. Benjamin B 
Ferencz coined the term "less-than-slaves" to describe the treatment of Jewish 
concentration camp workers. Slaveholders, observes Ferencz, care for their human 
property and try to preserve it. By contrast, the Nazis intended that "Jews would be 
used up and then burned". Ferencz highlights the inadequacies of language when 
writing about the destruction of European Jews: "The term 'slave' is used because 
our vocabulary has no precise word to describe the lowly status of unpaid workers 
who are earmarked for destruction". 79 Historians have subsequently sought to 
differentiate between the various groups of workers from volunteer, conscripts or 
forced workers, POWs and concentration camp inmates. Even when forced workers 
are divided into separate categories, depending on the specific circumstances of their 
employment in Germany, these categories also prove to be problematic because an 
individual's position was not necessarily static and some workers changed category: 
some POWs were "converted" to civilian status during the course of the war; 
workers who initially went to Germany as volunteers were prevented from returning 
to their home at the end of their contracts and effectively became forced workers. 
78 Homze, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany, 298. 
79 Benjamin B Ferencz, less than slaves. Jewish forces labour and the Quest for Compensation 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1979), xvii. Cf. Herbert, "Labour as spoils of conquest," 220.; 
Spoerer and Fleischhacker, "Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany," 17 l. 
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In 2000 the German government established the legal definitions of enforced, 
forced and slave labour within the context of compensation laws. Hilton and Delaney 
observe that these legal definitions "form too rigid a scheme to encompass the wide 
· h' . 't " 80 Th range of victim experiences from 1933-1945 about which rstonans wn e · e 
historical reality of the Nazis' use of coerced labour, argue Hilton and Delaney, is 
best describe_d as a continuum that stretches from obligatory, to enforced, forced and 
on to slave labour. 81 Hilton and Delaney emphasise the necessity of developing new 
and flexible definitions of forced and slave labour, which allow for temporal shifts. 
As a starting point for their quantitative research on the forced labour 
program, Spoerer and Fleischhacker set out to establish a definition of forced labour 
and a framework for interpreting the various manifestations of forced labour during 
the Third Reich. They argued: 
A sensible definition of forced labour and the different degrees thereof, must 
take into consideration the conditions of life and work. Four criteria are 
critical: ( 1) was the worker able to end the employment relationship in the 
short term? (2) Was he or she able to enforce legal standards concerning the 
conditions of life and work? (3) Would he or she have any voice in 
complaining about the conditions of life and work? ( 4) Was his or her 
probability of surviving similar to that of a normal (native) worker?
82 
The application of Spoerer and Fleischhacker's four key criteria produces four 
categories of foreign workers in Germany: privileged, forced (in a narrow sense), 
slave and less-than-slave. Privileged workers included Italians, Croats and Slovaks. 
Particular attention must be paid to varieties of experience and how the treatment of 
individual national groups changed over time. The position of national groupings 
within the racial hierarchy was by no means fixed, as the case of Italian Military 
Internees (IMis) illustrates. Italian workers took up voluntary employment in 
Germany under the auspices of an agreement concluded between Fascist Italy and 
Germany in 1937. As citizens of an Axis state, Italians enjoyed a privileged status 
and could end their employment contract and return home. However, Italian soldiers 
were captured and transferred to Germany after the fall of Benito Mussolini in July 
1943 and the Badoglio government's "treachery" in declaring war on Germany on 
13 October 1943. By contrast with Italian civilian workers, IMis were subjected to 
80 
Hilton and Delaney, "Regional Studies and New Directions" 86 
81 Ibid. ' . 
82 
Spoerer and Fleischhacker, "Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany," J 74. 
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treatment on a par with that inflicted on Ostarbeiter and were amongst the groups 
who suffered the most severe brutality.83 French, Belgian, Czechs, Dutch and Serbian 
workers fall under the category of forced workers. This is interesting because this 
category includes both "Aryan" -related, Latin and Slav nationalities. Poles and 
Soviet workers come under the category of slave workers. In the category of less-
than-slave workers came Polish Jews, concentration camp inmates (all nationalities), 
working Jews, IMis and labour education camp (Arbeitserziehungslager) or AEL 
inmates. Within this framework, German workers are regarded as forced labourers 
(in the broad sense) only if they experienced internment in a concentration camp or 
AEL. Aside from racial considerations that determined a worker's position in the 
racial hierarchy, the role of gender is another dimension that must also be 
considered.84 Spoerer and Fleischhacker's model for analysing forced labour will be 
used as the basis in this study of Belgian workers. The role of gender in shaping 
Belgian workers' experiences will also be examined. 
The place of the Nazi Ausltindereinsatz in the history of foreign labour in 
Germany has been consistently debated in the historiography. Two key trends can be 
observed in early studies. Some scholarly treatments of the deployment of foreigners 
in Nazi Germany have subscribed to the notion that the Auslandereinsatz was part of 
a continuation of "normal" labour migration in Europe. Adherents of this approach 
argue that the employment of foreigners on such a massive scale is not specific to 
Nazism and is a phenomenon associated with industrialised societies generally. Other 
historians describe the forced labour program as an unending process of humiliation, 
harassment, maltreatment and crime. Crucially, the latter emphasise the role of racist 
ideology in the treatment of foreign workers. It was not until the 1980s that these 
initial interpretations began to be replaced with more complex analyses. Peukert 
rightly reminds us, however, that while the Nazi Ausltindereinsatz can be viewed as 
an integral phase in recent German history, it is differentiated by its racist 
foundations, which struck a blow at the notion of the fundamental equality of all 
men. 85 Herbert similarly argues, "The truth is not located in the middle. Rather the 
83 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 83-4. 
84 See Gabriela Hauch, "Zwangsarbeiterinnen und ihre Kinder: Zurn Geschlecht der Zwangsarbeit," in 
NS-Zwangsarbeit: Der Standort Linz der "Reichswerke Hermann Goring AG Berlin" I 938-1945, ed. 
Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna: 200 I). 
85 Peukert, Volksgenossen und Genieinschaftsfremde, I 54. 
21 
difficulty lies in combining the two approaches ... but without blurring the 
contours".86 By contrast with the more nuanced approach to the Ausliindereinsalz 
proposed by Peukert and Herbert, accounts of labour policy in occupied Belgium 
have emphasised that the approach adopted by the Military Administration can be 
divided into distinct phases. Potargent divides the occupation of Belgium into three 
phases. The first period, from June 1940 until March 1942, was characterised by the 
modus vivendi that was reached between the Military Administration and Belgian 
officials. Potargent stresses the voluntary nature of the recruitment of Belgian 
workers for employment in Germany during this period. The second phase, from 
6 March 1942 until 6 October 1942, saw the introduction of compulsory labour 
assignments in Belgium, while recruitment for employment in Germany remained 
voluntary. In the third phase, from 6 October 1942 until end of the occupation in 
September 1944, compulsory labour assignments were extended to include transfer 
to Germany. This final phase was characterised by the recruitment drives ordered by 
Sauckel and the deportation of large numbers of Belgians to Germany. 
87 
Like 
Potargent, Warmbrunn also divides the German occupation of Belgium into three 
phases. 88 Dutch historian BA Sijes adopts a similar approach, dividing the German 
occupation of the Netherlands into two periods: during the first phase from June 
1940 until March 1942 surplus workers - primarily the unemployed - were forcibly 
exported to Germany; in the second phase, the Dutch civilian administration 
deported large numbers of Dutch workers under Sauckel's orders. 89 It will be argued 
here that earlier trends in labour migration also persisted alongside more coercive 
forms of labour mobilisation during the German occupation of Belgium, particularly 
in parts of Germany that were geographically close to Belgium like the Rhine-Ruhr 
region. 
:: Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 383. 
88 
Potargent, La mise au travail de la main-d'oeuvre beige. 
Wannbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 225. 
~9 BA Sijes, "Dutch Forced Labour in Germany, 1940-1945. A study in administrative collaboration " 
m 13th International Congress of Historical Sciences. International Committee on the History of ' 
World War II. 
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3. Methodology 
The Auslandereinsatz has been the topic of intense interest for a number of years. 
Major studies of the forced labour program have revealed much about its 
development and the role played by the Nazi Party, leading Nazis and state 
organisations, as well as the general prescriptions for the treatment of foreign . 
workers. However, far less research has been carried out on the role of local and 
regional authorities and employers in the implementation of the forced labour 
program. Localised studies offer valuable insights into how the forced labour 
program operated in practice and also contribute to broader understandings of how 
the Nazi regime functioned. Heusler emphasises that historiographical contributions 
to the debate surrounding the Auslandereinsatz fall into two main categories: 
contributions to the first category consist of older monographs, which focus on the 
role of central agencies in shaping the forced labour program~ and, on the other hand, 
a large body of multifaceted research that has come out of work inspired by local and 
regional histories. He observes that a "fruitful interaction between the two types of 
literature has only seldom been found". 9° Further work is needed to analyse the 
differences and similarities that have been highlighted in the many local and regional 
studies in order to reshape our understanding of forced and slave labour at macro-
level. It is this body of scholarship that this thesis attempts to augment. 
This thesis examines the implementation of the Auslandereinsatz through a 
study of Belgian workers who were deployed between 1940 and 1945.91 It utilises a 
range of documentary sources, from the records of the Military Administration and 
German and Belgian labour officials, to the accounts of Belgians who worked in 
Germany. This thesis proposes a social history of the Nazi forced labour program 
with a strong focus on the history of everyday life, drawing extensively on letters, 
diaries, photographs and the personal accounts of Belgians who worked in Germany, 
which hitherto have been an under-utilised resource in studies of the deployment of 
Belgians in wartime Germany. Their experiences are compared and contrasted with 
those of other national groups and are related to the broader history of foreign labour 
90 Heusler, Zwangsarbeit fur die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft, 12. 
91 This thesis will therefore focus on Belgian workers and will not examine the experiences of workers 
from the annexed part of northern France. 
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in Nazi Germany. Most Belgian civilian workers were employed in industry, with 
comparatively few Belgian civilians deployed in agriculture. This thesis aims to 
extend the detailed research that has been undertaken into the use of forced labour in 
rural Germany through an examination of Belgian workers employed in German 
industry. The experiences of Belgians deployed in Germany will be examined 
through case studies of Berlin and Dlisseldorf, industrialised cities where Belgians 
were deployed in significant numbers. This approach will also allow for an 
examination of Belgian women, many of whom worked in German industrial centres. 
Studies of the forced labour program have shown that occupational skills or a 
lack thereof had a tremendous impact on foreign forced workers' recruitment, 
deployment, treatment and survival rates.92 This argument certainly holds true in the 
case of Jewish workers, whose very survival was determined by their capacity to 
undertake productive work. But how did occupational skills affect western 
Europeans who did not face the threat of destruction? Homze argues that German 
officials were also much more selective in the workers they recruited. They sought 
skilled workers in particular, and the placement of the workers reflected care in 
recruitment. 93 This study of Belgian workers provides an ideal vehicle to examine 
how occupational skills affected the treatment of foreign workers because a high 
proportion of Belgians were skilled industrial workers who were recruited with the 
specific aim of alleviating skills shortages in the German labour market. Specific 
questions that will be examined include: what methods were employed by German 
labour officials to recruit workers and allocate work assignments; to what extent 
were the jobs assigned to Belgian workers matched to their previous professional 
skills and experience; and did Belgians exercise the same profession in Germany as 
they had in Belgium? Research has shown that employers introduced incentives such 
as extra rations to encourage higher productivity. To what extent were skilled 
Belgian workers able to obtain better paid jobs and did they benefit from incentive-
based pay scales? Aside from quantifiable differences such as pay differentials 
depending on a worker's skills, non-quantifiable benefits will also be considered. In 
the case of highly-skilled workers whose skills were valued by their employers, did 
92 Hilton and Delaney, "Regional Studies and New Directions," 94. 
93 Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany, 45. 
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their professional skills afford them better treatment and more flexible work 
arrangements than their unskilled colleagues? 
Belgian workers were divided along linguistic lines and were subject to 
differentiated treatment based on whether they were Flemings or Walloons. The 
differentiated treatment of Belgians is a key focus of this study and reveals much 
about Nazi racial practice. To what extent did Flemings benefit from their privileged 
status, as members of a supposedly Germanic race? A command of the German 
language was more common amongst Flemings and the similarities between German 
and Dutch also meant that Flemings found it easier to grasp the German language. 94 
What role did language skills play in workers' dealings with the German population? 
Did a command of German bring greater opportunities to improve one's material 
position? There is a substantial gap in the research with respect to foreign workers' 
lived experiences. Studies of Belgian labour in Nazi Germany have focused on 
labour policy in occupied Belgium. A key focus o~ this study is the lives of Belgian 
workers, some of whom spent most of the war years working in Germany. The use of 
accounts provided by Belgians who worked in Germany during the war offers new 
insights into the realities of the foreign labour program. Hilton and Delaney observe, 
"Historians know little about the internal structure and social dynamics of the forced-
labour 'community' and tend to discuss them collectively as one homogenous group 
or as cohesive national sub-groups. A closer look reveals profound differences".95 
This thesis explores many aspects of Belgian workers' experiences: the 
circumstances of conscription and transport to Germany; their treatment upon arrival 
and during their first days and weeks in Germany; their working lives; the impact of 
bombing; the treatment they received from German work colleagues, employers and 
camp personnel, as well as the wider German public; life in the camps; the role of the 
work and camp community; the social and leisure time activities; and Belgians' 
experiences during the final months of the war and liberation. A key focus of this 
study is the housing of Belgian workers. Many larger employers set up camps to 
house their workers either on the factory grounds or close by. Workers employed at 
large industrial concerns were therefore more likely to be housed in camps rather 
than in private lodgings. How common was it for workers to be accommodated in 
94 Jacquemyns, Les travailleurs deportes, 64-5. 
95 Hilton and Delaney, "Regional Studies and New Directions," 90. 
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private lodgings and how did this change over the course of the war? Did Flemings 
and Walloons both have opportunities to take up private accommodation? What 
benefits and disadvantages did housing in private lodgings bring? How did German 
landlords treat Belgian lodgers? This thesis is a social history of Belgian labour in 
Nazi Germany and focuses on lived experiences - a history which has been obscured 
by overemphasis on official decrees and directives. This thesis will argue that, 
regardless ofracial ideology, there was not much difference in the treatment of 
Flemings and Wallons in Germany. This study of Belgian workers reveals much 
about the treatment of western European workers on the whole and contributes to a 
broader understanding of the Auslandereinsatz. Wherever possible, the treatment of 
Belgian workers is compared and contrasted with the treatment of other national 
groups. 
Furthermore, women made up 14. 7 percent of Belgian civilian workers 
deployed in the Reich, yet the deployment of Belgian women has remained largely 
overlooked within the studies of Belgian labour in Germany. How were female 
workers treated? To what extent were women's experiences similar to or different 
from those of men? .What sorts of jobs did women undertake? Were they generally 
housed in camps or private lodgings? By contrast with the wealth of information 
provided by male workers, the available sources relating to Belgian women who 
went to Germany are sparse. The Service for the Victims of the War (SVG/DO) in 
Brussels holds the records of 78,801 Belgians who applied for official recognition as 
labour deportees after the war. Crucially, however, only 746 women applied for 
official recognition under the Statute for Deportees.96 Women are therefore evidently 
underrepresented amongst those who sought official recognition as deportees, 
although the reasons for this are unclear. The conscription of Belgian women sparked 
public outrage in Belgium and genuine fear about the moral threat deployment in 
Germany posed for women. The reported moral degradation of you~g women who 
went to Germany was a key element of protests against the conscription of women. 
Women returning to Belgium faced social stigma and many were probably reluctant 
to admit that they went to Germany. The period of their deportation was perhaps a 
96 Hannelo~e v.ande~roek, "Ongekend is onbemind: vrouwelijke weggevoerden voor verplichte 
tewerkstellmg m Dmtsland ( 1942-1945) en de archieven van de Dienst voor de Oorlogschlachtoffers " 
Cahiers d'histoire du temps present!Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis 19 (2008): 186. ' 
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fleeting experience for some women, as many female conscripts managed to return 
home within months.97 Another possible explanation is that fewer women were 
aware of their entitlements. Many women who submitted applications reported that 
they became aware of the Statute for Deportees by word of mouth through friends or 
work colleagues; as a result, applications tend to cluster around certain districts. 
Given that work networks played a role in spreading information about the Statute 
for Deportees, women who had left the workforce to raise a family were probably 
less likely to apply. Women often submitted late applications because they did not 
become aware of the Statute for Deportees until after the deadline for applications 
had passed. Some women reported that upon making enquiries at their local police 
station or with administrative authorities they were told that the Statute was for men 
and resisters, and did not apply initially because they had been led to believe that 
they were not eligible. 
4. Sources 
The Enquete Travail Obligatoire survey of former forced workers was conducted by 
the CEGES/SOMA in conjunction with the National Association of Labour 
Deportees and Labour Draft Evaders (FNTDR/NVWW).98 The CEGES/SOMA 
amassed a large collection of documents from survey respondents, including 
conscription orders, as well as items such as work and camp identification cards, fine 
notices from employers or camp authorities, employment records (Arbeitsbuch), 
Belgian passports and provisional passports issued by German authorities, payslips, 
as well as photographs, letters, theatre tickets and diaries. In the years that followed 
many deportees also lodged lengthy written accounts of experiences in Germany. 
Interestingly, although women were represented in the membership of the 
FNDTR/NVWW, few women responded to the survey. 
The records of the SVG/DO are a key source of information on Belgians who 
worked in Germany during the Second World War. The SVG/DO is a department 
within the Belgian Federal Public Service for Social Security and presides over 
records relating to victims of the Second World War, including forced workers, Jews 
97 Belgian women and married men were normally granted leave after six months in Germany, while 
single men were generally not granted leave until they had served a year in Germany. 
98 
The survey was published in.the FNDTR/NVWW newsletter in 1971. CEGES/SOMA, AA1216. 
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and Belgian internees of concentration camps and prisons (in both Belgium and 
Germany). After the war 400 Belgian Liaison Officers (BLO) from the Belgian 
Commission for Repatriation were sent to Germany to organise the repatriation of 
Belgian citizens and gather information about Belgian victims of the Nazi regime. 
Officers gathered a wealth of material, including residence lists, as well as 
employment, judicial, prison and hospital records.
99
. The SVG/DO also holds 
wartime records from the Belgian National Labour Office (ONS). Files relating to 
applications under the Statute for Deportees are the main source of information on 
individual forced workers. Following the war the Belgian government passed laws 
that entitled former forced workers to official recognition as labour deportees. 
Belgium's Ministry for Public Health was responsible for investigating and assessing 
applications under the Statute for Deportees. Records relating to applications under 
the Statute for Deportees have certain limitations, as officials focused on the 
circumstances of a worker's departure for Germany in order to establish whether 
they were volunteers or conscripts and the length of their stay in Germany. The files 
therefore provide scant information about their experiences in Germany. The 
SVG/DO also holds 600,000.Service Documentation et Recherches (SDR) files on 
Belgian civilian victims or those living in Belgium at the time of the war. These 
administrative files were created for the purpose of assessing applications under the 
various statutes for the victims of the war and in relation to pension claims for 
Belgians who worked in Germany. 
Captured German records offer a wealth of information regarding German 
labour policies in occupied territories. The Marburg Collection is the largest 
document collection relating to German labour policies in occupied Belgium. Eggert 
Reeder, head of the administrative staff of the Military Governor of Belgium and 
northern France under General Baron Alexander von Falkenhausen, ordered the 
transfer of the documents to Marburg, where they later fell into the hands of the 
French authorities and were deposited at the French National Archives. Copies of 
d . . B I · 100 ocuments pertammg to e gmm are held at the SVG/DO. The collection contains 
99 
Patrick Nefors has produced a 497 page inventory of the records held at the SVG/DO, Patrick 
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a large part of the files of Military Administration Group VII - Welfare and Labour 
Deployment, dating from 1941-1944 and covers a diverse range of topics, including 
restrictions on welfare benefits for part-time workers, recruitment for the armaments 
industry in Belgium, labour conscription, contract breakers, and the records of 
Belgian workers who died in Germany. Reeder's Activity Reports 
(Tiitigkeitsberichte) are another source of information about the Military 
Administration and its policies in Belgium. 101 Finally, the reports of the 
representative of the German Security Service and Security Police in Belgium are a 
valuable source of information on Belgian popular opinion and the reaction to the 
introduction of a compulsory labour draft. 102 In Germany, the records relating to the 
German Labour Front (OAF) are held at the German Federal Archive. 103 The North-
Rhine Westphalia State Archive Diisseldorf (HStAD) holds 70,000 Gestapo files 
from the Diisseldorf regional headquarters - one of the few places in Germany where 
these records survived the war. 104 The Berlin State Archive (LAB) holds judicial and 
police case files and police log books, offering key records on law and order in 
wartime Berlin. The vast holdings of the Red Cross International Tracing Service 
(ITS) in Bad Arolsen, which opened to researchers only in recent years, provide 
invaluable resources on all aspects of the Ausliindereinsatz across Germany. 
In terms of the methodological ordering of this research, the chapters of this 
thesis will move from an overview of labour policy and recruitment in occupied 
Belgium and deployment of Belgian workers in Germany to specific case studies of 
the cities of Berlin and Diisseldorf. Chapter One introduces the reader to Belgium 
under the Military Administration and provides a detailed study of labour policy and 
recruitment in occupied Belgium, utilising the records of the Military 
Administration, as well as the accounts of Belgian workers. Chapter Two provides an 
overview of living conditions in Germany, drawing upon the accounts of Belgians. 
101 CEGES/SOMA, BAL 13. I /9-11, Militarverwaltung beim Militarbefehlshaber Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich, Tatigkeitsberichte. These records were seized by the United States Military and are 
held at the US National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized (Record Group 242). 
Hereafter referred to as "Tatigkeitsbericht". 
102 CEGES/SOMA, AA553, Der Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des 
Sicherheitsdienstfiir den Bereich des Militarbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, Briissel. 
Meldungen aus Belgien und Nordfrankreich, 1943-1944 (hereafter SP/SD Meldungen aus Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich). 
103 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS 5 l/vorl.270, fol. I. 
104 Gestapo case files survive for DUsseldorf, WUrzburg, Speyer and Zichenau. 
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Chapter Three examines working conditions. Utilising records relating to the 
placement and earnings of Belgians deployed in Germany, this chapter considers the 
question of what types of jobs Belgians undertook and the extent to which Belgians 
were employed in skilled jobs. The accounts of Belgians deployed across Germany 
are also used to illustrate their experiences in the workplace. Chapter Four consists of 
a case study of the experiences of Belgians deployed in Germany's capital Berlin, a 
heavily industrialised city that was dominated by the armaments industry. Chapter 
Five provides a case study of the smaller industrialised Rhine-Ruhr city of 
Dilsseldorf. Residence lists have been utilised to provide a demographic profile of 
the Belgians deployed in the two cities. 105 The files of Belgium's Service for the 
Victims of the War have been used extensively to form a picture of the wartime 
employment patterns of Belgians who were deployed in Germany. Health and 
judicial records have been used to study the treatment of Flemings and Wal loons and 
whether these two groups were treated differently, as well as how their treatment 
compared with the experiences of their counterparts from the Soviet Union. First-
hand accounts from Belgians who worked in Berlin and Wehrmacht mood reports 
from the final months of the war have been used extensively to gauge relations 
between Belgians and ordinary Germans, while Gestapo case files offer perspectives 
on relations between Germans and Belgians in Dilsseldorf and everyday terror during 
the Nazi era. 
105 R 'd 1· es1 ence 1sts have also been used to randomly sample individual files. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
German Labour Policy and 
Recruitment in Occupied Belgium 
With a population of 8.39 million inhabitants shortly before the outbreak of the 
Second World War, Belgium was the most densely populated country in Europe. 1 It 
was the first country in continental Europe to experience the industrial revolution. 
After Britain, Belgium was the most highly industrialised country in Europe, with 
48.9 percent of the workforce employed in industry and mining in 1930.2 Belgium's 
main industries were metal production, coalmining, chemical and machinery 
production and textiles. Liege and Namur were coalmining and manufacturing 
centres, while Antwerp was Europe's largest port and Ghent was a manufacturing 
city. However, industry was distributed unevenly across Belgium. Belgium's Dutch-
speaking regions to the north and west were mostly agricultural, with the notable 
exceptions of the industrialised cities of Antwerp and Ghent, while industry was 
concentrated in the francophone regions of Liege, Namur and Hainaut in Belgium's 
south and east. Belgium's economic wealth was also distributed unevenly. The 
capital Brussels and Walloon regions to the south and east enjoyed greater economic 
prosperity, while Flanders tended to be poorer and more economically backward. In 
1930, 42. 92 percent of the population spoke Flemish, while 3 7.56 percent spoke 
French, and a further 12. 92 percent were bilingual. 3 In addition, there was also a 
small German speaking community in territories of Eupen, Malmedy and Saint Vi th 
which had been annexed to Belgium under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The 
German speaking community represented 0.23 percent of the German population in 
the l 920s4 The divisions between Flemings and Walloons were exacerbated by the 
First World War. Through the drafting oflarge numbers of Flemish soldiers into the 
Belgian armed forces, to serve under officers who usually only spoke French, the 
Flemish people came face to face with the Flemish-French duality. The schism in 
Belgian society widened as Flemings became more conscious of the social and 
I Wannbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 5. 
2 Ibid., 6. 
3 Ibid., 25. 
4 Meyers Lexikon, 7th ed., s.v. "Beigien". 
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economic discrimination they faced in Belgian society. The German occupiers 
sought to divide Belgian society by encouraging Flemish separatism. In the wake of 
the First World War Flemish nationalism began to acquire a political character. 
5 
Martin Conway emphasises that the "diverse populations of Belgium possessed little 
natural homogeneity". Belgium was characterised by the ethnic, division between the 
francophone Walloons of the southern provinces of the country and the Dutch-
speaking populations of Flanders, as well as long-standing commercial and political 
rivalries between the different cities of Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, Brussels and Liege 
and stark social divisions between the working class and the predominantly 
francophone bourgeoisie.6 In a nation characterised by its divisions, religion was a 
unifying force. Over 90 percent of Belgium's population identified itself as Catholic. 
Accordingly, the Catholic Church played an influential role in Belgian society and 
became a key voice of dissent during the Second World War. 
The trade unions were also an influential force in Belgian politics. Belgium's 
trade union movement was dominated by Socialist, Catholic and Liberal 
organisations. Established in the late nineteenth century in Walloon industrial areas, 
Brussels, and urban areas of Flanders, the Socialist trade union movement was the 
largest in Belgium with a membership of 582,000 in 1938, while the Catholic trade 
unions had a membership of 326,000.7 General strikes had been a key feature of 
social, political and economic life in Belgium from 1893 onwards when workers held 
a general strike demanding universal suffrage. A number of general strikes were held 
throughout the early twentieth century, with workers demanding better wages and 
working conditions, changes to the voting system and the right to collective 
bargaining. Many of the general strikes centred around industrial cities with the 
largest concentrations of workers, such as Liege, Namur and Charleroi in Wallonia 
and Ghent and Antwerp in Flanders. 
1. Belgium under Military Administration 
Following the German invasion of Belgium on 10 May 1940, the Pierlot government 
passed its authority to the cabinet of Secretaries-General. The government moved to 
5 Wannbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 25. 
6 Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Leon Degre/le and the Rexist movement, 1940-1944 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, I 993), 6. 
7 Val R Lorwin, "Labour Unions and Political Parties in Belgium," Industrial & Labour Relations 
Review 28, no. 2 (I 975): 250. 
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France and a minority of ministers subsequently moved to London in the autumn of 
1940. In one of its final acts, the Belgian Parliament charged the Secretaries-General 
with the responsibility of protecting the civilian population and ensuring that Belgian 
law and the Hague Convention were observed. These principles were codified in the 
protocol signed by the cabinet of Secretaries-General and the Military 
Administration on 12 June 1940. The Secretaries-General were professional 
bureaucrats and were responsible for overseeing all ministries on behalf of Belgium's 
King Leopold III. In contrast to the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg and Queen 
Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, who fled with their governments after the German 
invasion, King Leopold III chose to remain with his people possibly with the hope of 
continuing to play a political role. In a deal brokered in the weeks following 
Belgium's surrender on 28 May 1940, Belgium was governed by a Military 
Administration that ruled in conjunction with the Secretaries-General and the King, 
retaining its monarchy and civil administration. However, two key territorial and 
administrative changes took place. Belgium's borders were redrawn, with Belgium 
ceding the predominantly German-speaking region of Eupen-Malmedy, which was 
annexed to the Reich. The north-eastern French departments of Nord and Pas-de-
Calais were administered as French territories by the German Military 
Administration in Brussels. Richard Cobb emphasises that there was a degree of 
continuity in German policy during the Second World War, with the Germans 
annexing these north eastern departments of France to Belgium in both wars. Cobb 
observes, however, that Belgians were treated much better than the French. 8 A 
Military Administration was established under the command of von Falkenhausen.9 
The Belgian authorities were allowed to exist alongside the Military Administration, 
with most Belgian bureaucrats, the police and chiefs of industry remaining at their 
posts. Top civil servants and chiefs of industry assented to German hegemony and 
declared their resolve to collaborate with the occupier as long as this would be in the 
interests of the Belgian people - a kind of loyal collaboration. This pattern of rule 
contrasts with German rule in other occupied countries. The Netherlands was placed 
under a "civilian" administration headed by Reich Commissioner Arthur Seyss-
Inquart. Luxembourg, by contrast, was annexed to the Reich. Luxembourg becoming 
8 . . 
Richard Cobb, French and Germans, Germans and French: a personal interpretation of France 
under two occupations, 1914-191811940-1944 (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1983), 41-2. 
9 
Von Falkenhausen was arrested by the Gestapo in the aftermath of the attempted assassination of 
Hitler on 20 July 1944, and was held at the Dachau concentration camp until the camp's liberation. 
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part of Gau Koblenz-Trier; Gauleiter Gustav Simon headed Luxembourg's civilian 
administration. Gau Koblenz-Trier became became Gau Moselland in 1942. 
Contested territory, Alsace was similarly annexed to Gau Baden, while Lorraine was 
attached to Gau Saarpfalz (from 1942 Gau Westmark). The military and civilian 
administrations remained in place in western Europe until 13 July 1944, when Hitler 
placed Belgium and northern France under the authority of Josef Grohe, Gauleiter of 
Cologne-Aachen. 10 
The legacy of the First World War influenced the Belgian population's 
reaction to the German invasion. The invasion of Belgium created genuine panic 
amongst Belgian civilians. The crimes committed by German soldiers in Belgium 
and France during the opening weeks of the Second World War - the shooting and 
bayoneting and confinement of civilians to buildings that were then set alight, the 
pillaging and razing of villages - left approximately 6,500 victims, including seven 
babies in Les Rivages. 11 Underlying these crimes was the German army's belief that 
its progress was being sabotaged by partisans (jrancs-tireurs) and wounded German 
soldiers were being mutilated by innocent-looking maidens and children. An 
estimated 1.5 to 2.2 million Belgians fled west and south into France in the aftermath 
of the invasion. 12 The second painful legacy of Germany's World War One 
occupation was the deportation of approximately 60,000 Belgians to Germany 
between 26 October 1916 and 10 February 1917, of whom 1,250 or 1.82 percent 
perished. 13 The memory of the deportations was still vivid and had the effect that 
Belgian business was inclined to cooperate with the Military Administration in the 
hope of keeping workers in Belgium. 
The German occupying forces ordered Belgians to resume economic activity 
in the first days of the occupation. This call to resume economic activity met a 
favourable response in business, industrial and financial circles, as well as amongst 
10 Peter Hilttenberger, Die Gauleiter: Studie zum Wandel des Machtgefiiges in der NSDAP (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlagsanst., 1969), 147-49, 99-200, 14, 22. 
11 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, "A German Way of War?," German History 22, no. 2 (2004): 254. 
John Horne and Alan Kramer have published a key study of German World War One atrocities: John 
Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914. A History of Denial (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 200 I).; and Alan Kramer, "The Burning of Lou vain: Louvain and the Atrocities of 
1914," in Dynamic of destruction: culture and mass killing in the First World War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
12 Warmbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 46. 
13 Jens Thiel, "Belgische Arbeitskrafte ftir die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft. Deportation, Zwangsarbeit 
und Anwerbung im Ersten Weltkrieg" (Dissertation zur Erlangung der Promotion, Humboldt-
Universitat, 2003), 60. 
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the wider population. Potargent emphasised that one wished to safeguard national 
interests during the course of an occupation one feared would be long. 14 Many 
Belgians believed that Germany would win the war and that it would be in their best 
interests to adopt a policy of accommodation with the occupiers in order to safeguard 
the Belgian economy and food supply. 15 This accommodation with the German 
military occupier was justified as necessary politics of presence, a politics of "lesser 
evil". 16 For its part, the Military Administration encouraged the spirit of cooperation 
in order to maintain peace and order in occupied Belgium and secure the maximum 
participation of Belgium in the German war economy. From the outset of the 
occupation a policy of Realpolitik was adopted on both sides. 
The approach adopted by the Military Administration was not improvised, 
but rather was based on a set of directives developed by Reeder between November 
1939 and May 1940. Prussian bureaucrat turned military administrator, Reeder held 
responsibility for civilian matters in occupied Belgium. His directives were designed 
to protect the interests of the Wehrmacht and the security of the troops, as well as 
reinforcing Germany's war economy by harnessing the Belgian economy, and, more 
specifically, the Belgian labour force. The German authorities did not wish to 
become mired in the administration of Belgium and sought to limit the burden as 
much as possible in terms of both fiscal cost and manpower. Reeder foresaw the role 
of the Military Administration as that of an overseer: 
The organisation and working methods of the Military Administration are to 
operate on the principle that, in spite of its name, the [Military 
Administration] administers as little as possible, instead acting as an overseer 
predominantly governing, guiding and advising. 17 
On 5 June 1940 German officials and the Belgian Secretaries-General began 
negotiations to draw up a set of protocols and by the end of July 1940 they arrived at 
a modus vivendi. The protocols agreed by the Military Administration and the 
Belgian authorities meant that responsibility for administration remained in Belgian 
hands, although the Germans were in control. 
14 Potargent, la mise au travail de la main-d'oeuvre beige, 9. 
15 It was essential for Belgium to keep industry running, as Belgium was only able to produce roughly 
50 percent of its own needs iri terms of foodstuffs and was therefore dependent on trade to fulfil 
domestic need. 
16 In Flemish politics of "minste kwaf'. 
17 Reeder quoted in Haupt, "Der 'Arbeitseinsatz' der belgischen Bevolkerung", 12. 
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2. The Organisation of labour in occupied Belgium 
The framework of labour administration was established in the first year of the 
occupation and this structure remained in place until Belgium's liberation on 
3 September 1944. 18 The Military Administration was divided into two key 
divisions: the Administration Division and the Economic Division. Overall 
responsibility for labour direction came under the auspices of Group VII in the 
Economic Division, headed by Dr August Schultze. Group VII supervised 
recruitment offices (Werbestellen), which were run by Reich Labour Ministry 
(RAM) staff and Belgian employees. At its peak the labour administration had a staff 
of 4,000 officials employed outside Germany - 400 of whom were employed in 
Belgium and the Netherlands. 19 Recruitment offices were attached to military field 
headquarters ( Oberfeldkommandanturen and Feldkommandanturen) or OFKs/FKs, 
although in practice recruitment office staff rarely consulted with the military 
command. The key areas of responsibility within recruitment offices included labour 
deployment within Belgium and the Reich, welfare provision for the unemployed, 
wage policy, social security, the representation of the OAF in Belgium, medical 
service, matters relating to personnel and administration and recruitment for the 
mining industry (for a list of recruitment offices see Appendix 1 on page 286). 
Approaches to the recruitment of Belgian labour differed within the Military 
Administration. Von Falkenhausen preferred to adopt a less demanding approach in 
order to keep the Secretaries-General and Belgian population on side, whereas 
Schultze wished to push as hard as possible from the outset. The German occupation 
evoked bitter memories of the deportation of Belgians to Germany and France during 
the First World War. Von Falkenhausen was acutely aware of the resentment that the 
conscription of Belgian labour for deployment to the Reich would elicit and worked 
against the imposition of a labour draft. 20 However, the appointment of Sauckel in 
March 1942 brought a shift in the balance of power within the Military 
Administration. Germany faced ever-increasing manpower demands in the months 
following the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. A Fuhrer Order issued on 
30 September 1942 granted Sauckel broad powers with respect to the recruitment of 
18 Most of Belgium was liberated by 3 September 1944; however, some south-east border regions 
were not liberated until the Ardennes-Offensive in December 1944. 
19 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 37. 
20 Etienne Verhoeyen, la Belgique occupee. De l'an 40 a la liberation, 1994, trans. Serge Govaert 
(Bruxelles: De Boeck-Wesmael, 1994), 261. 
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labour both in Germany and the occupied territories, a task Sauckel pursued with 
great rigour. Sauckel' s new powers allowed him to take all measures he deemed 
necessary for the recruitment and deployment of labour and to issue directives to 
military and civil governments in the occupied territories. Schultze and Group VII 
gained an increasing degree of independence from Reeder over time - especially 
from 1942 when Schultze was appointed as Sauckel's representative in Belgium.21 
From October 1942 Schultze could determine labour policy against the will of the 
Military Administration, and Group VII therefore began to operate more 
independently. This shift in the balance of power had a direct impact on labour 
policy and allowed Sauckel and Schultze to prevail over those in the Military 
Administration who favoured a less demanding approach. 
Charles Verwilghen, Secretary-General for the Department of Labour and 
Social Welfare, held overall responsibility for labour within the Belgian 
administration. In his first meeting with Verwilghen, the head of the Administration 
Division, Harry von Craushaar, made it clear that the Military Administration would 
brook no \opposition from the Belgian authorities. Von Craushaar warned Verwilghen 
that the German authorities would not hesitate to take control of labour management 
if the efforts of the Belgian authorities were found to be lacking. 22 Von Craushaar 
and Verwilghen reached a compromise in July 1940: recruitment of Belgian workers 
for deployment to Germany would proceed on a voluntary basis and Belgian workers 
would not be employed directly in the war industries. German interventions in the 
labour market and the threat of forced labour in Germany forced the Secretaries-
General to declare their agreement with deployment of Belgian voluntary workers in 
Belgium and Germany at a meeting on 3 September 1940. 
The National Office for Labour Deployment and Unemployment (ONPC) 
was established in Belgium under a royal decree in June 1935. In June 1940 the 
office was ordered to resume its activities under the new appellation the National 
Office for Labour Deployment and Inspection. The ONPC was subsequently 
renamed the National Employment Office (ONT) in April 1941. To avoid confusion 
the abbreviation ONT will be used hereafter in reference to the Belgian labour 
offices. In the months following the start of the occupation, the Belgian labour 
21 Warmbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 225-6. 
22 Mark van den Wijngaert, "De Secretarissen-generaal tegenover de verplichte Tewerkstelling ( 1940-
1944)," Bijdragen tot de Geschiednis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog l, no. augustus ( 1970): 8. 
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offices were allowed to drift with no firm course or precise directives. ONT offices 
were required to carry out the instructions of local German authorities and thus the 
German authorities were able to circumvent the central Belgian authorities. Certain 
OFKs/FKs took advantage of this situation in order to give orders directly to labour 
offices.23 This situation came to a head in November 1940 with the appointment of 
Fritz Jan Hendriks as the director of the ONT. Hendriks was pro-German and 
willingly collaborated with the German authorities over the heads of his superiors 
and the Secretaries-General. While Hendriks was officially subordinated to the 
Secretary-General for. the Department of Labour and Social Welfare, he gained 
increasing independence from his superiors. Hendriks collaborated with the German 
authorities with virtual impunity, as his German counterparts protected him from 
attempts by his superiors to remove him from his office. Through the assistance of 
Hendriks, the recruitment offices were able to strengthen their control over the 
Belgian labour offices to the point that "the ONT became virtually the executive 
branch of the German administration with respect to compulsory placement in 
Belgium, and a subordinate but cooperative
1
partner in the administration of 
compulsory labour in Germany". 24 The ONT represented one of the few remaining 
avenues for the Belgian authorities to circumvent the German authorities' efforts to 
transfer Belgian workers to Germany; however, under Hendriks' direction the ONT 
had little efficacy. 
3. Labour policy in the aftermath of defeat 
Following Belgium's capitulation, the German authorities were faced with the urgent 
problem of Belgium's army of unemployed. With the demobilisation of the Belgian 
army and the return of refugees and POWs, the ranks of Belgium's unemployed 
swelled to an estimated 500,000.25 Moreover, the commission sent by the RAM 
believed that the level of unemployment was actually much higher.26 These figures 
give an impression of the scale of the difficulties Belgium experienced in the 
immediate aftermath of defeat. 
23 Potargent, la mise au travail de la main-d'oeuvre beige, 13. 
24 Wannbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 226. . 
25 Selleslagh, ed., l'Emploi de la Main D'Oeuvre Beige sous l'Occupation 1940, 8. Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, Minister for Foreign Affairs, later suggested that there were 600,000 unemployed in 
Belgium in the summer of 1940. Quoted in Wannbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 226. 
26 These figures are based on the unemployed who were claiming public assistance, and therefore did 
not include those who had not taken the step of registering as unemployed. 
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Before the war the Belgian state did not provide financial assistance to the 
unemployed and only 3 .4 million Belgians held unemployment and health 
insurance.27 Following the German invasion, the Military Administration faced the 
problem of financial support for Belgium's unemployed workers. To combat this 
crisis, the Reich Credit Bank (Reichskreditkasse) placed provisional funds at the 
disposal of the Public Assistance Commission (CAP). Additionally, the Office for 
Labour Deployment and Unemployment was re-established and charged with 
responsibility for overseeing the provision of unemployment benefits by the CAP. 
The German policy regarding unemployment benefits was based on the principle that 
entitlement would be determined on the basis of need, taking into account the 
earnings of all members of a household, as well any other financial resources 
members of the household had at their disposal. The Military Administration 
delegated responsibility for overseeing the provision of financial support for the 
unemployed to the Belgian authorities, obliging officials to enforce German 
unemployment polices. Welfare support for the unemployed was a key lever used by 
the German autho~ities to pressurise Belgian workers to accept work in Germany. 
Apart from taking steps to ameliorate the dire financial situation of Belgium's 
unemployed, the Belgian authorities also instituted a public works program aimed at 
the reconstruction of roads and buildings. Upon the insistence of the Military 
Administration, the mayors of communes were required to engage unemployed 
workers for two full days or four half days per week. The work undertaken by the 
unemployed as part of the public works program included clearing roads, forests and 
heath land, dredging watercourses, draining swamps and urgent agricultural work. 
During the first two years of the occupation, the Military Administration introduced 
several measures to ensure that Belgians fulfilled their responsibility to work. 
The resumption of business quickly helped to ease the problem of 
unemployment. The number of unemployed dropped from almost 500,000 in July 
1940 to around 100,000 in June 1941 (see Table 1 on page 40). The German war 
industry and allied industries provided a significant impetus in driving down 
unemployment. By the start of 1942 some 190,000 Belgians were employed by the 
Wehrmacht or military construction projects in either Belgium or the annexed French 
27 CEGES/SOMA, BALI 3.1 /9-11, Tiitigkeitsbericht, Nr.9, 96. 
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. . l t rmited the pool of potential 
departments. 28 However, the reduction m unemp oymen 
1 
candidates who could be recruited for deployment in Germany· 
Table 1: Belgian Unemployment Figures 1938-1942 
1939 1940 1941 
1942 
1938 
357,514 408,312 358,759 
207,785 85,994 
January 
February 339,960 348,849 324,467 
193,495 85,827 
March 286,942 318,821 255,288 
165,855 
April 275,903 305,933 210,000 
144,168 
May 308,498 331,397 NIA 
NIA 
June 288,244 302,461 387,931 
99,328 
July 287,962 324,353 493,700 
NIA 
August 297,013 339,950 462, 140 75,590 
September 302,808 361,456 413,870 NIA 
October 323,925 320,690 323,012 53,977 
November 326,920 312, 110 249,261 55,036+ 
December 432,392 328,308 219,556 59,828 
Source: Figures extracted from Reeder's monthly Activity Reports. 
4. Voluntary labour assignments in Germany 
The drafting of labour was a key aspect of the German exploitation of the Belgian 
economy. In accordance with the mutual agreement between the Belgian and 
German authorities in June 1940: i) workers would be free to accept or refuse work 
in Germany; ii) such refusal would not lead to the withdrawal of unemployment or 
welfare payments; iii) Belgians deployed in Germany would not be required to work 
in armaments or munitions factories; and iv) Belgian workers would receive the 
same welfare and social benefits as German workers. The German authorities 
initially abided by the terms of this agreement; however, the principles of the 
agreement soon fell by the wayside as difficulties with the recruitment campaign 
mounted. 
Labour policy mirrored the broader pragmatic approach of the Military 
Administration and Secretaries-General in the early years of the occupation. 
Warmbrunn notes: 
Threat~ of deportation of smaller groups of skilled workers continued to crop 
up durmg the early years of the occupation, usually at the instigation of Reich 
authorities, but the Military Administration, mindful of the antagonism 
28 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 61-2. 
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created by the First World War labour draft, emphatically preferred to rely on 
voluntary recruitment. The same memory of wartime deportations also 
inclined the Belgian administration at first toward cooperation with the 
Germans.29 
This tension between soliciting the cooperation of Belgian authorities and fulfilling 
the labour demands of German industry underpinned the campaign to recruit 
voluntary workers. Belgian employment authorities retained responsibility for labour 
within Belgium and the Military Administration was responsible for the recruitment 
of workers for deployment in Germany; however, a series of decrees directed at 
Belgian employment offices in the weeks following the invasion meant that Belgian 
employment offices were co-opted for the task of recruiting workers for deployment 
in Germany. Belgian labour officials were ordered to post German announcements, 
provide information and advice about work in Germany and provide assistance with 
recruitment by notifying unemployed workers offers of employment in Germany as 
required. Over time Belgian labour officials were drawn into even greater 
collaboration with the Military Administration. 
The first demands for labour came in June 1 940 when an envoy from the 
RAM visited Belgium to assess the workforce and levels of unemployment. In July 
1940 the German authorities commenced a campaign targeted at recruiting skilled 
and semi-skilled metalworkers, shipbuilders, miners, and construction, timber, textile 
and agricultural workers to cover immediate shortfalls within Germany's labour 
market. Private companies also started recruiting workers directly in Belgium. When 
skilled workers became increasingly scarce, German officials recruited unskilled 
workers and workers for retraining who were then sent to training centres 
(Umschulungswerkstatte) established in Belgium by German companies. Workers 
employed in industries with high levels of unemployment or less critical for the war 
effort were conscripted for retraining. 
The first of these training centres was established by aeroplane manufacturer 
Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke GmbH in February 1941 in Herstal, Ghent and 
Mechelen, where workers undertook an eight-week training program with the 
expectation that they would commence employment in Junkers' Dessau factory after 
completing their training. By 31 December 1942, 4,210 Belgians had departed for 
29 Warmbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 227. 
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Dessau after completing training.30 Other German firms followed suit and training 
centres were established across Belgium by companies including shipbuilding 
company Deutsche Werft AG, chemicals manufacturer IG Farben AG, Allgemeine 
Elektrizitats Gesellschaft (AEG) Berlin, auto manufacturer Ford-Werke AG and Erla 
Maschinenwerke GmbH. Following the introduction of compulsory labour 
assignments in Belgium on 6 March 1942, the Military Administration extended the 
existing training centres and established new training centres. Workers were 
conscripted for training in the hope that they would volunteer to work in Germany 
after training in Belgium.31 While Reeder suggested that initial results of the scheme 
were good, according to official statistics, by 31 December 1942 a total of just 5,574 
workers had taken up employment in Germany after training. Haupt argues that the 
number of workers who took up work in Germany after completing training in 
Belgium was low, concluding that the expense of training Belgians could hardly be 
justified considering that not all trainees took up work in Germany.
32 
Following the 
introduction of the compulsory labour draft the number of workers undertaking 
voluntary training at training centres dwindled as workers fear~d that they would be 
conscripted for employment in Germany upon completion of their training. After the 
introduction of compulsory labour assignments in Germany some workers were 
conscripted for training before they were sent to Germany. One worker recalled: "We 
were designated for retraining at Junkers in Herstal at the beginning of March 
1943 ... We made up a substantial number from the municipality of Montegnee 
called up on the same date". 33 After completing their training the conscripts were 
transported to Junkers in Dessau. Textile worker Pauline D was conscripted for 
retraining at the Junkers training centre in Ghent on 23 October 1942 and 
subsequently commenced work at Junkers in Dessau on 20 November 1942.34 
Trainees generally completed between four to thirteen weeks' training and then 
departed for Germany. 
German recruiters promised volunteers wages ranging from 0.57RM 
(Reichsmark) per hour in rural areas to 1 RM in large cities, with the average wage 
ranging from 0. 70 to 0.85RM, and some industries, such as construction, paid 
30 H t "D 'A b . . ' 
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western Europeans per diem allowances of 1-1.SORM for family upkeep. Workers 
were allowed to send home up to 250RM per month if married and l SORM if 
unmarried. Western Europeans were also promised leave every three months if 
married and every six months if unmarried. Additionally, the western Europeans 
were promised working conditions, food rations, fringe benefits (marriage and child 
loans excepted) and housing similar to those of the German worker. 35 Many 
volunteers went to Germany with high expectations of good wages and living 
conditions. However, Reeder noted significant shortcomings in his monthly report of 
13 August 1940. In some cases workers did not receive the wages promised and were 
forced to tolerate a lower standard of living. In one case Flemish volunteers were 
given only l SRM for four days work. In another case, workers who were told they 
would receive 69RM per week received only 59RM. Workers' food provisions were 
inadequate in view of the eleven-hour day they were required to work and some 
Belgians were forced to lodge with Poles, Czechs and other nationalities. Restrictions 
on movement were another cause for complaint. News of the false promises given by 
recruiters and poor living conditionsisoon began to filter back to Belgium. In 
November 1940 a report by the RAM appraising the foreign labour program 
observed that false promises given to workers, especially Dutch and Belgians, were 
causing difficulties in further recruitment in these countries. 36 The RAM 
subsequently issued guidelines for the recruitment of workers in the occupied 
territories, banning certain recruitment practices. 
The Military Administration made key interventions in the Belgian economy 
intended to keep inflation under control and make employment in Germany more 
financially attractive. Wages were frozen in Belgium, enhancing the appeal of 
working in Germany, where workers were promised higher wages. From July 1940, 
the Military Administration devalued the Belgian franc (bfrs) by 25 percent, 
increasing the value of the Reichsmark from 1 Obfrs to l 2.5bfrs37 Belgians who 
accepted labour assignments in Germany were paid in Reichsmark and thus working 
in Germany brought significant financial benefits. The Germans also removed many 
consumer goods from the market through extensive governmental purchases, and by 
artificially changing the discount rate to favour the Reichsmark over the local 
35 Homze, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany, 51-2. 
36 Ibid., 53. 
37 Verhoeyen, la Belgique occupee, 262. 
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currency. Inevitably, remaining consumer goods flowed into the black market. Thus 
. b d 38 
the average worker, whose wage was fixed, had limited capacity to uy goo s. 
These measures limited both the earning and purchasing power of workers who 
remained in Belgium, lowering real wages. Peter Scholliers has completed a detailed 
reconstruction of the standard of living of workers during the war. His mixed price 
index (official and black-market prices) has shown that at the end of 1943 purchasing 
power was only 15 percent of the pre-war levels.39 These economic interventions had 
the effect of making the situation of Belgian workers who remained at home 
markedly tougher, thereby increasing the appeal of work in Germany. 
The success of the Military Administration and Belgian authorities in 
combating unemployment proved to be a hindrance to the recruitment of Belgian 
workers, as many workers were hopeful of finding work in Belgium and were less 
inclined to accept work outside Belgium. The key obstacles to the recruitment and 
retention of Belgian workers, according to Reeder, were the lack of enthusiasm 
among Belgian workers to accept work in Germany, the breaking of contracts and 
the lack of cooperation amongst the Secretaries-General and the directors of some 
ONT offices. These problems were further exacerbated by the inordinate delays to 
wage transfers to workers' families in Belgium and bombing in Germany. Reeder 
also suggested that a lively whispering campaign and British radio were also taking a 
toll on recruitment. 40 The invasion of the Soviet Union (USSR) on 22 June 1941 also 
affected the recruitment drive. 
The German authorities began to use the laws in relation to the provision of 
financial assistance for the unemployed to increase pressure on Belgian workers. The 
Decree on the Provision of Financial Aid to People in Need, published by the 
Secretaries-General on 29 June 1940, stipulated that welfare recipients who refused 
to accept a job offer without a legitimate reason would be excluded from public 
assistance for one month. Welfare payments could also be suspended if a worker 
resigned or was dismissed from their job. In cases of repeated resignations or refusals 
to accept employment, welfare benefits could be suspended for two months or 
38 Homze, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany, 50. 
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indefinitely.41 Belgian labour offices were obliged to enforce this policy and from 
August 1940 Schultze also sought to apply section 26 of the decree to workers who 
refused to take up employment in Germany. Some ONT offices, for example the 
Antwerp labour office, did not hesitate to apply section 26 to workers who refused to 
work in Germany. In May 1942 the Military Administration prohibited the payment 
of financial support to persons unwilling to accept labour assignments and persons 
out of work or employed on a part-time basis altogether. The Secretaries-General 
refused to comply. However, the German authorities bypassed the Belgian central 
administration, instructing ONT offices to carry out the order. Most ONT officials 
complied, with a few notable exceptions resigning in the wake of the decree. The 
precise reason why ONT staff complied is unclear. Some officials held a genuine 
conviction that it was in the best interests of workers to accept work in Germany and 
approved of the measures. One notable example is the director of the Tournai ONT 
office who stated: "If one can resolve in a favourable manner the wishes of those 
concerning the provision of bread and meat and the transfer of regular earnings, I am 
of the opinion that encouraging workers to go ito Germany to work constitutes a 
social duty".42 Other officials probably complied out of fear of the consequences of 
refusing to cooperate. Whatever their reasons, many ONT officials collaborated 
actively with the German authorities, breaking the terms of the agreement in relation 
to voluntary employment in Germany. The cooperation of ONT officials, and the 
great zeal with which some ONT staff enforced German orders, indicates that many 
Belgians were pressured to accept work in Germany. Some unemployed workers 
were therefore forced to make a choice between their family's livelihood and 
refusing to work in Germany. The increasingly coercive methods employed by the 
Military Administration in conjunction with the ONT illustrates that Belgians who 
departed for Germany rarely fall into black and white categories. From as early as 
1941 the line between "voluntary" and "compulsory" labour became blurred. 
Belgian volunteers were initially engaged on fixed-term contracts - usually 
six months to a year in duration. Much to the annoyance of German employers and 
Labour Offices, many western Europeans refused to extend their contracts and 
returned home. In order to prevent western European workers from returning home, 
41 Decree published in Selleslagh, ed., L'Emploi de la Main D'Oeuvre Beige sous L'Occupation 1940, 
38-51. 
42 Verhoeyen, La Belgique occupee, 263. 
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many firms began to collude with Labour Offices and contrived to have legislation 
applicable to German workers with respect to restrictions on changing employers 
applied to foreigners. 43 Workers who had initially signed fixed-term contacts were 
often prevented from returning home when their contacts expired. Thus a foreign 
worker's employment status could in effect change from voluntary to forced. 
Industry subsequently successfully petitioned Nazi officials and Hitler ordered an 
end to fixed-term contracts.44 Open-ended contracts were used from early 1941. 
The Military Administration implemented measures to compel unemployed 
workers to accept jobs in Germany. In 1941 special public works were set up to 
occupy unemployed workers. In order to make employment in Germany more 
appealing, the work assigned to unemployed workers was intended to cause great 
hardship. ONT offices sent job applicants to German recruitment offices for 
registration and additional information about work available in Germany from March 
to October 1942. The persons concerned were told that they would not be forced to 
work in Germany, but the names of individuals who refused to report to the 
recruitment office were sent to German authorities by the ONT. They were classified 
as "asocial" and became the subjects of forced placement in re-education camps. The 
notion that people had a social obligation to undertake productive work was a key 
tenet in Nazi thinking and those who refused to accept work were considered to be 
I 
"asocial". Again, conditions in these camps were deliberately made unpleasant to 
encourage inmates to accept work in Germany.45 By 1942 the tactics used by the 
Military Administration to "convince" Belgians to accept work in Germany became 
more coercive. While the Germans promised not to place workers under duress to 
sign employment contracts for work in Germany, some Belgians "volunteered" under 
immense pressure from recruitment officials. 
Belgian civilians constituted the largest single group of workers from western 
Europe in Germany by September 1941. 46 At the outbreak of hostilities between 
Germany and the USSR 189,000 Belgians were working in Germany .47 Despite the 
initial success of the recruitment program in Belgium, the limits of what can be 
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considered genuinely voluntary recruitment were reached in the summer of 1941.48 
This was at the very time when Germany's labour resources were being stretched to 
their limit. By late 1941 there were half a million vacancies in agriculture, 50,000 in 
mining, 300,000 in the metals industry and 140,000 in construction.49 With hopes of 
a Blitzkrieg in the USSR and the return of German soldiers dashed, the recruitment of 
large numbers of foreign workers was essential for the German war economy to 
function. In December 1941 Reeder foreshadowed the mounting difficulties the 
Military Administration would encounter in the months to come, reporting concerns 
about the exhaustion of the pool of available workers in Belgium: "The source for 
recruitment, which has been fertile until now, of course, has its natural and economic 
limits".50 Potargent emphasises that "the measures implemented could no longer 
satisfy the occupier's insatiable demands. The setbacks the Germans experienced 
increased day by day". 51 
Nevertheless, Reeder warned against the adoption of coercive recruitment 
measures in September 1941: "Experience has clearly shown that greater successes 
can only be achieved under the precondition of absolutely voluntary [recruitment] 
and trust in assurances that Germany has [previously] given". 52 However, in view of 
Germany's growing manpower needs, the Military Administration's reluctance to 
introduce a compulsory labour draft was viewed with growing impatience. Despite 
his opposition to the introduction of a compulsory labour draft for Germany and 
scepticism about the success that this measure would bring, Reeder conceded defeat 
in his Activity Report for the period September to December 1942: "The measures 
were essential after a significant improvement in voluntary recruitment had not been 
achieved".53 At a time when Germany's manpower needs grew rapidly, the number 
of workers volunteering to work in Germany began to drop and the Military 
Administration was forced to consider other methods of recruitment. 
Dr Werner Mansfeld, Chief of Labour Allocation under Goring's Office of 
the Four Year Plan 1933-1942, issued guidelines to the offices in the occupied 
territories in early 1942. He advised that the aim was still voluntary recruitment, but 
in order to achieve a satisfactory result, the German authorities would "have to be 
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. ecessary to bolster voluntary 
able to order, with all requisite vigour, those measures n .. 
· " s4 While the German authont1es 
recruitment of workers for deployment 10 Germany · 
had initially employed a carrot and stick approach to the recruitment of Belgian 
labour, the authorities began to rely more on coercive measures to achieve their 
goals. 
Table 2: Belgian workers with contracts and Belgian workers in Germany 
Date With labour contracts 
Jn Germany 
7 December 1940 90,423 
18 January 1941 100,000 86,349 
25 April 1941 
20 August 1941 200,000 
15 January 1942 250,000 
20 January 1942 
131,000 
31 May 1942 300,376 
3 1 August 1942 325,235 
19 December 1942 398,270 
14 January 1943 250,000 
20 May 1943 500,000 
July 1943 310,000 
Autumn.1943 228,000 
15 November 1943 220,621 
1 December 194 3 548,937 
Mid-August 1944 586,746 
Civilian workers repatriated 215,000 
to Belgium to May 1945 
Source: Haupt, "Der' Arbeitseinsatz' der belgischen Bevolkerung", 82-4. 
5. Introduction of compulsory labour assignments 
The year 1942 was a turning point for labour policy in occupied Belgium and a 
number of factors came together to bring a sea change in the Military 
Administration's approach to recruitment. Labour policy in Belgium was 
characterised by caution and restraint in the first years of the German occupation, 
compared with the policies introduced in other occupied territories. Labour policy in 
Belg.ium was underpinned by the Military Administration's strong preference for 
voluntary recruitment. However, with flagging recruitment numbers, growing 
manpower needs and increasing pressure from Berlin, the Military Administration 
finally adopted more coercive recruitment measures during the course of 1942. 
54 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 168. 
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On 15 January 1942 the Military Administration celebrated the departure of 
the 250,000th volunteer sent to Germany. Leading official Reeder presented Mr 
Arys, a Flemish POW who had been released from German captivity and was taking 
up a second voluntary labour assignment in Germany, with a gold watch before 
invited press representatives at Brussels North Station. 55 However, the fanfare belied 
the Germans' growing dissatisfaction with the number of workers yielded by the 
recruitment program. Table 2 on page 48 shows the number of workers who had 
accepted contracts to work in Germany and the number of workers actually working 
in Germany at various intervals. Just days after officials marked the departure of the 
250,000th Belgian worker for Germany, official statistics showed that there were 
only 131,000 Belgians working in Germany. This differential can be explained in 
part by the Military Administration's inflation of recruitment numbers and the fact 
that some workers were counted more than once in official statistics because they 
had signed more than one contract. It is clear, however, that many Belgians did not 
remain in Germany beyond the end of their first contract. Officials nevertheless 
lauded the successes of the recruitment program: 
It is not, however, about a record number of workers, but rather their 
willingness to work and actual performance. Up until now all the large 
companies, in particular the Junkers works, which employ almost 11,000 
workers from this [military administration] zone, have confirmed [the 
Belgian workers'] strong willingness to work, skills, abilities and 
performance, which are only exceeded by those of the French and surpass the 
Dutch by far. 56 
The recruitment program was hailed as a success, both in terms of the number and 
quality of workers deployed. Officials also reported that a good balance had been 
achieved between the recruitment of workers for deployment in Germany and the 
policy of transferring orders to Belgian companies. Regardless of the obvious 
successes in some industries, experiences with Belgian employees varied across 
industries and from one workplace to another. Mining company Norddeutsche Hiltte 
AG in Bremen-Oslebshausen had a relatively unsatisfactory experience with their 
Belgian employees. Company personnel records show a high staff turnover rate 
among them. Additionally, absenteeism also constituted a significant problem for the 
55 CEGES/SOMA, BALI 3.1/9- l l, Tatigkeitsbericht, Allgemeine Obersichtfiir die Zeit 1.12.1941-
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company and resulted in a number of dismissals. Of the forty-eight Belgians 
employed by the company between the beginning of 1941 and the end of 1942, a 
total of eight employees were sacked due to unauthorised absence, seven were 
deemed unfit for deployment in the company's mining operation, a further four were 
1 d d 
·11 .c: ·1ed to return from leave in Belgium and three left the re ease ue to 1 ness, one 1a1 
company for unexplained reasons. A total of fourteen Belgians who commenced 
employment with the company during this period remained until the end of the war.
57 
While emphasising the successes of the recruitment campaign, Military 
Administration officials also conceded that recruitment levels had already begun to 
drop in the first half of 1941. 
The imposition of a compulsory labour draft in Belgium had been under 
consideration since the introduction of a similar decree in the Netherlands. The 
Dutch civilian administration introduced compulsory labour assignments in the 
Netherlands in February 1941 and extended this to include compulsory labour 
service in Germany in March 1942 - several months before this measure was 
introduced in Belgium. Mansfeld prepared the conscription directives in January 
1942. On 6 March 1942 the Military Administration introduced compulsory labour 
assignments in Belgium. However, the Military Administration's concerns about the 
impact the introduction of compulsory labour service in Germany would have on 
public opinion and reluctance to implement coercive recruitment measures delayed 
the introduction of a compulsory labour draft for work in Germany by several 
months. 
Following the introduction of compulsory labour assignments within 
Belgium, the German authorities began to gear up for the imposition of a labour draft 
for Germany, introducing a raft of measures intended to create a pool of workers who 
could be more readily compelled to accept work in Germany. The Military 
Administration made a series of changes with the aim of rationalising the workforce 
and tightening their control over the labour market. The minimum working week in 
Belgium was extended to six eight-hour days for all Belgians and it became 
mandatory for mineworkers to work on Sundays. In order to limit the movement of 
labour, workers were required to obtain permission from the ONT before changing 
jobs and employers had to report any changes to a place of work. Employers were 
57 
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also required to employ married men and fathers with large families, and were not 
permitted to employ single men or widows. Other measures introduced during the 
course of 1942 included the closure of enterprises that were not crucial to the war 
effort and a ban on the establishment of new enterprises. Additionally, the decree of 
6 March 1942 also obliged employers to provide the ONT with a personnel list. 
Rightly recognising that this was the first step towards the introduction of 
conscription of labour assignments in Germany, some employers delayed or refused 
to provide personnel lists. However, facing the threat of heavy fines and 
imprisonment, most eventually complied. 
The Military Administration extended the labour draft to include service in 
Germany on 6 October 1942. According to the Amendment to the Decree on the 
Safeguarding of Workers for Tasks of Particular Importance, Belgian men aged 
eighteen to fifty and women aged twenty-one to thirty-five could be conscripted for 
deployment in the Reich. Married women and women with children were to be 
exempted. The preferred order in which men were conscripted was: i) single men ii) 
married men without children iii) married men with children. For women the 
preferred order for conscription was: i) single women ii) married women without 
children. Potargent emphasises that under pressure from the German authurities, the 
rules on conscription were not observed in numerous cases. Moreover, while German 
officials generally respected the age-limits that were placed on the conscription of 
workers for deployment in Germany, the age-limits were ignored in some cases. 58 As 
recruitment became more difficult, officials would become accustomed to breaking 
these rules and would implement more coercive recruitment measures in order to 
boost diminishing recruitment numbers. 
6. Reactions to the compulsory labour draft 
The Military Administration feared that the introduction of a compulsory labour draft 
would bring civil unrest in Belgium. The memory of the deportation of Belgian 
workers was an abiding legacy of the First World War and shaped labour policy in 
Belgium during the first years of the occupation. Leading officials recognised that of 
all the occupied territories Belgium was a special case due to the experience of the 
58 Potargent, la mise au travail de la main-d'oeuvre beige, 60-l. No age-limits applied to the 
conscription of workers for labour assignments within Belgium. 
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First World War and the introduction of conscription should be approached with 
great caution: 
It was clear to the Military Administration from the start that the measures 
would, in comparison to the orders that have been m~de s.o far, provoke a 
reaction that cannot be foreseen, which has its roots m painful memor~ of the 
"Deportations" during the First World War that has be~n r~;wakened mall 
sections of society and has no parallel in any other region. 
The Military Administration was reluctant to introduce a compulsory labour draft for 
Germany due to fears about the disquiet such measures would provoke. The 
compulsory labour draft was introduced on a piecemeal basis and later in Belgium 
than in other occupied territories, such as the Netherlands. The fears of the Military 
Administration proved to be justified, and the reaction of the Belgian population to 
the announcement of a compulsory labour draft for Germany was broad and swift: 
Growing civil unrest, both publicly and privately, has developed in all 
regions ... the broad effect of which cannot be overlooked even today. The 
mood of hatred has now grown to the point of willingness to [participate] in 
active resistance. 60 
By April 1943 officials reported that the "anti-German sentiment had become wider 
and deeper as a result of the conscription".61 As Reeder predicted a year earlier, the 
introduction of compulsory labour assignments in Germany jeopardised civil peace 
and led some Belgians who had tolerated the German occupation until that point to 
participate in acts of active resistance. 
The introduction of compulsory labour assignments in Germany brought 
public outrage and provided ammunition to opponents of the Military 
Administration. The representative of the Head of the Security Police and Security 
Service in Belgium and Northern France reported: 
Using the legacy of the most terrible horror stories from the World War 
people are trying to engender anxiety amongst the whole population, and 
thereby emphasise in particular the lot of conscripted girls and women in the 
Reich, who people believe are hopelessly exposed to the most serious moral 
dangers.62 
The Security Service reported that the conscription of Belgian workers for 
deployment in Germany was being used as a propaganda tool. The Security Service 
reported that the "these tendencies find fruitful ground amongst the working classes 
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where there is widespread animosity toward taking up employment in Germany".63 
Anti-Nazi pamphlets appeared decrying the fate of conscripted workers and urging 
conscripts to refuse to cooperate. Belgian labour offices, as well as local mayors and 
other officials who cooperated with the Military Administration, were attacked, as 
resistance to compulsory labour service in Germany grew. 
The compulsory labour draft for Germany, and in particular the conscription 
of women, brought fierce condemnation and a chorus of protests from the King, the 
Church and the Secretaries-General. On 17 December 1942 the King sent a letter to 
the President of the Belgian Red Cross, drawing parallels between the deportation of 
Belgians during the First World War and the introduction of the compulsory labour 
draft for Germany, requesting the assistance of the Belgian Red Cross in aiding 
conscripts in Germany. The Security Service reported in January 1943 that even 
clerics who had until that point of the occupation remained neutral were speaking out 
in their sermons.64 For the most part, however, these protests fell on deaf ears. 
The conscription of Belgians for deployment in Germany brought renewed panic in 
Belgium. Just as thousands of Belgians had fled to France in the aftermath of the . 
German invasion, many Belgians tried to flee to France in the first days following the 
introduction of the compulsory labour draft. On 10 October 1942 officials at the 
OFK520 in Mons reported to Group VII that they had taken the step of closing the 
French/Belgian border because Belgians were seeking refuge in France. The military 
police patrolled railway stations and 120 Belgians were arrested trying to leave 
Belgium. By 15 October 1942 the number of arrests had increased to 850. 65 
However, despite efforts to prevent Belgians from escaping to France, where 
compulsory labour assignments had not yet been introduced, the sheer number of 
Belgians trying to flee across the "green border" into France proved overwhelming 
for the small number of military police. 66 Throughout the German occupation, flight 
to France continued to be a common method used by Belgians evading conscription. 
Others fled to the Belgian countryside, often joining the bands of resisters and other 
labour draft evaders, which became a growing problem for the Military 
Administration. Dutch labour draft evaders had also fled to the countryside, joining 
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64 Ibid., 7. 
65 SVG/DO, R. I 84/Tr.33.462, Marburg Collection, 4/1836. l 7 (Film I). 
66 CEGES/SOMA, BALl3.l/9-l I, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.22, A6. 
53 
. h'l h d'ng conscription in France often fled to join the 
groups of resisters. w i e t ose eva i 
Maquis. 
The only concession made by the Military Administration in the face of 
vociferous protests was the cessation of the compulsory recruitment of Belgian 
· . k 67 Th 
women in January 1943, with the notable exception of domestic wor ers. e 
Military Administration also promised that conscripted women would be permitted 
to return home; however, this promise was not fulfilled. Indeed, officials continued 
to exert pressure on conscripted women who sought to stay in Belgium after a period 
of leave and many conscripted women were forced to remain in Germany for the 
duration of the war. After agreeing to stop the conscription of women for deployment 
in Germany, German officials changed tack and intensified their efforts to conscript 
women for deployment in Belgium. This change in approach saw thousands of 
Belgian women forced to take up labour assignments in Belgium, with many 
deployed in armaments factories. Women who refused to respond to a summons for a 
compulsory labour assignment were arrested or sent to prison or an AEL. Although 
the demand on the part of employers for female workers was minimal, a campaign to 
conscript women for labour assignments in Belgium began in early 1944.
68 
This 
policy of conscripting women for deployment in Belgium was directly linked to the 
campaign to recruit men for compulsory labour service in Germany. The 
conscription of women for labour assignments in Belgium continued and intensified 
during the final months of the occupation, as the Military Administration struggled to 
conscript male workers. Recruitment office staff were charged with the task of 
conscripting women in the 1918/1925 birth cohorts irrespective of whether they were 
single or married. Moreover, staff were instructed that no consideration should be 
given in cases where the women had children. Increasingly desperate, officials also 
explored the possibility of establishing forced labour camps for women in Belgium 
in early 1944.69 The methods implemented to deal with the problem of flagging 
recruitment levels became more coercive as labour officials sought to recruit workers 
by any means and with little regard for the effectiveness of these methods or the 
negative impact repressive measures had on popular opinion. 
67 I . I . . nterestmg y, it was on 27 January 1943 that limited labour conscription for German women was 
introduced. 
68 SVG/00, R. I 84/Tr.33.462, Marburg Collection, 14/5095.5 (Film 8). In this period officials in 




7. "Combing-out" actions 
Following the introduction of conscription, German officials embarked on a 
"combing out" program, primarily focussing on filtering Belgium's labour force for 
workers with much needed skills, which was combined with a number of subsidiary 
measures designed to release workers. The earliest conscripts came from key 
industries and were destined for deployment in German industry to fill immediate 
gaps in the labour market. This program mirrored the methods introduced in the 
Netherlands following the introduction of compulsory labour assignments. 70 
According to the Military Administration's directives, Belgian companies were 
required to release an average of 25 percent of their personnel. Officials stressed that 
this figure was not a fixed rule but rather an average, and that some companies would 
not have to release any employees whereas others would be required to release their 
entire staff. 71 Additionally, the Military Administration sought to reorganise 
completely the structure of the Belgian workforce. According to a circular sent out 
on 22 October 1942, the personnel of companies should be composed of at least 50 
percent of men older than forty-five years of age and 50 percent women. 72 
Companies were forced to release younger men in favour of older men, particularly 
those with dependants, and women. 73 T.hese measures were linked to the Military 
Administration's broader labour policies and were designed to utilise all available 
workers and thereby optimise the use of the labour available in Belgium. 
During the first phase of the compulsory labour draft for Germany special 
recruitment commissions from the RAM visited Belgian workplaces to identify 
suitable workers. The military field headquarters in each region managed the 
compulsory labour draft at local level. A recruitment office was attached to each 
OFK/FK and was also supported by local branches. Most recruitment personnel were 
Belgians who were overseen by German officials. Recruitment office staff 
collaborated with the local branch of the ONT in order to gather information about 
businesses in their respective regions. The officials from the local ONT then visited 
70 Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German occupation, 1940-1945 (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1963), 72-7. 
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authority to force companies with more than five employees to replace younger workers with older 
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companies whose employees were earmarked for conscription in order to interview 
workers and establish whether there were any circumstances where conscription 
would cause particular hardship for a worker or their family. Company 
representatives were subsequently invited to attend a meeting at the OFK/FK. While 
the labour authorities consulted with employers with respect to the conscription of 
their employees, it should be noted that the instructions in the circular sent to ONT 
offices on 14 October 1942 stipulated that employers had no right to determine 
which of their employees would be conscripted.
74 
Finally OFK/FK officials assessed 
manpower requirements at the meeting with company representatives and determined 
whether the company should be permitted to employ new workers to replace 
conscripted employees. 
Once officials had selected the workers from company personnel lists, the 
workers were then summoned to attend the recruitment office and were notified that 
they were to be conscripted for a labour assignment in Germany. A female conscript 
who was amongst a group of workers conscripted in November 1942 recalled: "We 
worked at the cotton plant on the Nijverheids Quay [in Ghent] and received a notice 
that we had to present ourselves at the recruitment office through our employer. It 
was the unmarried women who received such a notice".75 Conscripts often recalled 
that they were amongst a group of workers from the same workplace who were 
conscripted. In some cases, work colleagues were sent to Germany together and 
assigned to the same employer. 
The "combing out" program led to resentment amongst Belgian workers. In a 
memo to OFK/FK staff dated November 1942, officials from Group VII emphasised: 
"For the conscription of workers for the Reich to be carried out smoothly, it is of 
great political importance that the perception that only the workers are bearing the 
burden of these measures does not take hold amongst the working classes". 76 Yet, 
despite officials' concerns regarding perceived unfairness in the application of the 
forced labour draft, officials nevertheless implemented measures that targeted 
workers. The head of the Security Service observed in February 1943, "Due to the 
urgent need for skilled workers in the Reich ... the legitimate wishes and needs of 
74 Ibid., 60. 
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loyal sections of the population could not always be taken into account". 77 The report 
concluded that the preference for skilled workers had caused resentments: 
In all parts of the country the criticism is being made that black-market 
traders and profiteers, by whom the valuable members of society feel 
exploited in the most crass manner, as well as the circles of the Anglophile 
bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, have not been the first to be conscripted. 78 
Belgian workers rightly felt that they were being targeted for conscription, while 
other social groups were escaping conscription. These resentments were also fuelled 
by rumours that wealthier Belgians bribed officials in exchange for their release from 
conscription. The Security Service duly investigated these allegations; however, no 
proof could be found to substantiate the claims. Officials acknowledged that these 
rumours were, nevertheless, damaging because they were "causing dissatisfaction 
amongst the population".79 On 29 January 1943, Pahls, a local group leader for the 
Nazi Party Overseas-Organisation in Brussels, felt compelled to write to August 
Schultze, head of Group VII, to warn officials about the impact that the perceived 
inequality in the conscription of workers was having on popular opinion amongst 
Belgian workers,"Criticism over the handling of the conscription of Belgian workers 
is being made amongst German-friendly circles". 80 Pahls also reported that 
complaints were being made that the sons of influential Belgians had been included 
in the list of employees at welfare organisations such as the Secours d'Hiver, Foyer 
Leopold III and Red Cross, and even large companies, so that they could evade 
conscription. According to Pahls, this avoidance of conscription "was having a very 
negative impact on public opinion amongst blue-collar workers and low-ranking 
white-collar workers and led to the view that National Socialism calls up small 
people for the purposes [of the labour draft], but not the rich". 81 On a practical level, 
it was also preferable to conscript skilled workers who required a minimum level of 
training for their new jobs in Germany and were already accustomed to industrial 
work. Certainly many middle-class and upper-class Belgians were spared from 
conscription for employment in Germany. Firstly, groups such as police officers, 
civil servants and university students were exempted from the compulsory labour 
draft. Secondly, the Military Administration pursued a policy of combing trade and 
77 CEGES/SOMA, AA553, SP/SD Meldungen aus Belgien und Nordfrankreich, 2143, 59-60. The 
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. . . d C'. who could be transferred to replace industrial 
the financial services m ustry 1or men 
workers who had been conscripted for work in Germany. According to Reeder's 
Activity Report for the period January to March 1943, officials planned to conscript 
25 percent of skilled workers and those workers completing work training on a long-
term basis (lathe operators, milling machine operators and specialist drillers) who 
were employed on the date of the company inspections in the armaments industry for 
deployment in Germany. As a substitute for every skilled worker from the 
armaments industry conscripted, companies were to be allocated one male worker 
and one female worker from trade or the financial services industry for retraining.
82 
Middle-class conscripts were therefore more likely to be transferred to another 
workplace in Belgium. Moreover, Reeder reported in August 1943 that the planned 
measures to "comb out" trade and the financial services industry were yet to be 
carried out. 83 The compulsory labour draft decree stipulated that single women 
between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five were subject to conscription; 
however, women who had never worked were generally exempted. 
84 
Working-class 
women were therefore much more likely to be conscripted for employment in 
Germany, while middle-class women who were employed as white-collar workers 
were more likely to be conscripted for a labour assignment within Belgium. Thus it is 
clear that recruitment efforts were firmly focussed on recruiting workers who could 
be deployed in industry and that working-class Belgians therefore bore the brunt of 
the labour draft. This mirrors the effects of attempts to conscript German women to 
some degree. 85 
8. Age-group conscription 
By spring 1943 it became clear that the pool of available workers who could be 
drawn from Belgian industry had largely been exhausted and the Military 
Administration turned to age-group conscription, calling up men in their twenties, 
although the "combing out" program continued. Recruitment statistics for the period 
January to April 1943 illustrate that officials fell far short of Sauckel' s recruitment 
targets (see Appendix 2 on page 287 and Appendix 3 on page 288). The OFK589 
82 
83 
C~GES/SOMA, BAL13.l/9-l l, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.23, 012. 
Ibid., Tatigkeitsbericht Nr 24 D 15 
84 ' • ' • 
85 
Potargent, la mise au travail de fa main-d'oeuvre beige, 57. 
In Germany, you~g women of all .classes were conscripted for Labour Service, while middle-class 
women were sometimes volunteers m the Red Cross or the air-raid protection association. 
58 
Liege, OFK520 Mons and FK520 Antwerp recruited fewer than 10 percent of their 
quota, while the OFK672 Brussels and OFK570 Ghent recruited just 11. 7 and 15.6 
percent of their quotas respectively. Overall, 58, 182 Belgians between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-five were recruited; a figure that represents just 11.6 percent of 
the 500,000 workers whom officials hoped to recruit.86 This failure to meet 
recruitment targets reflects the fact that labour was increasingly scarce and the labour 
draft only exacerbated problems with recruitment by angering the Belgian 
population, especially after officials resorted to using more coercive recruitment 
methods. 
In September 1943 German officials decided to focus on conscripting men 
from the 1920/1921 birth cohorts, while continuing to recruit volunteers from all age 
groups. By focussing their recruitment efforts on the 1920/1921 birth cohorts, the 
Military Administration hoped to reduce friction with the Belgian population. In a 
letter to the chairman of the cabinet of Secretaries-General dated 15 September 
1943, Reeder advised: 
Having taken into account the wishes put forward by the Belgian side, and in 
order to bring greater calm to wider sections of the population at same time, 
in the coming months the conscription measures would be limited to 
members of the birth cohorts born in 1 920 and 1921.87 
Reeder added that search measures for labour draft evaders would also be limited to 
members of the 1920/1921 birth cohorts. Increasing difficulties with recruitment led 
officials to widen their focus in March 1944; thereafter men born between 1922 and 
1924 were conscripted. Two key methods were used to develop an overview of the 
age groups earmarked for conscription. Recruitment offices took extracts from 
municipal population records, compiling lists of all workers liable for conscription 
within each OFK/FK. Officials then used the population records to classify workers 
and prepare record cards. The records were then used to gather further information 
about the workers by sending out questionnaires and, in a small number of cases, 
asking the worker to attend a recruitment office. 
9. Sperrbetriebe ("protected factories") 
During the course of 1942/1943 a power struggle played out between Sauckel and 
Speer who adopted different approaches to solving the problem of increasing 
86 SVG/DO, R. I 84/Tr.33.462, Marburg Collection, 8/430-440 (I) (Film 12). 
87 Ibid. 
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industrial production. This power struggle had a direct bearing on labour policy in 
occupied Belgium. Developments in the military situation, most notably the 
declaration of war on the USSR and major military setbacks during the winter of 
1942/1943, resulted in increasing manpower demands, strengthening Sauckel's hand 
and paving the way for the introduction of compulsory labour draft in Belgium. On 
the other hand, the mounting danger of bombing, which made it necessary to disperse 
industry as widely as possible, and the shortage of industrial capacity in Germany, 
led Speer to adopt a policy of awarding armaments contracts to companies in 
occupied Europe. But for this policy of transferring orders to be a success, Speer also 
needed to ensure that the employees of foreign companies producing for the German 
war economy were protected from Sauckel 's recruitment drive. The Military 
Administration passed the Decree on the Protection of Recognised Enterprises of 
29 January 1942. 88 The decree afforded greater protection. to companies that were of 
particular importance to the war economy. Greater restrictions were placed on hiring 
and dismissing workers from these companies. "Protected factories" were given 
preferential treatment with respect to the allocation of workers. These companies 
were not, however, given protection from the conscription of their personnel after the 
introduction of compulsory labour assignments and many of their employees were 
conscripted during the "combing out" program without the Armaments Inspection 
being able to prevent their conscription. Speer became increasingly frustrated that 
workers, fearful of Sauckel's labour draft, were leaving their jobs in the armaments 
industry and going into hiding. On 8 October 1943 Speer introduced a decree that 
protected companies working for the German war economy in occupied western 
Europe. The employees of "protected factories" in which at least 70 percent of. 
production supported the war effort were issued with release papers and were fully 
protected from conscription.89 By the end of 1943, the Armaments Inspectorate had 
recognised 344 companies, with a total of approximately 420,000 employees, as 
"protected factories", with further requests still to be assessed.90 By May 1944 there 
were 1,780 "protected factories" with a total of 906,344 employees.91 Workers 
flowed into "protected factories" working for the armaments industry where they 
88 Ibid., R.497/Tr.22.832, Verordnungsblatt der Militiirbefehlshaber in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, 
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were afforded protection from Sauckel's recruitment drive. The establishment of 
"protected factories" therefore made recruitment even more difficult as thousands of 
workers were immune to conscription. Speer's policy of transferring contracts 
proved to be very successful, and, by the middle of 1944, 25-30 percent of German 
industrial production came from occupied western Europe and Italy.92 Speer's policy 
of protecting companies working for the war economy outside Germany, by contrast 
with Sauckel's policy of conscripting foreign workers for deployment in Germany, 
enabled Germany to optimise the human resources of occupied Belgium, while at the 
same time sparing many Belgians from labour service in Germany and combating the 
problem of labour draft evaders. 
10. Conscription of university students 
To the credit of the Belgian authorities, the universities remained open during the 
occupation, by contrast with the Netherlands and Norway where the conscription of 
students forced the virtual closure of universities.93 The Military Administration used 
discretion with respect to Belgian elites and intellectuals and had a long-standing 
policy of exempting them from the labour draft. It is therefore clear that working-
class Belgians were more likely to be conscripted. Students in higher education, 
secondary schools and vocational schools were initially exempted from the labour 
draft. The initial exemption of students in higher education prompted a "flight to the 
universities" by people who wished to avoid conscription. However, under pressure 
from Sauckel, the Military Administration announced in March 1943 that students 
would only be permitted to register at higher education institutions after serving one 
year working in Belgian industry or in Germany, following graduation from 
secondary education. Additionally, first-year students were required to complete six 
months' labour service from 1 May to 1 October 1943 before they could be admitted 
to the second year of their course. The Nazi authorities had introduced a requirement 
for German intending students to perform six months' labour service (Arbeitsdienst) 
before first matriculation; this requirement was introduced in 1933 for males and by 
spring 1934 for females. 94 Students who failed to report for labour duty were liable to 
92 Sijes, "Dutch Forced Labour in Germany, 1940-1945," 24. 
93 Warmbrunn, The German occupation of Belgium, 234. 
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be sent to Germany for an indefinite period. Belgian officials made a concerted effort 
to thwart attempts to conscript students. The Secretary-General for Education 
ordered institutions not to communicate instructions relating to the decree to 
students, and German officials were therefore forced to publish their mandates in the 
press. The German authorities also requested lists of students from the heads of 
educational institutions. However, the heads of some institutions refused to comply 
with the order and faced conscription themselves as punishment. German officials 
also sought to force secondary schools to provide lists of pupils in their final year of 
secondary education. Efforts to gather information about final-year pupils were met 
with similar opposition from schools and educational authorities. University officials 
also refused to request a certificate confirming completion of their six months' 
labour duty when registering students for the second year of their course. A total of 
approximately 4,000 students were put to work in the summer of 1943 - 71 percent 
of students. Three quarters of conscripted students were deployed in industry.95 In 
view of the relatively small number of Belgian students deployed in Germany, this 
issue is dealt with only briefly here. 
11. Conscription as a punitive measure 
When German officials found that the number of labour draft evaders captured by the 
military police barely made a mark on the growing number of labour draft evaders, 
officials soon implemented more ruthless measures. The Military Administration 
passed decrees in late April 1943 providing for the use of punitive measures in cases 
where workers .evaded conscription, including sanctions against labour draft evaders 
and their families or others who supported them. Sanctions ranged from the 
confiscation of radios and bicycles to the conscription of other family members in 
place of labour draft evaders.96 On 28 June 1943, the Military Administration 
authorised the heads of OFKs/FKs to impose prison sentences of up to six months 
upon labour draft evaders.97 Punitive measures introduced to combat the growing 
"Women's Labour Service in Nazi Germany," Central European History 15, no. 3 (1982): 247. Also 
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problem of labour draft evaders were not an idle threat and were applied in many 
cases. 
In June 1944 Victor P, a teacher from Dinant, was taken hostage in place of 
his son who had evaded the labour draft. Despite his age and unsuitability for 
deployment in Germany, officials at the OFK520 Mons transferred Victor P to a 
reception camp in Etterbeek, Brussels, ready for transportation to Germany. 
However, Victor P was fortunate and on 28 June 1944 officials from Group VII 
wrote to the OFK520 Mons to advise that Victor P was not fit for deployment in 
Germany and that "the taking of hostages in this case was pointless". 98 German 
officials were quite prepared to use repressive measures against labour draft evaders 
and their families. Twenty-four-year-old Arsene C was conscripted on 21 June 1943 
and left the family home a few days later saying that he was departing for Germany. 
However, on 15 August 1943 members of the military police visited the family home 
looking for him. The officials advised that because their son had failed to obey the 
conscription order it had been decided that his fifty-two year old father, Felicien C, 
would be deported in his place. Felicien C was sent to a labour camp in northern 
France. His wife, Laure A, was left to run the household and care for their disabled 
daughter on her own. Laure A wrote to officials in November 1943 explaining the 
great hardship the conscription of her husband had caused. In response to her pleas 
for her husband's release, officials callously responded on 19 January 1944, "Your 
son, who was earmarked for deployment in the Reich, is still in hiding. The release 
of your husband therefore cannot take place".99 Officials showed little regard for the 
consequences of conscripting other family members and used punitive measures to 
compel labour draft evaders to depart for Germany. Punitive measures were also 
used to engender fear in the population and discourage other conscripted workers 
from trying to evade conscription. These actions must also be viewed as acts of 
retribution by officials who were becoming increasingly frustrated and wanted to 
punish those seen to be hampering recruitment. 
On 26 July 1943 miners at Ougree-Marihaye went on strike protesting against 
the bread shortage. According to the account of German officials, the OFK589 Liege 
ensured that workers were provided with enough bread, but workers went on strike 
again without explanation .on the following day. The OFK responded quickly, 
98 Ibid., R. l 84/Tr.33462, Marburg Collection, 14/5092 (Film 6). 
99 Ibid., Marburg Collection, 4/1800 2 (3) (Film I). 
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arresting striking workers and transporting them to Germany. 100 The Military 
Administration clearly made an example of the striking workers in order to send a 
warning to others. Despite attempts by the miners' employer to secure their release, 
they were not permitted to return to their jobs in Belgium. Conscription could also 
come as a result of raising the ire of German officials. In 1943 eight employees of the 
ONT branch in Bruges refused to cooperate with the labour draft, tendering their 
resignations in the presence of the ONT's national director, FJ Hendriks. German 
officials made an example of the Belgian labour officials by conscripting them for 
labour assignments in Germany: 
After the employees of the Bruges labour office resigned in protest after the 
decree of 28 June 1943 was announced and therefore ended their employment 
with the Bruges labour office, the German Military Administration had no 
other option but to deploy these workers more effectively, like other Belgians 
who are either unemployed or have less importantjobs. 101 
While German officials justified the conscription of the former ONT employees on 
the basis that they were no longer employed and were therefore liable for 
conscription, it is clear that they intended to send a warning to other Belgian labour 
officials who might have also had objections to cooperating with German officials. 
Belgians who were involved or suspected of involvement in the resistance 
were in some cases conscripted and sent to Germany. In June 1944, Belgian woman 
Aloysia H was arrested by the Gestapo in a raid in Repel on suspicion of 
involvement in the resistance. After a long interrogation, during which Aloysia H 
denied involvement in the resistance much to the irritation of officials, she was 
deported to a camp near Dresden where she remained in appalling conditions until 
the liberation. 102 The Military Administration also carried out raids against 
"asocials", conscripting smugglers, black-market traders, Belgians who refused to 
work and convicted criminals for deployment in Belgium and Germany. 103 This 
measure was intended to appease sections of Belgian society angered by the labour 
authorities' strong preference for the conscription of workers. 
100 Ibid., Marburg Collection, 4/1836.'1 (2) (Film 2). Letter from von Falkenhausen to the employer of 
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12. Call-up and interview procedures 
Interviews were normally conducted by the main regional recruitment office, with 
local branches following up where needed. Officials sent a summons to workers 
ordering that they attend the recruitment office on a particular date. In cases where 
workers ignored the summons, officials sent a second and, if necessary, third 
summons, which were increasingly threatening in tone. 
Belgians who had the misfortune of being members of the 1920-1924 birth 
cohorts lived in fear of being called up. Femand L recalled: "I remember the dread 
that filled us each time the postman passed because the threat of a summons from the 
recruitment office ordering us to depart for the 'boche' hung over our heads like the 
sword of Damocles". 104 Fernand L finally received a summons on 2 April 1943. His 
first reaction was to ignore the summons, burning it in the fire, but a month later a 
third summons arrived and at the beginning of June he received another summons 
accompanied by a threat of reprisals against his father if he did not attend the 
recruitment office. Faced with threats against his family, Femand L felt resigned to 
his fate and attended the recruitment office along with four friends. The five friends 
were conscripted and departed for Dessau together in July 1943. 
Officials interviewed workers in order to determine whether there was any 
reason to exempt a worker from the labour draft. Those who were interviewed were 
divided into three categories: 
Group A: Released from conscription on the basis that they were already 
undertaking work that was deemed important; 
Group B: Released temporarily or indefinitely due to illness; 
Group C: All other persons. 
Workers who fell into the third category were liable for conscription and were given 
a medical examination to confirm that they were in good health. The doctor 
conducting the medical examination was required to determine whether a worker was 
a) fit for deployment b) temporarily unsuitable for deployment c) permanently 
unsuitable for deployment. Workers who were temporarily unfit for conscription 
were given a release from conscription for a limited period of time and could be 
summoned again for reassessment by the recruitment office after that period had 
lapsed. In cases where a worker was deemed fit for deployment, the doctor also 
indicated whether a worker. was capable of heavy, medium or light duties. Doctors 
104 CEGES/SOMA, AA1216/l, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Fernand L. 
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were instructed to ensure that no illnesses that would soon require medical treatment 
in Germany were overlooked. In view of the threat to public health in Germany and 
the high potential of the spread of disease in close living quarters in camps, where 
most workers were housed, doctors were advised to ensure that workers with 
communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, venereal diseases, contagious skin 
conditions, or afflicted with lice, were not cleared for labour assignments in 
Germany. 105 The identification of cases of tuberculosis was particularly crucial as 
health officials in Belgium reported in September 1941 that there had been a leap in 
the number of reported cases of tuberculosis and that there was no drop in the 
number of cases reported during the summer months. 106 Records of the deaths of 
Belgian workers in Germ.any show that tuberculosis was the cause of death in many 
cases. 
Despite the emphasis on ensuring the fitness of conscripted workers, the 
sheer number of workers who needed to be assessed clearly limited the doctors' 
capacity to complete a thorough examination. A memo dated 4 March 1943 reported 
that the doctor responsible for medical examinations at the OFK672 Brussels had 
requested assistance because "a single doctor cannot examine more than 1,200 
people per week". 107 Femand L later described the superficial medical examination 
he was given as a "parody": "Open the mouth, [check] the teeth and a few taps on the 
back. Voila, fit for work in Germany". 108 The facilities at the disposal of the doctors 
conducting medical examinations also limited the thoroughness of examinations. An 
official from Group XI - Medical Division noted on 20 April 1943 that screens 
needed to be set up at the FK520 Antwerp in order to "improve the quality of the 
medical examinations that have been superficial until now". 109 The lack of suitable 
facilities for the examination of workers meant that not only were workers forced to 
suffer the indignity of having to undress and stand naked with others who were also 
waiting, but moreover the lack of basic privacy meant that doctors were perhaps not 
as thorough as they might otherwise have been. 
The inadequacies of the medical examinations conducted in Belgium were 
soon evident from reports that came back from Germany. A file note dated 
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9 November 1942 recorded that Wehrmacht officials had raised concerns that people 
suffering from tuberculosis and exophthalmic goitre, bed-wetters and workers who 
had already been sent back from Germany more than once due to unfitness for 
deployment were amongst those recruited for work battalions. 110 In early 1943 some 
companies called for more accurate medical examinations because of the "poor state 
of health of some new conscripted workers, amongst whom there were also workers 
who were not fit for work". 111 A subsequent memo dated 22 April 1943 regarding the 
Medical Examination Service for the labour draft noted that the number of 
examinations undertaken by doctors should not be more than 100 per day. 112 The 
case of Roger B who was recruited in Ghent in 1943 raises questions about how 
thorough the doctors were in their medical assessments. Although Roger B had a pre-
existing heart condition, he was nevertheless conscripted and sent to work in 
Halberstadt, Saxony. A few months after his arrival, Roger B suffered a recurrence 
of his heart problem and had to remain in bed until he recovered. 113 These examples 
and, in particular, the fact that some new recruits had already been sent back from 
Germany more than once because they were not fit for deployment, indicate that the 
labour authorities were probably more interested in meeting recruitment quotas than 
the fitness of recruits. Thorough medical examinations were crucial not only to 
ensure that conscripts were fit, but also because the living conditions in the camps 
aggravated certain medical conditions and could lead to a rapid deterioration in a 
worker's health. 
Once officials determined that there were no grounds for exemption, 
conscripts were asked to sign a "voluntary" employment contract agreeing to take up 
employment in Germany. Workers faced a choice between signing the employment 
contract and taking a stand against their conscription by refusing to sign. As an 
incentive for workers to sign the contract, conscripts were offered the payment of an 
allowance of 750bfrs for the purchase of provisions such as clothing for their stay in 
Germany. 114 Additionally, interim financial support was paid to the families of 
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workers with dependants. The families of conscripted workers received a weekly 
payment of 75bfrs for their spouse and 25bfrs for every child under the age of 
sixteen, which was paid for a period of six weeks. Workers could also be issued with 
a pair of shoes, the cost of which was later deducted from their earnings, and a ration 
card for the purchase of clothing. Officials stressed that workers needed to take all 
necessary items, as they would not be able to obtain shoes or clothing in Germany. 
Letters sent home by Belgians working in Germany frequently contained requests for 
family members to send shoes and clothing because these items could not be 
obtained in Germany. In some cases volunteers returned to Belgium to obtain winter 
clothing. As the war progressed only workers whose belongings had been destroyed 
in bombing raids were issued with ration cards for clothing or shoes. Germans also 
found it difficult to purchase clothing - from 1943 clothing coupons were available 
for mourning attire but not regular clothes. 115 Workers who went to Germany ill 
equipped would find life in Germany even more difficult. 
Franc;ois V, a worker from Brussels who was conscripted for deployment in 
Brunswick in early 1943, illustrates the quandary many conscripts faced: 
During this time my wife was expecting a child and I requested a 
postponement of my departure, which was refused. I refused to sign for the 
famous 750bfrs bonus, but the recruitment office [staff] put my back to the 
wall, saying that if I signed they would guarantee that I would be given leave 
to assist at the birth, or alternatively they would force us to leave and we 
would have no hope of returning. It was really under constraint and following 
my conscience that I signed. There are some who like to pretend that we were 
volunteers. 116 
Franc;ois V's account illustrates the great pressure workers were placed under by 
recruitment officials to coerce them to sign a contract. Officials made it clear to 
conscripts that refusal to sign a contract would result in adverse consequences and 
that, in the case of workers with dependants, refusal to sign a contract would cause 
their families greater hardship. Interim financial payments were vital for workers' 
families because there were often long delays before they received the first wage 
transfers. Conscripts with dependants had no real economic alternative to working in 
Germany, unless they were prepared to jeopardise their family's material well-being. 
Franc;ois V's account also draws attention to the fact that workers who signed 
contracts, however reluctantly, stood accused by some Belgians of working in 
115 Stephenson, Hitler's Horne Front, 183. 
116 CEGES/SOMA, AA1216/l, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Frarn;ois V. 
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Germany voluntarily. After the war, contract-signing was considered in some 
quarters as a gesture of collaboration. Nevertheless, given that conscripts would be 
transported with or without their consent, signing the contract was the most prudent 
course of action. 
The account of conscript Maurice L, a dairy worker from East Flanders, 
offers further insights into the methods used by recruitment officials to force 
Belgians to depart: 
At the beginning of 1943, my brother, who was one year younger than I, and 
I received a summons to go to work in Germany. Many others from my 
municipality and also my street received the same summons. We were 
required to present ourselves a few days later at the recruitment office in 
Ghent where the date we had to depart for Germany would be decided. A 
group of ten men from our street agreed to go to Ghent together. Only a few 
days after we went to Ghent and knew the date of our departure, we decided 
that no one should depart. 
After speaking with his employers Maurice L decided it would best if he sought a 
release from the recruitment office. At the recruitment office Maurice L met a 
German official who provided information a~out working in Germany and tried to 
persuade him to agree to accept a labour assignment in Germany. Trying to find a 
way out of conscription, Maurice L told the official that he did not want to go 
Germany and preferred to remain at home, and, besides, he was needed at the dairy 
where he worked. The official listened to Maurice L's objections and offered a three-
week postponement of his departure. However, when Maurice L enquired why he 
could not be granted a longer postponement to his departure, he did not respond and 
left the room. Upon his return, the official led Maurice L to a small office where two 
Germans were working. Maurice L begun to feel uneasy: 
When I had been sitting there for an hour I began to have a bad feeling. I 
thought I should ask to go to the bathroom, if they let me go I would try to 
escape because I could see that there was something fishy going on. I asked 
to go to the bathroom. Hereupon one of the two Germans leapt up and told 
me that I was going with them. I thought yes, I am sitting here imprisoned, 
which was not right. 117 
Feeling extremely anxious, Maurice L began to look for a way to escape. After 
detaining Maurice L for several hours, two officials took him to the Sint Pieters 
Barracks in Ghent where he was held for two days before being deported to 
Germany. Witnesses who s~w officials take Maurice L to Ghent's Sint Pieters 
117 Ibid., Maurice L. 
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Barracks notified his family who brought him food and clothing. Maurice L's story 
illustrates how officials sought to secure a worker's agreement to depart voluntarily 
in the first instance, but soon resorted to more heavy-handed measures if workers 
resisted conscription. The circumstances of Maurice L's departure are fairly typical 
of those who resisted conscription, who were generally imprisoned until they could 
be transported to Germany in closed carriages to prevent escape. 
Employment contracts set out the date and time of the conscript's departure, 
the place of their labour assignment, work hours, rate of pay and details of any daily 
allowance to be paid to workers who were separated from their spouse. Officials 
stressed the importance of providing workers with concrete details of their wages in 
order to avoid problems later when workers found that their earnings were lower than 
they anticipated. Additionally, some employment contracts also provided details of 
the type of accommodation that would be provided and deductions for 
accommodation and food. The amount of detail provided with respect to the work 
assignment varied. Some deportees were simply given the details of the regional 
Labour office and local Labour office where they had been assigned and in other 
cases workers were given the details of a specific employer. Workers were then 
issued with transfer papers, which they needed to take to Germany with them. 
The story behind Marcella P's conscription illustrates the difficult position in 
which many Belgians found themselves and demonstrates that the line between 
voluntary and compulsory labour assignments is not black and white: 
On 15 November 1941 my husband died in France and I was therefore left 
without any income. In 1942, in the course of July, I went to register to go to 
work in Germany voluntarily at the labour office in Wetteren. Shortly after, I 
received financial support so that I no longer needed [to get a job]. I went 
back to the labour office in order to withdraw my application to depart. 
However, they would not allow me to withdraw my application so that I had 
to depart. 118 
Marcella P's application to be recognised as a deportee after the war was rejected on 
the basis that she had, by her own admission, volunteered to work in Germany. The 
Belgian state did not recognise volunteers as victims of the war under the category of 
labour deportees, even if workers had broken their contracts after a period of 
voluntary employment in Germany and had subsequently been conscripted and 
forced to return to Germany against their will, or, as in this case, withdrew their 
118 SVG/DO, 0378440. The labour office Marcella Prefers to here is the ONT. 
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application. This issue is further complicated by the fact that while volunteers were 
initially employed on a fixed-term basis, by early 1941 the German labour authorities 
replaced fixed-term contracts with open-ended contracts, forcing volunteers to 
remain in Germany indefinitely. 
13. Labour draft evaders 
Conscripts faced the dilemma of whether they should depart. Opinions were divided 
in the occupied territories as to whether conscripts should depart. On the one hand, 
younger men came under pressure to depart so that older men might be spared from 
conscription, "When you don't go, then someone else must go. You don't have a 
wife or children to support". 119 Whereas others suggested that conscripts should go 
underground because "it was not right to go to Germany". 120 Reeder reported that in 
the beginning those called up showed a certain understanding for the conscription 
measures and almost always obeyed summonses and conscription orders. 121 Most 
conscripts departed out of fear of the consequences, but as time passed an increasing 
number sought to avoid deportation by going into hiding a~d from the start of 1943 
the Military Administration already observed signs of widespread opposition. 
Between 4 January and 6 February 1943 a total of 4,571 conscripts failed to depart 
for Germany; this represents 18 percent of those scheduled to depart. Additionally, 
30-40 percent of those summoned by the recruitment office failed to respond. 122 The 
ranks of labour draft evaders swelled as conscripted workers who evaded departure 
were joined by deportees who had failed to return to Germany after leave periods or 
had escaped and made their way back to Belgium. As the months passed the number 
of conscripts who actually departed for Germany diminished even further. 
Officials normally followed up conscripts who failed to depart for Germany. 
In the first instance, officials passed on the details of labour draft evaders to the local 
municipal authorities. If this step failed to yield results, files were given to the 
military police. Officials faced the problem of finding labour draft evaders at home 
and often made repeated visits without success. Labour draft evaders often vacated 
their accommodation after their conscription and thus visiting their registered address 
proved fruitless in many instances. The military police frequently conducted raids in 
119 Johan Meijer, "Zwangsarbeiter in Berlin," in Nieder/tinder und Flamen in Berlin 1940-1945, 140. 
120 Ibid. 
121 CEGES/SOMA, BALI3.l/9-l I, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.23, 014. 
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areas that black-market traders were known to frequent, as many black-market 
traders were labour draft evaders who could not work legally. At Easter 1943 the 
Military Administration marshalled 2,000 military police officers and soldiers to 
conduct a major raid in search of labour draft evaders. The raid was reported to be a 
success, with a reduction in the number of labour draft evaders in the aftermath of 
the raid. 123 When an individual was stopped on the street and could not produce 
appropriate documentation, officials worked on the presumption that they were 
labour draft evaders, arresting and detaining them until they could be deported. 
However, with insufficient staff, the military police could not systematically pursue 
labour draft evaders and contract breakers. The military police therefore relied upon 
sporadic raids to apprehend labour draft evaders - following the same pattern that 
was seen in the Netherlands. Labour draft evaders from regions that bordered France 
often fled across the border to France, while others fled to the Belgian countryside, 
most notably the Ardennes. Military Administration officials noted that the French 
authorities showed little inclination to deport Belgian nationals and many Belgian 
labour draft evaders were able to take up employment in France. In other parts of 
Belgium, labour draft evaders were more likely to seek refuge in their own cities or 
neighbourhoods, often with friends or family. 
The ranks of recruitment office staff and the military police burgeoned as the 
Military Administration struggled to recruit workers against a rising tide of 
opposition. The measures implemented to deal with labour draft evaders and contract 
breakers demanded more and more staff, as the military police struggled to keep up 
with the number of cases given to them. Military Administration officials also 
complained that the Belgian police did not assist with efforts to apprehend labour 
draft evaders. 124 While the Military Administration increased the number of military 
police, the number of staff available to pursue labour draft evaders was simply 
insufficient to deal with the ever-increa~ing number of contract breakers and labour 
draft evaders. 
Going into hiding brought great difficulties, especially for workers with 
dependants, who needed to consider how they would support their families. 
Measures introduced in the months following the introduction of compulsory labour 
assignments in Germany made life harder for labour draft evaders. The Military 
123 Ibid., Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.24, D 14. 
124 Ibid., D 16. 
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Administration prohibited employers from employing labour draft evaders and 
ordered municipal authorities to deny them access to ration cards for food. Anna R 
recalled: 
I was in hiding, one day here and one day there, I was at my sister's [place] in 
Welle and also at my brother Frans' [place] at Gaston de Scheppersstraat ill 
Erembodegem. I can't recall with certainty how long I spent in hiding. I never 
worked anywhere while I was in hiding. 125 
Anna R initially tried to go into hiding, but was eventually forced to depart. Anna R 
returned to Belgium on leave in July 1943 and stayed when her leave period ended. 
Labour draft evaders could not be legally employed and were reliant on the support 
of friends and family. In a bid to protect labour draft evaders, the Belgian authorities 
refused to cooperate with the order to withhold ration cards and the decree was 
eventually suspended. After spending a period of time in hiding, some labour draft 
evaders probably eventually departed rather than place any further burden on their 
families. 
14. Recruitment numbers October 1942- July 1944 
The Military Administration initially reported good recruitment numbers. The 
number of workers recruited each week rose from 3,528 in the third week of October 
1942 to 10,240 in the last week of October 1942 - the highest number of weekly 
recruits during the occupation to that point. 126 However, this early success soon 
disappeared as the growing resistance hampered recruitment and meant that officials 
were unable to meet the recruitment quotas set by officials in Berlin. Sauckel ordered 
the Military Administration to recruit 120,000 workers in the period April to June 
1943. However, only 59,966 workers were recruited. 127 Reeder reported that of the 
500,000 recruits from the 1917-1924 birth cohorts ordered by Sauckel a total of just 
72, 185 had been recruited up to late June 1943. In the second quarter of 1943 a total 
of 23,457 conscripts failed to depart and a further 102, 132 did not respond to the 
summons sent by the recruitment office. The Security Service reported in March 
1943 that the "conscripts who departed were being called the stupid ones". 128 Reeder 
concluded that the "principal reason for the failure to meet the recruitment target was 
125 SVG/00, 043057/354336. 
126 CEGES/SOMA, BALI3.l/9-I f, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.22, 012. 
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the ever greater resistance to employment in the Reich". 129 In the third quarter of 
1943 Reeder again reported very poor recruitment numbers, noting that only 33 
percent of the target number had been sent to Germany. 130 Month after month, the 
Military Administration reported that it had failed to meet its recruitment targets. 
In late 1943 a commission headed by General Unruh tendered a scathing 
report on the recruitment campaign in Belgium. The commission concluded that the 
personnel of Group VII had expanded enormously after the appointment of Sauckel 
and the scale of the administrative apparatus could not be justified by the results of 
the recruitment campaign. 131 The commission launched an attack on the methods 
adopted by Sauckel, which took no account of the political situation in Belgium or 
the tensions the repressive recruitment measures caused. The commission concluded 
that the "recruitment measures were no longer successful and that the more intensive 
and rigorous the recruitment apparatus was the poorer the results that were 
achieved". 132 The concerns raised by the commission point to the failure of the 
compulsory labour draft in Belgium and demonstrate that Reeder had been correct in 
his belief that the introduction of a compulsory labour draft would hinder rather than 
help the recruitment drive. The failure of the compulsory labour draft enabled Speer 
to win support for the policy of transferring contracts, which saw fewer and fewer 
Belgians depart for Germany. 
In the first quarter of 1944 the Military Administration reported that 19,597 
Belgians who had broken their employment contracts had been sent back to 
Germany, including 8,323 women. 133 From early 1944 German companies sought to 
recruit voluntary workers directly in Belgium. These recruitment efforts yielded just 
159 voluntary recruits in March 1944. 134 Officials reported that a total of 6,324 
workers were recruited for deployment in Germany during April 1944, including 
Ir 1,065 workers who had broken their contracts and were returned to Germany. ' 
Reeder concluded that Belgian workers were less inclined than ever to depart for 
129 Ibid., BAL13.l/9-l l, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.24, 014 & 016. 
130 Ibid., Ttitigkeitsbericht, Nr.25, 013. 
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Reeder attributed this significant reduction in recruitment numbers to 
impact of the Anglo-American bombing of occupied France and Belgium. The 
worsening military situation also strengthened the resolve of the Belgian population 
because they sensed that the end of the war was near. Additionally, many Belgians 
were unwilling to depart, leaving their families to an uncertain fate. In the latter 
stages of the occupation, the Military Administration also faced the problem of 
transporting workers to Germany because Allied bombing had inflicted significant 
damage to the railway networks. 
15. Conclusions 
According to Reeder's Activity Report for June 1944, the total number of Belgian 
workers recruited for work in Germany between June 1940 and 30 June 1944 was 
577,579. 137 Selleslagh has calculated, on the basis of his research into the records of 
the International Red Cross, that a total of 189,542 Belgians were forced to work in 
Germany between l November 1942 and 31 July 1944 and a further 224,300 
Belgians had worked in Germany voluntarily between June 1940 and October 
1942. 138 These figures differ significantly from the official German recruitment 
figures. This difference can be explained, in part, by the fact that workers who had 
taken up more than one contract in Germany were often counted more than once in 
the official German recruitment figures and officials routinely inflated recruitment 
figures (see Appendix 4 on page 289 for statistics recruitment numbers and the 
number of labour assignments commenced). Workers deployed in Germany 
represent 89.35 percent of the total number of Belgians deployed outside Belgium: a 
further 23,394 were deployed in other countries, including France. Potargent argues 
that roughly 10 percent of the Belgian workforce was deployed in Germany. 139 
According to Potargent, "[This] relatively favourable result was assured solely 
through the wise politics followed by the Department of Labour and Social Welfare 
and the active resistance of this department from the start of the occupation". 140 The 
recruitment program was less successful in Belgium than other occupied territories 
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due to the greater caution exercised by the Military Administration and the 
increasing opposition of the Belgian authorities. 
The compulsory labour draft in Belgium was in many ways an abject failure. 
The introduction of conscription proved unpopular and threatened the recruitment of 
voluntary labour in Belgium. While the introduction of compulsory labour 
assignments initially brought success and some of the highest monthly recruitment 
numbers in the first months of the compulsory labour assignments, within months the 
number of recruits who departed diminished substantially. Recruitment numbers 
never reached the ambitious targets set by Sauckel. A similar pattern was seen in the 
Netherlands where Sauckel set the quota of 467 ,000 workers for the period January 
1943 to July 1944. Only 163,819 Dutch workers were delivered during this period.
141 
Sauckel's recruitment targets must therefore be viewed as totally unrealistic and his 
methods counterproductive, as the increasingly coercive recruitment measures 
jeopardised voluntary recruitment. In the final months of the occupation, the 
recruitment campaign in Belgium reached an impasse, yielding pitifully few workers 
- hardly justifying the manpower required to run recruitment offices. 
In the Netherlands, for example, there was a higher degree of collaboration 
on the part of the Dutch authorities when compared with Belgium. Sijes argues that 
"at least in the beginning, the fight against unemployment and the expectation of a 
soon-to-be-realised 'New Order' formed the basis for cooperating with the 
occupying power" and some high-ranking Dutch civil servants continued to 
cooperate with the German occupying force in order to prevent more dangerous 
action by the Germans. 142 While some of the first Dutch workers to depart for 
Germany in June 1940 were volunteers, the majority were unemployed workers 
forced to accept labour assignments in Germany under penalty of having their 
benefits cut. 143 Sijes emphasises that the Depression heavily influenced the economic 
policy of the government in power and that the Dutch government was forced to take 
measures to protect its own economy. In the Netherlands "the general character and 
seriousness of unemployment led to the opinion that the state must have greater 
authority in combating this evil - indeed, that if need be it must be allowed to 
141 Sijes, "Dutch Forced Labour in Germany, 1940-1945," 28. 
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143 Ibid., I . 
76 
encroach on the freedom of the individual". 144 The Belgian Secretaries-General, by 
contrast, sought assurances from the Military Administration that Belgian workers 
would not be forced to work in Germany, in spite of the high unemployment in 
Belgium after the invasion. The refusal of the Belgian authorities to cooperate with 
the Military Administration on a number of key points, such as the introduction of 
the Arbeitsbuch system of labour control, the conscription of university students and 
the withdrawal of ration cards from labour draft evaders, hindered the recruitment 
program. The differing political stance of the Belgian and Dutch authorities made an 
appreciable difference to the outcomes of the labour recruitment program in each 
country and probably spared many more Belgians from conscription. In the final 
months of the war the German authorities focussedtheir efforts on maximising 
industrial production in Belgium, quietly abandoning compulsory the labour draft for 
Germany. 




The Living Conditions of 
Belgian Workers in Germany 
The living conditions of Belgians deployed in Germany are a central focus of this 
study of the social history of the Ausltindereinsatz. Key issues such as housing, the 
management of foreign workers' camps, food, hygiene and health will be examined 
in order to illuminate the experiences of Belgian workers in wartime Germany. 
Heusler has emphasised that the camp system remains one of the few under-
researched aspects of the Nazi totalitarian regime. 1 While much work has been done 
to identify camps, with a number of regional studies that document camps appearing 
in recent years, much less is known about the day to day realities of camp life. This 
study focuses on Belgian workers' letters and postwar testimony, which are 
compared and contrasted with both official rhetoric on the treatment of foreign 
workers and the approach of those who were involved with the imple?lentation of the 
Ausliindereinsatz at a local level. Personal accounts are used extensively to provide 
an impressionistic view of the lives of Belgian workers in wartime Germany and 
highlight their broad range of experiences there. Another key focus of this study is 
the health of Belgians who worked in Germany, as an indicator of their treatment, 
and living and working conditions. The Company Health Insurance Fund records of 
Hamburg ship-building company Deutsche Werft are analysed to provide an 
impression of the health of workers over the course of the war and the ailments 
experienced by Belgians deployed in Germany.2 The health and medical treatment of 
Belgian workers will also be examined in close detail through the examination of 
individual cases in the context of case studies of Belgians deployed in Berlin and 
Dilsseldorf in later chapters. We will see how the housing crisis in wartime Germany 
benefited Belgian workers in a number of key ways. Belgians, especially Flemings, 
were marked out for privileged treatment as western European workers. However, 
1 Heusler, Zwangsarbeit fur die Munchner Kriegswirtschaft, 12. 
2 SVG/DO, R.219/Tr.26.686, Betriebskrankenkasse der Firma Deutsche Werft Hamburg List. This 
summary was produced by BLO Ghilain after the war on the basis of the records held by the Deutsche 
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we will see how the prolongation of the war began to erode the racial ideology that 
shaped the treatment of foreign workers and paved the way for a more pragmatic 
approach to their treatment. Developments during the latter stages of the war led to 
the deterioration of the privileged position Belgians enjoyed. 
In line with the general strategy of Blitzkrieg, a key principle that 
underpinned the Nazi Auslandereinsatz was that foreigners would work in Germany 
only temporarily, returning to their home countries once the war was over. The living 
facilities provided for foreign workers were therefore transitory and makeshift in 
nature. During the early stages of the war foreign workers were housed in private 
homes, halls, empty wings of factories and OAF camps - in short, any building that 
could be converted into living quarters. 3 However, the end of Blitzkrieg, the 
prolongation of the war and the impact of the Allied bombing prompted officials to 
embark on a program of mass construction in order to ease the housing crisis and 
minimise the security threat posed by the burgeoning number of foreigners living in 
Germany by bringing them under greater control. Efforts to construct more camps for 
foreign workers were, however, largely cancelled out by the Allied bombings. 
Herbert concludes, "At no point during the war was there ever really a 'satisfactory' 
organisation of the camps for foreigners". 4 Shortages of labour and building 
materials and higher construction priorities, on the one hand, and the perpetual cycle 
of bombing, on the other hand, meant that the number of barracks places destroyed 
outstripped the number of places that were constructed, and the Nazis were 
ultimately unable to come to grips with the housing crisis. 
The guidelines for the housing and treatment of foreign workers in Germany 
mirrored Nazi racial ideology. According to the decree prepared by the Reich Main 
Security Office (RSHA), foreign workers were divided into five main groupings, 
wherein existed various sub-groups. The term Westarbeiter or "western worker" did 
not accord with Nazi racial ideology, which distinguished between peoples of 
Germanic stock and those who were considered to be racially alien (jremdvolkisch). 
While Dutch, Danish, Norwegian and Flemish workers were considered Germanic, 
French and Walloon workers were classified as racially alien. According to official 
policy, civilian workers of Germanic stock could be lodged in private 
3 Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany, 264. 
4 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 217. 
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accommodation, whereas Walloon and French civilian workers were not permitted to 
take up private accommodation. Following German policy, it was more common for 
Flemings to be housed in private accommodation than Walloons. French and 
Walloon workers rarely had the opportunity to have any influence upon where they 
were housed. 
5 
By contrast with civilian workers from western Europe who enjoyed 
relative freedom, POWs were housed in separate camps, where a much harsher 
disciplinary regime prevailed. Camps for Belgian POWs were generally surrounded 
by barbed wire fences and run by armed Wehrmacht guards who escorted POWs to 
their places of work. This harsh disciplinary regime for POWs remained in place for 
the duration of the war. 
1. Camp accommodation 
The term forced labour camp (Zwangsarbeiterlager) was not used during the Nazi 
period, but rather is a contemporary term that has largely superseded the now 
obsolete term foreign workers' camp (Fremdarbeiterlager). In view of the fact that 
camps generally did not exclusively house conscripted or forced workers, but often 
housed both volunteers and conscripts, the term forced labour camp is in man~ ways 
a misnomer. Camps can be divided into two broad categories: camps for civilian 
workers and camps for POWs. Camps in each category can then be divided into 
numerous sub-categories depending on who ran the camp, the type of administration 
at the camp and the nationality and legal status of residents. The boundaries between 
the different types of camps were also fluid. 6 The most common type of camp for 
civilian workers was the so-called Gemeinschaftslager - the majority of which were 
run by private companies, with a few run by the OAF. Additionally, the SS ran its 
own concentration camps, external or satellite camps and labour education camps. 
Foreign workers' camps sprang up across German cities during the war, 
transforming the urban landscape. According to the estimates published in the Nazi 
newspaper the Volkischer Beobachter in October 1943 there was a total of 22,000 
camps in Germany, which housed two-thirds of the foreign workers, while the 
5 Heusler, Zwangsarbeilfiir die Miinchner Kriegswirlschafi, 176. My examination ofresponses to the 
Enquete Travail Obligaloire survey yielded few examples of Walloons who were lodged in private 
accommodation. Nevertheless, on the basis of the limited information available, the tentative 
conclusion may be drawn that Walloons who were lodged in private accommodation were more likely 
to be engaged in white-collar jobs in Germany. 
6 Ibid., 237. 
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remaining third was housed in private accommodation. 7 Homze emphasises that it is 
difficult to assess the accuracy of these figures, as the term "camp" was very broad 
and could refer to anything from a shed to a vast complex that housed thousands of 
workers. He nevertheless suggests that these figures seem very high, in view of the 
fact that the DAF, which held responsibility for all foreign workers in the Reich, with 
the exception of agricultural workers, reported in 1944 that it administered 1,000 
camps directly and oversaw the running of a further 4,600. This would imply that, 
based on the figures reported in the Volkischer Beobachter, there were approximately 
16,400 camps in rural areas.8 In rural areas many foreign workers lived on family 
farms. The figure of 22,000 is therefore clearly exaggerated. More recent regional 
studies of camps for foreign workers have shown, however, that German cities 
hosted hundreds of camps during the war years. Sustained research on camps in 
Berlin, for example, has led to the identification of over 1,000 camps within the 
boundaries of the Berlin Autobahn ring. 9 In addition to purpose-built barracks that 
were constructed to house foreign workers, a wide variety of buildings were 
converted into accommodation for foreign workers: disused rooms in factories; run-
down work halls; barns; sheds; rooms in cellars; ballrooms; theatres; pubs; 
restaurants; guest houses; hotels; and sporting and recreational facilities. The general 
designation Lager was applied broadly to the accommodation established for foreign 
workers in the Reich and no distinction was made between the different types of 
buildings that were utilised. Aside from differences in terms of the types of buildings 
that were used to accommodate foreign workers, camps also varied significantly in 
terms of size. While just five to ten workers might be housed in a small camp, the 
majority of camps housed 100 to 200 workers and larger camps housed 1,000 
workers. Exceptionally large camps housed 2,000-3,000 workers or more. 10 These 
significant variations in the type of buildings used to accommodate foreign workers 
and the size of camps meant that living conditions and the regime in camps differed 
enormously. 
7 Quoted in Homze, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany, 267. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Rainer Kubatzki, Zwangsarbeiter- und Kriegsgefangenenlager: Standorte und Topographie in 
Berlin und im brandenburgischen Umland 1939 bis 1945: eine Dokumentation, ed. Berlin-
Forschungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, vol. l (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Spitz, 2001), 11. 
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Labour administrators placed the burden of providing suitable 
accommodation for foreign workers upon employers. According to the decree 
published by Sauckel in November 1942, German companies should only be 
assigned foreign workers if they could accommodate them in individual camps 
according to nationality or, if this was not possible, they were required to ensure that 
workers of different national groups were segregated and housed separately within 
camps.
11 
Official policy also stipulated that foreign workers should be segregated 
according to gender. Sauckel preferred to house workers of different nationalities 
separately wherever possible in order to reduce friction amongst residents. 12 The 
most obvious source of friction amongst camp residents was the differentiated 
treatment afforded to foreigners, depending upon their position in the Nazi racial 
hierarchy. Thus the preference to segregate workers probably related more to the 
practicalities of managing thousands of foreigners, rather than out of consideration 
for national or linguistic differences. 13 Yet even from the outset of the 
Ausliindereinsatz, German officials struggled to house workers in accordance with 
official regulations. Reeder reported in his monthly Activity Report in August 1940 
that Belgians were being lodged with Poles, Czechs and workers of other 
nationalities. 14 While German officials generally tried to adhere to these rules during 
the first years of the war, the housing shortage caused by bombing and the arrival of 
large numbers of Russians in late 1942 meant that the strict rules with respect to 
housing could not be applied consistently and were relaxed significantly in many 
instances. The worsening housing situation as the war continued meant that officials 
relented, quietly ignoring the ban on housing different national groups together. The 
strict segregation of males and females was similarly abandoned. In the final years of 
the war, single-sex camps were rare, and in most cases camps were simply loosely 
11 Rafael R Leissa and Joachim Schroder, "Die Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen der auslandischen 
Arbeitskrafte in DUsseldorf," in Zwangsarbeit in Diisseldorf "Ausliindereinsatz" wiihrend des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges in einer rheinischen Grossstadt, ed. Clemens von Looz-Corswarem, (Essen: Klartext, 
2002), 150-1 . 
12 Homze, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany, 266. 
13 Heusler's research, for example, has shown that problems arose in Munich when Ostarbeiter were 
housed together in camps with much better placed western European workers. Heusler, Zwangsarbeit 
fiir die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft, 179. 
14 CEGES/SOMA, BALl3.l/9-l I, Tatigkeitsbericht, 10-Tage-Bericht, Nr.2. 
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divided into male and female sections. 15 The gap between the living conditions of 
eastern and western Europeans narrowed over the course of the war, as the 
exigencies of war and the need to optimise economic production eroded Nazi racial 
ideology. 
Living conditions in camps were diverse and ranged from generally good to 
deplorable. Factors such as the availability of sanitation facilities, communal rooms, 
cooking facilities, camp canteens, underground air-raid shelters, medical personnel, 
sick bays and recreational facilities, as well as freedom of movement and access to 
public transport played a decisive role in shaping living standards in camps. The 
arrival of large numbers of Soviet POWs in late 1942 marked a turning point and 
living conditions deteriorated markedly in the last two years of the war, especially in 
the urban areas. 16 Homze emphasises that, while western Europeans' living 
conditions varied, their housing was by no means poor. He argues that the bulk of the 
German evidence suggests that, by contrast, eastern peoples suffered terrible 
privations in Germany. 17 While the sufferings of Ostarbeiter should not be 
underestimated, it must be noted that Belgian conscripts arrived in Germany at a time 
when the housing situation was worsening and the personal testimony of Belgians, 
the majority of whom lived in cities, indicates that many Belgians had very poor 
living conditions in Germany. 
The number of residents who were housed in each barracks and the 
furnishings provided varied enormously both from one camp to another and over 
time. Most barracks in purpose-built camps were fitted with rudimentary furnishings 
and provisions. The guidelines for standard barracks established by the Reich Labour 
Service in April 1942 set out three basic models for barracks for foreign workers: 
15 Heusler, Zwangsarbeit fur die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft, 238. Heusler emphasises that 
segregation was introduced to prevent sexual relations between camp residents. However, the security 
services treated sexual relations between camp residents with indifference and rarely sought to 
prohibit such contacts. 
16The living conditions of foreign workers were generally better in rural areas; however, few Belgians 
were deployed in rural areas. 
17 Homze, Foreign labour in Nazi Germany, 270-1. 
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Table 3: Standard barracks types (from April 1942) 18 
Type RADRLIV RADRLIV RLM 501134 
Occupancy 18 civilian workers or non- 36 Soviet POWs 12 female civilian workers 
Soviet civilian POWs 
Sleeping 9double bunk beds 2-level plank beds 6 double bunk beds 
accommodation 
Cupboards 9 double cupboards None 6 double cupboards 
200 cm tables 2 3 I 
Seating provisions 18 stools 6 benches (200 cm in 12 chairs 
length) 
Cutlery and I bowl, I plate, I cup, I I bowl, I cup and I spoon I bowl, I plate, I cup, I 
crockery (per cutlery set cutlery set 
person) 
Bedding (per I straw mattress, I pillow I straw mattress, I pillow I straw mattress, I pillow 
person) case, 2 bed covers, 2 hand- case, 2 coarsely-woven case, 1.5 sheets, 2 bed 
towels blankets, 2 hand-towels covers, 2 hand-towels 
Source: Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 118. 
Not all camps, however, followed the same model. At the 
Gemeinschafislager Gustofstrasse in Magdeburg, for example, there was a total of 
twelve barracks, which were each divided into twelve rooms accommodating twelve 
men. 19 Nevertheless, the accounts provided by Belgians who lived in purpose-built 
barracks generally confirm that their barracks housed eighteen or twenty residents 
and conformed to the official guidelines. In accordance with Nazi racial ideology, the 
barracks for Soviet POWs were more crowded and were equipped with only the bare 
minimum of furnishings and other provisions. Western European workers were, by 
contrast, better provided for both in terms of the number of residents housed in each 
barracks and the furnishings and provisions that were supplied. Additionally, 
barracks for female workers housed fewer residents and were better equipped than 
those provided for their male counterparts. Some Belgians witnessed the privations 
experienced by Ostarbeiter at first-hand. Belgian Marcel V who visited the camp for 
Ostarbeiter with a Russian colleague reported that the unfortunate Ostarbeiter were 
accommodated in barracks without any drawers and with just one cover for their bed. 
He recalled that the Russians were frail and suffered from illness.20 Some Belgians 
were also acutely aware of how badly some other national groups fared. These 
18 This model of camp was also used to house families. Rainer Kubatzki, "Irgendein Lager gleich um 
die Ecke," Berlinische Monatsschrift 9, no. 9 (2000): 71. 
19 CEGES/SOMA, AAl216/I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Victor B. 
20 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel V. 
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workers felt pity for Ostarbeiter and were grateful for the privileged position they 
enjoyed. 
The models put forward by the Reich Labour Service were simply guidelines 
and were not always observed. Even at the time when the guidelines for barracks 
accommodation were prepared, wartime shortages had already prompted the 
authorities in some parts of Germany to ban the provision of bedclothes to foreign 
workers. In Dilsseldorf, for example, bedclothes were no longer provided for foreign 
workers from the end of 1941, in spite of clear evidence of the threat of an epidemic 
that a lack of clean bedclothes would bring. 21 Similar bans on the provision of 
bedclothes were also introduced in other parts of Germany. In Munich, for example, 
the provision of bedclothes to foreigners was banned in spring 1942.22 These 
examples illustrate the gap between official guidelines and the reality in camps. In 
theory western European workers were better provided for than Russian workers in 
terms of the provisions and furnishings supplied in barracks accommodation; 
however, local officials did not always follow guidelines and western Europeans' 
privileged treatment was not necessarily always assured, particularly during the latter 
stages of the war. 
The cheap timber construction of many barracks afforded residents little 
protection from the cold. Victor B provided the following description of his barracks: 
"The interior of the barracks was constructed of planks of natural pine and the floor 
was made from poplar wood that had not been made into planks, which left a large 
join and allowed the cold in during winter". 23 While barracks were normally 
equipped with a small stove for cooking and heating, fuel shortages meant that 
workers could not heat their barracks. With coal in short supply, some foreigners 
resorted to chopping down trees from nearby woods in order to heat their barracks. 24 
Of course, cutting down trees was prohibited and those who sought to supplement 
their coal rations in such a way had to reckon with punishment if they were caught. 
21 Frank Sparing, "Die medizinische Behandlung von Zwangsarbeitern und Zwangsarbeiterinnen in 
Otisseldorfund die stadtischen Krankenanstalten," in Die Medizinische Akademie Diisseldorf im 
Nationalsozialismus, ed. Michael G Esch (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1997), 27 l. 
22 Heusler, Zwangsarbeit fur die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft, 240. 
23 CEGES/SOMA, AA1216/l, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Victor B. 
24 Ibid., AB 1202, Lucien Boskin, "Temoignage 1943-1945" [account written in 1988]. 
86 
The living conditions in makeshift accommodation were often less 
satisfactory. Many Belgians report that they were housed in cafes, theatres and large 
halls. Fernand Lambermont who worked in Dessau described his accommodation as 
follows: 
It was an old theatre, the Bierpalace. We were approximately 200 men, the 
complete lack of sanitation, no natural light due to there being no windows 
[and] the rats ran all over the floor ceaselessly. I remember that one night I 
was bitten by a rat on my big toe, it was the bite that woke me up. For a 
number of days I suffered from pain in my foot. 25 
As this former resident's account reveals, large numbers of workers were often 
housed together in buildings that were unsuitable. Overcrowding was a major 
problem in many camps. Toilets and washing and cooking facilities often had to be 
shared between many residents in overcrowded barracks. Gustave B also recalled 
that his makeshift accommodation was not equipped with a sufficient number of 
toilets or washing facilities for the large number of residents: 
On the floor where we were located there was another dormitory adjoining 
our dormitory, which was occupied by Russians - both men and women. At 
the side of the latter there was a very small room where we could wash 
ourselves in a very basic fashion, of course with cold water. Next to this 
small room, there was a toilet solely for use at night that had to serve more 
than 300 people. Imagine the filth, one literally walked through the 
excrement.26 
In this case, western Europeans and Ostarbeiter lived in adjoining dormitories in a 
converted building and shared toilet and washing facilities. This account highlights 
just how deplorable conditions were in some makeshift camps and it is not surprising 
that infectious diseases could easily spread under such conditions. Russian men and 
women were housed together in the same dormitory, whereas Belgian men and 
women were not housed together in dormitories or barracks unless they were married 
couples or families. Marcel Audenaert recalled that at the Betriebslager "Sporting" 
in Leipzig changing rooms were used to house married couples who were separated 
from unaccompanied male residents. 
Nazi officials set minimum standards for the accommodation of foreign 
workers; however, some employers failed to meet even the basic requirements. For 
example, in some camps there were twice as many workers as health standards 
25 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Femand L. 
26 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Gustave B. 
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allowed.27 The Nazis provided few incentives for the employers to maintain living 
standards in their camps. When companies complained that the 0.50RM daily charge 
imposed upon foreigners was insufficient to cover housing costs, officials suggested 
that employers crowd more beds into the buildings or join forces with another 
company to establish a joint facility. 28 The location, type of construction, size and 
living standards in camps were determined not by binding guidelines, rather by local 
imperatives and requirements, as well as the availability of building materials and 
manpower.29 Living conditions in camps were also determined to a significant degree 
by the approach adopted by camp commanders, company officials and the local 
authorities: 
The organisers and those who benefited from the labour of foreign workers 
provided the bare necessities to exploit and preserve their workers. Some did 
more, also holding Christmas celebrations, providing additional food and 
coal, supplying good work clothes and looking after the sick. Others did this 
to a lesser extent or not at all. 30 
In spite of economic constraints and the scarcity of food and coal, particularly as the 
war continued, some employers and camp commanders treated foreign workers well 
and worked hard to help them, providing additional rations and coal at their own 
cost. Heusler emphasises that most directives, guidelines and decrees published by 
central agencies with respect to the minimum requirements for living standards and 
security measures in camps for foreigners were adhered to broadly, but local 
employers and officials often took into account limitations due to the wartime 
conditions. Local authorities and camp administrators could therefore exercise a 
significant degree of discretion.31 Local conditions and the approach of the local 
authorities and camp management led to wide variations in living conditions - both 
across Germany and even the same region or city. 
The level of supervision in camps varied significantly. In Diisseldorf the 
Arbeitslager fur ausltindische Zivilarbeiter-Am Muhlenweg (civilian workers' 
camp) or "Alte Muhle" camp was established in Diisseldorf-Heerdt by the Gebriider 
Bohler & Co AG Edelstahlwerk in 1941. The camp was divided into two parts: the 
27 Homze, Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany, 266. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Heusler, Zwangsarbeitfilr die Mu~chner Kriegswirtschaft, 237. 
3° Kubatzki, "lrgendein Lager gleich um die Ecke," 71. 
31 Heusler, Zwangsarbeitfilr die Munchner Kriegswirtschafi, 239. 
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camp for western European workers housed an average of 241 workers; the camp for 
Ostarbeiter housed 542 workers.32 Although the camp housed civilians, residents 
were nevertheless subject to a strict surveillance regime. The company established 
guard posts at the camp that were manned day and night by unarmed civilian guards. 
Workers were also escorted to and from work by camp guards. A similar regime was 
imposed upon the 400-600 workers who were resident at the foreign workers' camp 
(Lager.fur ausliindische Arbeiter), which was established by the company 
Rheinmetall-Borsig at Helmutstrasse 45/Kanzlerstrasse 21 in Dilsseldorf-Rath. The 
camp was surrounded by a wooden fence and was patrolled by armed members of 
the factory police ( Werkschutz). 33 Some security measures were relaxed as the war 
continued~ however, what is not clear is whether the camp management felt that the 
measures were no longer necessary or whether labour shortages meant that strict 
measures could no longer be enforced. By stark contrast, civilian volunteers from 
Belgium, France, Italy and Poland- were housed in a building in the best part of the 
city at the Lager Achenbacherstrasse 55 in Dilsseldorf-Dilsselthal. The 
approximately thirty to forty residents were free to come and go and some even had 
their own room with cooking facilities. 34 In some smaller camps there was no on-site 
overseer, but rather the camp was run by company officials who only intervened if 
there were problems. It is also worthwhile to note temporal shifts. For example, in 
some cases civilian workers employed in the manufacturing of secret weapons were 
housed in concentration camps for security reasons. At first they were not treated as 
prisoners, but were free to come and go. Towards the end of the war, however, no 
distinction was apparently made between these civilian workers and the prisoners, 
the former receiving the same treatment and conditions as the prisoners.35 As the war 
progressed strict differentiation was no longer maintained and distinctions between 
different nationalities or types of workers began to melt away. It is therefore 
32 The information provided after the war by the company is somewhat contradictory, as it indicates 
that western workers were housed at the camp from 1941-1945, although the Westarbeiterlager "Alie 
Miihle" (camp for western European workers) was apparently constructed in June 1942, subsequent to 
the establishment of the Ostarbeiterlager "Alte Mtihle" in February 1942. SVG/00, BUR 71 "Camp 
Douteux. Reg. Bez. DUsseldorf 1/406". 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 International Tracing Service, Catalogue of camps and prisons in Germany and German-occupied 
territories, September 1939 - May 1945, 2 vols., vol. I (Arolsen: International Tracing Service 1949-
1950), 3. 
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important to avoid generalisations and to differentiate between different types of 
camps and recognise changes in the regime in camps over time. The situation of 
residents in these camps was largely dependent on the approach adopted by company 
officials and the camp personnel. The security regime at camps was particularly 
important because freedom of movement enabled foreign workers to try to improve 
their position. Workers who were free to leave the camp often spent much of their 
free time seeking additional food to supplement their meagre rations. Western 
European workers, who generally enjoyed greater freedom of movement, therefore 
often had greater opportunities to improve their material situation in concrete ways. 
There was also a social aspect to this. Belgians who had friends or family members 
living in the same city were able to visit in the evenings and at weekends and 
therefore had greater opportunities to establish a support network. 
Nazi officials envisaged that the camp commander would play a key role with 
respect to security in Germany, helping to keep the increasing number of foreigners 
under surveillance and control: 
As the housing of foreign workers in closed camps is an important means for 
surveillance, as well as a means for the work of preventative enlightenment, 
close contact must always be maintained with the management of camps. It is 
thereby important to check that camp commanders, who are appointed in part 
by the DAF, and in part still appointed by companies, are suited to [serving 
as] auxiliary police officers. 36 
In Nazi parlance the "work of preventative enlightenment" signalled the 
communication of Nazi values and winning foreign workers over to the Nazi cause. 
Officials hoped to co-opt camp commanders in order to gain greater control over 
Germany's foreign population by placing the management of camps in the hands of 
Nazi sympathisers. But in reality labour shortages meant that alongside committed 
Nazi Party members who strode around in uniforms, company employees, old war 
veterans and even foreigners acted as camp commanders. The broad spectrum of 
people who were appointed to supervise camps meant that the atmosphere in camps 
varied enormously. 
Belgians frequently reported that they had little or no contact with the camp 
commander: "There was nothing to report with regard to the camp commander, we 
36 Hauptstaatsarchiv Otisseldorf (HStAD), RW37/23, 81.35. The guidelines for the treatment of 
workers from the occupied territories in western Europe deployed in the Reich issued by the Higher 
SS and Police Chief West, Dtisseldorf(dated 08.02.1941). 
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had no contact with him".
37 
This arrangement probably suited all parties: camp 
commanders were happy to leave workers alone if there were no perceived problems 
with order in the camp; the workers themselves often preferred to avoid contact with 
the camp management. Marcel C similarly observed: "In the event that the food was 
bad we had contact with the camp commander, otherwise we left this man in peace. 
He was human after all!!! Most [of us] were afraid ofhim".38 Unsure of how the 
camp commander might react, camp residents often avoided dealings with the camp 
management altogether unless it was absolutely necessary. Others reported that their 
experience with the camp commander was positive. Flemish worker Felix G recalled: 
"We got along well with the camp commander (he was human)".39 Roger D similarly 
observed: "The camp commander was human, but demanded discipline".40 In these 
cases the relationship between the camp commander and residents was characterised 
by mutual understanding and respect; residents and the camp commander adopted a 
pragmatic approach in order to make the best of the situation. The approach adopted 
by the camp commander set the tone for relations in the camp and workers report a 
much more positive experience in cases where the camp management showed a 
greater understanding of their situation. Gustave B recalled: "There were no 
problems with the camp commander. He was a veteran from the I 9 I 4- I 9 I 8 war. He 
did his best to improve our food and to obtain various items for work, boots, caps, 
toothbrushes etc". 41 Walloon Jean E recalled that "relations were good with the head 
of the camp who lent us a gramophone and some records, including the 
Marseillaise".42 In spite of the fact that providing foreigners with the use of a 
gramophone and a recording of the French national anthem would have undoubtedly 
met with the disapproval of Nazi officials, the camp commander used his discretion 
with this small act of kindness. Kind acts improved relations between residents and 
camp personnel and made an immeasurable difference in the lives of foreign 
workers. These examples illustrate that some camp personnel showed empathy 
37 CEGES/SOMA, AAl216/I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Emile S. 
38 Ibid., AA 1216/9, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel C. 
39 Ibid., AA 1216/13, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Felix G. 
40 Ibid., AA 1216/4, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Roger D. 
41 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Gustave B. 
42 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jean E. 
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towards the plight of camp residents and genuinely tried to ameliorate their living 
conditions in whatever ways they could. 
Belgians often emphasised in accounts of their time in Germany that the 
camp commander behaved in a correct or proper manner. Robert G who was 
employed by the German Railways in Heldenbergen, Kreis Friedburg, observed: 
Relations were correct and cool with the track engineer from where we 
worked· who was responsible for running the camp, but things deteriorated 
because there were illnesses, both real and fake. This man rarely smiled, but I 
must say that he was just and gave the impression that he was concerned with 
our well-being.43 
In this case, the Reichsbahn employee appointed to manage the camp was concerned 
with the well-being of the residents under his charge, and generally tried to ensure 
that the foreign residents were treated properly, while still keeping a proper distance 
between himself and residents. But, as Robert G observes, relations between workers 
and the camp management could become strained, especially if camp commanders or 
the company management suspected workers were feigning illness in order to avoid 
work. Camp personnel and company managers often took the view that it was 
incumbent upon both parties to fulfil their responsibilities: workers were expected to 
work hard, as well as abide by camp and workplace rules; camp personnel and 
company management would generally endeavour to ensure that workers were 
adequately provided for in exchange for their hard work. A failure on the part of 
residents to keep their side of the bargain could sour relations. Belgian F Joly 
recalled how relations with the company management deteriorated significantly after 
the German military experienced major setbacks and a number of thefts: 
The factory guards deployed in the camp after the [D-Day] landings of June 
1944, and in response to numerous instances of theft from the kitchen and the 
theft of potatoes, chickens and rabbits at the expense of the Germans who 
lived in the surrounding area were real savage handlers, who forced those 
who were genuinely ill, and unable to get up, to go to work. The camp 
manager tried to limit their brutal excesses, but he was paralysed because 
they were directly answerable to the factory director.44 
In cases where camp rules were broken, managers might clamp down on residents. In 
response to increasing disorder in the camp, the director of the company that ran the 
camp deployed the factory police in the camp, largely sidelining the camp 
43 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Robert G. 
44 Ibid., Enquete Travail Ob/igatoire, F Joly. 
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commander. While the camp commander tried to curb the excesses of the factory 
police members, his authority had diminished and he could do little to protect the 
residents. Marcel D similarly emphasised the impact the changing fortunes of the war 
had on the attitudes of the camp personnel: "Relations were reasonably good with the 
camp commanders. Some were strict and moody depending on the point during the 
war. In 1944 and 1945 they were nasty even because of the tense situation and the 
bombardments".
45 
Residents also observed a discernible change in the approach of 
company managers after Germany suffered a series of military defeats and it became 
clear that Germany would lose the war. German cities descended into chaos towards 
the end of the war and foreign workers became increasingly brazen in their defiance 
of the camp regulations and the law. The German authorities and camp commanders 
often imposed a harsher regime in many camps in a last-ditch attempt to maintain 
control. 
Camp personnel might use the slightest infraction as an excuse to withdraw a 
worker's privileges. Jean Bo recalled: "Relations between the camp commander and 
we French and Walloons were not good. We [should have] received ten cigarettes 
per day, but rarely received them for some reason or another they were withheld 
from us". 46 Bullying and violence were also common features oflife in some camps. 
Roger Do recalled: "We often had arguments with the [camp] commanders. On this 
point, I received many kicks in the backside ... to punish us they took away our 
cigarettes (three per day, our ration)".47 Some camp personnel were rather unpleasant 
characters who conducted themselves with impunity and were adept at meting out 
corporal punishment. Some foreigners ingratiated themselves with the Germans and 
were elevated to the privileged position of interpreter or camp commander. In many 
larger camps foreign interpreters were appointed to aid communication. Walloon 
Victor B reported: "An interpreter, a Flemish volunteer, advised us of the rules and 
the sanctions that would await us if we failed to obey the rules or in the event that we 
accosted German women".48 Belgian conscripts harboured a certain degree of 
distrust towards volunteers and treated them with caution. Louis Z recalled: "The 
45 Ibid., AA 1216/9, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel D. 
46 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jean Bo. 
47 Ibid., AA 1216/ 15, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Roger Do. 
48 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Victor B. 
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camp commander was a poor old beggar [who] looked like hell..· he was assisted by 
a self-styled interpreter (Polish). The latter was a repugnant creature and was 
1. ,, 49 F · dangerous. With a smile, he would denounce you to the po ice . ore1gn camp 
personnel were in some cases more dangerous due to their willingness to collaborate 
with the German authorities. Workers had to be on their guard with such individuals 
and residents' dealings with them were underpinned by a sense of distrust and 
anxiety. 
In view of the fact that living conditions in camps varied enormously, it is not 
possible to provide a description that is representative of life in all camps. 
Nevertheless, accounts provided by Belgian workers can be used to reconstruct an 
impressionistic view of camp life. For some the first night in the barracks was one of 
their most abiding memories: 
The first night was awful, the straw mattress with a kind of mat, the 
bedclothes that emitted a horrible odour of disinfectant as well as the noxious 
air produced by twenty men and the heat of the July summer night that 
condensed the smell of sweaty feet. 50 
Camp life came as a shock for Belgians arriving in Germany for the first time. Their 
initial shock upon their arrival at their accommodation gave way to resignation, as 
workers adjusted to life in the barracks. Life in barracks was rarely plain sailing: 
"Disagreements alternated with periods of solidarity, it was about black-market 
trading, noise, the use of the kitchen, theft, misunderstandings due to language and 
the like". 51 While some workers tried to make the best of a situation they could not 
change and simply adjusted, for others the experience of camp accommodation 
prompted them to quickly seek a better alternative: 
The first few days I slept okay in the barracks, but after a couple of weeks the 
"little creatures" (lice and fleas) made their appearance. I then went to find 
private accommodation with a friend. We were able to get a small room of 
2.9m by l .9m with a good bed, a table and a chair.52 
The two friends shared a small room and must have lived at very close quarters 
indeed; however, this was still seen as far preferable to the living conditions in 
camps. As Flemings, the two new arrivals enjoyed the privilege of taking up private 
49 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Louis Z. 
so Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Femand L. 
si Ibid., AA 1216/9, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Michel D. 
sz Account written by A de Bruyn and L van Cauwenberghe quoted in Seberechts, Hier gaat al/es 
zijnen gewonen gang, 79. 
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accommodation. Others were less fortunate and had no alternative to camp 
accommodation. 
Many Belgians reported that relations between workers in camps were 
generally good, although conscripted workers often felt distrust towards volunteers. 
For many Belgians one of the most vivid memories of their time in Germany was the 
friendships they formed. Belgian conscript Femand G recalled: "I had the chance to 
make very good friends, almost like brothers". 53 In a show of true solidarity, some 
residents shared what little they had with their friends: "One shared the packages and 
helped one another".
54 
The companionship of fellow countrymen was an important 
aspect of camp life, which helped foreign workers cope with life in Germany without 
their friends and family. Felix G recalled: "The atmosphere was good because we all 
remained together from [the time of our detention at] the Louvain Prison. We lived 
as a true community and relations always remained good".55 Many others made 
similar observations: 
Our camp consisted almost completely of young men from around Ghent... 
Given that most of the residents came from the same region, relations were 
good. 56 
The occupants of the barracks all came from Charleroi and relations were 
always perfect. Above all, a spirit of solidarity reigned.57 
Often a number of Belgians from the same region were conscripted at the same time 
and were transported to Germany together. Amata L was one of a group of female 
employees of Antwerp's Grand Bazaar department store conscripted in December 
1942. The women were sent to work for Robert Karstens Elektrotechnische und 
Metallwarenfabrik in Berlin and were all accommodated together in a camp.58 The 
recruitment office had initially planned to send Amata L to Bremen, but upon her 
request officials permitted her to go to Berlin with her colleagues. Other Belgians 
also managed to stay with friends or acquaintances by destroying their transfer 
papers and boarding trains that were bound for other destinations. Such cases 
illustrate that although it was difficult to escape conscription and deportation to 
53 CEGES/SOMA, AA 121611, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Femand G. 
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56 Ibid., AA 1216/ 15, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel A. 
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Germany, some Belgians took the initiative and managed to secure a more 
favourable situation for themselves. Some groups stayed together from the time of 
their transport to Germany until their liberation and repatriation. This engendered a 
sense of togetherness and solidarity as a result of shared experiences. This was 
especially the case with workers who were conscripted on the basis of their 
employer's personnel list or following the introduction of age-group conscription. It 
was no coincidence that workers from the same region were housed together. Some 
camp commanders recognised the benefits of more flexible management of residents. 
F Joly noted: "The camp commander left it up to the guys to organise themselves [in 
barracks] according to their affinities or their region of origin etc". 59 The camp 
commander recognised allowing residents to decide amongst themselves who would 
live in each barracks would minimise friction amongst residents and foster better 
relations. Being housed with fellow Belgians offered some key benefits: residents 
spoke the same languages; and you were able to obtain news about home when new 
residents arrived or others visited home on leave. This was particularly true of those 
who came from the same part of Belgium who spoke the same dialect and had 
perhaps lived just a few kilometres from each other. Those returning from leave 
communicated news about how their home communities were faring, and also often 
took letters and packages to and from Germany. With post sometimes taking weeks 
to arrive, sending mail with those who returned to Belgium on leave allowed workers 
and their families to receive up-to-date information. At home in Belgium, families 
passed on news and information about the situation in Germany through the 
grapevine. In mid 1943 Roger B was sent to work in Halberstadt in Saxony. While 
his mother was very anxious about her son after his departure, in her letter of 1 7 July 
1943 his mother reported that she had spoken to "another worker [who] told them a 
few things that put them more at ease". Roger B's mother worked in a shop and 
through talking to other Belgians who also had family members working in 
Halberstadt, the family was able to obtain more information about the situation in 
Germany.6° Families acted as a conduit of information, for example, by providing the 
addresses of other people from the local community who were working in the same 
59 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, F Joly. 
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part of Germany, enabling those working in Germany to establish a social network 
after their arrival. 
Residents of some barracks cooperated together in their daily tasks. Jozef van 
Mele wrote, "One of the Dutchmen took care of the meals. The others helped him by 
peeling potatoes or cutting up vegetables". 61 Cooperation between residents made an 
appreciable difference in daily life, but such cooperation was largely dependent on 
the approach of the residents and was not al ways the norm. In other cases, there was 
far less cooperation between residents. The following account illustrates how 
difficult things were in barracks where residents did not work together: 
As the canteen was only open from 5.00pm until 6.30pm the majority of 
those amongst us were forced to eat their meals cold. As there was only one 
stove per room, those who returned first were able to use the stove to do some 
cooking, while the others were not able to use it until much later. 62 
In stark contrast to the situation in barracks where residents worked together, 
preparing food was almost impossible if everyone cooked their own meals. It is 
important to remember that workers worked long hours and thus at the end of the day 
some workers returned home only to face lengthy delays before they could cook their 
evening meal. 
In order to maximise production some employers operated three shifts, which 
invariably led to great disruption in barracks where residents worked different hours. 
Residents in large camps run by the DAF fared even worse because workers were 
employed by numerous employers and had completely different work hours. 
Walloon Fernand G recalled: 
The first camp where I spent my first six weeks, which was run by the DAF, 
was infernal. It housed workers of numerous nationalities who frequented the 
dozens of enterprises that were scattered across the city. No work hours 
matched: some departed at 5.00am or 6.00am, others worked in teams and 
returned at 6.00am, 7.00am, 5.00pm, 7.00pm, 11.00pm or midnight. This 
made it impossible to get rest.63 
Varied work hours, combined with the disruption caused by bombing raids and long 
working hours, took their toll on workers who often suffered from complete 
exhaustion. 
61 Letter sent by Jozef van Mele in Berlin to his family in Belgium (dated 06.07.1943) quoted in 
Seberechts, Hier gaal al/es zijnen gewonen gang, 84. 
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Herbert's research on the dynamics of camps has emphasised the negative 
aspects of camp life: 
The everyday camp life that emerges is one that is dominated by the law of 
the jungle, with distrust, anxiety and swindling part of the daily round. And 
the lower they were in the racial pecking order, the worse off foreign workers 
were. All of these dirty dealings were often accompanied by a certain 
chumminess between ·the German camp commander and the foreign 
spokesperson (Lageralteste) or interpreters. 64 
Police and judicial records indicate that theft was common in camps; however, 
Belgians seldom refer to instances of theft in their accounts. Belgians who lived in 
camps were generally very positive in the assessment of relations between residents 
and only occasionally allude to the negative aspects of camp life. Jean Be. lived in a 
large camp with fifty barracks that housed workers of different nationalities in 
Gustavsburg near Mainz. He recalled, "An atmosphere of suspicion reigned in the 
camp and small clans formed". 65 Taken from the bosom of their families, workers 
often formed close-knit groups. Belonging to a group enabled workers to insulate 
themselves against isolation and homesickness. Relationships formed with fellow 
foreign workers provided both practical and emotional support. Establishing 
friendships with work colleagues and other residents was vital because in times of 
serious illness they were often dependent on the help of others. The accounts of those 
who fell ill in Germany emphasise the help they received from colleagues, who in 
some cases accompanied them when they were sent to have medical tests, brought 
them food or drink when they were bed-ridden and visited them in hospital. Belgians 
who worked in German cities during the Second World War were under no illusions 
about their own mortality and the threat to their life that workers faced every day, 
and some worried that their families would receive no information in the event that 
they died in Germany. Victor B recalled he was one of a group of Belgian workers 
who made a fatalistic pact with each other that should one of the group die in 
Germany the others would pass on the news of their death to their family. 66 The 
friendships forged in the camps were often enduring and some former camp residents 
held reunions after the war, while others returned to Germany together to visit the 
place where they worked during the war. 
64 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 2 I 8. 
65 CEGES/SOMA, AA I 2 I 6/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jean Be. 
66 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Victor B. 
98 
Foreign workers' camps were also a site of friction between foreigners and 
members of the local German communities, especially if camps had been established 
in sporting or recreational facilities that had been requisitioned. In Leipzig-Mockau 
the Betriebslager "Sporting" was set up in a hall belonging to a local football club. 
While most of the building was converted into accommodation for foreign workers, 
the football club retained the use of the canteen. Marcel A later recalled: It was 
possible for us to obtain a glass of 'light' beer, but we were not welcome there. 67 The 
presence of the foreign workers was clearly resented by some members of the local 
community who probably blamed camp residents for the loss of sporting facilities. 
The problems encountered at the AEG-A T foreign workers' home at Kopenickerstr. 
13 7 in Berlin SO 16 illustrate the sorts of problems encountered by residents of 
makeshift accommodation. In April 1943 the AEG-A T management proposed that 
the lease for the premises should be terminated due to continuing disputes between 
residents and the landlord. Company officials noted: "The available toilets were used 
by the residents of the home, as well as the guests of the ballroom [run by the 
landlord], and have therefore become the subject of disagreement between residents 
and Herr L". Company representatives noted that the landlord had also complained 
that residents of the home stood around in the reception room and suggested that the 
reason for this was that the landlord did not heat the building sufficiently, as required 
under the terms of the lease, and residents therefore sought out the reception room in 
order to keep warm. 68 The dispute illustrates how workers were often dependent on 
the good graces of those who provided their accommodation. In this case, the 
landlord responsible for providing heating in the workers' accommodation had no 
economic interest in the workers' health, and, indeed was able to exploit the situation 
for his own economic benefit. 
It made little difference if camp residents kept their own belongings and 
living space scrupulously clean because the untidiness of one resident might create 
problems for the whole barracks. The situation in camp accommodation was 
exacerbated by the fact that many young men who were away from the parental 
home for the first time and were not used to looking after themselves. The limited 
possibilities for washing and drying clothes prompted some Belgians to send their 
67 Ibid., AA 1216/15, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel A. 
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clothes back to Belgium to be washed. Roger B sent his clothes home to be washed 
by his mother during his first months in Halberstadt, but this practice had to stop 
after the postal service became increasingly unreliable. The accounts of many 
Belgian workers indicate that they spent a lot of their free time washing and mending 
their clothes. The washing facilities in camps were often quite limited, even in camps 
that housed western European workers. Spoerer emphasises that "the insufficient 
provision of sanitation facilities, which often even lacked hot water, and the lack of 
disinfectant materials made the infestation of the barracks with vermin unavoidable". 
In camps for western European workers, argues Spoerer, the infestation of barracks 
could often be avoided. 69 Marcel A recalled: 
There were washing facilities in the cellar of our camp, [but] you could not 
bathe there. Each Saturday we had the opportunity [to bathe] in the factory 
itself. In the beginning I felt ill at ease due to communality [of washing 
together] ... The Germans themselves had no problems with it because it was 
normal. It required a little getting used to that's all.70 
While German companies often provided bathing facilities for their workers, 
communal bathing came as a shock to Belgians. With no other options available 
residents soon adjusted to the practice of communal bathing. Living conditions in 
camps for western Europeans varied significantly and some reported that their 
barracks were infested with lice and fleas. Fernand L recalled, "I must also say that 
the only thing that could remedy this state of affairs was for the Fritzs to send us to 
be disinfected, which involved sending all of us in our birthday suits under a hose 
that put out a miniscule stream of tepid water". This account illustrates the indignity 
suffered by residents who were forced to strip naked and be hosed down alongside 
the fellow residents. Fernand L voiced the suspicion that the Germans took sadistic 
pleasure from sending the foreigners to be disinfected because they always chose the 
coldest time and many of his comrades were struck down by pulmonary infections 
during the last winter in Germany. 71 Other residents found novel ways to try to 
combat the problem of vermin. Marcel A recalled that there was a major problem 
with lice in his camp: 
The whole camp was constructed of timber. That's why we had enormous 
problems with lice. We were given fresh straw for our sleeping bags. That 
69 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 138. 
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brought a small improvement but not much. Years after my return I can still 
see the scars on my legs and buttocks. I had a lot of problems with [the lice], 
others less and some even had to be given an injection because they were 
allergic to the fluid [injected by] lice. If we spread petrol or white spirit on 
the walls and cupboards thousands [of lice] appeared. The best remedy was 
just to sprinkle washing powder on your sleeping bag. 72 
It is not surprising that there was a problem with vermin in many camps. Wartime 
shortages meant that the authorities banned the provision of bedclothes to foreign 
workers as early as late 1941 in some parts of Germany. Belgian Lucien B who was 
employed by Rheinmetall-Borsig in Henningsdorf near Berlin reported that his 
bedding was not changed once during his twenty-month stay in Germany.73 Under 
such circumstances it would have been virtually impossible to keep vermin at bay, 
even in camps for western Europeans. 
There was a severe shortage of clothing and shoes in Germany, especially 
during the last years of the war, and the German population was given priority over 
foreigners. Belgians were only provided with ration cards for items such as clothing 
and shoes if their belongings had been destroyed by bombing. While Belgian 
workers were often sent clothing by their families or were able to obtain new clothes 
when they returned to Belgium on leave, it was much more difficult to obtain clothes 
during the last years of the war because all leave was cancelled after the summer of 
1943 and the postal service became increasingly unreliable. Records from the 
Deutsche Werft Company Health Insurance Fund reveal that eleven Belgian 
employees were afflicted with scabies - a contagious skin infection caused by 
mites. 74 The deplorable living conditions in camps and the lack of clean bedding and 
clothing allowed vermin such as mites and lice to flourish. 
2. Private accommodation 
The year 1942 was a turning point for the housing situation in German cities with the 
impact of large-scale aerial bombing and the deployment of Russians coming 
together to exacerbate the housing crisis. Up to the end of 1942 the number of 
foreign civilian workers in Germany doubled, two-thirds of whom were 
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Ostarbeiter. 75 The authorities embarked upon a mass construction program, which 
they hoped would alleviate the housing crisis and free up accommodation for 
bombed-out German families. Officials therefore sought to prohibit foreign workers 
from lodging in private accommodation. However, numerous efforts to force 
foreigners into camps through decrees were futile in practice. 
76 
In Essen, for 
example, Krupp replaced some 22,000 beds after damage in bombing raids between 
March 1943 and the end of the war, and by the end of 1942, the bed shortage was so 
acute that the Krupp housing department issued an appeal to German employees to 
take in foreign colleagues as paying lodgers. 77 Faced with a housing crisis, officials 
in many German cities were forced to allow western Europeans to live in private 
accommodation. Significant numbers of Belgians continued to live in private 
accommodation until the end of the war. 
Official policy stipulated that Flemings could take up private accommodation 
in Germany. However, circumstances varied significantly across industries and 
regions. Workers in certain key industries were in some cases subject to more 
restrictive regulations with respect to housing from the outset of the 
Auslandereinsatz. On 4 September 1940 Hermann Goring ordered: "Foreign workers 
who were recruited by the labour administration in Belgium and northern France to 
work in the Ruhr mining industry must be housed in closed camp accommodation 
run by the DAF". More restrictive measures were put in place in the Ruhr due to the 
urgent need to increase Germany's coal production.78 A letter sent to Dr Alfred 
Meyer, Gauleiter of North-Westphalia by the Ruhr Coalmining Regional Group on 
11 September 1940 illustrates the confusion that arose and the disagreements that 
occurred between the different agencies that dealt with foreign workers. 79 The Group 
had reported that some mining workers from Belgium and northern France had left 
the camps against the orders of the camp manager and had taken up private 
accommodation, in contravention of rules that prohibited mining workers from living 
in private accommodation. Furthermore, some of the miners had brought their 
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families to Germany. The Group reported this matter to the relevant police 
headquarters requesting that the police order the workers to return to the camps and 
the workers' families to return to Belgium and France. However, the police 
authorities refused to carry out these measures on the grounds that workers from 
Belgium and northern France were, according the directives they had received, to be 
treated the same as German workers. One member of the Group also reported: 
Labour offices were also taking the view that workers from Belgium and 
northern France could be housed in private accommodation ... and the labour 
office in Essen had, for example, permitted metalworkers from other 
industries who were recruited in Belgium to bring their families with them 
and live in private accommodation. 
Clearly, the industry in which one worked also affected one's treatment, with highly 
skilled metal workers enjoying preferential treatment. The Group warned that mining 
workers who were aware that workers in other industries were receiving better 
treatment would quite understandably become dissatisfied and demand equal 
treatment. The Group therefore called for instructions to be issued to all relevant 
authorities to ensure that workers were treated uniformly so that potential conflicts 
could be avoided. The case of the Ruhr miners illustrates how the treatment of 
foreign workers was shaped at the local level by various authorities, and German 
officials were not always reading from the same page. The numerous authorities that 
regulated the treatment of the foreign workers often issued contradictory instructions 
and the local authorities responsible for managing the foreign workers in their region 
often navigated a course between conflicting decrees. Heusler emphasises that 
contradictory rules, ill-defined competencies and instructions that were open to 
misinterpretation that emanated from the level of executive bodies and 
administrations were perpetuated in subordinate agencies. Unclear jurisdictions 
between different authorities and agencies led to regular conflicts at local level, 
which often hampered a sensible implementation of the Auslandereinsatz on a long-
term basis.80 Practice at local level varied depending on the approach of local 
officials and also changed over time depending on the shifting balance of power 
between the various local agencies overseeing foreign workers. 
80 Heusler, Zwangsarbeit fiir die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft, 191-2. 
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The case of Belgians recruited to work in Ruhr coalmines also highlights the 
problems faced by German officials who worried that they risked discouraging 
workers from taking up labour assignments in Germany if restrictive conditions for 
foreign workers were introduced. Paul Walter, an official from the Office of the Four 
Year Plan, emphasised: 
[While] foreign workers should be housed in camps, they should receive the 
same remuneration and treatment as German workers. Restrictions of any 
kind should not be put in place, as otherwise there will be a risk that workers 
will no longer be prepared to accept labour assignments in Germany on a 
voluntary basis. 81 
These fears were realised when officials ordered mining workers from Belgium and 
northern France who were living in private accommodation to return to camp 
accommodation. The Oberhausen Police Chief reported on 19 February 1941 that 
single workers had been returned to camps, but some of these workers subsequently 
left their places of work and returned to their homeland. 82 The German recruitment 
campaign had its greatest successes in Belgium, especially Flanders, and in 
September 1941 Belgians constituted the largest single group of civilian workers 
from the west.83 However, many of these. workers arrived in Germany with high 
expectations and were sorely disappointed when their living conditions and earnings 
failed to meet expectations. Moreover, false and misleading information provided by 
recruitment officials in Belgium led many workers, quite rightly, to feel that they had 
been duped into signing up to work in Germany. Living and working conditions were 
a key cause for complaint for Belgians deployed in Germany, many of whom 
claimed that recruitment officials in Belgium had made promises of private 
accommodation, joint accommodation for married couples and families and better 
remuneration. In North-Westphalia Gauleiter Meyer played down workers' 
complaints, suggesting complaints about unfulfilled promises vis-a-vis living and 
working conditions or earnings made by officials in Belgium and northern France 
"were only made in particular cases by foreign workers who were dissatisfied with 
81 HStAD, RW37/23, 81.7-8. 
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the situation in Germany for whatever reason and were put forward as a reason to 
justify their return to Belgium or northern France".84 However, the fact that the 
recruitment officials in occupied territories exerted pressure on the firms to remedy 
abuses illustrates that many of the workers' complaints were regarded asjustified. 85 
Moreover, enquiries with recruitment offices in Belgium also revealed that workers 
had indeed been promised that their families could join them in Germany when they 
were recruited. 
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The issue of joint accommodation for married couples and families 
came to a head on 26 June 1942 when an official from Group VII wrote on behalf of 
the head of the Military Administration: 
Again and again complaints are put forward to the effect that married couples 
were promised joint accommodation when they were recruited. These couples 
insist upon the promise that they were allegedly given and refuse to start 
work when they cannot be provided with accommodation together. 87 
Married couples who signed up together at recruitment offices in Belgium sought 
assurances that they would be able to live together in Germany and this promise of 
joint accommodation was a crucial factor in their decision to accept work in 
Germany. In order to put an end to complaints regarding promises of joint 
accommodation, Military Administration officials amended the contract signed by 
workers taking up employment in Germany to state: "Accommodation together with 
the wife/husband is not possible".88 Of course, married couples and families 
continued to go to Germany, but could no longer insist upon joint accommodation. In 
his report for December 1940, Reeder reported that the number of workers who had 
broken their contract was increasing, although overall only 5 percent of Belgians 
recruited to work in Germany had returned home. 89 These figures suggest that 
concerns about their living and working conditions did not have a major impact on 
retention rates amongst Belgians who had been recruited to work in Germany. 
Nevertheless, the quality of living and working conditions for foreign workers in 
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Gemrnny was a key factor in recruitment and news of false promises about living and 
working conditions in Germany hampered recruitment in the occupied territories. 
The accommodation options that were available to Belgian workers in 
Germany also varied significantly depending on the city or region where they lived, 
and also changed during the course of the war. The attitudes of local officials also 
affected the housing situation of foreign workers. In Hamburg, for example, officials 
sought to bar all foreign workers from taking up private accommodation. In 
December 1941 Military Administration official Haftmann wrote to staff at the 
recruitment office attached to the OFK589 in Liege to advise that Karl Kaufmann, 
Gauleiter of Hamburg, "finds it unacceptable that foreign workers in Hamburg are 
housed in private Iodgings".90 Officials in Belgium were requested to ensure that 
workers who were recruited to work in Hamburg were made aware that they could 
not be housed in private accommodation and that the only housing available to them 
was in barracks. The official refers only to foreign workers, and makes no distinction 
between Flemings and Walloons. Reading between the lines, one gets the impression 
that much to the chagrin of officials in Hamburg, Belgian volunteers arrived in 
Germany with the expectation that they would enjoy the same rights as Germans and 
would be able to live in private accommodation. Herbert observes that the dictates of 
Nazi racial policies, and specifically the differentiated treatment of foreign workers, 
were not always accepted by the German populace.91 Pre-existing ideas about 
foreigners persisted and many Germans probably regarded workers recruited outside 
Germany as foreigners without differentiating between different national groups. The 
official's attitude probably also reflects the concern that Germans would be denied 
housing due to the influx of foreigners into the city and such measures were intended 
to ensure that the German population continued to enjoy a privileged position over 
foreigners. 
Another concern held by Nazi officials was that the residence of foreign 
workers in private accommodation made them more difficult to control and allowed 
criminal activities, such as black-market trading, to flourish. To what extent officials 
in Hamburg managed to enforce this policy is less clear. However, many Belgians 
90 
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working in Germany were able to secure private accommodation. According to a 
Security Service report from March 1943, some 8,500 of the approximately 35,000 
foreign workers in Essen were in private lodgings in March - roughly one in every 
92 B . 
four. Y contrast, accordmg to the figures of the DAF Gau Administration, between 
6,000 and 8,000 of Munich's 100,000 foreign workers were resident in private 
accommodation in March 1945.93 The accommodation of significant numbers of 
foreign workers in private accommodation was not, however, just limited to large 
industrial cities, but rather a substantial number of foreign workers in smaller cities 
and rural areas also lived in private quarters. 
The German police and security services also opposed the housing of 
foreigners in private accommodation on the grounds that it led to a decline in work 
discipline. More worrying perhaps, security service officials suggested that workers 
who lived outside camps represented a greater threat to internal security due to the 
risk of sabotage and spying. Additionally, officials also warned that allowing foreign 
workers to live in private accommodation represented a threat to the sanctity of the 
German family and would lead to "moral intrusion by foreigners into the German 
family" and even relationships between German women and foreign men. 94 The 
Inspector for the Security Police and Security Service in Diisseldorf reported on 
31 March 1944 that "a not insubstantial number of foreign workers do not live in the 
camps, but rather in private accommodation". In response to the perceived security 
threat these workers posed, the Inspector for the Security Police and Security Service 
ordered a series of raids and searches of private accommodation where foreign 
workers lived in April 1944.95 While German officials stressed that workers of 
Germanic stock, including Flemings, should be treated the same as German workers, 
the approach of German officials was often underpinned by the view that foreigners 
were in Germany to work and must be kept under control by the German authorities. 
Like other foreigners, Belgians, including Flemings, were invariably still regarded 
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with suspicion. Many Gennan landlords were, however, keen to let their 
accommodation to western Europeans because they were able to pay comparatively 
higher rents and often received parcels containing goods that were difficult to obtain 
in Gennany, including chocolate, coffee, alcohol and soap.96 Workers who lived in 
private accommodation enjoyed greater freedom of movement and therefore had 
greater opportunities to improve their living conditions. Additionally, workers who 
were living in private accommodation received their own ration cards and did not fall 
victim to the swindling that was common in camps. These workers therefore often 
enjoyed better food provisions. 
Marcel P arrived in Dessau on 21 May 1943 and lived in a camp until a few 
months after his arrival when his friends told him about an opportunity to board with 
a Gennan woman in nearby Mosigkau. He recalled that moving into private 
accommodation brought a very big improvement in his living conditions, "I had a 
nonnal bed, a furnished room, and naturally the food was better and I was better 
cared for". 97 While some employers advertised to find private accommodation for 
their workers or encouraged Gennan employees to take in foreigners as paying 
lodgers, in other cases infonnation about vacancies in private accommodation spread 
via word of mouth. 
The availability of private accommodation in German cities made it possible 
for Belgian couples and families to establish temporary homes in Gennany during 
the war. In view of fears about the perceived threat foreign workers posed for the 
Gennan family, it is also likely that officials gave preference to married couples and 
families rather than single and unaccompanied male workers when it came to the 
allocation of private accommodation. Married couples and families, of course, also 
had the advantage of earning more than one wage and could probably more readily 
afford to pay private rents. Despite the difficulties of life during the war, some 
Belgian families were able to remain together as a family unit and home life surely 
provided some degree of nonnality for family members. 
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3. Food provision 
Food provision was a high priority for the Nazi regime and officials were determined 
to avoid a repeat of the Turnip Winter of 1916/1917 and its consequences for the war 
effort. The regime managed to maintain adequate food provision for the needs of the 
German population almost until the end of the Second World War, in part because of 
the plunder of occupied territories. The German population therefore enjoyed 
relatively good food provisions until the final stages of the war, although this did not 
stop people grumbling incessantly about provisioning. The comparatively good food 
provision of the German population came at the expense of foreign workers who 
were deployed in Germany.98 One worker later described the food provision as "too 
much to die, too little to live".99 Most Belgians were accommodated in camps and 
fed in works and camp canteens. While foreign civilians, excluding Ostarbeiter, 
were to receive the same rations as German civilians, according to the official 
guidelines issued in October 1943, workers who were fed in camps were not able to 
check their rations. This system was therefore open to abuse. Corruption was 
endemic and in many cases camp commanders or personnel siphoned off food 
designated for foreign workers. 1001Belgians who lived outside the camps and those 
who lived in camps where residents were not catered for were issued with ration 
cards and were therefore generally better off than those living in camps. These 
workers were able to purchase foodstuffs from shops and could also eat in 
restaurants. 
Although there was some variation in the food provisions from camp to 
camp, the accounts of Belgian workers consistently emphasise the inadequacy and 
poor quality of the rations they received. Michel D noted that the food was very bad. 
In the mornings there was coffee without sugar or milk, bread was allotted once per 
day, at lunchtime they received soup consisting of a little meat and vegetables. He 
noted that during his time in Germany he suffered from open wounds on his feet that 
98 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 123. 
99 Stichting Hollanderei, ed., Niederlander und Flamen in Berlin, I 83. 
100 Herbert emphasises that food passed through many hands along the supply chain on its way from 
the wholesale markets to the camps and much was pilfered by Germans, who in some cases took the 
view that giving any food at all to the Russians was just sentimental nonsense. Herbert, Hitler's 
Foreign Workers, 212. 
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would not heal which the doctor ascribed to a lack of fats in his diet.
101 
Frans S gave 
' 
a similar account: "The food was inedible and insufficient, it was a sort of watery 
soup. This resulted in many illnesses due to general [physical] weakness ... we were 
served coloured water under the guise of coffee accompanied by bread that was 
inedible". 102 Joseph C emphasised that "the food was insufficient for completing 
twelve hours intense labour under the surveillance of guards". 103 The food rations 
they received were insufficient to meet their daily calorific requirements, especially 
for Belgians employed in heavy labour. Some Belgians reported that they lost 
substantial weight due to their poor diet. Hermann D reported: "My weight was 
seventy-five kilograms before my departure, ten months later it was forty-five 
kilograms". 104 One exception was Roger B who gained weight in the first months 
after his deportation. Roger B received packages containing food and tobacco from 
his family in Belgium. As a non-smoker, Roger B exchanged his tobacco with other 
workers for food and was therefore able to supplement his allotted rations. Shortages 
meant tobacco was an important commodity in wartime Germany and many Belgians 
were able to supplement their rations or earn extra money by bartering or selling 
tobacco they received from home. 105 Belgians also received various foodstuffs in 
packages from home such as gingerbread, biscuits, fruit conserves, macaroni, 
pudding mixtures, porridge, dried meats and canned sardines. Even perishable goods 
such as butter, cheese and sausage were sent to Germany with Belgians who were 
returning from leave. For Belgians working in Germany, the liberation of Belgium in 
September 1944 had a levelling effect. Belgians no longer received packages from 
home and this development in the war therefore put an end to the packages that had 
done a lot to ensure the comparatively privileged position of Belgian workers. 
Plagued by hunger, particularly as the war continued, some Belgians resorted to a 
range of methods to obtain additional food. A most common method was petty theft 
from other camp residents. Postal and railway workers stole packages. Some 
Belgians robbed shops or stole vegetables and even chickens from local Germans. 
One Belgian teenager landed himself in prison after he was caught trapping rabbits, a 
101 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/9, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Michel D. 
102 Ibid., AA1216/l, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Frans S. 
103 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Joseph C. 
104 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Hermann D. 
105 Ibid., AA 1216/36, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Roger B. 
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privilege that was presumably reserved for Gennans. A particularly risky option was 
plundering German homes or businesses in the wake of bombing raids, which was 
deemed very detrimental to the morale of the German population and could lead to a 
death sentence if one was caught. 
4. Health 
As we have already seen, workers recruited in Belgium were subject to a medical 
examination to assess their suitability before their labour assignment in Germany was 
confirmed. However, these medical examinations left much to be desired and in 
many cases workers suffering from infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis, were 
cleared for employment in Germany. It is unclear whether Belgian workers were 
consistently examined again upon their arrival in Germany. Jean B who was 
conscripted and worked in Stuttgart recalled: 
The following morning we were taken to attend an appointment with a 
doctor, a military man, and the guy who was ahead of me, a young man of 
around twenty years of age who gave the appearance of being in good health, 
was told by the doctor that he could return to Belgium. My comrade was 
suffering from tuberculosis, which they completely ignored. We returned to 
our lodgings. The young man was completely distraught. We tried to comfort 
him and told him, on the one hand, that he would have the chance to return 
home and, on the other hand, the illness that he was suffering from could now 
be cured very easily. 106 
This observation raises serious questions about the adequacy of the medical 
examinations that were carried out upon the arrival of foreign workers in Germany. 
Certainly few Belgians make reference to medical examinations that were carried out 
upon their arrival and Belgians were frequently transferred directly to their employer. 
Paradoxically, while pejorative stereotypes encouraged the notion that Ostarbeiter 
were afflicted with infectious diseases, inadequate medical examinations, both in 
Belgium and upon the workers' arrival in Gennany, meant that Belgians with 
infectious diseases were allowed to work in Gennany. In spite of the concerns about 
the public health risk posed by foreign workers, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
there was a great deal of complacency. 
The medical care of foreign workers in Gennany was in reality a two-class 
system, although all civilian workers, with the exception of Ostarbeiter, were 
106 Ibid., AA 1216/ I, Enquete Travail Ob/igatoire, Jean 8. 
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obliged to pay for social security and were therefore formally covered by medical 
health insurance. 107 In principle, the level of medical care provided to foreign 
workers, with the exception of Poles and Ostarbeiter, should not have been worse 
than that provided to German patients. However, officials were only required to 
hospitalise a foreign worker in cases where there was a threat that infection would 
spread. The treatment or hospitalisation of sick foreign workers was normally left to 
the discretion of the relevant health authorities. Individual cases were determined by 
the health insurance fund that was responsible for the company that employed the 
h . c. d 10s E . foreign worker, i.e. the company, regional or state healt insurance 1un . ven m 
cases where camp doctors believed that a worker was seriously ill they might not 
necessarily order time off work, treatment or hospitalisation. Medical doctors were 
often employed in larger camps and workplaces, but these doctors did not want to 
interfere, as decisions about treatment and hospitalisation were made by the doctors 
employed by the insurance funds. Although special visiting hours were held by 
company doctors in some large companies, most company doctors did not feel 
responsible for the treatment of sick forced workers because the doctors employed by 
health insurance funds held responsibility for diagnoses with respect to foreign 
civilians. The company doctor employed by Gebrtider Bohler & Co in Dilsseldorf-
Heerdt reported: "I did not want to give a diagnosis because the majority of foreign 
civilian workers were treated by the doctors appointed by the health insurance funds, 
especially in cases of illnesses that affected their fitness for work". 109 The direct cost 
of medical treatment and hospitalisation was borne by insurance funds and these did 
not always approve treatment or hospitalisation. Of course, insurance funds also had 
a financial interest in returning employees to work rather than pay them for periods 
of incapacity. Moreover, cases of illness were often regarded with suspicion, and in 
some instances the advice of doctors was disregarded. Even in cases where a camp 
doctor recommended that a worker was unfit for work, the employer might oppose 
the granting of leave. 
107 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 139. Ostarbeiter were specifically excluded from 
the regul~tions of the Reich health insurance system and therefore had no health insurance. They were 
first required to pay for social security in April 1944. 
108 L b h. h d . · arger concerns, ot m t e state an private sector, often ran msurance funds for employees. 
~ 09 Letter from the GebrUder Bohler & Co AG Edelstahlwerk in DUsseldorf-Heerdt to the inspectorate 
m Monchengladbach regarding medical provisions for the company's Gemeinschaftslager (dated 
14.11.1942) quoted in Sparing, "Die medizinische Behandlung von Zwangsarbeitern," 277. 
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Insurance funds often ordered workers to return home to avoid the cost of 
treating them. Illness was therefore the principal avenue for foreign workers to end 
their employment in Germany and many workers pretended to be ill in order to 
escape home. Foreign workers, especially self-confident western Europeans, were 
often able to exploit the system in order to avoid work for a few days or even 
weeks. 
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Workers also frequently pretended to be sick in order to waste time and 
avoid work. Shortages of medical staff often meant that seeing the doctor involved a 
long wait and enabled workers to avoid work while they waited. Officials introduced 
some key measures to combat the increasing number of workers registering as sick. 
Foreign workers were not permitted to choose their own doctor, but rather employees 
were obliged to attend doctors who were prescribed by the health insurance fund. 
These measures were introduced to limit the access of foreign workers to medical 
doctors who were in short supply in wartime Germany and, above all, as a means of 
reducing the number of workers who were registered as sick. Other measures that 
were introduced included the establishment of sick bays in camps. The staff that 
oversaw sick bays were charged with the responsibility of hampering workers' 
efforts to avoid work. Camp personnel, company officials and medical doctors 
therefore often treated claims of ill health with scepticism because they were well 
aware that many workers feigned illness. 
By contrast with traditional medicine and its focus on returning the patient to 
full health, the medical care provided to the burgeoning number of foreigners 
working in the Reich was focussed solely upon the restoration of the patient's 
capacity to work. A decisive factor in determining whether a worker would receive 
treatment or would be sent home was the length of time their recovery was likely to 
take. From October 1941 foreign workers who fell ill or had a mental breakdown 
were sent to hospital and were immediately repatriated to their home countries if they 
were not expected to recover within six weeks. In cases where a convalescence 
period of more than three weeks was expected the health insurance fund generally 
refused to pay for treatment and ordered the worker's return to their homeland. 
However, after 1943 increasing demands on transport networks, the negative impact 
repatriation was having on voluntary labour recruitment in occupied territories and 
110 Heusler, Z·wangsarbeitfiir die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft, 347. 
113 
the advance of the Red Army meant it was no longer feasible to send foreign workers 
home. This time limit was extended to six weeks in February 1944 due to severe 
labour shortages. In the case of Belgian women who fell pregnant, they were 
permitted to return home to have their child and were usually able to avoid returning 
to Germany after the birth of their child. Belgian women who remained in Germany 
to have their child, for social or economic reasons, were able to give birth in German 
hospitals and generally remained in hospital for around ten days after the birth. 
An ever increasing number of foreign workers were unfit for work and the 
cost of maintaining sick foreign workers and overcrowding in German hospitals 
prompted officials to seek a radical solution to this problem. Officials in Brunswick, 
for example, began to discuss "euthanasia" as a solution to the problem of foreign 
workers afflicted by tuberculosis as early as June 1943. 111 In July 1944 Sauckel 
arrived at the decision to "treat" foreign workers who had been suffering from illness 
on a long-term basis in mental institutions and nursing homes. This so-called 
"treatment" was a euphemism for the Nazi euthanasia program and treatment 
signalled the commencement of a killing program wherby foreign workers whose 
health showed little or no prosect of improving would be killed. 112 On 6 September 
1944, the Reich Interior Ministry (RMdI) instructed all regional governments that 
Ostarbeiter unable to work due to "mental illness" must be transferred to specific 
regional hospitals. 113 Those who were not expected to recover within six weeks were 
sent to one of eleven "collection centres" where they were killed. While the RMdI 
directive referred to "mentally ill" foreign workers, foreign workers afflicted with 
illnesses such as tuberculosis were often labelled "mentally ill" to justify their 
murder under the auspices of the euthanasia program. The first killings took place at 
the end of July or early August 1944. This group was made up of foreign nationals 
from Russia and Poland, and included fourteen women and two young children. 114 
This group was killed within hours of their arrival at the Hadamar State Mental 
111 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 141. 
112 Ibid., 141-2. There were 41,000 foreign workers were classified as suffering from a long-term 
illness in December 1944. 
113 Henry Friedlander, The origins of Nazi genocide: from euthanasia to the final solution (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 161. 
114 Earl W Kintner, ed., The Hadamar Trial, vol. 4, War Crimes Trials (London; Edinburgh; Glasgow: 
William Hodge and Company, Ltd, 1949), 19. 
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Hospital and Nursing Home in Hesse. 115 How many foreigners suffering from long-
term incapacity were killed in such a manner is unknown. 116 Health insurance funds 
also established "collection camps" for sick Ostarbeiter who showed no prospect of 
recovering within eight weeks. These camps were characterised by routine neglect 
and many residents perished. 
Foreign workers were conscious of the reality that the Nazi regime viewed 
the lives of those who could no longer work as expendable. Rumours circulated 
amongst foreign workers about the fate of those who became seriously ill: 
In the meantime, two other deportees who went to the doctor with me and 
complained of a sore throat and the doctor did not take them seriously ... 
They took them to hospital in Esslingen and I did not hear any news about 
them. And another one who complained about stomach pains went the same 
way and we no longer heard anything about him. One said that deportees at 
that hospital who took too long to recover were exterminated. 117 
Nazi utilitarian ideals engendered fear amongst foreign workers who worried that 
their life might come under threat the moment they became seriously ill and could no 
longer perform productive work. Foreign workers harboured grave fears for 
colleagues who were never seen again after they went to hospital. Anxiety about the 
murder of sick foreigners added a whole new dimension to concerns foreign workers 
might have about going to hospital in a foreign land. While the workers' suspicions 
about the murder of sick foreign workers were based on rumour and there was little 
evidence to confirm that western Europeans were killed, sadly these rumours and 
fears were not completely unfounded. 
The German health insurance funds continued to pay for medical costs and 
sickness benefits in the case of Belgians who returned home for medical treatment. 
Payments for Belgians who had been working in Germany were overseen by the 
Central German Health Insurance Fund for Belgium and Northern France, which 
recouped costs from the German health insurance funds. However, individual cases 
show that significant delays could leave sick workers without benefits and prompted 
115 While staff at the institution later claimed that this group of patients were afflicted with lung 
diseases and were terminally ill, the six autopsies conducted by Major Herman Bo Iker as part of the 
International Military Tribunal war crimes investigation call this claim into question. Ibid., 62. 
116 There is no evidence to suggest that Belgians fell victim to such killings. Spoerer argues that 
generally only sick foreign workers who were considered politically "dangerous" were killed as part 
of the euthanasia program, while others were simply transferred to camps for sick patients. Spoerer, 
Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 142. 
117 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jean B. 
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some to return to work in Germany before they had fully recovered. Gabriel B was 
diagnosed with tuberculosis and pleurisy in May 1942 and sent home to Belgium. He 
was incapacitated for an extended period and attended numerous appointments with 
the doctor employed by the Military Administration to assess workers. On 
2 September 1942 an official from the Union of Manual Workers and White-collar 
Workers intervened in the case writing to the Central German Health Insurance Fund 
for Belgium and Northern France to advise that Gabriel B had not received any 
payments and to request that they resolve the matter as soon as possible. Gabriel B 
wrote to his employer, the Firma Ludwig Specht, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, on 
5 November 1942 to request permission to resume his job. The recruitment office in 
Dendermonde approved Gabriel B's return to Germany on 13 November 1942. 
Gabriel B died in Berlin on 29 January 1944. 118 Workers who returned to Belgium 
due to ill health were required to attend regular appointments with the doctors 
appointed by the Military Administration. The doctors could recommend that the 
worker was no longer fit for employment in Germany, order their return to Germany 
if they had recovered or order the worker to attend further check-ups if they had not 
yet returned to full health. 
According to eye-witness accounts, foreign workers who were admitted to 
hospital generally received good treatment. Walloon Frarn;ois V sustained an eye 
injury as a result of a workplace accident when he was working for the Reichswerke 
Hermann Goring in Hallendorf, near Brunswick. Frarn;ois V was admitted to a 
private clinic for an eye operation. He recalled: 
I remained at this private clinic for more than a month for treatment, I think 
that I was the only foreigner. I was well looked after, but nothing more: not a 
short note of encouragement, nothing. I experienced quite painful moments 
[during my convalescence]. I did not know what was going to become of me 
and had no news of my family. Fortunately, I often had visits from fellow 
workers. It was very encouraging and very nice because I must say you could 
not speak of bilingualism at that time. 119 
While Frarn;ois V was given an operation on his injured eye and received good 
treatment, he lost the sight in the eye. This case illustrates that injured Belgians 
generally received the treatment necessary to aid their recovery. The account also 
touches on the psychological aspects of the experience of hospitalisation in a foreign 
118 SVG/DO, Dad 4247/374508 & SOR 134375. 
119 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Francyois V. 
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country. As the only foreigner at the clinic and without a good command of the 
German language, Fran9ois V was socially isolated and felt afraid. This isolation was 
compounded by the fact that he did not receive any news from home. The importance 
of a network of friends for deportees is clearly illustrated by this account. After his 
convalescence Fran9ois V returned to work; however, upon returning to Belgium on 
leave, he managed to avoid returning to Germany by getting a doctor to declare that 
he was incapable of work due to his eye injury. Another Belgian similarly 
emphasised that he received good medical treatment: "I also recognise that specialist 
physicians of Hagen ... and the personnel of the hospitals never made any distinction 
between Germans and hard-working deportees. They always showed devotion and 
conscientiousness".
120 
These cases illustrate that sick and injured Belgian workers, 
including Walloons, were treated in German hospitals and in many cases received 
medical treatment on a par with that accorded to German citizens. 
The records of the Deutsche Werft Company Health Insurance Fund provide 
a useful basis for examining the health problems faced by Belgians who worked in 
Germany during Second World War, most of whom were employed in German 
industry. 121 The majority of the 606 Belgians employed by shipbuilding company 
Deutsche Werft were male, with a small number of female employees who were 
mainly employed as cleaning staff or in the company canteen. The majority of the 
company's Belgian employees came from Flanders, with many recruited in the port 
city of Antwerp where the company established a training centre. 122 The key 
limitation of this data is that it does not indicate whether the period of illness 
recorded correlates directly with any period of incapacity or whether the dates of the 
illness simply refer to the period in which the worker received treatment for a 
medical problem. Moreover, while the date each worker commenced employment 
with Deutsche Werft is available, the data source does not indicate the date when 
their employment with the company ceased. Thus, it is not possible to calculate the 
average number of sick days per year for each worker or the retinue as a whole. 
120 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, F Joly. 
121 SVG/DO, R.2 I 9/Tr.26.686, Betriebskrankenkasse der Firma Deutsche Werft Hamburg. 
122 By 31 December 1942, 208 Belgians trained at the Deutsche Werft Hamburg training centre in 
Antwerp were deployed in Germany. Haupt, "Der 'Arbeitseinsatz' der belgischen Bevolkerung", 204. 
117 
Nevertheless, the data can be used to analyse the sorts of medical problems Belgians 
suffered in Germany and worker health generally. 
Analysis of the Deutsche Werft Health Insurance Fund records clearly 
illustrates that the number of workers who suffered from medical illnesses steadily 
increased during the war (see Figures 1, 2 and 3 on pages 120-22). This trend may, in 
part, result from an overall increase in the number of Belgians employed by 
Deutsche Werft~ Nevertheless, the trend points towards worsening worker health as 
the war continued. Appendix 5 on page 290 provides a breakdown of the reported 
cases of medical illness amongst Belgian employees. Significant numbers of 
Belgians suffered from colds, influenza, pneumonia and bronchitis, particularly in 
the winter of 1944/1945 when the number of cases peaked. A number of Belgians 
suffered from furuncles, boils and abscesses - medical complaints that were most 
likely an outcome of poor hygiene. Eleven workers also suffered from scabies, 
another medical complaint linked to poor hygiene. Other common medical problems 
experienced by Belgian employees are consistent with the types of injuries sustained 
in the workplace by those employed in heavy industry, including contusions to 
various parts of the body, bums, fractures, cuts and foreign bodies lodged in the eye. 
Looking more closely at specific cases, one notices that some Belgian workers 
suffered repeated bouts of illness during their time in Germany, with some workers 
experiencing as many as fourteen health problems. Despite repeated bouts of illness 
these workers continued working in Germany. Another notable point is that workers 
afflicted with tuberculosis were not necessarily sent home and some continued to 
work in Germany despite the risk to public health. 
Belgians generally received good medical treatment. However, they often 
suffered from multiple ailments during their time in Germany and there are 
indications that the deployment in Germany took a toll on their health in the long 
term. Marcel V reported: "I returned with chronic bronchitis contracted during my 
deportation and after that time I have suffered from angina. It is already five years 
since I last worked and the health insurance company doctor has declared that I am 
incapable of working [due to ill health]". 123 Marcel A also pointed to the long-term 
effects of deportation on the health of deportees. At the reunion of Belgian deportees 
123 CEGES/SOMA, AAl216/I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel V. 
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held fifteen years after the end of the war, he observed that a number of his 
contemporaries from the Betriebslager "Sporting" in Leipzig had already died either 
in Germany or during the intervening years. 124 
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5. Conclusions 
The examination of the housing of Belgian workers in Germany has revealed 
significant variations in their living conditions. Variations in the type of buildings 
used to accommodate foreign workers and the size of camps meant that the living 
conditions of workers who lived in camps differed enormously. Local conditions, 
and the approach of the local authorities and camp management, also led to wide 
differences in foreign workers' living conditions - both across Germany and even 
within the same region or city. In theory western European workers were better 
provided for than Ostarbeiter in terms of the provisions and furnishings supplied in 
barracks accommodation; however, local officials exercised a significant degree of 
discretion and did not always follow the guidelines provided by the central 
authorities. Belgian workers benefited most from their status as privileged western 
Europeans during the early stages of the war. One of the key advantages enjoyed by 
Belgians, mainly Flemings, was the opportunity to live in private accommodation. 
Belgians who were fortunate enough to find accommodation outside the camps 
enjoyed greater freedom of movement, more personal control over their food rations, 
greater privacy, and the opportunity to live with relatives as a family unit in some 
cases. Most Belgians who lived in private accommodation probably had higher 
standard accommodation and were also less likely to be affected by infectious 
diseases and vermin which plagued camp residents. 
The privileged status bestowed upon western Europeans was empowering. 
Belgians who went to Germany expected that they would be treated the same as 
Germans and asserted their rights when it came to issues such as freedom of 
movement and the entitlement to live in private accommodation or joint 
accommodation with their spouse. Belgians who were dissatisfied with their living 
and working conditions during the first years of the war often left Germany at the 
end of their contract. The greater rights enjoyed by western Europeans also gave 
them greater self-confidence to exploit the system. For example, many Belgians 
feigned illness to avoid work without fear of the consequences, while others attended 
Belgian doctors when they returned home on leave in order to avoid returning to 
Germany. Nevertheless, the privileged treatment of western Europeans was not 
necessarily always assured, particularly during the latter stages of the war when 
123 
shortages of food, fuel, clothing, shoes and bedding affected all foreign workers. 
Moreover, Belgian conscripts arrived in Germany at a time when the housing 
situation was worsening and Belgians, the majority of whom lived in cities, often had 
very poor living conditions in Germany. The exigencies of war and the need to 
optimise economic production eroded Nazi racial ideology and forced Nazi officials 
to improve the treatment of Ostarbeiter in order to increase productivity. Strict 
differentiation was no longer maintained and distinctions between different 
nationalities or types of workers began to melt away as the war progressed. Belgians 
benefited from packages from home, which provided a wide range of foodstuffs, as 
well as items such as clothing, shoes and tobacco to supplement their rations. 
However, the suspension of leave in the summer of 1943 and then the liberation of 
Belgium in September 1944 meant that Belgians no longer obtained foodstuffs and 
other items from home and these developments therefore resulted in a worsening of 
the position of Belgian workers. Health insurance records also show a steady 
increase in the number of Belgian workers suffering from medical illnesses towards 
the end of the war, indicating that the health of Belgians deteriorated as the war 
continued. The gap between the living conditions of eastern and western European 
workers narrowed towards the end of Second World War. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
The Working Conditions of 
Belgian Workers in Germany 
The Nazis' imperialist policies necessitated the deployment of foreign workers on a 
massive and unprecedented scale. Foreigners were deployed in all comers of 
Germany from the smallest rural farms to large factories in Germany's industrial 
heartland. An army of foreigners was imported to fill the gap in the labour force left 
by the call-up of German workers to the armed forces. The German economy became 
increasingly dependent on foreign labour. In September 1944 foreign workers 
represented 26 percent of Germany's workforce. 1 This figure was even higher in 
industry where 29 percent of the labour force was foreign. 2 The overwhelming 
majority of the foreigners deployed in Germany during the war came from eastern 
Europe, chiefly from Poland and the USSR, while a smaller number came from 
western Europe. 
Most Belgians were deployed in industrial centres, such as the Ruhr region, 
Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg, Dessau and Magdeburg. Almost three in four Belgians 
were employed in industry, while others were employed in construction and service 
industries (see Appendix 6 on page 294). The recruitment campaign in Belgium had 
led to the deployment of many skilled workers who were in high demand in German 
industry. According to Reeder a total of 280,992 Belgians had been recruited to work 
in Germany by March 1942, including 89,268 metal workers.3 In addition, Belgians 
who were semi-skilled, unskilled or had trained in professions for which there was 
less demand in Belgium were also recruited. Employment in Germany offered these 
workers the opportunity to gain new skills and experience. Many of those recruited 
in the first wave of conscriptions from November 1942 until early 1943 were 
conscripted through their employer's personnel list and fulfilled the demands for 
skilled workers. The management at Siemens welcomed the influx of conscripts not 
least because "conscripted workers would be pulled from their jobs in which they 
1 Spoerer and Fleischhacker, "Forced Labourers in Nazi Germany," 172. 
2 Stephenson, "Triangle: Foreign Workers, German Civilians, and the Nazi Regime," 34 I. 
3 CEGES/SOMA, BALI 3.1/9-11, Allgemeine Obersichtfiir die Zeit OJ. I 2. 1941-15.3. 1942, 16. 
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had worked until their conscription, [and] are therefore not work shy elements, like 
those who have so often been assigned to us".4 While a significant proportion of 
Belgian workers were employed by large industrial concerns, their experiences vary 
a great deal. The accounts of Belgian workers add weight to the argument that there 
were great variations in the treatment foreigners received in Germany, depending on 
the approach adopted by their employer. Many German employers adopted a 
pragmatic approach when dealing with western Europeans in order to limit conflict 
in the workplace and lost productivity. Many German factories were modern and 
characterised by an enlightened approach to the management of workers. Whatever 
the circumstances of their recruitment, many Belgians had positive experiences 
working in German factories. 
1. Transport and arrival in Germany 
Most Belgian workers were transported to Germany via Herbesthal and the reception 
camp just across the German-Belgian border in Aachen, while a smaller number 
were transported directly to the area of Germany where they had been assigned to 
work.5 Some of those who were assigned jobs in the Ruhr were, for example, 
collected directly from the transit camp in Aachen and transported to their places of 
work by truck. The period of time spent at the transit camp varied from a brief stop 
to a couple of days. Workers who stayed for longer periods of time were fed and 
accommodated in a requisitioned school a short distance from the station before they 
continued their journey. Worker transport trains often made a number of stops with 
workers disembarking at locations across Germany. 
The stop at the transit camp in Aachen and in other places en route provided 
an opportunity for some workers to destroy their transfer papers and board trains 
destined for other parts of Germany in order to remain with friends, join friends or 
relatives who were working in another part of Germany, or simply to avoid their 
assigned job. Such cases caused consternation for labour administrators but 
' 
employers were generally only too happy to accept stray workers. Indeed, Germany's 
labour shortage was so severe that some German employers resorted to employing 
4 Ti Ila Siegel, "Die Doppelte Rationalisierung des 'Auslandereinsatzes' bei Siemens" Internationale 
Wissenschafiliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegzmi 27, no. 1 ( 1991 ): 
18. 
5 This reception camp was established in early 1941 in response to the increasing problem of workers 
who returned home illegally. 
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agents to lure workers from worker transport trains. On 22 July 1943 the President of 
the Westphalia State labour office reported that he had recently received numerous 
reports that "during stops at train stations in the Rhineland 'wild recruiters' are trying 
to convince workers on worker transports destined for my region to disembark and 
take up employment with companies other than those to which they have been 
. d" 6 I ass1gne · twas reported that some agents even boarded trains after they arrived in 
Germany. Illegal recruiters appealed to workers with promises of higher wages and 
the granting of leave to return home after just six weeks. 7 Promises such as early 
leave were clearly dubious and were almost certainly never kept. Workers who 
destroyed their transfer papers or disembarked before they reached their final 
destination risked being arrested as a suspected contract breaker, especially in border 
areas, as their lack of papers might lead officials to assume that they were trying to 
return home illegally. 
New recruits arriving at their destinations after a long train journey were 
generally transferred to reception camps that were established across Germany. On 
9 December 1941 the Reich Labour Minister, Franz Seldte, ordered the presidents of 
regional Labour Offices to establish a network of transit camps in preparation for the 
intensification of the Ausliindereinsatz. In the months that followed f01ty-six transit 
camps were set up across the Reich. Workers who had already been assigned to a 
specific employer were sometimes met by company officials upon arrival and 
escorted directly to their accommodation. Workers who were yet to be allocated to 
an employer generally remained at reception camps until they were assigned a job or 
completed retraining. Labour office staff interviewed workers to assess their job 
skills and prospective employers visited reception camps to select workers. Marcel 
De recalled that he spent one night in a camp in Cologne: "The following day we 
were assigned to a factory, like slaves who are sold by a trader".8 Another worker 
similarly observed: "We were assembled according to our trade and the German 
bosses made their selection (a bit like at a market for livestock)".9 For recruits who 
had been conscripted and forced to leave their homes and loved ones, labour 
selections at reception camps represented a further indignity. While selections did 
6 HStAD, RW37/23, 81.21. Letter of the President of the Westphalia State Labour Office, Dortmund, 
to the Higher SS and Police.Chief West, Dtisseldorf(dated 22.07.1943). 
7 Normally married workers were entitled to leave after six months continuous employment in 
Germany and unmarried workers after twelve months employment in Germany. 
8 CEG ES/SOMA, AA 1216/ I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel De. 
9 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Rene V. 
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not bear any of the hallmarks of the selections that occurred in concentration camps, 
workers clearly found the methods used to allocate workers demoralising and 
inevitably drew comparisons between their own treatment and the purchase and sale 
of animals or slaves. Such experiences impressed upon new recruits their loss of 
employment rights and the coercive nature of their employment in Germany, 
reinforcing their subordinate position as foreigners in Germany. 
2. The allocation of labour assignments 
In Belgium prospective recruits attended recruitment offices where officials gathered 
information regarding their trade/profession, employer and their current job. This 
information was then used to match their skills with suitable jobs in Germany and 
identify workers whose skills were desperately needed in Germany. Workers with 
desirable skills and experience, such as metal workers, electricians and technical 
draughtsmen, were generally assigned jobs that matched their existing skills. For 
workers with skills for which there was less demand, on the other hand, the job 
assigned to them was determined by the available vacancies and very often meant 
they were assigned a semi-skilled or unskilled job that did not match their existing 
job skills. The insatiable demand for workers in the war industries meant that many 
Belgians, including a significant proportion of women, were deployed in munitions 
factories and other industrial concerns. Many Belgian men were also assigned low-
skilled jobs in construction and mining. 
During the first years of the German occupation Belgian recruits often 
volunteered to go to Germany because they were unable to find work in Belgium. 
These workers often had skills for which there was less demand and were therefore 
deployed in lower-skilled jobs and were invariably paid lower wages. 10 A closer 
examination of the jobs assigned to Belgians in Germany indicates that many 
Belgians were assigned semi-skilled or unskilled jobs. Appendix 7 A on page 295 and 
Appendix 7B on page 316 show that many Belgian workers were assigned labour 
contracts as unskilled workers, trainees and apprentices. In the first months following 
the introduction of conscription labour administrators combed Belgian workplaces 
10 Ibid., BALI 3.1/9-11, Tiitigkeitsbericht, Nr. I 0. According to Reeder's Activity Report for 
September 1940, unemployed workers who had previously trained in a different industry were to be 
classified as "unskilled" workers for the purposes of the recruitment office's registration system and 
unemployment statistics. The classification of many unemployed workers who could not find work in 
their profession as unskilled workers clearly increased the likelihood that they would be assigned low-
skilled jobs that paid lower wages. 
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for skilled workers desperately needed in German industry. Rather than cooperate 
with recruitment officials, some skilled workers lied about their previous work 
experience and job skills due to fears that employment in German industrial centres 
would put them at greater risk of bombing. However, in most cases such deception 
was futile, as workers were conscripted irrespective of their skills and most Belgians 
were deployed in German cities. Moreover, by playing down their skills conscripts 
increased the likelihood that they would be assigned a job that was not 
commensurate with their skills and experience. The massive undertaking of assigning 
jobs to thousands of workers probably meant that for the sake of expediency in some 
instances even skilled workers were assigned jobs that did not reflect their existing 
skills and experience. Western Europeans often complained that they were assigned 
unsuitable jobs.
11 
A metal worker from Charleroi recalled: "There were five of us 
from the factory [who went to Germany], three of us worked in the rolling mill and 
two others in a garage. Only one of us practised their trade". 12 Alfons L similarly 
recalled: "Each of us had to undertake a different job - it was a question of adjusting. 
The first days were lost, but we had to quickly adjust". 13 New recruits were under 
pressure from employers to get up to speed with their new jobs as quickly as 
possible. Workers themselves had to learn to be flexible and those who worked in 
Germany throughout Belgium's occupation were often employed in different jobs 
across Germany. Crucially, however, workers were paid according to skill level and 
thus those in unskilled jobs earned lower wages. 
Once a worker was assigned to an employer it was generally quite difficult to 
change jobs. According to the advice provided in the "De Post Onder Ons" section 
of the DAF's Flemish-language newspaper De Vlaamsche Post, a replacement 
worker had to be secured before a worker could leave their employer and take up a 
new job. 14 In view of Germany's labour shortage, this was difficult to arrange. Most 
employers were unlikely to release an employee unless their work was unsatisfactory 
or they were troublesome - not least because releasing an employee would 
necessitate securing and training a replacement. In some cases husbands and wives 
were assigned jobs in different parts of Germany and remained separated because 
11 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 315. 
12 Quoted in Jacquemyns, Les travailleurs deportes, 20. 
13 CEGES/SOMA, AB2 I 79, Alfons L, "Bommen op Berlijn". [Account written in 1994.] 
14 Ibid., BCR335 GR, De Vlaamsche Post. Weekb/ad voor de Vlaamsche Arbeiders in Duitsch/and, 
(Jahrgang 2, Nr.32, 09.08.1942, 7). 
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neither could obtain a release from their employers. The best approach for husbands 
and wives or other relatives who wished to join family members working in 
Germany was for those already working in Germany to line up a job with their 
employer and then approach the recruitment office in Belgium to arrange the 
necessary paperivork. 
3. Young workers 
Under Belgian law, teenagers could commence paid employment at the age of 
fourteen and were recruited for work in Germany once they attained that age.
15 
Transport and residence lists and personnel records from German companies shows 
that a number of young Belgian workers - both male and female - were deployed in 
Germany during the war. 16 The parents or legal guardians of young workers were 
required to sign a form giving their permission for their children to work in 
Germany. On 23 July 1942 Military Administration official Haftmann wrote to 
recruitment offices advising that staff should avoid recruiting female workers below 
the age of eighteen and that female workers between the ages of sixteen and eighteen 
should only be recruited for work in industry in isolated cases with good 
justification. 17 Nevertheless, young Belgian women continued to work in German 
industry and were also deployed in domestic service or agriculture. While officials 
showed reluctance to allow females below the age of eighteen to be deployed in 
industry, they had few such reservations when it came to male teenagers. Records 
from December 1942 show that officials from Group VII and the Junkers plant in 
Dessau planned the recruitment of 1,000 male workers between the ages of fifteen 
and seventeen and 200 workers per month thereafter for two-year apprenticeships in 
skilled trades. 18 Young Belgians who worked in Germany generally fell into two 
categories: teenage workers who accompanied family members who were also 
working in Germany; and teenage workers who went unaccompanied. Young 
workers who fall into the second category most often came from precarious 
15 By contrast, officially Ostarbeiter children could work in Germany from the age of twelve and the 
strict protection and safety measures for German children and young people were not applicable to 
Ostarbeiter. Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 308. 
16 SVG/00, R.696/Tr.238190, Lists of the worker transports to Germany from Kortrijk for the period 
1940-44 from Public Assistance Commission (Commission d' Assistance Publique). 
17 Ibid., Werbestel/e Records, Az 5000 - Az 5552. Letter from Haftmann, Group VII, to all 
recruitment offices (dated 23 .07 .1942). 
18 Ibid. Letter from Haftmann, Group VII, to all recruitment offices. Filenote made by a Group VII 
official (dated 15.12.1942). 
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economic backgrounds: some were orphaned after the death of both parents and were 
under the guardianship of relatives; others came from large or single-parent families. 
In some instances Belgian teenagers used the opportunity provided by work in 
Germany to escape parental control. 
Teenagers who went to Germany unaccompanied were treated in the same 
manner as adult workers by the German authorities. No specific provisions were 
made for their care and most were housed in camps like adult workers. It is likely 
that in some cases older workers took unaccompanied younger workers under their 
wing. However, ultimately teenage workers were left to their own devices outside 
work hours. The case of Jan H and Robert W illustrates the trouble teenage workers 
could encounter. Jan H was recruited for work in Hamburg-Altona as a trainee turner 
at the age of sixteen in April 1942 and was assigned accommodation at the Lager 
Palmaille 17. At the camp Jan H met fellow Belgian teenager Robert W who was 
also working as a trainee. Together Jan H and Robert W committed several thefts in 
the camp. The two also found their way to Hamburg's famous Reeperbahn - the 
centre of the city's nightlife and the red-light district-where they met a German 
homosexual man called Lindner who made sexual advances on the teenagers. Robert 
W rejected these advances and warned his young friend about his meetings with 
Lindner. Jan H, who was uncertain about his sexuality, and began to meet the older 
man regularly and performed sexual acts in exchange for money and other gifts. Jan 
H was arrested just eleven weeks after his arrival in Hamburg for the thefts he 
committed in the camp and naively confessed to police officers about his relations 
with Lindner. During his interrogation Jan H told police officials that he had been 
unaware that it was a criminal offence to commit homosexual acts. Paragraph 175 of 
the Criminal Code criminalised homosexual acts. The police investigators handling 
the case viewed Lindner as a sexual predator, concluding that his conduct was 
indicative of an offender who routinely seduced impressionable young males. 
Officials came to the conclusion that "[Lindner] was able to tum the young man into 
a tool without his own will because Jan H is a case of a so-called weak character". 
Nevertheless, despite this acknowledgement of his youth and vulnerability, the 
judicial authorities showed Jan H little mercy, convicting him of theft and 
prostitution (under Paragraphs 242, 257, l 75a and 77 of the German Criminal Code 
and 1, 3, 9 of the Juvenile Justice Act) and sentencing him to four months 
imprisonment. Robert W was also convicted of theft and received the lesser sentence 
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of two weeks youth detention. 19 Police investigators recommended that Jan H be sent 
back to Belgium after serving his sentence due to his obvious criminal tendencies; 
however, he was subsequently despatched to the Dachau Concentration Camp where 
he was eventually released at the end of the war. 
4. Wages 
Foreign workers employed in Germany were paid according to wage groups set out 
in the labour accords. The tariff was established on the basis of the labour accords 
and workers also received any relevant bonuses for overtime, Sunday work or heavy 
manual labour, as well as any social welfare payments to which they were entitled.
20 
The OAF bulletin "Die Arbeitsaufnahme in Deutsch/and" (Taking up employment in 
Germany) outlined the terms and conditions under which foreign workers would be 
employed in Germany, emphasising that workers from Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and France would enjoy equality with German workers: 
With the same rights and responsibilities [the foreign worker] should work 
shoulder by shoulder with his German work colleagues. He will always be 
treated with the same esteem and respect that National Socialist Germany -
the Germany of working people - shows every German worker.21 
The bulletin emphasised that the Nazi state held workers in high esteem -
irrespective of their nationality. The bulletin also specifically emphasised that the 
principle of "equal pay for equal work" applied to these workers: "The [foreign] 
worker with the same level of performance should not be worse placed in terms of 
wages than the German worker who performs the same work".22 However, Poles and 
Ostarbeiter were denied the equality western Europeans enjoyed. 
While workers from countries allied to Germany, as well as workers from 
northern, western, southern and south-eastern Europe were, in principle, entitled to 
wage equality, these foreign workers were nevertheless at a material disadvantage for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, employers could exercise discretion with respect to 
tariff classifications and the allocation of special bonuses, and employers certainly 
often exploited foreign workers' lesser capacity to raise objections.23 Secondly, 
workers with families carried the double burden of financially supporting two 
19 SVG/00, R.2 l 9/Tr.27.678, Transcript of the proceedings of the Hamburg District Court, case ref 
120 DLs 134/42jug. 
20 Poles and Ostarbeiter were excluded from receiving most additional payments. 
21 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS/5/1/ vorl.262 fol. I. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, l 62. 
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households. Married workers from Belgium received a per diem separation payment 
of l .50RM; however, this payment did not compensate them for the cost of 
maintaining two households. Thirdly, the social security and taxes levied on foreign 
workers were also comparatively high.24 By contrast, the Belgian state did not 
introduce compulsory membership of a social insurance fund for those in paid 
employment until after World War Two. Finally, as we have seen in chapter one, 
foreign workers were treated as lower-class patients by the German health insurance 
funds and were sent home in cases of serious illness. Thus foreign workers were 
required to pay for health insurance, but were not necessarily guaranteed the same 
level of care afforded to German patients. The Central German Health Insurance 
Fund for Belgium and Northern France was responsible for the reimbursement of 
medical expenses and incapacity benefits to Belgians who were sent home due to 
illness. Belgians were also required to make unemployment insurance foreign 
contributions of 6.5 percent of their earnings.25 Wartime shortages and rationing also 
meant workers could buy few consumer goods in Germany. While Dutch workers 
were permitted to transfer their entire earnings to their families at home, Belgians· 
could transfer a maximum of l 25RM home each month. Additionally, foreigners 
were not permitted to take German currency outside the Reich and were therefore 
forced to exchange their earnings into Belgian francs if they returned home. Reeder 
reported in his Activity Report for September 1940 that "as a result [of the limits on 
wage transfers] Belgian workers returning on leave have sought to take their saved 
earnings across the border in German currency".26 However, a closer examination of 
the earnings of Belgian workers in Germany shows that few Belgian workers earned 
sufficient wages to be able to transfer more than l 25RM per month to their families 
at home. A more likely explanation as to why Belgian workers preferred to take their 
earnings back to Belgium with them was that they distrusted the transfers, which 
were often delayed.27 Moreover, foreign workers lost a significant proportion of their 
wages when they transferred their earnings home. This was due to German policies 
that encouraged higher inflation in the occupied territories. The rate of exchange for 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 162-3. 
26 CEGES/SOMA, BAL 13. I /9-11, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr. I 0, I 05-6. 
27 Reeder also suggested in his Activity Report for November 1940 that some workers were avoiding 
wage transfers, as they would then be required to repay any interim payments their families had 
received from the Belgian municipal authorities while waiting for their first wage transfer from 
Germany. Ibid., Tdtigkeitsbericht, Nr.11. 
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Reichsmark was kept artificially low to the detriment of workers transferring wages 
to their families. The purchasing power of wages transferred to workers' families in 
Belgium was therefore reduced significantly. 
The information available regarding the wages paid to Belgian workers is 
generally limited because records such as employment contracts, wage records and 
personnel records are often absent from personal files held at the SVG/DO. 
28 
In some 
cases, the official record of annual earnings is available. However, the best indication 
of a worker's earnings is provided by payslips retained from their time in Germany, 
as these records also detail the overtime worked, as well as deductions. During the 
initial training period, which normally lasted for a period of six weeks, workers were 
generally paid a lower training wage.29 The first weeks of their deployment in 
Germany were often particularly difficult for many workers because training wages 
limited their earnings. This problem was exacerbated by the fact workers who had 
been issued a pair of work shoes by the recruitment office in Belgium had to repay 
the cost of their work shoes in the form of wage deductions. Some workers found 
that after deductions for accommodation, food, work shoes, tax, social insurance, as 
well as DAF and Winter Relief Aid contributions, were taken from their wages they 
were paid very little. Additionally, there were often delays before workers received 
their first packages from home, which often made their first weeks in Germany 
particularly hard. It is difficult to assess to what extent Belgian workers received 
wage increases after completing initial training or after gaining new skills and 
experience, as employment contracts, where available, set out the wage paid upon 
commencement. The wages of some workers increased after they had completed 
training. In a small number of cases this wage increase was stipulated in their initial 
employment contract; however, most often this was not the case. 
The wages earned by Belgian men in Germany point to a significant degree 
of variation depending on their skills and the industry in which they were deployed 
(see Appendix 8 on page 324 and Appendix 9 on page 327). This sample is based on 
one hundred wage records. The majority of those recorded in the sample worked in 
Berlin and Diisseldorf. 30 The hourly wage for male workers ranged from 0.56RM per 
hour for unskilled workers to l .50RM per hour for skilled workers. Workers 
28 Recruitment officials stopped producing employment contracts in March 1943. 
29 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 162. 
30 Germany was divided up into separate wage areas, with the highest wages being paid in Gau Berlin. 
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employed in the metals industry, carpentry, and printing and book binding 
commanded some of the highest wages. Belgian men earned 0.87RM per hour on 
average. 
Belgian women, who had often undertaken unskilled jobs or lower-paid jobs 
in the textile or service industries, were usually employed in semi-skilled and 
unskilled jobs in German factories. Many women were also employed as kitchen-
hands in canteens in workplaces or camps, in hospitality or domestic service and the 
textile industry. Women invariably earned substantially lower wages than their male 
counterparts because they tended to be employed in lower-paid jobs and 
discriminatory pay scales also meant that female workers were paid lower wages 
than men working in comparable positions. Appendix I 0 on page 330 shows the 
earnings of a sample of twenty-one women for whom wage information is available. 
Although small, the sample nevertheless provides a good indication of the earnings 
of Belgian women in Germany. The average hourly wage earned by the women 
included in the sample is 0.49RM and their hourly earnings cluster around 0.50RM. 
At the same time, wage deductions for board and lodgings in camps were set at the 
same rate for women as their male colleagues. The material position of female 
workers was therefore significantly worse than their male counterpart~. The average 
wage for a German woman was 23RM per week. However, it is difficult to assess to 
what extent Belgian women earned higher or lower wages than German women, as 
there was an increasing tendency for employers to employ German women for half-
day work in order to encourage more women to take up paid employment. Belgian 
women did not, however, have the option of working on a part-time basis. While the 
DAF Leaflet "Accepting Work in Germany" indicates that special protections 
applied to women regarding work hours, an examination of the contracted work 
hours of Belgian women indicates that the women's work hours were similar to those 
of their male counterparts. 
Belgian workers frequently used black market trading and bartering to 
supplement their wages and provide greater financial support to their families at 
home. Many Belgians found that the best way to improve their material position was 
to sell tobacco, which was much more readily available in Belgium. One worker 
recalled that he sold one kilogram of tobacco each month, which was sent to him by 
his wife. The worker then transferred the proceeds of his tobacco sales - circa l ,300-
l ,400bfrs - to his wife. This enabled him to retain his own wages in order to 
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supplement his food rations. Another worker who had a wife and three children to 
support told his wife to send him packages of tobacco rather than other goods. His 
wife purchased the tobacco for 750bfrs per kilogram and he sold it in Germany for 
3,000-4,000bfrs.31 The profits that could be made by black marketeers did not, 
however, come without risk. Belgian Josef J was arrested by the police in Hamburg 
in April 1943. He had 1 OOg of tobacco in his possession and was accused of trading 
tobacco on the black market. During police questioning Josef J admitted that he had 
purchased three 1 OOg packets of tobacco for l 4RM each from an unidentified 
Dutchman at the Gross Neumarkt in Hamburg and had in turn sold the tobacco for 
l 6RM per packet. He also admitted that he had traded cigarettes. Josef J had 525RM 
in his possession when he was arrested - a considerable sum that would have 
represented a significant portion of a worker's annual earnings. On 9 April 1943 the 
Hamburg District Court convicted him of trading tobacco at exorbitant prices and 
without ration cards (under Paragraph 1, 5 of the Ordinance on Price Regulation of 
18 August 1941, Paragraph 22 of the Ordinance on the War Economy of 
4 September 1939, Paragraph 1 Section 1 of the Ordinance on Rationing of 
26 November 1941 and Paragraph 73 of the German Criminal Code) and sentenced 
him to two months imprisonment. 32 
Tobacco was also used to barter with other workers. Non-smoker Roger B 
regularly received packages of tobacco from his family in Ghent, which he 
exchanged for food with fellow workers in Halberstadt. While some workers 
reported that they lost weight after their arrival in Germany, Roger B told his family 
that he had gained weight following his arrival.33 Some workers used tobacco as a 
bargaining tool. Jean L recalled that he obtained leave to return home on leave by 
bribing his boss at the Mannesmann Rohrenwerke AG in Dilsseldorf-Rath with the 
promise of bringing a box of cigars upon his return.34 Access to tobacco - a scarce 
commodity during the war - gave Belgian workers an enormous advantage over 
workers from Poland and eastern Europe and allowed some workers to make 
substantial profits and improve their material position immeasurably. Herbert 
observes that "the social hierarchy among the various groups of foreigners was 
31 Jacquemyns, Les travailleurs deportes, 31. 
32 SVG/DO, R.2 I 9/Tr.27.678, Flemish translation of the records of the Hamburg District Court, 
Department 132, case ref. 132 Cs 187/43. 
33 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/36, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Roger 8. Letter sent by Roger B's 
mother discussing contents of her son's previous letter (dated 15.01.1944). 
34 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jean L. 
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extended even to the substructures via which food was obtained; the gradations 
became even more rigorous". 35 Thierry Bonzen and Belinda Davis emphasise in their 
study of food and consumption during the First World War that the black market 
redistributes resources to those who have the ease and influence to use it.36 Western 
Europeans also earned higher wages and were not subject to the wage restrictions 
that had such a deleterious effect on the earnings of Poles and Ostarbeiter.37 Western 
Europeans' higher earnings ensured that they had a greater capacity to access goods 
on the black market. As privileged western Europeans, Belgians were also exempted 
from wearing a badge that identified them as foreigners, as was required of 
Ostarbeiter and Poles. This enabled them to blend into the German civilian 
population more readily and therefore gave them greater access to the black market 
that operated beyond the camps. Their privileged status also gave western European 
workers greater confidence in their day-to-day dealings with the German public. 
Many Flemings were also able to take greater advantage of the black market because 
the linguistic similarities between Flemish and German enabled them to learn the 
German language more quickly. 
Some women used prostitution to supplement their income, while others gave 
up other employment and relied solely on prostitution to earn a living. Belgian 
women working as prostitutes were recruited to work for German employers and 
turned to prostitution as a way of making ends meet after their arrival in Germany. 
The earnings that could be made through prostitution were much higher than the 
wages paid by German employers. Some women working as prostitutes reported that 
they saw up to fifty clients per day.38 Belgian Andree B told police officers that she 
worked as a prostitute on weekends alongside her usual factory job, earning I 00-
200RM per day. Andree B explained that she had a six-month-old child to support 
35 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 328. 
36 Thierry Bonzon and Belinda Davis, "Food and Consumption," in Paris, London, Berlin. Capital 
Cities at War, 1914-1919, ed. Johannes Winter and JL Robert (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994). 
37 According to the rates set in July 1944 in the Gau labour office in Berlin, where the highest wages 
were paid, Poles could earn a maximum of 7RM per week for men and 5.55RM per week for women. 
Poles were also excluded from most bonuses and additional payments. Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter 
dem Hakenkreuz, 154. 
38 Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. 15, 6069. (lnlandsfragen: 29.11.1943) 
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who was being cared for in France.39 Single mother Andree B found that prostitution 
provided much needed additional income to support her child. 
Wages were a common cause for complaint amongst western Europeans. 
Frans G and Pieter D were recruited to work as trainees for the aviation manufacturer 
Junkers in Dessau on 24 March 1941. After their arrival they were transferred to 
Siiddeutsche Maschinen- und Geratebau GmbH in Meretitz-Eggertal in the southern 
Germany. The two workers were content with the work, accommodation and food 
provisions in Meretitz-Eggertal, but had cause for complaint because they only 
received an hourly wage of 0.57RM, even though their employment contracts 
stipulated that they would be paid 0.70RM per hour. Upon their return to Belgium in 
July 1941 the men visited the recruitment office in Mechelen, where they had been 
recruited, to complain about their employer's failure to pay them the wage agreed in 
their employment contracts. Recruitment officials from Antwerp and Mechelen 
subsequently intervened in the case, writing to the Junkers management: "It seems 
advisable that the workers recruited in Belgium should be guaranteed the wage set 
out in their employment contract, and the difference [between the wage paid and the 
wage stipulated in the contract] should be repaid".40 But despite the strongly-worded 
objections of officials in Belgium, the Junkers management would not waver. On 
23 July 1941 a company representative wrote to the recruitment office justifying the 
payment of lower wages on the basis that the men's wages reflected the pay-scales in 
southern Germany, and argued that in fairness to all workers employed at the 
company's factory in Meretitz-Eggertal the men could not be paid at the rate set out 
in their contracts. Company officials were clearly conscious that disagreements 
would inevitably arise if workers found that certain colleagues were receiving higher 
wages. The company official argued that the men were not worse off financially, in 
any case, as living expenses such as accommodation and food were significantly 
lower in Meretitz-Eggertal.41 It is unclear whether these two workers initially raised 
their objections directly with workplace representatives or their employer without 
success; however, this case illustrates that Belgians used all means available to 
ensure their rights were upheld. Additionally, the case is interesting as it shows that 
39 LAB, A Rep. 358-02: Nr.111910, sworn statement dated 22.10.1943 [files of the Berlin State Court 
in relation to the prosecution of a French national accused of the I iving off the earnings of prostitution, 
case reference (512) KLs 46/43 (70/44)]. 
40 SVG/00, 067264/378.955 and SOR 158695. Letter to Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke AG 
from the Antwerp recruitment office (dated 07 .07 .1941) 
41 Ibid. 
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some recruitment officials acted in good faith and sought to ensure that recruits were 
treated properly and that the terms of their employment contracts were upheld. 
Officials took this matter personally - not least because they were well aware that 
negative reports from workers in Germany filtered back to Belgium and hampered 
recruitment. 
5. Work hours 
Spoerer emphasises that, although employers generally had a free hand in the 
workplace and could use their own discretion in determining industrial matters, this 
did not lead to the greater exploitation of foreign workers in terms of the hours they 
were required to work. As a general rule, Germans and foreigners worked the same 
number of hours, as the task of overseeing the work of foreigners was undertaken by 
German employees who worked the same shifts.42 Foreign workers worked fifty-six 
hours a week nominally, although this was later often raised to sixty hours a week.43 
Appendix 8 on page 324 and Appendix I 0 on page 330 provide an indication of the 
hours Belgians were contracted to work. Herbert emphasises that normal work 
rhythms were disrupted from 1943 onwards and nominal working hours became 
illusory, since actual hours worked declined due to air-raid warnings, lost time 
because of repairs, breakdowns in public transportation and increased numbers of 
workers reporting sick, leading to an increase of overtime and Sunday work.44 
Belgians employed in industry commonly worked ten, eleven or twelve-hour shifts 
five days a week, with a break of half an hour or an hour for lunch, and generally 
worked a half day on Saturdays. Additionally, workers employed in industry were 
also often required to work one Sunday in three or one Sunday in two, or perhaps 
even more. Workers employed in smaller businesses or who had been assigned 
white-collar jobs recalled that they worked from 8.00am-5.00pm Monday to Friday 
and a half day on Saturdays. Louis B recalled: "It was said work above all else, 
virtually no leisure time, our little [spare] time was used for doing our washing, 
mending our socks, preparing our meals etc ... I worked twelve hours per day and 
three Sundays in four". 45 Workers whose accommodation was not located close to 
their place of work might also face a journey of up to an hour at the start and end of 
42 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit u,:,ter dem Hakenkreuz, 148. 
43 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 307. 
44 Ibid., 226. 
45 CEGES/SOMA, AAl216/I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Louis B. 
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their shift. Workers therefore had very little leisure time, especially during weeks 
when they were required to work on Sunday. While German women were protected 
by the prohibition of night work, there were no such restrictions on working hours 
for foreign women. Belgian women could in principle be allocated night work, 
although it is unclear whether many Belgian women were required to undertake night 
work.46 Factories in the war industries often operated around the clock and 
employers usually ran two twelve-hour shifts or three eight-hour shifts. Belgians 
employed in factories where multiple shifts were in operation generally report that 
their shifts rotated on a weekly basis, although occasionally workers were assigned to 
work the day shift or night shift on a permanent basis. 
6. Modern work environment 
Western workers were often very positive in their assessment of the German work 
environment. Many Belgians reported that the facilities in German factories were 
excellent: factories were modern and many had been improved through the DAF's 
''Beauty of Labour" project; wo~kplaces were well equipped and work tools were in 
good condition; and work was well organised.47 One French worker wrote: 
As far as the plant is concerned, or to put it more correctly, the way things are 
organised, well it's just perfect. I wish they could see the facilities here, all 
the machines we have, the wash-stands, showers and lockers for clothing. 
Imagine the lessons French employers could learn from this.48 
One Belgian similarly recalled that "the working conditions were more agreeable 
there than here [in Belgium]".49 Even workers who came from industrialised 
countries in western Europe were impressed with the modern work environment in 
Germany and the enlightened approach of some companies. From a professional 
standpoint many Belgians also reported that they felt that their time in Germany was 
profitable. 50 Belgians who were assigned different jobs in Germany had the 
opportunity to gain new skills and experience. The opportunity to expand their skills 
enabled some Belgians to improve their future employment prospects and was 
therefore a welcome opportunity that many workers grasped. 
46 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 307. 
47 Jacquemyns, Les travai//eurs deportes, 3 1-2. 
48 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 314. 
49 Quoted in Jacquemyns, Les travai//eurs deportes, 3 I. 
so Ibid., 32. 
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7. Sickness and absenteeism 
Absenteeism became a major problem for employers from 1943. As the statistics on 
worker health at Deutsche Werft have shown, the number of workers suffering from 
illness steadily increased over the war and invariably affected production. Workplace 
accidents, as well as factors such as long work hours and air-raid alarms at night that 
led to general exhaustion, resulted in higher absenteeism. Many workers also used 
reporting sick as a means of avoiding work, and in some cases this was a veiled 
strike. However, Herbert emphasises that the rates of absenteeism amongst western 
European workers were not higher than those of German workers. 51 In response to 
the problem of absenteeism many companies introduced a system whereby a 
company representative attended the workers' camps every morning to register sick 
employees. Those who reported sick were sent to the company doctor. Another 
worker recalled that the factory police came to his camp each morning to register 
sick workers. Sick workers were sent to the company doctor and "those who were 
not very sick were given two aspirin tablets and were sent to work, while those who 
had a fever were given two aspirin tablets and were sent to bed for a day's rest". 52 In 
other factories the factory nurse came to the camp to examine workers who reported 
sick and if their illness was considered serious enough the nurse sent the worker to 
see the doctor outside the camp, accompanied by another worker. 53 In this manner 
company managers limited access to doctors and reduced the number of work hours 
lost due to workers seeking medical attention. Company doctors therefore played a 
key role in reducing absenteeism and lost hours. Such a system was, however, only 
possible at camps that were run by companies for employees. Foreign workers 
recognised that in most cases company doctors acted as an arm of the company 
management. Addressing Central Planning in October 1944 Speer reported: 
Ley has determined that where plant doctors are present and people are 
examined by them, the number of workers on the sick-list immediately drops 
by a fourth or fifth. The SS and police could go right ahead, and put those 
persons known to be idlers and malingerers in concentration camp factories. 
There's no other solution.54 
The Nazi authorities and company officials regarded absenteeism and work 
avoidance as a major threat to industrial production. Frustrated by widespread 
51 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign' Workers, 226. 
52 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Victor B. 
53 Ibid., AA 1216/15, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Marcel A. 
54 Quoted in Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 331. 
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absenteeism, the German authorities advocated a harsh approach to those considered 
to be idlers and malingerers. Herbert observes, "Speer had fired the starting pistol for 
a tightening of the penal system against ~loafing' which would then boost 
performance by repression". 55 Regulations issued by the Reich Main Security Office 
and Sauckel at the end of 1943 provided for a graduated system of internal and 
external penalties. Company managers were given more punitive authority and the 
Gestapo was given sole responsibility for penalties external to the factory; through 
the use of the Gestapo to handle the serious cases, the German authorities sought to 
avoid clogging up the courts with industrial matters. 
Employers became increasingly reluctant to allow sick workers to return 
home, even if a medical doctor recommended that the worker return home to 
convalesce: 
The doctor who cared for me told me that I could go home on leave, but the 
boss of the factory did not want to allow me to leave because I would not 
return. I had a lot of difficulties obtaining leave, I stayed at the barracks 
without working to convalesce. 56 
Unless a worker was gravely ill, many employers probably adopted a wait-and-see 
approach, hoping that their employee's health would improve. As the labour shortage 
became more acute, and it became increasingly difficult to obtain replacement 
workers, employers tried to prevent foreign employees returning home, especially as 
a considerable number did not return to their jobs in Germany. In February 1943 
Belgian Samuel G fell ill and, despite receiving intensive medical treatment, his 
condition showed little prospect of improving in the short-term. The physician 
treating Samuel G recommended that he be released from service: 
As it will take more time for [the illness to heal], we order that patient return 
to his home in Belgium. The patient requires lengthy and attentive nursing. 
We therefore recommend the return of [the patient's] wife, who is also 
working in Berlin. 57 
This case illustrates that Belgians received often good medical care and that Belgian 
workers were sent home when they were suffering from a serious or life-threatening 
illness. The release of the worker's wife from service so that she could return to 
Belgium and nurse her husband back to good health also demonstrates that Belgian 
workers often received privileged treatment. 
55 Ibid. 
56 CEG ES/SOMA, AA 1216/ I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jacques C. 
57 SVG/DO, SOR 381127. 
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8. Leave provisions 
The leave entitlements of foreign civilians employed in Germany were set out in a 
decree published in August 1941. In accordance with this decree, married workers 
were entitled to leave after six months of continuous service, while unmarried 
workers were entitled to leave after completing twelve months of continuous service. 
However, many Belgian women, including unmarried women, obtained leave after 
just six months of service, and in some instances even less. By contrast with western 
Europeans, Poles faced a virtual ban on leave until the end of the war with leave only 
granted in exceptional cases on the grounds of the death or serious illness of a close 
family member or marriage, while workers from the USSR were even worse placed 
having no entitlement to leave. 58 The length of leave granted to foreign workers was 
determined by the distance of their home from their place of work in Germany: 
Table 4: Leave provisions59 
Distance (km) Number of days 
up to 500 7 
' 500-700 8 
750-1,000 9 
over 1,000 IO 
The timing of a worker's leave was determined by their employer taking into 
account the needs of the company and the availability of worker transport trains.60 
German employers met the travel costs for home leave, although the employer could 
deduct the travel costs from the worker's wages or veto their next scheduled leave 
period if they returned to Germany after the end of their leave period.61 
Leave provisions were an important consideration for prospective recruits and 
hampered the recruitment of female workers during the first months of the 
occupation. The importance of leave provisions is illustrated by the difficulties 
58 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 167. Sauckel relaxed the restrictions on leave for 
eastern workers in July 1943 granting them the entitlement to one week of paid leave in Germany in 
the second year of their service, but did grant eastern workers leave to return home. 
59 Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, NS/5/l/vorl.262 fol. I., OAF Merkb/all "Die Arbeitsaufnahme in 
Deutsch/ and'. 
60 On 6 October 1941 the Reich Labour Minister advised the Reich Transport Minister that it was 
necessary to institute measl!res to ensure that foreigners employed in Germany only travel on special 
trains scheduled for workers going on leave when returning home. Ibid., letter dated 06.10.1941. 
61 Ibid., "Tarifordnung zur Regelung von Familienheimfahrten wahrend der Kriegszeitfiir 
aus/andischer Arbeitskrafle im Deutschen Reich", issued by the Reich Labour Trustee for the 
Brandenburg economic area as Special Trustee, Tarifregister Nr.330 I /2 (dated 27 .08.1941 ). 
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encountered by the Military Administration in recruiting women for domestic 
service. In November 1940 Reeder noted in his Activity Report that there were 2,200 
available vacancies for women in domestic service jobs in Germany and just 700 
Belgian women had been recruited, even though there were an estimated 20,000 
unemployed domestic servants in Belgium. Reeder suggested that the reason behind 
the unwillingness-of Belgian domestics to accept work in Germany was that there 
were no provisions for the reimbursement of their travel costs for leave in Belgium. 
To solve this problem, Reeder proposed that the Belgian Labour Ministry should be 
required to cover the travel costs of domestic servants returning to Belgium on leave 
because German housewives could not be expected to pay for the travel costs of their 
domestic servants and these costs would, in any case, be less than the cost of paying 
unemployment benefits.62 The persistence of unemployment amongst female 
domestic servants, in spite of many unfilled vacancies in Germany, illustrates that 
Belgian workers were not prepared to accept work in Germany on any terms. Leave 
provisions were a deal breaker and many Belgians would not consider working in 
Germany if there were not adequate leave provisions. 
The labour authorities sought to limit the granting of leave to foreign workers 
during the Christmas and New Year period. In late 1941 the Reich Labour Minister 
issued an appeal for the restriction of travel over the Christmas period, emphasising 
that the German railways had to prioritise the supply of goods to the front, as well as 
the travel of serving soldiers who had been granted leave to visit their families after 
brave military service. However, the denial of leave angered western European 
volunteers who had been assured that they would be granted leave. Frustrated with 
the refusal to grant leave over the festive season some workers breached their 
employment contract and returned home illegally, while others elected to return to 
Belgium when their contract ended. 
Initially the number of foreign workers who absconded remained relatively 
low. However, absconding workers became a major problem for German employers 
from the summer of 1942, levelling off towards the end of 1943 at around 45,000 per 
month. At IG-Farben in Ludwigshafen, of 407 western Europeans granted leave in 
May and June 1943 only 58 returned on time, while 278 (68 percent) did not return. 63 
The Drahtwerke Eidelstedt GmbH in Hamburg employed six Belgians during the 
62 CEGES/SOMA, BALl3.l/9-l I, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.11. 
63 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 341. 
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war. The company's records show that four of these workers commenced 
employment with the company on I 3 September I 943. The four men were all 
granted leave on 30 June I 944 and failed to return to Germany after the end of their 
leave. Another joined the company on 20 January I 943 and returned to Belgium on 
leave a few weeks later on 23 February I 943 and failed to return. The last Belgian to 
work for the company was dismissed on 6 December I 944 less than a month after he 
commenced employment with the company. 64 Employers in other parts of Germai:iy 
also had similar experiences with western European employees. German employers 
were understandably frustrated, and demanded the right to block contractually 
stipulated leave if they suspected a worker would not return. Sauckel faced the 
problem of balancing the demands of employers with the expectations of western 
Europeans who had been assured that they would receive regular leave. Sauckel was 
reluctant to issue a blanket ban on leave for western Europeans due to concerns that 
an outright ban would provoke widespread unrest. In August I 943 Sauckel did, 
however, authorise employers to ban leave if the needs of their business necessitated 
such a step - giving empl0yers a significant degree of discretion to block leave. 65 On 
I September 1943 Sauckel suspended the granting of home leave to foreign workers 
until 15 October I 943 and from mid October I 943 more wide-ranging restrictions 
were implemented, due to large numbers of workers who failed to return. After the 
introduction of greater restrictions in October I 943 few Belgians were granted leave. 
Many unmarried men who were conscripted after the introduction of the compulsory 
labour draft spent up to thirty months in Germany without returning to Belgium. 
Emile S recalled that single men knew they had no chance of obtaining leave.66 In 
some cases workers were permitted to return on compassionate grounds because a 
family member was suffering from a serious illness or due to family bereavement. 
However, all leave was left to the discretion of employers and, as Frans S bitterly 
recalled, his employer even refused to grant leave upon the death of a parent.67 
Excepting a small number of workers who were sent home due to serious illness, the 
more than 200,000 Belgians working in Germany at the time of Belgium's liberation 
<>.i SVG/DO, R.45 l/Tr.75.702, Letter from the Drahtwerke Eidelstedt GmbH in Hamburg to BLO de 
Maen (dated 09.02.1951). · 
65 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 341. 
66 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Emile S. 
67 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Frans S. 
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were cut off after Belgium fell to the Allies in September 1944. Sauckel finally 
cancelled all leave for western Europeans in January 1945. 
The introduction of a guarantor system when granting leave for western 
Europeans further strengthened the hand of employers. In some cases workers were 
treated as a group and if a worker who visited home on leave failed to return to 
Germany their employer might refuse to grant leave to their fellow countrymen. In 
many companies workers acted as a personal guarantor for a work colleague who 
went home on leave. The guarantor system was clearly underpinned by the 
assumption that camaraderie amongst foreign workers would engender a sense of 
obligation towards their colleagues and workers would therefore return to Germany 
at the end of their leave. Conscripted worker Jeanne C, who was granted leave in 
December 1943 because her father was ill, later recalled: 
After my leave I returned to Germany because before my departure for 
Belgium another girl had to act as a guarantor in Germany and I did not want 
to cause her to have no opportunity to return [home]. That's why I did not 
want to go into hiding in order to escape returning to Germany. 68 
Conscripted worker Jean B similarly recalled: "A young deportee turner who arrived 
after me whom I had helped a lot signed for me [to go on leave]".69 Workers like 
Jeanne C and Jean B had to make a choice between their own freedom and denying 
their colleagues the chance to visit home. The guarantor system was probably more 
effective when workers were required to have a colleague agree to act as a guarantor 
for their return because the failure to return from leave was in effect a personal 
betrayal of a colleague or perhaps even a close friend. 
The introduction of a guarantor system still failed to deter many workers 
from breaching their labour contracts when they returned home on leave. Those 
amongst the latter groups scheduled to return home were inevitably consigned to 
spending the remainder of the war in Germany with no opportunity to visit their 
families. Workers who were denied the opportunity to return home after a fellow 
worker failed to return from leave did not generally express animosity towards 
colleagues who did not return. Robert Q recalled: 
I never returned on leave. This is why: the French and Belgians were 
considered as one group. Two Frenchmen were able to go on leave (three 
weeks, if I recall correctly). Upon their return two Belgians were to have their 
68 SVG/00, 039757/333361, sworn statement made by Jeanne C (dated 15.07.1952). 
69 CEG ES/SO MA, AA 12 16/ I, Enquete Travail Obi igatoire, Jean B. 
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turn and so on. Only, we knew in advance that the Frenchmen would not 
return. Due to this fact no further leave was authorised. 70 
After the failure of workers to return from leave employers often took advantage of 
the powers given to them by Sauckel, blocking all leave. Workers who were denied 
leave to return home naturally felt great disappointment, but they did not generally 
resent colleagues who were fortunate enough to be amongst the first who were 
granted leave, especially as employers often gave priority to married workers with 
wives and children at home. Workers themselves were often honest with each other 
regarding their intentions. The knowledge that the Frenchmen were not planning to 
return did not prompt the Belgians to report this information to their employer. Some 
even left parting gifts such as money or other goods as a consolation gesture to those 
they left behind. 
71 
The anger felt by workers who could not obtain leave was usually 
directed at those they felt were responsible - the employers and labour authorities 
who held them hostage in Germany. 
The records of leave granted to Belgians show that they were required to 
place the sum of 300RM on deposit with the Deutsche Bank before they returned to 
Belgium on leave from 1943. In most cases this figure represented a significant 
proportion of a worker's earnings - perhaps as much as a quarter of their annual 
earnings - and it is evident that workers forfeited the deposit if they failed to return. 
This deposit clearly intended to be an incentive for them to return to Germany. 
However, many workers probably felt that the loss of the deposit was a small price to 
pay for the opportunity to escape Germany - especially as bombing raids became 
more frequent. 
Some workers were granted leave to return home after their barracks had 
been destroyed by bombing. These workers were sent home to obtain new clothes 
after all their belongings were destroyed. Sending workers home on leave also 
temporarily solved the problem of where to house them until new accommodation 
could be arranged. In cases where a worker's accommodation and place of work 
were located together their employer may have been forced to suspend work in any 
case. Moreover, employers probably chose to send workers home temporarily rather 
than release them to the Labour Office. 
70 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Robert Q. 
71 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 167. 
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9. Marriage and morality 
A number of Belgian women used marriage as grounds to seek leave and return 
home. Some women were engaged to be married at the time of their conscription, 
while in other cases weddings were arranged by relatives who were eager to secure 
their return to Belgium. It is likely that some women found themselves entering into 
marriage prematurely under pressure from their family. In view of the lurid claims of 
those campaigning against the conscription of Belgian workers, it is not surprising 
that Belgian families held grave fears for the fate of young women who went to 
Germany and endeavoured to secure .their return through all available means. 
Married women were not liable for compulsory labour service in Germany and some 
of those who returned to get married probably hoped that they would be permitted to 
remain in Belgium. 
The conscription of Belgian workers prompted a public outcry in Belgium. 
Church leaders and the Young Christian Workers (KAJ/JOC) led a campaign against 
conscription, decrying the living and working conditions of Belgian conscripts in 
Germany. 72 A central element of the campaign against conscription was the claim 
that the morality of workers, in particular young women, was compromised in 
Germany. Belgian Christian organisations took up the task of shielding Belgian 
workers from moral temptation and spiritual degradation. Letters expressing moral 
outrage sent home by conscripted workers, many of whom were female, were read 
publicly by representatives of the KAJ/JOC and parish priests in Belgium. The 
representative of the head of the Security Police and Security Service in Belgium and 
Northern France reported in March 1943 that opponents of the conscription of 
Belgian workers were making the claim that "young girls who went to Germany pure 
and chaste were ruined within days". 73 The letters of conscripted workers painted a 
picture of workers' camps rife with sexual immorality~ describing strip-tease acts, 
indecent pictures on the walls, brothels, orgies and the abundance of contraceptive 
devices such as condoms, which could be readily purchased in public toilets in cities 
like Berlin. 74 Morally indignant letter writers complained that conscripts were housed 
72 Pieter Lagrou, The legacy of Nazi occupation, 146. The KAJ/JOC was founded in France and 
Belgium in the 1920s as one of the most dynamic branches of the Catholic Action and shared its 
missionary spirit for the re-Christianisation of the working classes under strict clerical guidance. 
73 CEGES/SOMA, AA553, SP/SD Meldungen aus Belgien und Nord Frankreich, 4143, 21. 
74 Lagrou, The legacy of Nazi occupation, 145. Annette F Timm emphasises that condoms - bought by 
men - for instance, were never banned despite their dual function as both prophylactic and birth 
control device Annette F Timm, "The Politics of Fertility: Population Politics and Health Care in 
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together with volunteers who were living freely and that all moral inhibitions were 
soon abandoned, even amongst the morally pure. It was also reported that free love 
and abortions were the order of the day in Germany. 75 Catholic priest Gaston Poppe, 
the leader of the social works section of the Catholic Action for the Mechel en area, 
agitated against the conscription of workers in his sermons and at gatherings of 
workers, warning that many workers had become infected with sexually transmitted 
infections. 
76 
Female volunteers were characterised as "adventurers" who went to 
Germany so that they would be liberated from moral and social constraints. 
It is certainly true that going to Germany was a liberating experience for 
young Belgians, offering the opportunity to escape the control of their families and 
the strictures of Belgium's traditionally "pillarised" society. Belgian workers enjoyed 
greater freedoms in Germany - including sexual freedom. And certainly there is no 
smoke without fire. Occasionally there are references to sexual impropriety in 
workers' quarters in the records. Albert S recorded in his diary: "'Uncle said women 
had run across our beds without any trousers on". 77 References to sexual impropriety 
are often described in the third person, describing another person's exploits. 
Members of the German population complained about the alleged sexual promiscuity 
of foreign women. In Ti.ibingen, for example, the Security Service reported in July 
1941 that seven members of the Hitler Youth were in the habit of "going for walks 
with Belgian women at night and having sexual intercourse with them". 78 The moral 
panic discourse that was a core element of the Christian organisations' campaign 
against the conscription of Belgian workers stigmatised female workers, in particular 
female volunteers, many of whom came from precarious socio-economic 
backgrounds and went to Germany to work in order to support themselves and their 
families. 79 Most Catholic Action activists came from middle-class backgrounds. 
Pieter Lagrou argues that Catholic Action activists "very explicitly based their moral 
Berlin, 1919-1972" (The University of Chicago, 1999), 59. Timm's thesis has since been published 
Annette F Timm, The Politics of Fertility in Twentieth-CentWJ' Berlin (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 20 I 0). 
75 CEGES/SOMA, AA553, SP/SD Meldungen aus Belgien und Nord Frankreich, 4143, 21. Clearly, 
some of these claims were exaggerated. Abortion was a crime for "racially valuable" women and the 
German Criminal Code proyided for severe prison sentences. 
76 Ibid., SP/SD Meldungen aus Belgien und Nord Frankreich, 5143, 17. 
77 Ibid., AA 1216/38, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Albert S (diary entry 01.01.1944). 
78 Quoted in Stephenson, "Triangle: Foreign Workers, German Civilians, and the Nazi Regime," 349. 
79 Lagrou, The legacy of Nazi occupation, 145. 
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contempt for their compatriots on social prejudice".80 Margaret R Higgonet and 
Patrice LR Higgonet have observed that the '~social and economic roles of many 
women undergo rapid and radical transformation at the onset of war and, in a 
symmetrically opposed direction, at its conclusion". 81 This double helix analogy is 
particularly true of Belgian women who went to Germany during the Second World 
War. For many Belgian women the time spent in Germany during the war was a 
hiatus when they enjoyed new autonomy and employment opportunities; however, 
women faced social stigma upon their return as the Belgium's pre-war moral and 
social order was restored. The discourse of moral panic tarnished the reputations of 
women who went to Germany and some women felt the need to keep the period they 
spent in Germany secret after the war. The stigma attached to the women who 
worked in Germany also helps to explain why proportionally few women applied for 
recognition as deportees after the end of the war. 
Women granted leave to return to Belgium to marry were told that their 
impending marriage did not preclude them from returning to Germany; however, 
many women did not return. Textile worker Henriette D was conscripted in 
November 1942. After failing to depart for Germany on the appointed date Henriette 
D was collected by the military police and transported to Kothen, near Dessau. She 
was granted leave to return home for her marriage in April 1943 and used the 
opportunity to avoid returning to Germany. Henriette D recalled: 
Afterwards I had to depart for Germany again, but I didn't go. I went with my 
husband to work for farmers in France. The Germans did not anticipate that. I 
had no more trouble with the occupiers. I worked there until the end of 
January I 944. 82 
Male workers could also obtain leave to return home for marriage. While for female 
workers marriage represented a real possibility to escape Germany and remain in 
Belgium, marriage offered males the opportunity to obtain more frequent leave to 
return home as married men. In other cases, those who were in de-facto relationships 
when they departed were prompted to formalise a long-standing relationship with 
their partner, due to the high wage deductions for unmarried workers, and ensure 
80 Ibid., 150. 
81 Margaret R Higgonet and Patrice LR Higgonet, "The Double Helix," in Behind the lines: Gender 
and the Two World Wars, ed. Margaret R Higgonet, et al. (New Haven; London: Yale University 
Press, 1987), 3 I. 
82 SVG/DO, D 17325/329795, Sworn statement made by Henriette D (dated 02.08.1951 ). 
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their partner received the daily separation payment. 83 However, the families of some 
women engaged to men working in Germany opposed their marriage on the grounds 
that the newlyweds would embark on a miserable existence living apart if their son-
in-law returned to Germany. Families also worried that their prospective son".'in-law 
might be killed during a bombardment leaving behind a pregnant widow. 84 
10. Pregnancy 
Pregnancy was another avenue used by Belgian women to return home. The RAM 
prescribed that foreign women who were pregnant should be deported - a policy that 
remained in force until December 1942. 85 However, high rates of pregnancy, 
especially amongst Polish and Ostarbeiter women, led the German authorities to 
condude that the practice of deporting pregnant foreigners encouraged them to 
deliberately fall pregnant in order to return home. The authorities therefore 
abandoned the practice of deporting pregnant foreigners from the end of 1942. From 
March 1943 pregnant Polish and Ostarbeiter women had the right to request an 
abortion, subject to the authorisation of the local abortions' evaluation section of the 
General Medical Council.86 By contrast with their Polish and Soviet counterparts, 
Belgian women who were pregnant were given leave from their jobs in Germany for 
six months and were permitted to return home for childbirth. Factory worker 
Celestina R was conscripted in October 1942 and worked at a chemical factory in 
Leipzig. She was given leave to go home for her marriage in April 1943 and returned 
to Germany after her wedding, Celestina R was subsequently released by her 
employer on 31 May 1943 due to pregnancy. Many Belgian women who returned 
home for childbirth did not return to Germany. Conscript Germaine W commenced 
work at Junkers in Magdeburg in January 1 943 after spending two months at the 
company's training centre in Ghent. In late April 1943 she returned to Belgium on 
leave due to pregnancy and returned to Germany at the end of October 1943.87 Like 
many Belgian working mothers, it is most likely that Germaine W left her child in 
the care of relatives upon her return to Germany. Henriette H was conscripted in 
83 Jacquemyns, Les travail/eurs deportes, 72. 
84 Ibid., 73. 
85 Heusler argues that the p9licy of deporting pregnant foreign women was not enforced universally, 
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November 1942. The recruitment office postponed her departure so that Henriette H 
could marry. However, her impending marriage did not prompt the authorities to 
exempt her from conscription. Henriette H was finally forced to depart for Germany 
in early January 1943, but returned to Belgium in July 1943 due to pregnancy. 
Officials granted a release from conscription after Henriette H returned to Belgium. 
88 
These cases illustrate that even conscripted Belgian women were permitted to return 
home to give birth. Belgian women who gave birth in Germany did so by choice 
whether due to economic circumstances, the social stigma attached to illegitimate 
births and the desire to conceal their pregnancy from their families in Belgium or 
because they did not wish to be separated from the child's father when they returned 
home. 
As the producers of "racially valuable" offspring, Flemish expectant mothers 
were protected under the Law for the Protection of Mothers in Gainful Employment 
(Mutterschutzgesetz). 89 The law was passed on 17 May 1942 to safeguard the health 
of pregnant workers and gave expectant mothers the right to stop work in the final 
six weeks before the birth and forbade work during the first six weeks after the birth, 
while nursing mothers were entitled to leave from work for eight weeks after the 
birth and twelve weeks in the case of premature births. By contrast with Flemings, 
pregnant Walloons were not protected by the Mutterschutzgesetz; however, it is 
unclear to what extent Walloons and Flemings were treated differently in practice. 
In some parts of Germany maternity homes were set up for western European 
women. Forty-two children were born at a maternity home for western European 
women in Brunswick in 1944, for example, and six of these infants died. This 
represented a mortality rate of 14 percent, which was comparable to a mortality rate 
of 15 percent amongst the German newborns up to the age of six months, and 
contrasted with the mortality rate of 80 percent at the maternity home for Polish and 
Ostarbeiter women. 90 Many children born to Belgian mothers in Germany did not 
survive beyond the first few months of their life. However, as rates of mortality rose 
considerably during the war, the rates of mortality amongst newborns born to 
Belgian mothers were not necessarily higher than amongst children born to German 
88 Ibid., 037915/366298, Statement made by the Antwerp police authorities (dated 25.11.1953). 
89 Expectant mothers from Croatia, Bulgaria, Italy, Serbia, Hungary, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and the Flemish part of Belgium were protected under the 
Mutterschutzgesetz. 
90 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 208. The infant mortality rate was 6.1 percent in 
Germany in 1939 Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi Germany (London: Longman, 200 I), 7. 
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mothers. A significant proportion of the Belgian women who gave birth in Germany 
were unmarried. Without a family support network and with limited financial means 
to support their children after their birth, some Belgian mothers abandoned their 
babies in Germany, while others left their children in the care of Germans who were 
prepared to care for them. The Nazi People's Welfare provided assistance to single 
mothers with "racially valuable" children. However, it is not clear whether Belgian 
women were entitled to access to the same social welfare programs that were 
available to German mothers, and still less the extent to which Belgian women 
succeeded in accessing social welfare payments and services. 
11. Breach of labour contract 
Breach of labour contract ( Vertragsbruch) became a problem for labour 
administrators from the beginning of the Auslandereinsatz. As set out in the DAF 
guidelines, breach of labour contract referred to unauthorised absence from the 
workplace, but also encompassed refusal to work. Military Administration officials 
in Belgium used the linguistically similar designation Kontraktbruch, but used the 
term in the narrower sense applying the term to workers who had breached their 
labour contract by failing to return after a period of leave in Belgium or returning 
home illegally. Caution must therefore be exercised when discussing the issue of 
breach of labour contract. The term Arbeitsflucht (flight from work or absconding) is 
also problematic because it is imprecise and groups together offences that were not 
registered separately by the Nazi authorities. 91 The issue of workers who remained in 
Belgium illegally after a period of leave and flight from work will be examined 
separately in order to bring greater clarity to the issue. 
The motivations behind breaches of contract changed over the course of the 
war. The Military Administration first reported that an increasing number of 
Belgians had broken their labour contracts and returned home in December 1940.92 
Reeder noted in March 1 941 that 2,200 Belgians were reported to have breached 
their labour contracts in Germany, prompting the authorities to increase border 
security and establish a reception camp near the Belgian-German border in Aachen. 
During the first months of the deployment of foreigners many workers broke their 
contracts and returned home due to concerns for their family's welfare. These 
91 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 341. 
92 CEGES/SOMA, BALl3.l/9-l I, Ta1igkei1sberich1, Nr.12, 71. 
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concerns often stemmed from delays in wage transfers. As winter set in many 
Belgians also became increasingly dissatisfied with the weather and working 
conditions in Germany. Poor weather conditions often halted work in the 
construction industry during winter. Highlighting this problem, construction worker 
Albert S recorded in his diary that he did not work on seven workdays during 
January 1944 due to the poor weather conditions in Schonebeck on the Elbe.
93 
Workers employed in industries affected by cold weather often worked reduced 
hours and faced a resultant drop in their wages, and some therefore preferred to 
return home during the winter months. While work in industries such as agriculture 
and construction was often seasonal, and many migrant workers traditionally 
returned home during winter, Germany's labour administrators sought to break the 
pattern of seasonal work and force workers to remain in Germany - probably due to 
fears that workers would not return. 94 This refusal to allow workers to return home 
during winter was a source of great frustration for construction workers, who could 
not spend the festive season with their families. To add insult to injury, workers 
might spend days on end idle in the barracks because it was too cold outside to work. 
Belgians like other residents of German cities were menaced by the spectre of 
bombing. Fear of bombing emerged as a major reason for the failure of workers to 
return from leave from 1943, coinciding with the intensification of Allied bombing. 
The Military Administration suggested many Belgians, and in particular women, 
who failed to return to Germany after going home on leave were afraid of the 
bombing raids that had become increasingly frequent. 95 Workers' fears were 
compounded due to the poor air-raid protection that was available to foreign workers. 
Foreign workers were exposed to the bombing raids to a greater degree than the 
German population. In Essen, for example, 7.7 percent of the German inhabitants 
were killed by bombs during the war, contrasted with 13.8 percent of the foreign 
workers.96 Foreign workers' camps were frequently located at the epicentre of 
bombing, and they were therefore often disproportionately represented amongst the 
bombing victims. With most Belgians working in industrialised areas that were 
affected by bombing it is not surprising that an increasing number of Belgians failed 
93 Ibid., AA 1216/38, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, diary kept by Albert S. 
94 Prior to WWI the "closure period" (Karenzzeit) regulation, which was introduced in l 89 l, required 
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95 CEGES/SOMA, BALI 3. l/9-11, Tatigkeitsbericht Nr.24 Anlage D 16 
96 ' ' ' • 
Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 317. 
154 
to return from leave, especially if their barracks or workplace had been affected by 
bombing. 
Most Belgians who broke their labour contracts did so after a period of leave 
in Belgium. The Military Administration was therefore charged with responsibility 
for ensuring that Belgian contract-breakers were returned to Germany. Officials in 
Belgium relied upon two key measures to force contract-breakers to return to 
Germany: the denial of all financial support such as unemployment benefits; and the 
denial of ration cards. These measures were intended to make life financially difficult 
for contract-breakers and their families. In May 1941 Reeder reported that 70-80 
percent of Belgian contract-breakers returned to Germany after they had visited their 
family and recruitment officials had dealt with the case.97 Sisters Maria and Anna V 
were granted leave in 1942 and failed to return to their employer, the Firma Eiso 
Schrauben GmbH in Eisefeld, Thuringia. After sending repeated summonses 
demanding the women return to their jobs in Germany, their employer wrote to the 
Rationing Office in Antwerp on 20 April 1942, requesting the withdrawal of the 
women's ration cards in a final attempt to force the women to return to ·Germany. 98 
But these efforts were in vain and the women failed to return. Maria V subsequently 
took up employment in Berlin, marrying a German in 1 945 and remaining in 
Germany. Many Belgians broke their employment contracts only to resume 
employment in Germany with a new employer. Certainly some Belgians broke their 
contracts because they were dissatisfied with their job and had not been permitted to 
change jobs. 
While the labour administration had a policy of returning workers who broke 
their contract to their existing employer, it is clear that recruitment offices often 
arranged new labour assignments for contract-breakers. In view of the fact that it was 
difficult to change jobs, breaking one's employment contract was a key means of 
ending a labour assignment. The increasing tendency to assign contracts to Belgian 
companies and the protection of factories involved in war production from August 
1943 probably meant that labour officials in Belgium were less likely to return a 
contract-breaker to Germany if they managed to find work in the war industries. 
Officials in Belgium most likely adopted a pragmatic approach to this problem, and 
were, in some cases, sympathetic towards Belgians toiling in difficult conditions in 
97 CEGES/SOMA, BALl3.l/9-l I, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.16, Anlage C3, 2. 
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Germany. Of course, labour officials also recognised that workers who went into 
hiding were lost to the war economy. 
The Military Administration continued to report that recruitment officials 
were enjoying significant success in returning contract-breakers to Germany. In the 
three-month period from August to October 1942 a total of 6,3 79 Belgians were 
reported to have broken their labour contracts. However, during the same period a 
total of 8,800 Belgian contract-breakers returned to Germany.99 In some instances 
workers felt compelled to return due to finanCial pressures, while others came under 
pressure to return from family members who feared the repercussions if they failed to 
return to Germany. Perhaps the apparent success of the Military Administration in 
returning Belgian workers to Germany can be attributed to other factors during the 
first years of the occupation. A delay often ensued between a worker's flight or their 
failure to return to Germany after leave and this information being relayed to 
officials in Belgium. Thus workers who broke their contracts were perhaps willing in 
many cases to return to Germany by the time officials contacted them. Moreover, 
workers employed in seasonal industries were also prepared to return to Germany to 
work after the colder weather passed. In such cases the denial of leave proved 
counter-productive, as workers returned home without authorisation and were absent 
from their jobs in Germany for longer. Moreover, greater manpower was needed in 
Belgium and Germany to follow up the mounting number of contract-breakers. 
In the final year of the occupation the Military Administration adopted 
harsher measures in response to the problem of contract-breakers. Military police 
visited the homes of contract-breakers, but such attempts to apprehend "fugitive 
workers" were often ineffective because the person they were seeking was not home 
o~ had moved elsewhere to avoid detection. By May 1944 the Military 
Administration resorted to carrying out raids in order to apprehend workers who 
broke their labour contracts. 100 The measures introduced by the Military 
Administration were often undermined by friends, family members or other members 
of the community who provided assistance, shelter or jobs to contract-breakers. 
The Military Administration had very limited success in forcing women who 
broke their contracts to return to Germany, especially after the Military 
Administration put a stop to the conscription of women for labour contracts in 
99 CEGES/SOMA, BALI 3.1/9-11, Tiitigkeitsbericht, Nr.22, D 13. 
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industry in early 1943. Some Belgian women lived in fear that they would be 
returned to Germany, remaining in hiding until Belgium's liberation in September 
1944, while others simply returned to their old jobs in Belgium or secured new jobs. 
Vitaline B was conscripted and sent to work as a chambermaid in Berlin. In June 
1943 she was granted leave after just four months service and resumed employment 
in Belgium fifteen days after her return. Vitaline B recalled: "I did not return to 
Germany again, but I had to work for the occupiers until the end of the 
occupation".
101 
Yvonne P was one of a group of female conscripts sent to work for 
electrical goods manufacturer Robert Karstens Elektrotechnische und 
Metallwarenfabrik in Berlin. Yvonne P returned to Belgium on leave in December 
1943 and rather than return to Germany was permitted to resume her job with her 
previous employer. 102 Women who made concerted efforts to return home 
permanently were often successful. Georgette B was one of a group of female 
workers from a clothing manufacturer in Bruges who were conscripted and sent to 
work in Leipzig in November 1942. A doctor sympathetic to her plight provided a 
medical certificate stating that her mother was seriously ill so that Georgette B could 
request leave to return home. Georgette B's employer granted her leave to return 
home for one month on 27 January 1943. After returning to Belgium Georgette B 
requested an extension to her leave and an official visited her home to check on her 
mother's health. Officials then ordered Georgette B to attend the recruitment office 
and advised that she must return to Germany, as her mother was not seriously ill. 
Georgette B refused to return to Germany, arguing that there had been a cessation to 
the conscription of women. Georgette B remained a fugitive until the end of the 
occupation and military police attended her home, but did not succeed in arresting 
her because she was absent during their visit. 103 Through the determination of her 
family and her own defiance of recruitment officials, Georgette B succeeded in 
avoiding a return to Germany. But the colleagues Georgette B left behind in Leipzig 
were not so lucky. Julia V recalled: "As a result [of her failure to return] the control 
of workers who went on leave from the factory in which we worked became much 
stricter". 104 While male workers were in some instances detained at the recruitment 
101 SVG/00, 048143/364212, Letter written by Vitaline B to the head of the commission assessing 
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104
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office and imprisoned until they could be deported to Germany, officials were 
apparently reluctant to detain female workers. In view of the end to the conscription 
of women for compulsory labour assignments in Germany, excepting labour 
assignments in domestic service, officials probably focussed on apprehending male 
workers. The public outcry provoked by the conscription of Belgian women probably 
also ensured that women who failed to return to Germany were not pursued 
rigorously. These cases illustrate that women who were granted leave to return home 
often managed to avoid going back to Germany. 
Belgian workers often failed to return to Germany following a leave period 
claiming that they were unable to work due to illness. Workers recognised that 
reporting sick was a key way to avoid returning to Germany. Many Belgian doctors 
were sympathetic to the plight of Belgians working in Germany and were often 
willing to provide them with medical certificates testifying to their ill health. In some 
cases Belgian doctors testified that a worker's spouse or close relative was gravely ill 
so that they might be granted leave on compassionate grounds. On 6 April 1943 
officials from the company health insurance fund at Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG 
in Dilsseldorf wrote to officials at the Central German Health Insurance Fund for 
Belgium and Northern France regarding company employee Gustave M who failed 
to return from leave. Upon his arrival in Belgium he immediately reported that he 
was suffering from a stomach complaint. Company officials placed little stock by his 
claim that he was unfit for work: 
Gustave M now wants to skive off work (Krankfeiern) at our expense and 
escape from our control. We have the same sort of experience with virtually 
all employees who are granted leave and then refuse to return here. We are 
therefore refusing to pay any sickness benefits, and ask that you ensure that 
Gustave M returns here immediately, so that we may possibly transfer him to 
a hospital here [if necessary]. 105 
Company officials refused to pay sickness benefits in an attempt to force the worker 
to return to Germany. Paradoxically, while Belgian workers were normally sent 
home in cases where they were expected to be unfit for work for an extended period 
of time, in this case company officials demanded the worker's return to Germany. 
This demand was highly impractical and is indicative of the frustration felt by 
German employers due to the increasing number of foreigners who reported sick 
while on leave. This case also illustrates that company officials did not trust medical 
105 Ibid., SOR 157894. 
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certificates provided by foreign doctors, preferring to seek their own assessment. 
Workers registered as sick were required to attend regular appointments with a 
doctor employed by the Military Administration. Doctors in the employ of the 
Military Administration assessed each worker's health and sought to return them to 
Germany as soon as they were fit enough to resume work. 
12. Arbeitsflucht (absconding) 
Absconding from one's workplace was a far less common form of breaching one's 
employment contract amongst Belgian workers. Escape was only really a possibility 
for those deployed in areas close to the German border, for example Belgian and 
Dutch workers working in the western regions of Germany. However, fewer 
Belgians managed to abscond and return home independently after greater controls 
were put in place on the railways and in border areas in early 1941. In spite of the 
risks associated with absconding and the limited prospects of success, some Belgians 
nevertheless attempted to return home illegally, even those who had been sent to 
areas far from the Belgian border. Walloons Antoine R, Julien T and Celestin L 
absconded from their jobs at AEG in Berlin on 23 August 1941. The young men 
were later apprehended after travelling on the roof of a direct train travelling from 
Berlin to Kreiensen in Lower Saxony. The trio were arrested in Kreiensen after they 
failed to produce a ticket on the railway platform. The men appeared before the court 
in Brunswick on 7 October 1941 and were found guilty of absconding (under the 
ordinance of 25 June 1938) and fare evasion (under Paragraph 265 of the German 
Criminal Code). The men were each sentenced to three months imprisonment. 106 
Some Belgians who absconded managed to cross the Belgian-German border only to 
be arrested in Belgium. Young domestic servant Anni P left her job in Diisseldorf 
and sought to return home illegally. She was arrested by the Gestapo in Herstal, near 
Liege, on 20 December 1942 under suspicion of absconding and was sent to prison in 
Aachen two days later. 107 In August 1943 Fernand W absconded from his workplace 
in southern Germany with a French POW. After spending a night in a field the two 
men boarded a train destined for Saarbriicken on the French-German border, but 
were discovered during a security check. The two men were removed from the train 
in Idar-Oberstein, along with fifteen other men and a woman, and taken to the police 
106 Ibid., R.451 ffr.47.034, French translation of court transcript, case ref 7 Os 500/41 A, Brunswick 
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headquarters, where they were interrogated. The men were simply returned to their 
employer once officials established from where they had absconded.
108 
According to 
the instructions issued by Friedrich Jeckeln, Higher SS and Police Chief West in 
Di.isseldorf, in February 1941, in instances where foreign workers left their 
workplace without authorisation the authorities should check their papers to 
determine where they were registered and transfer the worker to the local police 
authorities in the area where the worker had been resident.
109 
Perhaps because they 
were faced with a mounting number of absconding workers as the war continued, the 
German authorities adopted a more pragmatic approach to deal with the problem of 
western Europeans who absconded. 
13. Conflict in the workplace and sabotage 
For the purposes of examining foreign workers' responses to the Nazi regime and its 
policies it is useful to adopt Detlev Peukert's four major categories of dissident 
behaviour: non-conformity, refusal, protest and resistance. Nonconformity can be 
defined as behaviour that ran counter to Nazism but was not directed against Nazism 
as a system. Nonconformity typically focused on matters relating to everyday life, 
such as wage levels and food shortages, and took the form of "grumbling". 
Nonconformity could develop into behaviour that can be described as refusal, such as 
absences from work. Like nonconformity, refusal was not necessarily directed 
against Nazism as a system, but was often characterised by a sense of conflicting 
socio-economic interests. This shrewd sense of conflicting socio-economic interests 
was a key feature of workers' behaviour. Protest was generally intended to make a 
public impact and commonly involved actions such as workplace sabotage. Within 
this framework resistance is defined as action intended to make a public impact and 
pose a basic challenge to the regime. 11° Foreign workers tended to focus on day-to-
day survival in Germany and most dissident behaviour therefore stemmed from 
socio-economic issues. Foreign workers engaged in various forms of dissident 
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behaviour, although actions that can be categorised as political resistance were rare. 
Herbert argues that employers and the German authorities "succeeded in limiting the 
phenomenon of loafing to individual incidences of reluctance or refusal to work. The 
latitude for joint opposition by foreigners remained extremely restricted, and 
sabotage was a rarity". 111 By contrast with Poles and Ostarbeiter, privileged western 
Europeans did not suffer from starvation and were not worked to the brink of 
physical exhaustion. Belgians therefore had good prospects of surviving and 
returning home once the war was over. In this respect Belgian workers had more to 
lose than Poles and Ostarbeiter who were often fighting for basic survival. Belgians 
understood that the greatest threat to their survival was posed by imprisonment or 
transfer to an AEL, and few engaged in high-risk activities that might result in 
serious punitive measures. 
Supervision and surveillance were central elements of the strategy employed 
by employers to manage foreign employees. Herbert observes that "from the start of 
the war, the German authorities and the directors of numerous firms harboured 
suspicions that foreign workers were intentionally holding back on their labour 
power". Herbert emphasises that "this mistrust was a logical consequence of their 
own policy, and in the early years of the war, was as a rule based more on racial 
arrogance than any empirical assessment of performance". 112 The general distrust of 
foreign workers prompted many employers to implement a heavy workplace 
surveillance regime. Managers at Siemens emphasised: 
It is important that at every workstation foreign workers are looked after by 
an advisor or instructor in all cases, so that they come to grips with the 
particulars of the workstation as quickly as possible. Additionally, instructors 
can oversee the foreigner's work discipline and keep it under control. 113 
By maintaining strict supervision of foreign employees, managers sought to maintain 
the pace of work, increase productivity, limit work avoidance and prevent instances 
of sabotage. Workers who were considered lazy or troublesome were singled out for 
particular attention. Frans S recalled that "the Germans had no confidence in me and 
I was kept apart from my friends in a separate department, under the watchful eye of 
the boss". 114 Managers also emphasised that German workers could not be 
supervised by foreigners. The principle underlying these policies was that Germans 
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should feel that they were the master of foreign workers. The approach adopted by 
company managers discouraged solidarity between Germans and foreign workers. 
German employers also enlisted the help of German employees to manage foreign 
workers. One worker recalled: "There was never any question of sabotage amongst 
us fifteen Belgians in the work force, when the Germans and the Dutch did not 
budge. It was impossible to slow down [the pace] in a factory supervised by police, 
who also oversaw the Germans". 115 Belgians frequently emphasise that they were 
policed too closely to carry out acts of sabotage in the workplace without putting 
themselves at great risk of detection. In many workplaces employees were kept under 
constant surveillance, particularly in workplaces where POW s were deployed, and 
thus efforts to slow production or carry out acts of sabotage were extremely difficult. 
Siemens called upon its German employees to contribute to Germany's war 
effort by playing an active role in the "small war" in the workplace. This analogy 
signalled to German workers that foreigners were the enemy. Paradox;ically, at the 
same time that Goebbels called upon foreigners to join the pan-European fight 
against the Bolshevist enemy, the management implied that foreign workers were the 
enemy in the workplace. While Nazi ideology established a racial hierarchy, the 
approach adopted by the Siemens' management did not so much emphasise a 
hierarchy, but rather simply distinguished between German and foreign employees. 
All Belgians were conscious that acts of sabotage would bring serious 
consequences if detected. One worker recalled: "There were lots of 'refusals' to work 
- the men were then sent to the 'Siegfried' line to build defences - many died in the 
bombardments". 116 Foreign workers often witnessed first-hand the consequences 
when colleagues were subjected to punitive action: 
Two young men who dropped a box had to go to a concentration camp. One 
died and the other one came back broken after his release. Nine men wanted 
to show their anger about the food they were given by dropping it in front of 
the canteen. They were sent to a punishment camp for a few weeks and were 
weak and skinny when they returned. 117 
Similar accounts about workers who were arrested by the Gestapo or sent to an AEL 
are provided by many Belgians. Workers commonly describe a colleague who was 
physically transformed by the experience; returning as a barely recognisable shadow 
of their former self. This physical transformation was generally the result of the 
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extremely harsh disciplinary regime at AELs and hard labour, as well as beatings in 
some cases. Workers suspected of committing some misdemeanour were often 
arrested in their barracks with their comrades looking on, while in other cases the 
Gestapo was called to deal with problems in the workplace. The behaviour of many 
foreign workers was shaped by the fear of the consequences of protest or carrying 
out acts of sabotage. 
Peukert asserts that working-class social history during the Third Reich was 
characterised by "limited social conflict, partial conformity, and extensive 
breakdown of the forms of public behaviour and social organisation that might have 
fostered a unified resistance". 118 While some Belgians report that they frequently 
discussed means of sabotaging production with Belgian comrades, and some even 
report discussing sabotage with Russian colleagues, others report that fear of being 
reported prevented them from discussing sabotage at all. The possibility of sabotage 
was often only discussed amongst small groups of trusted friends. Female conscript 
Amata L recalled: 
We (two girls, myself and a female friend whose uncle worked in the same 
factory as my brother in Prenzlau) found out that when we touched something 
under the workbench with our soldering iron, it caused a short circuit and 
sometimes it took a few hours before they fixed it all. The Germans were 
disgruntled and barked at us that we had to "work for victory". We answered 
"merde". 119 
Amata L was one of a group of female employees from the Grand Bazaar department 
store in Antwerp deported to Berlin in December 1942. The women discussed 
sabotage amongst a small circle of trusted people whom they knew before they went 
to Germany. There were also divisions between Belgian conscripts and volunteers, 
with conscripts reporting that they feared volunteers would report them if they 
sabotaged production. Even workers who felt confident enough to talk about 
sabotage emphasise that discussion of sabotage was in most instances as far as it 
went: "Means [for carrying out sabotage] were discussed a lot, but [the idea] was 
usually nipped in the bud. If it was discovered the matter would be investigated 
thoroughly and punishment would soon follow". 120 While many workers considered 
sabotage, the German authorities and employers succeeded in preventing the 
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development of unified opposition amongst foreigners and therefore managed to 
stifle dissident behaviour to a considerable degree. 
German employers had the authority to employ a range of disciplinary 
measures in response to breaches of work discipline. These disciplinary measures 
were characterised by penalties that escalated in severity, depending on the worker's 
misdemeanour and whether they had been disciplined previously. Disciplinary 
measures were at the disposal of managers included verbal and written warnings, the 
withdrawal of food provisions in company accommodation, monetary fines and the 
denial of leave. Fines were, for example, commonly used by employers to punish 
workers for a range of misdemeanours in the workplace from tardiness, smoking on 
the job, the theft of items from the workplace and failure to register absences from 
the workplace due to illness in a timely manner. At companies such as Siemens arrest 
cells were constructed at the company's camp. These arrest cells proved to be an 
effective means of disciplining workers and also served as a warning to others.
121 
In 
cases where these punishments failed to bring an improvement in discipline 
managers might resort to referring recalcitrant workers to the external authorities -
usually the Gestapo - with a written request for a penalty to be issued. The 
punishments meted out to workers were intended to serve an educative function and 
as a deterrent to others. Transfers to AELs and other court sentences were therefore 
often published on the "foreigners' notice board" in both German and the relevant 
foreign languages. Similar models were used by companies across Germany. 
The accounts of Belgian workers, a significant proportion of whom were 
employed in large industrial concerns, highlight considerable variation in their 
treatment and how employers dealt with industrial matters. In some cases employers 
sought to handle cases of refusal to work internally, thereby avoiding the 
involvement of the Gestapo. Belgian Femand W refused to go to work within a few 
weeks of his arrival in Darmstadt. Each day a colleague who acted as an interpreter 
came to see him to check if he was capable of going to work, but Fernand W replied: 
"No, stop pestering me!" At midday he ate lunch with his colleagues in the canteen. 
After a few days Femand W was called up to the office and the director told him 
through an interpreter that he would no longer receive food and it would be a matter 
for the Gestapo. In a last-ditch attempt to resolve the matter Femand W's employer 
121 Siegel, "Die Doppelte Rationalisierung," 21. 
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sent a doctor to speak to Fernand W. The French-speaking doctor told him, "I advise 
you to resume your work because otherwise you will have troubles. You do your bit 
and for my part I will try to organise an easier job, less dirty. Be patient". Fernand W 
took the doctor's advice and he was transferred to another job three weeks later. 122 
Fernand W's refusal to work was a risky strategy, which could have easily landed 
him in an AEL, but his stubborn approach ultimately paid off and he secured a better 
job through the assistance of the German doctor. This case clearly illustrates that 
some German doctors acted in good faith and genuinely tried to help foreign workers 
in their care. This example also shows that some employers exercised their own 
judgement and sought to deal with recalcitrant workers internally. 
Other employers resorted to punitive measures. Conscript Jean V, who 
worked at a Berlin engineering firm, recalled: "I was punished twice in Germany for 
acts of sabotage, each time I got a few days locked up in the bunker without food". 123 
This case demonstrates that employers who wished to deal with industrial matters 
internally were also able to draw on more repressive measures to punish workers. 
The transfer of workers to an AEL meant that their employer lost their labour, for at 
least a number of weeks, and some employers therefore probably only involved the 
Gestapo as a last resort, even when dealing with more serious offences. By contrast, 
other employers maintained a harsh disciplinary regime and did not hesitate to call 
upon the Gestapo, "My friend who turned up one or two minutes late three or four 
mornings was sent to the Gestapo in Bonn for eight days". 124 Some employers 
cracked down on workers who flouted workplace discipline, signalling to others that 
even minor breaches of workplace rules would not be tolerated. The Nazi authorities 
gave employers a free hand in the workplace and the disciplinary regime that reigned 
in workplaces was therefore shaped to a significant degree by the approach adopted 
by individual company managers. 
Protest actions by foreign workers usually related to socio-economic issues. 
Belgians typically protested due to dissatisfaction with food provisions or 
accommodation, and their protests most often took the form of refusal to work. Emile 
S recalled: 
We, several of my companions and I, decided that we would not work in the 
afternoon. We returned to work, but crossed our arms ... I explained in the 
122 CEGES/SOMA, AAl216/I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Femand W. 
123 SVG/DO, SOR 177754 & 046719/367363, Sworn statement made by Jean Y (dated 08.06.1954). 
124 CEGES/SOMA, AAl216/I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jean Bo. 
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best German possible that our team would not work without food. The 
supervisor of the team, an old Nazi, tried his best to glare and ranted and 
raved, but we would not do anything. 125 
In another case, a group of Belgian workers rebelled when they were told they had to 
move to another barracks, which was infested with lice: 
We refused to leave our lodgings. They wanted to expel us [from the 
barracks], we barricaded ourselves in with tables and cupboards and this until 
19.00. Finally the barracks were surrounded and a member of the factory 
police demanded to speak to us to give us a final deadline, a veteran from 
1914-1918 who insisted that he understood our situation ... He made us 
understand that without his intervention with the director to obtain a final 
delay the SS would have certainly already brought us to our senses with 
disastrous consequences. He also appealed to our commonsense. We 
capitulated, but hundreds of hours were lost that day. 126 
For the sake of putting an end to the stand-off and avoiding more disruption, the 
company adopted pragmatic approach. In these cases the workers' grievance related 
to intolerable living conditions or perceived unjust treatment. Western Europeans 
defended what they regarded as their basic entitlement to adequate food provisions 
and housing. These examples clearly illustrate that privileged western Europeans had 
the confidence to voice criticisms, and staunchly defended their rights in the face of 
deteriorating wartime conditions. These examples also show that the workers did not 
always face serious consequences for their actions and German employers did not 
necessarily adopt a heavy-handed approach in response to protests. The fact that 
these workers did not face severe penalties could be interpreted as a tacit admission 
by their employer that the withdrawal of their labour was in some ways justified. 
Spoerer emphasises that western Europeans, in particular, were accustomed 
to strong trade unionism, which, combined with their relatively high position in the 
Nazi racial hierarchy, gave them greater confidence to voice criticisms. 127 However, 
while there was a tradition of strong trade unionism and industrial action in Belgium, 
a significant proportion of Belgian conscripts were young men, especially those 
conscripted through the call-up of whole age-groups. Lucian A reported that he and 
his colleagues did not carry out acts of sabotage because "everyone was very young 
and not experienced enough to organise things. No sabotage that I am aware of, only 
by the Russians (breaking things, causing electrical break-downs etc.)". 128 While 
125 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Emile S. 
126 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Femand G. 
127 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 168. 
128 CEGES/SOMA, AA1216/12, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Lucian A. 
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some younger workers had probably been integrated into workers' organisations in 
Belgium to some degree, it was unlikely that younger workers had assumed 
leadership roles or had experience in organising industrial action. Maltreated Russian 
and Polish workers had less to lose than privileged western European workers, and 
perhaps physical exhaustion and despair prompted them to carry out sabotage in 
order simply to get a break from work for a few hours. 
Loafing and work avoidance was a significant problem for German 
employers. Foreign workers employed various methods to avoid work. One Belgian 
recalled: "The easiest way and also the most common way was to go to the bathroom 
all day and the factory police had trouble chasing out all the 'long-sitters"'. 129 Other 
methods employed by foreign workers to avoid work included reporting ill and time 
wasting, for example taking as long as possible when undertaking errands in the 
workplace, and hiding. In some cases workers resorted to extreme measures to avoid 
work. Georges M recalled, "I asked certain colleagues to mutilate my fingers ... and 
all this in order to avoid working for the enemy. Certain [colleagues] broke an arm 
after several painful tentative attempts". 130 Belgians who were injured might avoid 
work for a few days, while those who managed to inflict more serious injuries upon 
themselves might be unable to work and would stand a good chance of being sent 
home. 
Employers' distrust of foreign workers meant that relatively minor offences 
might be reported as sabotage by overzealous managers. The following account 
illustrates how loafing on the job could be built up into a more serious offence: 
One Sunday I was on anti-aircraft duty [watching for] potential incendiaries 
and I wanted to escape having to help change the wagons, so I hid in my 
work building and wrote a letter to my fiancee. My supervisor took me by 
surprise. He informed the director. I was called up to the office the day after 
regarding the matter. Accused of sabotage, threatened with the Gestapo and 
all the rest. .. the camp commander Schmidt came to defend me before the 
director. 131 
Jean Bo sought to avoid work and his behaviour is probably partly the response of a 
disgruntled worker who was frustrated by the requirement that employees work on 
Sundays. However, his supervisor characterised his actions as an act of sabotage. 
This example demonstrates that employers' concerns about the work ethic of foreign 
129 Ibid., AA 1216/13, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Alfons P. 
130 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Georges M. 
131 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jean Bo. 
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workers meant that any actions that threatened productivity might be construed as 
acts of sabotage. Jean Bo fortunately avoided serious consequences through the 
support of the camp commander. 
Louis Z who worked in a foundry in Molkau near Leipzig emphasised that 
opportunities for sabotage were often very limited: 
Sabotage· was practically unthinkable in a foundry without putting the lives of 
your comrades in danger. A "go-slow" was applied by all the foreign workers 
in spite of the threats. Based on the information provided by his infamous 
second in command, the camp commander sent those who were supposed to 
be the ring leaders to Riebeckstrasse, where a strong man returned at the end 
of three days weak and unrecognisable. 132 
This account illustrates that acts of sabotage were potentially very dangerous from 
the perspective of workplace safety. These accounts also emphasise that sabotage 
was regarded as high-risk and many foreign workers therefore opted for "go-slows" 
rather than engage in potentially riskier activities. Another worker recalled, "It was 
not direct sabotage in reality. When there was a fault or a defect somewhere, it was 
not mentioned or passed on. People left this to the foremen. In that way tens of 
thousands of grenades were produced that were too thin or too short". 133 Poor 
performance or the failure to inform one's foreman about defects or problems with 
the production process slowed production and were relatively low-risk. 
Foreign workers also exploited language barriers to avoid work or sabotage 
production. Franc;ois V recalled, "During this period you could not speak of 
bilingualism, arrangements were perfect from the point of view of sabotaging our 
work and doing as little work as possible". 134 In workplaces where there were no 
interpreters, foreign workers might discuss possibilities for sabotaging production 
without fearing that they could be understood. Moreover, by pretending not to 
understand instructions that were issued, foreign workers could slow or sabotage 
production. Linguistic difficulties could always be blamed for low productivity or 
damage to tools or machinery that stalled production. One worker recalled, "[The 
foreman] said I was a saboteur and a lazy swine because I was doing so little and I 
was always away from my work". 135 And while foremen frequently held suspicions 
about sabotage, this was usually difficult to prove. Workers used various methods to 
132 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Louis Z. 
133 Ibid., AA 1216/l 0, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Joannes H. 
134 Ibid., AA1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Fran~ois V. 
135 Ibid., AA 1216/5, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Maurice L. 
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slow production, produce inferior goods or disrupt work. Crucially, workers adopted 
methods that were difficult to detect and were therefore comparatively low-risk 
activities. 
Fear and strict supervision in the workplace limited opportunities for_ 
organised sabotage. F ernand K suggested that acts of sabotage were very common 
amongst foreign workers: "I believe everyone [sabotaged production] according to 
the means available to them, without talking to others about it in order to avoid 
indiscretions".
136 
Fernand K's account echoes the concerns of the German authorities 
and many employers with respect to the productivity levels of foreign workers. 
While Fernand K's account clearly overstates the frequency of acts of sabotage 
committed by foreign workers, he makes a very valid point with regard to the fact 
that many foreign workers did not discuss sabotage and that acts of sabotage carried 
out by individuals were probably more common. Individual acts of sabotage were in 
many cases highly effective and had a considerable impact on productivity levels. 
While the German population and Nazi authorities feared an uprising of foreigners 
during the final phases of the war, Herbert argues that "foreigners were too divided 
among themselves to organise such a rebellion". Herbert observes that "individual 
resistance was more feasible than collective, and the instructions issued by the Allies 
were along those lines". 137 This view was also repeated in the accounts of Belgian 
workers. Felix G emphasised that acts of sabotage were not organised, "No methods 
of sabotage were agreed between workers - everyone did it his own way. I faked that 
my right hand was paralysed and could not do much. Sometimes people broke things 
or created a bit of chaos". 138 Fear prevented many workers from discussing sabotage 
amongst a wider circle of people and therefore limited the extent to which unified 
opposition could be fostered. These examples clearly show that the German 
authorities succeeded to a considerable degree in preventing foreign workers' 
opposition from coalescing into forms of behaviour that might pose a fundamental 
challenge to the regime, such as unified rebellion. 
14. Relations with German work colleagues 
Belgian workers' accounts illustrate that their treatment in the workplace varied 
greatly and often depended upon individual personalities. Belgians emphasised that 
136 Ibid., AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Fernand K. 
137 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 394. 
138 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/13, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Felix G. 
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some of their German colleagues were opposed to the Nazi regime and therefore 
treated them well, while others suggested that colleagues who were fervent Nazis 
made their work life harder. One worker observed, 'The function of the foreman 
varied because there were good and bad foreman (did not give workers freedom)".
139 
While there is no suggestion of ill-treatment, the worker's account emphasises that 
foremen who maintained strict discipline, and did not allow workers any freedom, 
made their work life more difficult. Another worker recalled that the foreman in 
charge was "a just and correct man. His function was to distribute work, to oversee 
and check [work] - as well as keeping us under surveillance".
140 
Reading between 
the lines, it is apparent that some Belgians felt that the treatment they received from 
their supervisors in Germany was not dissimilar from the treatment they might 
receive in Belgian workplaces. 
A number of Belgians emphasise that they avoided punishment because a 
German work colleague, foreman or camp commander intervened on their behalf. 
Maurice L recalled that his foreman frequently accused him of laziness and sabotage~ 
however, the foreman's accusations never went any further because "the other 
German work colleagues liked me and would not say anything negative to the 
foreman about me". 141 Belgian workers' experiences with German colleagues often 
proved that "not all Germans were Nazis". 142 Undoubtedly some German foremen 
acted out of self-interest, intervening to protect someone they regarded as a good 
worker. But others perhaps acted out of human instinct, seeking to protect a foreign 
worker whom they regarded as a good colleague and even a friend. 
While many Belgians were wary of German work colleagues and feared they 
would report them if they carried out acts of sabotage, some Belgians developed 
strong friendships with colleagues whom they regarded as "good Germans". Jacques 
V recalled, "I formed a team with a 'good German' from Aachen who gave me his 
ration of cigarettes. The two of us went to the toilets together and took as long as we 
could, and when we returned he always managed to get away with it and I never had 
any problems". 143 Jan A recalled that after he received a package from home 
containing cigarettes, "I also gave a cigarette to our German mate who had never 
139 Ibid., AA 1216/ I, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Simon D. 
140 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Victor B. 
141 Ibid., AA 1216/5 Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Maurice L. 
142 Ibid., AA 1216/ 13 Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Alfons P. 
143 Ibid., AAl216/I, Enquete Travail Obligaloire, Jacques V. 
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smoked a cigarette like it and to my Russian mate". 144 Jules C was treated kindly by 
his foreman whose son had died in Russia and who was opposed to the Nazi regime 
and the war, recalling: "My boss often invited me to eat at his place''. 145 Both men 
had suffered as a consequence of the war, and therefore found common ground. In 
spite of efforts to limit solidarity between Germans and foreigners, friendships did 
nevertheless develop. Mutual acts of kindness and solidarity between Germans and 
foreigners did not, however, generally escalate into acts that could be described as 
collective resistance. 
15. Conclusions 
Belgians, both Flemings and Walloons, enjoyed a privileged status as western 
Europeans. On a basic level, Belgians were afforded better treatment and greater 
employment rights and protection than their counterparts from Poland and eastern 
Europe. This improved their prospects of surviving the war and returning home to 
their families at the end of the war immeasurably. The material benefits western 
European workers enjoyed, inch.~ding near wage parity with Germans, also 
significantly improved their situation. Higher earnings and the greater confidence 
that came with their status as western Europeans gave Belgian workers greater access 
to the black market - a key means of obtaining additional food and other goods. 
Belgians guarded the privileges they enjoyed, defending their living and 
working conditions in the face of deteriorating wartime conditions, and frequently 
using their greater rights to their own advantage. Belgians often used leave, sickness 
and pregnancy as a means to escape working in wartime Germany and many were 
successful. Workers' grievances with respect to food and living conditions 
sometimes escalated into protests. However, many Belgians feared the consequences 
of sabotage and resistance and therefore often avoided higher risk activities and joint 
actions. Many Belgians were probably also reluctant to engage in activities that 
might jeopardise their chances of obtaining leave, as obtaining leave to return home 
represented the best opportunity of escaping Germany. Employers for their part 
sought to avoid conflict in the workplace, and in cases of rebellion or protest 
employers often adopted a pragmatic approach in order to minimise the impact on 
productivity. Fear and strict supervision prevented many Belgians from discussing 
144 Ibid., AA 1216/60, Enquete Travail Obligatoire. Jan A, diary entry 29.05.1943. 
145 Ibid., AA 1216/1 Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jules C. 
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sabotage amongst a wider circle of people and therefore limited the extent to which 
unified opposition could be fostered. The German authorities therefore succeeded to 
a considerable degree in preventing dissident behaviour from coalescing into forms 
of behaviour that might pose a challenge to the regime. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Belgian workers in Berlin 
The cosmopolitan metropolis Berlin was Germany's Reichshauptstadt or capital city 
and heart of the centralised Nazi state. Berlin was also central to the Nazis' vision 
and plans for the future. The Nazis envisaged a racially pure state that would span 
from Jutland to the Brenner and from the Riga Dom to the Strasburger Kirche. Berlin 
- renamed Germania -would form the heart of the Nazis' new empire and would be 
a world capital. Berlin is inextricably linked to key events during the Nazis' reign 
from their seizure of power in January 1933 to the Reichstag fire, the 1936 
Olympics, key speeches en route to war given by Hitler and Goebbels at the Berlin 
Sportspalast, the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 that sealed the fate of 
European Jewry, Hitler's suicide in April 1945, and finally Germany's defeat as the 
Red Army pounded the city into surrender. 
The seat of the regime's centralised administration, Berlin housed hundreds 
of ministries, departments, offices and institutes. Berlin was the nerve centre of 
Germany's military-industrial complex, housing the headquarters of all the military 
service branches, as well as almost a hundred barracks and depots. 1 Berlin was also 
the hub of Germany's communication network with its rail lines, airports and canal 
system. The city's industry played a vital role in war production. More than half of 
Germany's entire electrical industry was located in Berlin, which hosted the huge 
Siemens complex, ten Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft (AEG) plants and 
electrical goods manufacturers Telefunken, C Lorenz AG and Bosch GmbH - all of 
which produced crucial military components. The Alkett Altmarkische Kettenwerke 
GmbH factory in Spandau produced self-propelled guns and half of the Wehrmacht 's 
field artillery. Rheinmetall-Borsig produced rolling stock, locomotives, and heavy 
artillery. The Deutsche Waffen und Munitions (DWM) factory in the northern 
district of Wittenau produced small arms, ammunition and mortars. The Auto Union 
factories in Spandau and Halensee produced tank chassis. BMW's factory in 
Spandau produced a range of vehicles for the military and Heinke I, Henschel, 
Flettner, Focke-Wulf and Dornier manufactured bomber planes, attack aircraft and 
1 David Clay Large, Berlin (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 326. 
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aeroplane parts. During the war the Daimler Benz AG plant in Berlin-Marienfelde 
produced vehicles, a series of aircraft, tank and submarine engines, as well as parts 
for German arms. Additionally, smaller companies and workshops in the city also 
produced vital components. Berlin's importance both as the nation's administrative 
capital and its vital role in war production sealed the city's fate as a key target in the 
Allied forces' strategic bombing campaign. 
This chapter focuses on the experiences of Belgian workers in Berlin through 
the examination of records relating to housing, health, mortality, the social life of 
Belgians in Berlin, relations between Belgian and German civilians, and crime and 
punishment. In particular, the relationship between policy and practice will be 
considered. While it is clear that Flemings and Walloons enjoyed privileged 
treatment as western Europeans, what is less clear is to what extent this was shaped 
by Nazi racial policies and to what extent other factors played a role. It will be 
argued that the privileged position western Europeans enjoyed enabled them to 
improve their position proactively and therefore ensured that they benefited 
indirectly in myriad less obvious ways. Many western European workers enjoyed 
better wages and working conditions by virtue of the fact that they were highly 
skilled. Linguistic skills were also a key factor in the experiences of foreign workers 
and helped many to secure better living and working conditions. The German 
authorities' treatment of Flemings and Walloons will be also considered, focussing 
on the question of whether Flemings and Walloons were treated differently and to 
what extent their treatment reflected the strictures of a Nazi racial doctrine that 
upheld the value of "Nordic" peoples above others. It will be argued that German 
administrators and employers did not necessarily recognise the distinction between 
"Nordic" Flemings and French-speaking Walloons. Heusler has observed that 
foreigners employed by smaller businesses generally fared better than those 
employed by larger companies, arguing that it was precisely in small and medium-
sized enterprises that a sense of loyalty could prevail and foreign workers could be 
viewed as colleagues, thus relativising National Socialist discrimination against 
racial aliens.2 It will be argued that the reach of the Nazi authorities did not extend 
into the interactions between ordinary Germans and foreigners, and thus the 
2 Heusler, Zwangsarbeitfiir die Miinchner Kriegswirtschaft, 424. 
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approach adopted by individual Germans varied a great deal, even within larger 
enterprises. 
1. Dimensions of the Auslandereinsatz in Berlin 
While there was a significant increase in the number of foreign workers deployed in 
German agriculture from autumn 1939, the number of foreigners deployed in heavily 
industrialised Berlin rose more gradually. In January 1941 there were just 19,000 
foreigners working in Berlin; however, one year later the number of foreign workers 
in Berlin ballooned to 140,000. The arrival of civilian workers from the USSR 
marked a turning point in the deployment of foreign workers in Berlin. Berlin's 
industry was given precedence over other parts of Germany with respect to the 
allocation of foreign labour. The number of foreign workers in Berlin grew steadily 
from 170,000 in July 1942 to 386,000 in August 1943. 
In the summer of 1943 foreign workers represented 20 percent of Berlin's 
workforce; in the armaments industry foreign civilian workers and prisoners of war 
represented 28 percent of the workforce, and in some manufacturing companies 
foreigners represented an even higher percentage of the workforce. At the Siemens 
Kleinbauwerk I and Elektromotorenwerk 1 plants in Berlin foreign workers 
represented a total of 44. I percent of workers in September 1943, while POWs and 
prisoners represented a further 4.2 percent of company employees. 3 After reaching its 
highpoint in the summer of 1943 the number of foreign workers in Berlin began to 
drop due to the relocation of some Berlin industrial concerns to areas that were less 
affected by bombing. Despite the transfer of many foreign workers to other parts of 
the Reich, the registry of labour books that had been issued in the late summer of 
1944 show that 6.3 percent of foreign civilians working in the Reich were deployed 
in Berlin.4 At the end of 1944 there were approximately 400,000 foreign workers 
working in Berlin.5 While the number of foreign workers in Berlin rose, the city's 
population dropped from approximately 4.3 million on the eve of the Second World 
War to 2.8 million, due to the call-up of the city's men for military service and 
3 Siegel, "Die Doppelte Rationalisierung," 16. 
4 Figures quoted from Helmut Brautigam, "Zwangsarbeit in Berlin, 1938-1945 " in Zwangsarbeit in 
Berlin. 1938-1945, ed. Arheitskreis Berliner Regionalmuseen (Berlin: Metropol, 2003), 31-3. 
5 Gabriele Layer-Jung, "Uberwachung und Bestrafung in Wehrwirtschaftsbetrieben: Beispiele aus 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg," in ibid., 85. 
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evacuation of non-working women, children and the elderly.
6 
This demographic shift 
led to fears amongst the city's police force that, with Germanis defeat looming, 
Berlin's foreigner population would develop into a hostile internal front. 
The call-up of workers to the armed services and the insatiable demand for 
skilled workers in Berlin's industrial plants prompted labour officials to embark on a 
drive to bring skilled western European workers to the city. L 'Effort Wal/on - a 
weekly newspaper published by the OAF for French-speaking Walloons in Germany 
- was used as a vehicle for a recruitment campaign to attract Belgian workers to 
Berlin.7 Jean Miroir sang the praises of the city, "The whole of Berlin's population 
has taken on the character of war". Miroir described Berlin as a modern bustling 
world city, rivalling New York with its vast transport network and traffic signalling 
system. Miroir emphasised the pace of life in Berlin, the strong work ethic of the 
city's workers, as well as the great sights and leisure activities the city could offer: 
One could write long meditations on the rhythm of Berlin. It is a rhythm of 
work, which manifests itself behind the walls of the factories, the workshops, 
the offices. But come Sunday those [working in Berlin] will find themselves 
amongst the millions of people in the streets with the admirable sites, which 
make Berlin the great world capital with the most marvellous belt of fresh air 
[that surrounds the city], or escape towards this outskirts of the city. When 
one sees the crowd that heads towards banks of Wannsee, Mtiggelsee or 
towards Reichsporifeld, 8 even in times of war, one understands that it was 
necessary to build special stations to drain these multitudes.9 
Miroir's article appealed directly to Walloons many of whom were highly skilled 
industrial workers, who were badly neede_d in Berlin's industry. Efforts to attract 
western Europeans to accept labour assignments in Germany during the first years of 
the occupation paid dividends. Analysis of the personal files of 204 Belgians who 
worked in Berlin during the war indicates that the majority of Belgian men and 
women working in Berlin went to Germany voluntarily - most taking up their first 
6 Cord Pagenstecher, "-Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte. Neue Quellen zur Topografie und 
lirztlichen Betreuung der Berliner Zwangsarbeiterlager," in Medi=in und Zwangsarbeit im 
Nationalso=ialismus. Einsat= und Behand/ung van "Aus/iindern" im Gesundheitswesen, ed. Andreas 
Frewer and Gunther Siedblirger (Frankfurt a.M.: 2004), 103. 
7 The publication was controlled by supporters of the influential pressure group the 
Deutschwallonische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (De Wag), which was responsible for the care and welfare of 
Walloon workers in Germany. A rival collaborationist group to the Rexist movement, the supporters 
of De Wag used l 'Effort Wal/on to ridicule the Rexist leader Leon Degre Ile. Degrelle instigated a coup 
within l 'Effort Wal/on whereby control was transferred to a pro-Rexist editor-in-chief. Conway, 
Collaboration in Belgium, 199. 
8 National sport stadium. 
9 CEGES/SOMA, BCR292 GR, Jean Miroir, "Le rythme de Berlin: Pensees sur la circulation". 
l 'Effort Wal/on, Nr.50, 13.12.1942. 
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labour assignmenl in 1941 11942 prior to the introduction ot conscription in Octoba 
1942 (see Appendix 11 on page 331 and l·igurc). r·urthermore, O\cr half of the 
women were married and were therefore nol subject to conscription. providing 
further evidence that a significant proportion of Belgian-; in Berlin ''ere \Oluntccrs 
(sec Table 5 on page 178 ). /\ quarter of the sample undertook more than one labour 
assignment in Germany. thirty-seven undertaking labour assignments in another part 
of German;. Some Belgians worked in Berl in for just a fe\\ monlhs: ho\\ ever. man) 
more spenl most of the occupation years working in German). \\hi le gaps in the 
available records mean that it is not possible to determine how many months an 
individual spent in Germany. recording the calendar ;cars in"' hich an indi\ idual 
Belgian worked in Germany. I ha\ e found that those\\ ho \\Orked in Herl in spent 
time working in Germany in three calendar years on average. ·r he median year or 
birth of Belgian men and women \\Orking in Berlin \\as 1914 and 1920 respecli.,,el) 
(sec figure 5 on page 179). 










1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
~011rce: Author"s statistics based on research into indi,idual files from the VGtDO. 
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Table 5: Categorisation of Belgians deployed in Berlin based on a sample of 
204 files 
CateRmy Men PercenlaRe Women PercenlaRe Total Perc:enf af?e 
Conscript 21 13.55 3 6.12 24 11.76 
Volunteer 130 83.87 45 91.84 175 85.78 
Conscript/vol unt.eer 1 0.65 1 2.04 2 0.98 
Economic migrant 
(living in Germany 1 0.65 0 0 1 0.49 
before 1940) 
Unclear 2 1.29 0 0 2 0.98 
155 75.98 49 24.02 























































































































































































































































































































































As the war continued workers from Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
represented a maJor contingent of Berlin's working population (see Appendix 12 on 
page 331 for a stat1st1cal breakdown of the number of foreign ci\ ilian versus na11ve 
Gennan workers employed across the German economy) Workers from these 
countries represented a third of the foreign workers deployed in the capital - well 
above the national average of l8.4 percent Conversely. at 36.4 percent. the 
percentage of Berlin's foreign workers represented by Ostarheiter was significantly 
lower that the national average (see Figure 6).10 This divergence from the national 
picture can probably be largely attributed to the higher demand for skilled workers in 
the electrical and machinery production industries that dominated industry in Berlin. 
Figure 7 on page 182 shows that almost a quarter of Belgians registered 111 Berlin's 
Neukolln and Kreuzberg districts came from the Antwerp region where the highest 
level of unemployment was recorded during the occupation. Significant numbers also 
came from Belgium's most heavily industrialised regions, including Brussels, Namur 
and Hainaut. Skilled western Europeans enjoyed a privileged status and secured jobs 
that attracted higher wages. Thus the privileged position of western Europeans was 
often funher reinforced due to the fact that they secured better jobs. 
Figure 6: Foreign civilian workers employed in Berlin (September 
1944) 
• Belgium (9%} 
• Denmark (2%l 
France Cl8%) 
• l taJy (3%) 
• Croatia (2%) 
• The Netherlands (8°1.l 
Eastern European <Ostarbe1terl <27%) 
Poles from occupied Pol11nd C8%l 
Ukrainians from occupied Poland (2%) 
Czecnoslo11akia Cb°lol 
• Other nationa lities Cl 5°41 
Source· Brautigam. "Zwangsarbcit in Berlin" . 31 . 
10 BrUultgam "/.wang.~arhc1t in Berlin." 33 
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Figure 7: Belgians deployed in Berlin's Kreuzberg and Neukolln 
districts 1939-1945, by region of birth 
I 
Source: Staustics based on SVG/00, R.429ff r.54.854 
2. Arrival in Ber lin 
• Antwerp ( 2 3. 2%> 
• Austria <0.1%> 
• Brabant - Bru~els <13.1%> 
•Brabant - Flemish (b.3%) 
• Brabant -Walloon <l.3%) 
• East Flanders (14.9%) 
• Hainaut (5.5%) 
• Liege <3.2%> 
• Limburg <1.2%) 
•Luxembourg Province (0.b%) 
• Namur n l %) 
West Flanders <b.9%) 
England (0.1 %) 
France <1..1%) 
Germany <1.1 %) 
•Hungary (0.1 %> 
• 11.lly (0.2%) 
• The Netherlands (0.b%) 
Soviet Union (0.1 %> 
USA (0.2%) 
Unknown (19%) 
The journey from departure points across Belgium to Berlin was arduous and usually 
look a day or more. Worker transports stopped at the transit camp in Aachen, as weU 
as stopping en route to allow passengers destined for other destinations to disembark. 
Travelling through the night, Belgians often arrived in Berlin late at night or in the 
early hours of the morning, hungry and tired from the journey. Their final destination 
was usually one of three transit camps established in the Brandenburg area: the 
Berl 111-Wi lhelmshagen transit camp located to the east of Berlin in Kopenick: the 
Lager Nordmarkstrasse in Prenzlauer Berg served as a transit camp from late 1941 ; 
and the Potsdam-Rebbri.icke transit camp in the woods close to the Potsdam-
Rehbnicke railway station. The majority of those who passed through the Berlin-
Wilhelmsbagen transit camp were Polish and Soviet workers, while a smaller 
number of western European workers also passed through the camp.11 The Potsdam-
II PagcnMccher. "l.agerlistcn und Erionerungsbcnchte," I 05 er Claus-D1ctc1 Spnnk. "Das System 
der Durchgang:.lager Jllr auslandische Arbeitskrafle im Ocrhncr Raum." m /.wangsarheit i11 Berli11, 
1938-1945 ed. Arbcitskreis Berliner Regionalmusccn (Bcrl11r Mctropol, 2003), 75 Spnnk suggests 
that the camp had a capacity of 4,800 residents. 
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Rehbrticke transit camp was established in early 1943 in order to process the 
increasing number of workers arriving from occupied territories and was the arrival 
station for many workers arriving from western Europe. 
Arrival at a transit camp served as a baptism of fire. These were massive 
facilities, accommodating hundreds and often operating well beyond their capacity. 
According to the account of young Dutch worker Klaus Brinks, the narrow timber 
beds at the camp had to be shared at the Potsdam-Rehbrticke camp, "We had to tie 
ourselves to each other so that we did not fall down. No mattress and no cover (in 
February)".
12 
Belgian conscript Robert Q who arrived in Berlin in April 1943 
recalled: 
We were received at a transit camp in Berlin Potsdam. The camp was 
relatively clean, but it gave a bad impression because it was surrounded by 
barbed wire and there were many volunteers (not only Belgians) who had a 
tendency to act like the police. 13 
Their arrival at a closed camp surrounded by a barbed wire fence came as an 
unpleasant shock to many new arrivals. Others described the camp as the "central 
slave market". 
14 
Transit camps functioned as labour exchanges - or slave malikets in 
I 
the eyes of many foreign workers - with employers attending the camp to select 
workers. Newly arrived workers stayed at transit camps for anything from a few 
hours to a couple of weeks before they were assigned to employers across Berlin. In 
other cases workers were transferred directly to their assigned employer upon their 
arrival in Berlin. Leaving the transit camp, singly or in groups, foreign workers were 
undoubtedly filled with apprehension about what lay ahead. 
3. Housing and living conditions 
German cities hosted hundreds of camps during the war years and Berlin was no 
exception. Research on the housing of foreign workers in Berlin has led to the 
identification of over 1,000 camps and approximately 3,000 addresses where foreign 
workers were housed during the war. 15 The figures in Table 6 on page 184 illustrate 
how the influx of workers led to a rapid expansion of the number of camps in Berlin 
during the war. By early 1943 officials from the various districts of Berlin had 
registered a total of 1,010 camps, with foreigners and their workplaces spread across 
12 Quoted in Almuth Plischel, Zwangsarbeit in Potsdam: Fremdarbeiter und Kriegsgefangene, 
Dokumentation, I. Aufl ed., Verwehte Spuren (Wilhelmshorst: Markischer Verlag, 2002), 70. 
13 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Robert Q. 
14 Dutch conscripted student Maarten Mourik quoted in Plischel, Zwangsarbeit in Potsdam, 65. 
15 Pagenstecher, "Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte," I 00. 
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all administrative districts. 16 Rainer Kubatzki emphasises: "'With the exception of the 
old middle-class residential areas in Berlin-Zehlendorf and the city centre, across the 
whole city there was a camp virtually just around the corner".
17 
Even before the First 
World War the centre of the city had become established as Berlin's administrative 
centre and business district, while most inhabitants resided in Berlin's outlying 
suburbs. This div.ision was later reflected in the distribution of camps in the city. 
Appendices 13 and 14 on pages 332-3 illustrate that the highest concentration of 
foreign workers and largest camps were located in the outlying suburbs and districts 
just outside Berlin, including Charlottenburg, Tempelhof, Kopenick, Pankow-
Schonholz, Reinickendorf, Weif3ensee, Lichtenberg and Treptow. By contrast with 
working-class districts, only a small number of camps were established in middle-
class districts like Berlin-Zehlendorf. A list of Belgians registered with the police 
station in Berlin-Zehlendorf during the war indicates that 197 Belgians were 
registered in the district. 18 
Table 6: The number of camps in Berlin 
Number of camps 
5 September I 940 35 
30 April 1941 400 
12 March 1942 700 
Early 1943 1,010 
Source: Helmut Brautigam, "Zwangsarbeit in Berlin", 35. 
Foreign workers who were resident in inner-city districts were generally 
housed in buildings such as restaurants, ballrooms and halls that were converted for 
the purpose of accommodating foreign workers, or in private accommodation, 
whereas large camps with barracks housing thousands of workers were generally 
built in outlying districts and outside the city. There was an overrepresentation of 
smaller companies in the inner city districts of Berlin such as Kreuzberg and 
Friedrichshain, which helps to explain the number of Belgians who lived outside 
16 This figure is based on the number of camps registered with the Main Health Office by early 1943, 
which sent the district health departments a form requiring that officials provide details of all camps in 
their district in November 1942. Ibid., 91-2. 
17 Rainer Kubatzki, "Irgendein Lager gleich um die Ecke," Berlinische Monatsschrift 9, no. 9 (2000): 
73. Also see Kubatzki, Zwangsarbeiter- und Kriegsgefangenenlager. 
18 SVG/DO, R.429/Tr.8797, List of Belgians registered with the Police Station 161 during the war. A 
significant proportion of those who were resident in well-heeled suburbs like Berlin-Zehlendorf were 
women - perhaps some of these women were employed in domestic service in middle-class homes. 
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. th d" . 19 h camps m ese 1stncts. T e expense of building camps and shortage of 
construction materials as the war continued often meant that it was more cost 
effective to accommodate workers in rented premises or to allow workers to live in 
private accommodation.20 
The foreign workers' home was the most common form of accommodation 
for foreign workers in the inner city. Most foreign workers' homes in inner-city 
districts were small - often housing twenty or so residents.21 An examination of the 
list of Belgians who were resident in Berlin-Kreuzberg indicates that 281 Belgians 
were resident in the district during the war. Closer analysis of the housing of 
Belgians in Berlin-Kreuzberg reveals that in most cases fewer than five Belgians 
were registered at an individual address and there were no locations where large 
numbers of Belgian resided. A number of Belgians were registered as living at 
company premises, indicating that they most likely lived in makeshift 
accommodation in disused rooms or in a barracks that had been erected on factory 
grounds. A large concentration of Belgian workers could be found in the traditionally 
working-class district of Berlin-Neukolln. The residence list for the district of Berlin-
Neukolln provides a means of analysing the accommodation where Belgians were 
housed. A total of 9,555 foreign workers were registered as living in Berlin-Neukolln 
by late 1942/early 1943 (see Appendix 13 on page 333).22 The residence records for 
Berlin-Neukolln indicate that almost 1,000 Belgians were resident in the district 
during the war, including 141 women. 23 
Housing was a perennial problem in Berlin and this situation was further 
exacerbated by the war and bombing. David Clay Large emphasises that Berlin faced 
a housing crisis during the war: 
Housing had long been tight in Berlin, and it became considerably more so 
because of an influx of war bureaucrats and workers to man the arms 
factories. While the population increased by an estimated 25 percent, housing 
19 Layer-Jung, "Uberwachung und Bestrafung," 85. 
20 This was especially true for smaller companies during the first half of the war because foreign 
workers were employed on fixed-term employment contracts and were yet to be stripped of their right 
to return home at the end of their employment contract. Moreover, the allocation of new workers was 
uncertain, particularly for small businesses. 
21 Brautigam, "Zwangsarbeit in Berlin," 35. 
22 Pagenstecher, "Lagerlis~en und Erinrierungsberichte," I 04. 
23 SVG/DO, R.429/Tr.54854, List of Belgian nationals resident in Berlin-Kreuzberg and Berlin-
Neuk511n 1939-1945 (prepared by the International Tracing Service using the social security records, 
labour office records and the records of Nazi organisations from the Verwaltungsbezirk Berlin-
Kreuzberg). 
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construction remained flat. Thus the legions of newcomers found it extremely 
difficult to find a single room, much less an apartment, in the overcrowded 
1. 24 metropo is. 
The arrival of western European workers, who were permitted to live in private 
accommodation, added further strain to the housing situation. On 8 September 1941 
a meeting of the representatives of the Armaments Inspectorate III, the Armaments 
Command and the Berlin state police took place to discuss the housing of the 85,000 
foreign workers living in the city. Officials noted that while workers from Poland 
and the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were housed in barracks in 
camps, the remaining foreign workers were housed in individual barracks or in 
make-shift accommodation established in buildings such as guest houses and halls, 
as well as in private accommodation. Officials emphasised that the housing of 
foreigners in closed camps was a key aim and those living outside camps should be 
moved into camps.25 Such policies illustrate that, while Nazi ideology deemed 
workers from the Netherlands, Flanders and Denmark to be racially superior 
Germanic peoples, many Germans in positions of authority sought to impose the 
policy of accommodation in camps on all foreign workers. Despite this policy of 
housing all foreign workers in camps, the reality changed little until the latter stages 
of the war. 
The shortage of camp accommodation in the city meant that 120,000, or 
almost half of Berlin's 250,000 foreign workers, were lodged outside camps in 
March 1943.26 According to a statistic published by the Berlin labour office at the 
end of 1942, some 23, 778 beds in camps remained unoccupied, ostensibly because 
workers preferred private accommodation.27 In view of the fact that many Berlin 
companies advertised to find private quarters for their foreign employees, during the 
period 1941 /1942, due to a lack of places in camps this claim does not entirely ring 
true.28 However, perhaps the problem of vacant camp accommodation arose because 
workers living in private accommodation were reluctant to move into camps -
especially as the regime in camps would curtail the greater freedoms they enjoyed. 
The issue of foreign workers living in private accommodation would become more 
pressing as the Allied bombing campaign began to take a heavy toll on Berlin's 
24 Large, Berlin, 33 1. 
25 Brautigam, "Zwangsarbeit in Berlin," 34. 
26 Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. I 3, 4954. (Nr.367: 15.03.1943) 
27 Ibid., 4956. 
28 •• 
Layer-Jung, "Uberwachung und Bestrafung," 89-90. 
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housing stock. Over the course of the war more than a million beds were lost as a 
result of bombing. Officials complained that, in areas heavily affected by bombing, 
some Germans were unable to find accommodation and had even been forced to 
t d . 29 accep camp accommo atton. In the summer and autumn of 1944 officials finally 
introduced a series of more restrictive measures, including directives requiring that 
all foreign workers living in private accommodation move into camps and seek prior 
authorisation before taking up accommodation, as well as greater restrictions on the 
movement of foreigners. A closer examination of cases where Belgian workers were 
housed in private accommodation, however, shows little evidence that Belgians were 
forced to comply with the requirement to move into camps. Much to the 
consternation of many Berliners, foreign workers were still living outside camps in 
the final months of the war. Berliners questioned, ""For the sake of better 
surveillance, why aren't all foreigners being housed in camps? They exploit the 
freedoms that they are allowed much too much ... Besides, they often threaten the 
safety of women and girls who go out alone". 30 Others suggested that the housing of 
all foreigners in camps would help stamp out black market trading, as well as free up 
rooms for Germans who had been bombed out.31 Despite the complaints of the 
German population, the security services' opposition to the housing of foreign 
workers in private accommodation and Berlin's housing shortage, many Belgians 
lived in private accommodation until the end of the war. Residence lists also reveal 
that Belgian families with children lived in private accommodation in Berlin in some 
instances. 
The approach adopted by German companies to resolve the problem of 
housing foreign employees varied significantly from one employer to another. 
Weserflug GmbH, for example, accommodated almost all its 3,500 foreign 
employees in one of two camps, which housed 1,800 and 1, 700 workers 
respectively.32 AEG was one of Berlin's larger employers with 9,112 employees 
across its ten plants. 33 Between 25 and 35 percent of the company's Berlin staff were 
29 Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. 13, 4956. (Nr.367: 15.03.1943) 
30 Bericht des Wehrmacht-Propaganda-Offiziers des Wehrkreiskommandos III, Berlin, Oberstleutnant . 
Wasserfall, Uber den "Sondereinsatz Berlin' (Nr. I: I 0.10.-15.10.1944) (hereafter Wehrmacht Mood 
Report) quoted in Wolfraf!l Wette, Ricarda Bremer, and Detlef Vogel, Das letzte ha/be Jahr: 
Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944145, I ed. (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 200 I), 129-30. 
31 Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.12: 25.12.-31.12.1944) quoted in Ibid., 198. 
32 Pagenstecher, "Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte," 104. 
33 Ibid., 102. 
187 
foreign in 1942.34 AEG established 101 smaller camps or Ausltinderheime. The AEG 
Kabelwerk plant established a camp that housed 1,295 workers at 
Wendenschlossstrasse 304 in Berlin-Kopenick.35 Many of its workers from western 
Europe lived outside camps in rented guesthouses, including married couples. The 
company also set up foreign workers' homes in rented premises that had been 
adapted to house workers (see Appendix 15 on page 334 ). Residents of foreign 
workers' homes were subject to a less strict surveillance regime and enjoyed greater 
freedom than their counterparts in large camps. The AEG factory police supervised 
accommodation run by AEG. By contrast with large camps, foreign workers' homes 
run by AEG-A T in rented premises generally did not have permanent supervision in 
place, rather the factory police carried out spot checks. For example, just after 
midnight on 15 May 1942 the factory police carried out a check at the ironically 
named Auslanderheim "Paradiesgarten ", Alt Treptow 4/5, Berlin-Treptow. Twelve 
residents of various nationalities were caught gambling - in breach of the rules at the 
home. Reporting the men to the police for a criminal offence under Paragraphs 284-
285a of the German Criminal Code (illegal gambling), the head of the company 
I 
factory police emphasised that "the men who made up the players were, for the most 
part, workers who do not go to work regularly and have already been arrested for 
refusal to work".36 The company probably requested police intervention because the 
men were regarded as problem employees and a threat to discipline in the home, 
whereas it is likely that residents who were otherwise regarded as good employees 
would have escaped with a warning under such circumstances. 
Conditions at foreign workers' camps varied considerably in Berlin. The 
undated photographs in Figures 8-10 on pages 189-90, taken by Belgian camp 
residents, illustrate the crudely built timber barracks that were the most common type 
of accommodation provided for workers. Timber barracks provided little protection 
from the elements during Berlin's bitterly cold winters. Camps were often located on 
or adjacent to factory grounds and therefore placed workers at greater risk of falling 
victim to bombing. Belgian conscript Willem L recalled, "Everything was 
34 Thomas lrmer, "» ... Eine Art Sklavenhandel« Konturen der Zwangsarbeit beim Elektrokonzern 
AEG/Telefunken in Berlin-Wedding," in Zwangsarbeit in Berlin, 158. 
35 Pagenstecher, "Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte," I 04. 
36 LAB, A Rep. 227 - 2: Nr.2. Letter to Criminal Police dated 15.05.1942. 
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constructed of timber that was of poor quality and unpainted". 37 It was difficult to 
keep cheaply constructed timber barracks clean exacerbating the problem of lice. 
By contrast a French worker who arrived in spring 1943, fearing he would be 
interned in one of Nazi Germany's infamous concentration camps, was pleasantly 
surprised: 
We were welcomed by very polite civilians, and calmly stepped off the 
train ... We were taken to whitewashed buildings that had obvious)) not been 
occupied. Nothing but cleanliness; everything tip-top! The sanitary facilities 
were brand new, and there were showers with warm water.311 
These two accounts clearly illustrate that accommodation standards varied 
significantly even across camps that housed western Europeans. Nonetheless, 
conditions in camps that housed western Europeans were quite favourable when 
compared with the conditions in which many of their Russian counterparts lived. 
Figure 8: The Berlin camp where Young Christian Workers' leader Jef Vyncke 
lived with fellow Belgians 
Source: CEGES/SOMA, image database, Nr.4962. 
37 CEGES/SOMA, AAl216150, Enquete Travail Ohligatoire, Willem L [extended account written in 
1975]. . . ' . -
l S Marcel Elola quoted in Roger Moorhouse, Berlin at War: L{fe and Death 111 the C ap1tal 1939-./J 
(London: The Bodle) Head. 2010), 123. 
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Figure 9: Belgian workers cleaning in order to rid their barracks of lice after their 
arrival at a camp in Berlin-Staaken 
Source: CEGES/SOMA, image database, r.5064. 
Figure 10: Photograph of the Berlin-Haselhorst camp 
Source: CEGES/SOMA, image database, r.5085. 
4. Health 
Access to health services was a problem for all inhabitants in Berlin during the war. 
Medical care for Germany's civi lian population suffered from the first years of the 
war as a result of anti-Jewish measures that banned Jewish doctors from practising 
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medicine, measures that made it more difficult for women to enter universities and 
the call-up of doctors and pharmacists to the military. Wehrmacht mood reports point 
to the difficulties that Germans faced in simply accessing a doctor and obtaining 
medicines. In November 1944 it was reported that many Germans complained that in 
the event of illness they could barely get access to a doctor or dentist if they were not 
already patients at the surgery. It was suggested that regular patients were allowed to 
enter via the back door, while others in the waiting room could get grey hair while 
waiting. 
39 
There is much to suggest that foreigners, who were much lower down the 
pecking order, found it even more difficult to access health services. While western 
Europeans received comparatively good standards of medical care, compared with 
Poles and Ostarbeiter, many Belgians nevertheless experienced great difficulties in 
getting medical attention in Germany. Moreover, standards of care deteriorated 
markedly towards the end of the war. The records of Belgians who died in Berlin 
illustrate that health had a major impact on the survival prospects of Belgians who 
went to Germany. Some Belgians suffered permanent or long-lasting effects on their 
health and a number of Belgians perished in Germany. 
For most foreign workers access to a doctor was very limited. In preparation 
for the mass deployment of Ostarbeiter in Berlin, Dr Adomat, the dir~ctor of the 
Berlin City Health Department, wrote to the local health departments in the city in 
November 1942, requesting that they register all camps in their local authority with 
the central health authorities. Officials gathered information regarding the provision 
of health services to foreign camp residents. Summing up the information provided 
by local health departments, one of Adomat' s colleagues in department II 6 reported 
in April 1943 that the overwhelming majority of doctors who were attached to camps 
worked in private practice and saw foreign workers in addition to their other patients, 
with few hospital doctors providing medical care in foreign workers' camps. 
Company doctors who were solely dedicated to the care of camp residents or 
company employees were generally only available in large camps or companies. In 
145 camps foreign workers had no access to a doctor. A small number of foreign 
workers - mostly western European - were permitted to choose their doctor freely. 40 
39 Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.5: 7.11.-12.11.1944) quoted in Wette, Bremer, and Vogel, Das letzte 
ha/be Jahr, 151. 
40 Pagenstecher, "Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte," 95. 
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In many cases officials reported that camp residents had access to a doctor; 
however, their access to doctors was very limited in reality. One practising doctor in 
Berlin-Mariendorf, for example, was responsible for providing medical care to a total 
of 4,829 foreign workers employed by Askania, Siemens, Fritz Werner and the 
Deutsche Reichsbahn.41 Jan A recalled that he went to see the camp doctor, but was 
turned away because he was required to see the Flemish workplace representative 
before he could be admitted to see the doctor. With many patients under their charge, 
camp doctors had very limited time and access to doctors was therefore often 
restricted to reduce unnecessary visits and prioritise more serious cases. Pressed for 
time with a long line of patients, it is unlikely that doctors were particularly thorough 
in their examinations. The Flemish workplace representative at Jan A's camp could 
also issue a certificate exempting an employee from work on medical grounds. Thus 
workers did not always receive medical attention even when they missed work due to 
illness or injury. Like many workers employed in heavy industry, Jan A sustained a 
cut that was 3cm long and l .5cm deep in the workplace. Jan A was initially given ten 
days leave; however, the wound did not heal and he recorded in his diary two months 
after he first sustained the injury that the wound had begun to ulcerate. He missed 
further workdays as a consequence.42 The lack of easily accessible medical services 
in Berlin also meant that relatively minor complaints developed into more serious 
health conditions in some instances. The failure to access medical attention could 
have dire consequences for foreign workers, as even relatively minor ailments could 
ultimately lead to death if left untreated. Walloon Guillaume T died on 2 November 
1944 as a result of an infection and thrombosis. Around three months prior to his 
death he had been swimming and water had penetrated his ear. He experienced some 
pain in his ear for a few days and then his condition improved. Several weeks later 
Guillaume T again began to suffer pain in his ear and severe headaches. He was 
admitted to the Berlin's Charite hospital on 28 August 1944. Doctors found that he 
was suffering from a chronic infection and had a phlegmon and thrombosis in his left 
sinus. Medical staff operated on his sinus, but he died three days after the 
operation.43 Foreign workers who were debilitated through physical exhaustion and 
malnutrition often struggled to fight infection, especially in the winter months, and 
41 Ibid. 
:~ CEGES/SOMA, AA 1260/60, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jan A's diary, entry dated 03.06.1943. 
SVG/00, R.149/Tr.13.221, Translation of Guillaume T's medical record. 
192 
thus even relatively minor injuries such as cuts could lead to death if chronic 
infection took hold. This applied equally to influenza and other respiratory 
infections, which often developed into life-threatening pneumonia. 
Doctors employed by companies were accountable to their employer and this 
probably had some bearing on their treatment of foreign workers. Manfred 
Sti.irzbecher emphasises, "The health of individual forced workers did not stand at 
the heart of medical activity by any means, rather the defence of the 'Aryan' German 
population and the preservation of the labour of forced workers". 44 This point is 
confirmed by the experience of Jan A. After suffering a workplace injury, Jan A 
initially continued working; however, after his boot filled up with blood from the cut 
he went to the factory doctor to get his leg bandaged. He recalled the uncaring 
approach adopted by the doctor, "He tended [the wound] and growled afterwards, 
'You are going back to work', which I didn't do because when I went back to my 
department the foreman immediately wrote a note saying that I could go back to the 
barracks".
45 
The doctor's primary consideration seemed to be the employee's return 
to work, and his approach was almost certainly shaped to some degree by the belief 
that foreign workers feigned illness or exaggerated the severity of their illness/injury 
to avoid work. Technical draughtsman Willem L recalled that he often reported to 
the doctor to avoid work. The long queue meant that by the time he saw the doctor 
much of the morning had passed. Gaining a reputation as a shirker who feigned 
illness could, however, have serious consequences in the event that one became 
genuinely ill. On 6 December 1943 Willem L felt ill and went to the camp doctor. 
However, the doctor sent him back to work. He suggested: "The doctors in the camps 
were really bad doctors who provided only a single diagnosis: 'work, work"'. 
Willem L continued to attend work for another week, performing little work and 
spending much of his day resting his head on his desk or in the bathroom. He 
returned to the doctor again only to be told once again that he was fit and should 
return to work. Suffering from a high fever, Willem L was finally admitted to the 
camp infirmary on 18 December 1943. At the time he was already subsisting on 
reduced rations as a punishment from his employer. According to Willem L's 
44 Andreas Frewer and Gtinther Siedbtirger, "Zwangsarbeit und Medizin im NS-Staat zur Einflihrung," 
in Medizin und Zwangsarbeit im Nationalsozialismus: Einsatz und Behandlung von "Ausliindern" im 
Gesundheitswesen ed. Andreas Frewer and Gtinther Siedbtirger (Frankfurt a.M.; New York: Campus, 
2004), 13. 
45 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1260/60, Jan A's diary, entry dated 31.03.1943. 
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account he was told after his transfer to the infirmary that: "He who does not work 
' 
does not receive food". Willem L was denied sickness benefits so that the only 
means through which he could obtain food to supplement his meagre rations was 
exchanging tobacco for food. He was "left helpless to starve and die". After spending 
fourteen days in the infirmary, Willem L had to walk three kilometres through the 
snow to visit another doctor. Suffering from a high fever, he faced the same trek back 
to the barracks. A week later he had to undertake the same trip to see the doctor 
again. During this period Willem L "became sicker and sicker, thinner and thinner". 
Finally in January 1944 Willem L was sent to the Potsdam City Hospital for a 
medical examination. At the time of his medical examination at the hospital Willem 
L weighed just 50kg. 46 His case provides clear illustration of the consequences of a 
doctor not believing that a sick worker was ill. 
The medical care afforded to foreigners in Berlin hospitals varied 
considerably. The medical records of foreign civilians treated at hospitals across 
Berlin indicate that western European patients generally received attentive care, in 
line with the normal standards of care in these institutions.47 However, the conditions 
at the foreigners' hospital run by the city administration in Berlin-Mahlow were, by 
contrast, catastrophic. According to a report written by the Main Health Office in 
Berlin to the Head of the Regional Government in Potsdam in December 1942, 
foreign workers, vagabonds and other "asocials" from the capital and the Teltow 
district suffering from serious illness or infectious disease should be sent to the 
Foreigners' hospital in Berlin-Mahlow in order to ensure that they did not cause 
annoyance or disquiet amongst the civilian population.48 From August 1942 around 
1,500 Ostarbeiter, including 400 women and eighty children, died at Foreigners' 
hospital - 60 percent from tuberculosis.49 In view of Nazi racial policy with respect 
to Ostarbeiter, it comes as little surprise that they represent the majority of those who 
perished at this institution. Ostarbeiter who were seriously ill and unlikely to make a 
fast recovery were considered expendable. Sti.irzbecher's study of patient records 
from the institution shows that patients from Poland, France, Holland, Belgium and 
46 Ibid., AA 1216/50, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Willem L. 
47 Manfred Sti.irzbecher, "Krankengeschichten von Auslandem: Ein Bestand im Landesarchiv Berlin," 
in Zwangsarbeit in Berlin, 97. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Pagenstecher, "Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte," 91. 
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the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia are notably absent amongst the patients 
admitted to the institution. 50 This revelation is not surprising. 
By contrast with Ostarbeiter who were transferred to the Foreigners' hospital, 
Belgian patients who were seriously ill were treated in hospitals across Berlin and 
those who were not expected to make a fast recovery were generally sent home 
where this was practicable. Of those 158 Belgians who were reported to have died 
from medical illness in Berlin during the war, ninety-three died in hospital, 
confirming that Belgians suffering from life-threatening illnesses were generally 
hospitalised.
51 
While the Foreigners' hospital was used as a quarantine station for 
Ostarbeiter suffering from contagious diseases, western Europeans suffering from 
highly contagious diseases were transferred to a department at the am Urban hospital 
in Graefestral3e Berlin-Neukolln and from November 1944 to the Prenzlauer Berg 
hospital and the Hufeland hospital.52 Interestingly, despite concerns about public 
health and provision for the transfer of foreigners suffering from infectious diseases 
to quarantine stations, Belgians suffering from infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis and diphtheria were not transferred to quarantine stations routinely. 
Confirming the privileged treatment Belgians enjoyed, Belgians suffering from 
tuberculosis were treated alongside German civilians. 
On the basis of the medical files of patients treated at the Foreigners' hospital 
in Berlin-Mahlow, Sti.irzbecher contends that the medical files of foreign patients 
treated at the institution are no different in principle to those of German patients -
implying that foreign patients received a similar level of care. Moreover, argues 
Sti.irzbecher, early discharge from hospital does not seem to have occurred in most 
cases. 53 This point is borne out by the experiences of a young Belgian woman, Anna 
B, who gave birth to a child at the university gynaecological hospital in Berlin-Buch 
in January 1945. A statement given by hospital staff to the police after Anna B 
abandoned her newborn revealed that the Belgian had been accommodated in the 
same ward as German mothers and a German woman had assisted with translation 
because Anna B spoke little German. In a further act of kindness, the German 
50 Stilrzbecher, "Krankengeschichten von Auslandern," 98. Just two files from the group of 200 patient 
files held at the Berlin State Archive pertain to Belgians. LAB, A Rep. 242: Nr.96-10 I. 
51 This figure is based on the author's own statistics based on research into the records of Belgians' 
deaths. 
52 Pagenstecher, "Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte," 93. 
53 Stilrzbecher, "Krankengeschichten von Auslandern," I 02. 
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woman gave the young Belgian a nappy for her child.
54 
This case illustrates that 
some Germans treated foreign patients with genuine compassion - regarding them as 
fellow human beings. 55 Belgians, especially Flemings, enjoyed a privileged status as 
western Europeans and were afforded a standard of postnatal care comparable to that 
provided to German mothers. The offspring of Flemish women were considered 
racially valuable and these women could therefore expect a good level of antenatal 
and postnatal care. Their experiences, of course, starkly contrast with the level of 
care afforded to Ostarbeiter women. The medical records of Belgian women who 
gave birth in Gennan hospitals indicate, for example, that they spent several days in 
hospital after childbirth, while Ostarbeiter women often gave birth in camps without 
medical care. However, the presence of foreigners, especially Ostarbeiter, in Gennan 
hospitals was considered as an affront to the more racially and ideologically minded. 
Security Service reports indicate that some Germans objected to being 
accommodated alongside foreign patients. In December 1944 Wehrmacht 
propaganda officers who garnered public opinion reported that Gennan women in a 
maternity ward questioned why foreign women were admitted to hospital and 
Gennan women were forced to return home just five days after the birth of their 
child. 56 
Belgians generally received a high level of care; however, the case of Flemish 
volunteer Jules H also provides clear signs that some Belgians experienced 
communication barriers that hampered their treatment in German hospitals. 57 Jules H 
who was admitted to the Wittenauer Heilstatten psychiatric institution in Berlin-
Wittenau on 24 January 1944 (see Appendix 16 on page 339).58 His admission record 
indicates that he was transferred to the institution because he was suspected of 
suffering from an organic psychosis necessitating his confinement in a closed 
institution. However, the medical diagnosis upon admission indicates that Jules H 
was suffering from epilepsy and tuberculosis. Institution staff noted that it was barely 
possible to understand him because he spoke very poor German and they repeatedly 
S4 LAB, A Pr.Br.Rep. 030-02-04: Nr.3. 
ss Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. 11, 4026-7. (Nr.304: 30.07.1942). 
s6 Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.9: 4.12.-10.12.1944 quoted in Wette, Bremer, and Vogel, Das letzle 
ha/be Jahr, 179. 
s7 Sti.irzbecher has observed that the medical notes were incomplete in a number of cases, probably the 
result of communication problems between staff and foreign patients. Sti.irzbecher, 
"Krankengeschichten von Auslandern," I 0 I. 
ss SVG/00, SOR 176091 and Dad 4074/374892. 
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referred to him as a Frenchman. It is apparent that Jules H struggled to communicate 
with staff even on a basic level. The final record in Jules H's file indicates that he 
died from tuberculosis and the accompanying mental disturbance on 27 June 1944. 
The distress and misery he must have experienced during his hospitalisation is quite 
extreme. 
5. Mortality 
Germany experienced an enormous loss of life throughout the war, although the 
worst of the killing took place from January to May 1945 due to bombing and 
fighting on German soil. During this time there was an average of 1,000 deaths each 
day due to bombing. 
59 
Richard Bessel observes that "Bombing, murder, terror, 
suicide, intense battles, mass flight, and deportation created a landscape of death in 
Germany in 1945". 
60 
Burial records from Berlin indicate that approximately 12,500 
foreign workers died in Berlin over the course of the war - the majority of whom 
were Ostarbeiter. 61 Life in Germany became more chaotic towards the end of the 
war and municipal authorities across Berlin struggled to deal with the rising death 
\ 
toll in the final months of the war and record-keeping was far less consistent. Reports 
regarding mass burials and the destruction of records appeared in the Berlin press 
after the war. In October 1945 the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) newspaper 
Neue Zeit published an article in which it accused the Nazis of mishandling the 
bodies of foreign civilians who died in the last bombing raids in Berlin, burying them 
in unmarked mass graves and thereby inflicting the final indignity of erasing their 
individual identity. Thus figures on foreigners who died in Berlin during the war are 
probably not accurate and the real figure may be much higher. 
There are two key sources of information regarding Belgian civilian deaths in 
Germany: the wartime records of the Military Administration, specifically telegrams 
sent by German labour offices to Group VII notifying officials of Belgian civilian 
deaths; and the lists compiled by BLOs in Germany after the end of the war. The 
59 Richard Bessel, "The Shadow of Death in Germany at the end of the Second World War," in Alon 
Contino, Paul Betts, and Dirk Schumann (eds), Between mass death and individual loss: the place of 
the dead in twentieth centwy Germany. Studies in German history (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2008), 52. 
60 Ibid., 55. 
61 Brautigam, "Zwangsarbeit in Berlin," 44. This figure is based on the cemetery records and many 
foreigners' deaths are probably omitted because the deceased was buried outside Berlin or their death 
was not recorded. This figure also does not include concentration camp prisoners and Jews who were 
killed in extermination camps. 
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Group VII telegrams from 1943 and 1944 have survived and form part of the 
Marburg Collection; however, the records from the final months of the occupation 
are incomplete.62 On the other hand, lists compiled by BLOs cover the entire war and 
the immediate postwar period. Using the records of Group VII and the reports of the 
BLOs, I have identified a total of 830 Belgians who died in Berlin between August 
1940 and in the months that followed the end of the war. All deaths recorded in 1945 
have been included in the sample as many of those who died in the aftermath of the 
war were often civilian workers who had not returned home due to illness. The cause 
of death is unknown in a total of 409 of these 830 deaths. It is notable that the 
number of deaths for which no cause of death is recorded rose significantly in 
1944/1945. 
Table 7 on page 199 provides a statistical breakdown of the cause of death for 
Belgians who died in Berlin. Frans Selleslagh suggests that 70 percent of Belgians 
who perished in Germany between August 1940 and June 1944 were killed in 
bombing raids. The analysis of Belgian deaths in Berlin reveals a different picture: 
28 percent of the Belgians who died in Berlin during the war were killed by 
bombing. This is a much smaller proportion than suggested by Selleslagh. Given that 
Berlin was heavily affected by Allied bombing, this finding raises questions about 
the conclusion that the majority of Belgians who died in Germany were killed by 
bombing. A total of fifty-six Belgians died at the Grossbeeren AEL, although the 
precise cause of death is unknown in all but one of these cases.63 Mortality rates at 
Berlin's three AELs, Grossbeeren, Wuhlheide and Fehrbellin, were high. Some 
25,000 people passed though the AEL Wuhlheide. According to Christine Steer's 
estimate 3,000 people perished at the camp as a result of murder, maltreatment, hard 
labour and illness. Another key cause of death in Berlin was execution. A total of 
ninety-nine Belgians were executed in Berlin during the war. These statistics are, 
however, somewhat deceptive because most executed Belgians were resistance 
fighters who had been arrested by the Military Administration in Belgium and were 
sent to Germany for trial. An increasing number of civilians from occupied western 
Europe were taken to penal institutions in Germany after their arrest. Comparatively 
62 SVG/DO, R. I 84/Tr.39157, Marburg Collection, 1141-8, 6081-5915 - 6082 (Film 21 ). 
63 ITS/ ARCH/ Arbeitserziehunglager Ordner I, S.34-7. List of prisoner deaths at the AEL Grossbeeren 
provided to the Netherlands Red Cross by the Dutch national Jan P who had been imprisoned at the 
camp and had worked as a nurse at the infirmary. 
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few of those Belgians executed in Berlin had been working in Germany at the time of 
their arrest. 
Table 7: Deaths by category 
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Accident 0 0 0 4 3 0 
Bombing 0 0 0 28 65 21 
Burns 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Deaths in custody 0 0 1 8* 38 11 
Drowning 0 0 0 5 4 0 
Executed 1 1 8 47 37 5 
Gas poisoning 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Illness 2 9 12 65 41 26 
Main utrition/starvation 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Murder 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Poisoning 0 0 0 I 0 0 
Suicide 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Workplace accident 0 0 0 6 2 0 
Unknown 6 3 24 46 83 106 
Total 9 13 45 206 275 175 
Date of death unknown 100 
Total deaths 830 
*One individual counted both under medical illness and deaths in custody 
Source: Statistics compiled by the author using records from the SVG/DO: 
R.184/Tr.39.157 and BUR Berlin (Acts de deces). 
The cause of death was "unknown" in a large number of cases. Bombing 
could have been the cause of death in many of these deaths. According to the 
findings, the medical illness claimed the lives of many Belgians in Berlin was 
medical illness, with a total of 155 Belgians' deaths attributed to medical illness. 
This figure represents 38 percent of the total Belgian deaths in Berlin where the 
cause of death is recorded. Table 8 on page 200 provides a breakdown of the cause of 
death of Belgians who died due to medical illness. These deaths have been broken 
down further to examine the factors underlying civilian deaths more closely. The key 
causes of death amongst Belgians in Berlin were infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis, diphtheria, as well as respiratory infections such as influenza and 


















reported to have died as a direct result of malnutrition - all in the final months of the 
war. Nevertheless, many Belgians' deaths can be indirectly linked to 
undernourishment and therefore lower resistance to disease. 
Table 8: Recorded cause of death for Belgians who died of medical illness in 
Berlin 




Influenza 1 * 
Meningitis 5 
Scarlet fever 2* 
Tuberculosis 36* 
Typhus 2 
Other medical illnesses 
Alcohol poisoning 1 * 
Angina pectoris 1 
Appendicitis 1 
Bleeding on the brain 2 





Exopthalmic goitre 2 
Gastritis 1 * 
General weakness 1 
Oedema 3* 
Heart attack 6 
Infection of the peritoneum 3 
Internal haemorrhage 1 
Kidney infection 1 
Lung infection 8* 
Miscarriage 1 * 
Myocardial paralysis 1 * 




Stomach ulcer 1 
Thrombosis 1 
Weakness of the heart 15* 
Weakness of the circulatory system 2* 
*Individual counted under two categories 
Source: Statistics compiled by the author using records from the SVG/DO: 
200 R.184/Tr.39.157 and BUR Berlin (Acts de deces). 
6. Bombing 
Berlin was targeted by Allied military leaders due to its symbolic importance as the 
capital of the Nazi state and was subject to 363 bombing raids altogether. In 
November 1943 Arthur "Bomber" Harris, Chief of Britain's Bomber Command and 
mastermind of the RAF bombing campaign, promised the British public that the RAF 
would "bombard [Berlin] until the heart of Nazi Germany has stopped beating".64 
From 1943 onwards daily life in Berlin was punctuated by frequent air-raid alarms, 
which disrupted people's days and nights. Belgians who came to Berlin early in the 
war witnessed how the city was reduced to ash and dust as one district after another 
was bombed. Around 600,000 civilians perished as a result of the Allied bombing 
campaign;65 in Berlin the death toll totalled 49,000.66 Between 1943 and 1945, 114 
Belgians were killed by bombing in Berlin. Most Belgian bombing victims died in 
1943/1944 (see Figure 11 on page 203).67 The number of Belgians killed as a result 
of bombing may be higher, as the number of cases where the cause of death was not 
recorded rose significantly in 1944/1945. 
The exigencies of war rendered the traditional distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants meaningless. Everybody living in an "industrial 
town" like Berlin was considered to be contributing directly or indirectly to the 
German war effort, and had therefore become a supposedly legitimate target. Harris 
justified the targeting of German cities and civilians on the basis that "[workers] are 
literally the heart of Germany's war potential".68 Goebbels, Gauleiler of Berlin and 
de facto leader in the capital, ordered the evacuation of children, non-working 
women and the elderly to the Mark Brandenburg, East Prussia and the Wartheland. 
Many Berliners were reluctant to leave the city. However, in the wake of the 
bombing of Hamburg in late July 1943, which resulted in a firestorm that killed 
34,000 people, wounded 125,000 and left the city largely in ruins,69 well over a 
64 Quoted in Mike Davis, "Angriff auf'German Village'," in Als Feuer vom Himmel fie/, ed. Stephan 
Burgdorff and Christian Habbe (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2003), 88. 
65 Jochen Bolsche, "'So muss die Holle aussehen'," in ibid., 19. 
66 Ibid., 20. 
67 The total bomb load the Allies dropped on Germany steadily increased: in 1943 was four times that 
of 1942 and in 1944 five times that of 1943. Jeremy Noakes, "Germany," in The Civilian in war: the 
home front in Europe, Japan and the USA in World War II, ed. Jeremy Noakes (Exeter: University of 
Exeter Press, 1992), 53. 
68 Quoted in Ulrich Schwarz, '"Uberall Leichen, tiberall Tod'," in Ats Feuer vom Himmel fie/, 70. 
69 Ursula Bilttner, "'Gomorrha' und die Folgen der Bombenkrieg," in Hamburg im "Drillen Reich", 
ed. Josef Schmid and Forschungsstelle ftir Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg (Gottingen: Wallstein, 2005), 
618. 
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million Berliners evacuated the city. 70 The number of registered inhabitants dropped 
from 3.7 million in July 1943 to 2.8 million by January 1945, although some 
evacuated Berliners would soon return from the countryside. 
71 
Evacuation was not an 
option available to German and foreign workers who were forced to stay in Berlin 
until the·end of the war. 
In late 1943 the RAF turned its attention to Germany's capital launching the 
Battle of Berlin. Berlin was subjected to an intensive bombing campaign, including 
sixteen major raids, between November 1943 and March 1944. 72 Belgian worker 
Alfons L recalled the opening raids: 
The bombardments increased in intensity. Over the course of a week the RAF 
bombarded Berlin with approximately 800 planes. It was the heaviest 
offensive we had experienced. Everywhere it thundered from the anti-aircraft 
guns. Screeching bombs exploded and the untameable seats of fire caught 
hold because the RAF dropped phosphorus bombs. 73 . 
Alfons L's account highlights the intensity of the bombing. The raid on the night of 
22/23 November 1943 had a devastating effect, causing 2,000 deaths and leaving 
175,000 homeless - half of those killed during the Battle of Berlin.74 Appendix 17 ~n 
page 341 provides a summary of the bombing raids in Berlin and details of deaths 
and the number of Berliners rendered homeless during some of the heaviest bombing 
raids. Estimates of the effect of the Battle of Berlin in terms of deaths, injuries and 
damage to housing vary: Laurenz Demps has calculated that a total of 7,480 were 
killed (with an additional 2, 194 missing), 17 ,092 were injured and 817, 730 were 
rendered homeless; 75 by contrast Reinhard Rilrup's more conservative estimate 
places the death toll at 4,000, with a further 10,000 injured and 450,000 left homeless 
as a result of the Battle of Berlin. 76 Mike Davis has suggested that up to 1.5 million 
Berliners were left homeless. 77 The bombing raids had a devastating effect on 
Berlin's inhabitants - German and foreign alike. Aside from those who were killed 
70 Anthony Read and David Fisher, Berlin: the biography of a city (London: Pimlico, 1994), 237. 
71 Large, Berlin, 347. While Goebbels hoped to rid the city of"supertluous eaters", to the frustration 
of Nazi officials many evacuees returned to Berlin. 
72 While the Allies focussed on the bombing of Berlin during this period, other Gennan cities were 
also bombed to prevent the concentration of defences in Berlin. 
73 CEGES/SOMA, AB2 I 79, Alfons L, "Bommen op Berlin", 22. 
74 AC Grayling, Among the dead cities: was the Allied bombing of civilians in WWII a necessity or a 
crime? (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 309-10. 
75 Laurenz Demps, "Die Luftangriffe auf Berlin: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht. Tei I II," Jahrbuch des 
Markischen Museums 8 ( 1982): 23. 
76 Reinhard RUrup, ed., Berlin 1945: eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Verlag Willmuth Arenhovel, 1995), 
] l. 
77 Davis, "Angriff auf'German Village'," 88. 
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or lcfl permanently maimed. it is clear that the raids left hundreds of thousands of 
people destitute and homeless. orten with little more than the clothes on their backs. 









1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Source: Author's statistics based on research into SVG. R.184 rr.39.157 and Bl R 
Berlin: Actes des dcces. 
Belgians living in Germany suffered as a result of bombing. just like their 
German counterparts. Man) I3elgians nevertheless later recalled that the) rejoiced at 
bombing raids - both because of the suffering the raids inflicted upon the Gennan 
people and. more importantly. because the} hoped bombing would soon bring an end 
to the war. Foreign workers also felt impotent in the face of the Allied bombing 
campaign. Jacques K later recalled the bombing of his barracks. Al I his belongings. 
with the exception of his work uniform. were destroyed. I le was. howeYer. amongst 
the more fortunate: the Russians in the neighbouring barracks were burned alive. A 
few weeks later he received a package from his parents with new clothes. In August 
1943 his camp in Mariendorfwas hit again and was completely destroyed. Jacques K 
described the instabilit} workers experienced, .. At that time we came to know the 
true life or a nomad: first to Wcissensee in the south of Berlin. then returning to 
Mariendorf to different barracks next to the factory. and final I} lodging in the factory 
canteen'".711 At the end of 1943 there were air raids ever) night. 79 
Belgians. like other residents of German cities. were menaced b} the spectre 
of bombing. f'lemish worker Pel ix G recalled how the bombing and innumerable 
"
8 CEGC c;oMA. AA 1260 I, Em111ete Trawiil Ohltgatoire. Jacques K. 
'9 Ibid. 
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fires that accompanied the bombing left them fearing that they would never return 
home.80 Willem B observed: "Because of the threat to life, [I] always hoped for a 
speedy end to the war". 81 The fear of bombing emerged as a major reason for the 
failure of Belgian workers to return from leave from 1943. The Military 
Administration suggested many Belgian workers, and in particular women, who 
failed to return after.visiting Belgium on leave were afraid of the bombing raids that 
had become increasingly frequent. 82 The terrifying experience of bombing raids was 
an abiding memory for those who lived through them. The Allies carried out the 
bombing of cities in France and Belgium between April and November 1944 in 
preparation for Operation Overlord - the Allied invasion of western Europe. The 
bombing of France and Belgium in the lead up to the Normandy landings, left more 
than 15,000 people dead. 83 While military preparations for Operation Overlord 
brought respite from the relentless bombing of Berlin, the bombing of Belgium 
brought new anxieties about the safety of their families for Belgians who were away 
from home. Belgium's liberation in September 1944 meant that Belgians still living 
in Germany were cut off from their families and experienced months of uncertainty 
about the fate of their loved ones. 
Belgians working in Germany relied upon the foreign newspapers for news 
regarding the progress of the war and the situation back home. Anxious about the 
fate of his homeland, Jan A braved the early snowfall on 16 November 1944 to buy 
copies of the foreign language newspapers Het Volk (Dutch) and Vlaamsche Post 
(Flemish). An article titled "Vlaanderen Vrij" ("Flanders Free") reported on the 
"hunger and cold in Belgium". He noted that the newspapers reported that there was 
fighting south east of Helmond in the Netherlands and in Lorraine. This point is 
interesting as it shows that Belgians working in Germany had relatively up-to-date 
information regarding the progress of the war, even if the newspapers did not 
necessarily provide an accurate picture of the course of the war. Many ordinary 
Germans resented the fact that the German newspapers did not provide an accurate 
picture of the course of the war. Quite surprisingly foreign newspapers continued to 
be produced until the end of the war, in spite of the rationing of paper and criticism 
80 Ibid., AA 1260/13, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Felix G. 
81 Ibid., Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Willem B. 
82 Ibid., BAL13.1/9-1 l, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.24, Anlage D, 16. 
83 Christoph Kucklick, Feuersturm: Der Bombenkrieg gegen Deutsch/and (Hamburg: GEO Ellert & 
Richter Verlag, 2003 ), 132. 
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from Germans who "complained about the surplus of foreign newspapers, which are 
always available in large quantities, [while] there are never enough German 
[newspapers]". 
84 
The continued availability of foreign newspapers provided foreign 
workers with an invaluable source of information regarding the progress of the war 
and the liberation of their respective homelands. 
Foreign workers' fears were compounded by the poor air-raid protection that 
was available to them. The Nazis publicised extensive plans for air-raid protection, 
including 2,000 public air-raid shelters in Berlin, after their rise to power; however, 
by the outbreak of the war just I 5 percent of the planned shelters had been 
constructed. Large public air-raid shelters were built at the Zoo, Anhalter Bahnhof, 
Humboldthain, Friedrichshain and the Kleistpark. These large shelters could 
accommodate just 65,000 people, while the masses of the population were forced to 
seek refuge in makeshift shelters in cellars. 85 Foreign workers justifiably felt 
particularly vulnerable because they could be denied access to air-raid shelters. Henri 
C recalled how German civilians sometimes refused to allow them entry to air-raid 
shelters, while at other times permitted them to enter. 86 In other instances only basic 
air-raid protection was available. Lucien B who worked for Rheinmetall Borsig and 
lived in Berlin-Henningsdorf recalled: 
As soon as a raid was announced the guards drove us from the barracks into 
the shelters. But the shelters were so rudimentary that we still preferred to 
slip away to our barracks to a good night's sleep. One night there was a 
veritable raid of phosphorous incendiary bombs. On the ground it sufficed to 
cover them with sand (and it did not miss here by much). But in one barracks 
it was more serious: not far from us some Czechs were killed through an 
incendiary. 87 
Belgians often felt that there was very little point in taking shelter during air raids. 
Moreover, many foreign workers felt so exhausted by the almost daily air-raid alarms 
and long working hours that they elected to stay in their beds rather than face another 
sleepless night in an air-raid shelter. Foreign workers were therefore left with the 
dilemma of whether to seek shelter or not to bother lest they were denied entry. 
Foreign workers were therefore often exposed to bombing raids to a greater degree 
than the German population. With the RAF and US Air Force bombing Berlin by day 
8
.i Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.9: 4.12.-10.12.1944) in Wette, Bremer, and Vogel, Das letzte ha/be 
Jahr, 178-9. · 
85 Ri.lrup, ed., Berlin 1945, l·I. 
86 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1260/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Henri C. 
87 Ibid., AB 1202, Lucien B, "Temoignage 1943-1945", 2-3. 
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and night from 1944, production in the city's factories was hampered significantly. 
The International Red Cross complained to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that in the 
summer of 1944 the Armaments Ministry had issued a decree giving plant managers 
more discretion: "Managers in individual factories can determine whether work will 
be halted or should continue during an air-raid. As a result, POWs and civilian 
workers in the armaments industry often have to remain at their workplaces even 
when attacking planes are flying overhead".88 Foreign workers therefore felt 
especially vulnerable because employers could force them to work through alarms in 
order to limit disruption and were disproportionately represented amongst the victims 
of bombing. 89 
A Security Service report dated 30 May 1943 discussed the behaviour of 
foreign workers and POWs in response to bombing raids. The authors emphasised 
that it was difficult to offer an overall judgement on the response of foreigners 
because their responses "ranged from cheerful and impeccable cooperation to 
indifference and attitudes that were to some degree openly oppositional".90 While 
some reports praised foreign workers for their assistance in clean-up efforts in the 
wake of bombing raids, others accused foreigners of openly expressing 
Schadenfreude (malicious pleasure) in the destruction. Reports from Koblenz and 
Bremen even accused foreign workers of using desk lamps to signal to bombers 
during air-raid alerts. 91 The claim that foreign workers intentionally used lamps to 
signal to Allied bombers must, however, be treated with great scepticism because 
they were also likely to be killed or injured as a result of such actions. By contrast 
with reports accusing foreign workers of Schadenfreude, another report praised the 
behaviour of Flemings: 
The Flemings generally display an attitude that is correct and are positively 
disposed towards the Germans, as well as [showing] a willingness to help. In 
Hamburg voluntary registration for fire-fighting can be observed in many 
cases. Their willingness to assist has increased considerably as a result of the 
attack on Antwerp. 92 
It is difficult to assess the effect of Allied bombing of Antwerp and Ghent on the 
attitudes of Belgians working in Germany. However, notably absent from the 
88 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 318. 
89 Ibid., 317. 
90 Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, vol. 13, 5295. (Nr.386: 30.05.1943). 
91 Ibid., 5295-301. 
92 Ibid. 
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postwar accounts of Belgians who lived through the bombing of Germany is any 
sentiment of anger. Alfons L recalled, "Lying in the courtyard of our camp was the 
motor of an English Bristol Blenheim bomber that had taken a direct hit from the flak 
and had broken up. The crew members had also fallen to their deaths from a great 
height".
93 
Even when confronted with the sight of the RAF bomber plane and its 
dead crew, Alfons L does not express any sentiment of anger towards the airmen. On 
the contrary, his account evokes the sadness he felt as he looked on as SS officials 
came to collect the bodies. Turning to the issue of the willingness of Belgian workers 
to assist with fire-fighting and clean-up work, this willingness to help after bombing 
raids is probably also symptomatic of the pragmatic approach adopted by foreigners 
in response to the destruction caused by bombing and a tacit acknowledgement that 
their own fate was entwined with that of the German population. Delays in carrying 
out clean-up work simply made life harder for everyone. 
The willingness of industrial workers to attend work even after heavy 
bombing raids meant absence levels were seldom greater than 15 percent. 94 The 
German authorities continually praised the discipline of the German workers, and 
also begrudgingly admitted that this also applied to some foreign workers toiling in 
German factories. There were, however, good reasons for workers to attend work 
even after their accommodation had been bombed. One such reason was the 
distribution of additional rations by employers. In view of the increasing chaos and 
disorientation, attending work each day provided workers with stability. Hans 
Mommsen has argued that the bombing of Germany had the opposite effect to that 
which was intended, "A spirit of struggling on developed [amongst the German 
people] as a result of the bombs, and Nazi organisations were able to portray 
themselves as helpers in times of emergency and were able to bind the people to the 
regime".95 Foreigners, like Germans, were dependent on the German authorities and 
their employers for housing and basic necessities such as food in the wake of 
bombing raids. Thus in this respect foreign workers were also tied to their employers 
and the Nazi authorities in order to survive. 
Figure 12: Distribution of soup to Walloons at an AEG factory in Berlin 
93 CEGES/SOMA, AB2 I 79, Alfons L, "Bommen op Berlin", 22. 
94 Hans Mommsen, "Wie die Bomber Hitler halfen," in Ats Feuer vom Himmel fie/, 118. 
95 Ibid. 
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CEGES/SOMA: image database, Nr.4992. 
7. Relations with the German civilian population 
Belgians· experiences in their dealings with Germans varied significantly. and often 
evolved over the course of the war. Some Belgians report that they received a warm 
welcome from Germans who believed Goebbels' claim that foreigners arriving in 
Germany were volunteers. Willem L recalled that upon the arrival of his transport in 
Aachen the German population showed great interest and a positive disposition 
towards the Belgians, "We [Belgiansl from Tienen could understand the language 
they spoke very well and the population was very friendly". He later realised why 
they had received such a warm welcome, ·'I came to know why the population was 
so friendly, they considered us to be volunteers - the German propaganda was very 
wel l organised". I le encountered similar treatment from his German work colleagues 
in Potsdam-Babelsburg, "I was received with open arms and friendship as if r was a 
collaborator. They refused to believe that I had been taken prisoner and could not 
return to Belgium·'.96 Belgian deportees resented the common misconception that 
foreign workers were volunteers that was often repeated by Germans who had taken 
Goebbels' propaganda at face value. 
96 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1260/50, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Willem L, 4. 
208 
Over time the attitudes of Germans who had day-to-day contact with foreign 
workers in the workplace often changed and even those who initially treated 
foreigners very harshly could change their approach. Lucien B recalled how outside 
factors prompted his German foreman to re-evaluate how he treated foreign workers: 
My boss - an SA commander - was enraged when I arrived and did not 
hesitate to hustle me, [or] hit me. But his attitude changed in the blink of an 
eye in the month that he learned that his son who was in the SS had 
disappeared in Italy and was in reality in a prison camp. He ended up even 
wanting to protect me from the cold during winter! 97 
The capture of his son who was serving in the military prompted the worker to reflect 
critically upon his treatment of foreigners and led to greater understanding of the 
Belgian conscript's plight. Alfons L similarly recalled that there were tensions at his 
workplace between a German and French worker. It was clear that the German boss 
Pflaume could not stand the sight of Frenchman Andre. Alfons L recalled one of his 
outbursts: 
On a certain day the source of Pflaume's fits of rage came to light. During 
one of his outbursts of rage he lowered his trousers and enormous scar about 
fifteen centimetres in length could be seen on his abdomen. "'Do you see 
that?" he screamed, '"Your grandfather gave me that during the World War 
during combat with bayonets at the Somme".98 
In the eyes of the German, the Frenchman stood for the French nation and those who 
had inflicted a terrible injury upon him during the First World War. In an effort to 
bridge the divide and minimise tensions, the French worker asked Alfons L to teach 
him how to express ""Mr Pflaume, you are a good man" in German. When the 
Frenchman expressed these words to his supervisor the German ""was so touched that 
he just stared at Andre with his mouth open and did not say a word". Even small 
gestures could bring about a measurable change in relations between foreigners and 
their German colleagues. Against all the odds, the two workers transcended this 
boundary over time and became close friends. These two accounts both point to the 
breakdown of Nazi stereotypes about foreigners and long-held resentments that 
stemmed from past military conflicts between their respective nations. 
At other times, the approach adopted by Germans was shaped by completely 
random or arbitrary factors. Lucien B and the French workers with whom he shared 
his barracks felled a tree in the nearby woods illegally in order to heat their barracks. 
While trying to take the tree back to their barracks they were caught by the camp 
97 Ibid., ABl202, Lucien B, "Temoignage 1943-1945", 3. 
98 Ibid., AB2 I 79, Alfons L, "Bommen op Berlin", 27. 
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guards and asked for their identity documents. Upon seeing that the Frenchmen came 
from Paris the guard smiled and exclaimed, "Ach, Paris. Beautiful Paris". The guard 
enumerated the beautiful sights of Paris where he spent the summer of 1940 and 
enjoyed his time. The men were able to build a rapport with the guard through this 
connection and he allowed the matter to pass without taking further action and the 
men simply faced a· stem warning from their employer. Two Slavs were, by contrast, 
later sent to a concentration camp after they were caught felling a tree illegally.
99 
The 
workers were under no illusion that their status as western Europeans and the guard's 
fond memories of Paris had ensured that they avoided serious consequences. Such 
experiences also reminded foreign workers that they could never really know how a 
German might react and left them with a feeling of uncertainty in their day-to-day 
dealings with Germans. Try as they might, the Nazi authorities were not able to 
exercise complete control over relations between the German population and 
foreigners. Some Germans were genuinely sympathetic to the plight of foreigners 
and treated them decently~ others, however, favoured harsh treatment. 
The ability to speak German and the establishment of good relations within 
the workplace and with the broader community could make a tremendous difference 
in one's material position in Germany. Jan A recorded in his diary that by July 1943 
the packages that had provided foodstuffs and tobacco to supplement their rations 
that he had regularly received when he first arrived in Berlin no longer arrived. He 
and his colleagues sought out farmers in nearby Berlin-Staaken to purchase food to 
supplement their meagre rations. In addition to selling the men food, a local farmer 
offered to give the men food in exchange for their labour if they came to work for 
him in the evenings after work and on weekends. 100 The labour shortage meant that 
some German farmers sought to secure additional labour through bartering. Belgians 
enjoyed more freedom of movement and therefore had greater opportunities to obtain 
food to supplement their rations - either by purchasing it or bartering. This 
advantage was of course further reinforced in the case of those who could 
communicate with the local population. 
Communication was, however, a two-way street and some Germans adopted 
a pro-active approach. A teenager during the war, Erich Neumann recalled that his 
mother applied to the labour office for two foreign workers when business flourished 
99 Ibid., AB 1202, Lucien B, "Temoignage 1943-1945", 4-5. 
100 Ibid., AA 1260/60, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jan A diary (dated 13.07.1943). 
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at her cafe in the western district of Charlottenburg. The labour office assigned two 
Belgian women: a German-speaking waitress; and a young girl in her early twenties 
to assist in the kitchen. Neumann recalled: 
Both of them came from Belgium and spoke amongst themselves 
predominantly in French. My mother didn't like this at all, so she took private 
lessons in French and paid for German lessons for the [younger] girl, [who] 
very quickly could speak German ... The two very quickly became part of the 
family and enjoyed coming to work. 101 
While foreigners naturally preferred to speak their own language amongst 
themselves, Germans were often suspicious of those who spoke their native tongue. 
Seeing the benefits of better communication with foreign employees prompted some 
German employers to learn a foreign language. Valuing her employee, this small 
businesswoman also invested in language lessons for her employee, whereas many 
larger companies employed staff who spoke foreign languages to handle foreign 
employees. 
Some Belgians found areas of mutual interest with German colleagues as well 
as other foreigners, "The young Germans taught me German songs, the Ukrainians 
taught me Ukrainian songs and the French taught me French songs". 102 German 
civilians were not forbidden from fraternising with western Europeans like Belgians 
and friendships did develop between the two groups. Belgians realised that many 
ordinary Germans were sick of the war, "We had the impression that many Germans 
were tired of iron discipline and also wanted to laugh and have some fun". 103 Like 
the foreign workers they worked alongside, many ordinary Germans wished that the 
war was over, and thus in this respect shared common ground with foreign workers 
who longed for the same thing. Many young Belgians were conscripted and sent to 
Germany at the time in their life when they would normally marry and settle down to 
start a family. Some Belgians met and fell in love with Germans during their time in 
Germany. Some married before the end of the war; however, this became 
increasingly difficult because couples intending to marry needed to supply a number 
of documents to the registry office in Germany and the Interior Ministry tightened 
the requirements to obtain a certificate confirming one's suitability for marriage in 
1943. Belgian agricultural worker Frans P was conscripted and sent to work in a 
rubber factory in Berlin-Rudow in March 1943. During his time in Germany Frans P 
101 Erich Neumann, unpublished memoir, quoted in Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 127-8. 
102 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1260/50, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Willem L, 22. 
103 Ibid. 
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met German woman Gertrud H and the couple married in Berlin, and their first child 
was born in 1944. They departed Germany and settled in Belgium in August 1945.
104 
The registry office records for Berlin from 1945 indicate that a number of Belgian 
men married German women once restrictions on marriage were lifted after the war. 
Reports about foreign workers featured prominently in weekly Wehrmacht 
mood reports. By contrast with accounts that point to good relations between 
Belgians and Germans, these reports reveal that relations between Berliners and the 
large number of foreigners in the city became increasingly strained over time. 
Germans grumbled about the presence of foreigners who represented a further drain 
on scarce resources. Their frustrations frequently revolved around the city's limited 
housing and food supplies, access to air-raid shelters and crumbling transport 
infrastructure. The arrival of refugees fleeing the approaching Red Army in the east 
only served to exacerbate these tensions further. Germans objected to the presence of 
foreigners on the streets, in cinemas, in public houses, on the city's public transport 
and in air-raid shelters. Complaints commonly centred upon the claim that foreigners 
traded goods at exorbitant prices on the black market in places like Alexanderplatz. It 
was suggested that foreigners were hanging around the streets and were not engaged 
in work and also failed to contribute to communal efforts to clean up after bombing 
raids. Others were infuriated by the sight of drunken western Europeans, questioning 
the source of the alcohol and how foreign workers could afford large amounts of 
alcohol. 
German inhabitants, who had grown accustomed to their role as masters over 
a helot population of foreign workers, increasingly complained about the behaviour 
of foreigners. The attitudes of many foreigners also clearly changed. Foreigners were 
acutely aware that the tide of the war had turned and Germany's impending defeat 
gave many foreigners greater confidence - confidence that often manifested itself in 
defiance of Germans. This defiance came as an affront to many Germans: 
Foreigners are always the first in the air-raid shelters and stand out in their 
objectionable [behaviour]. Most recently they have been especially insolent 
and sneering with respect to the aerial bombing raids, destruction and making 
corresponding remarks in their own native languages. 105 
104 SVG/00, 053970/337225. 
105 Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.20: 21.2.-27.2.1945) quoted in Wette, Bremer, and Vogel, Das letzte 
ha/be Jahr, 290. 
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Having experienced years of privations as foreigners in Nazi Germany, it was with 
some pleasure that foreigners bore witness as the Germans finally reaped what they 
had sown. Staff at the maternity ward at Berlin's Charite hospital reported that a 
Russian woman who gave birth to a son in December 1944 refused to register the 
birth with the registry office. Infuriating officials and German patients, the Russian 
defiantly argued "she would soon be home anyway [because] the Russian armies are 
already in Germany".
106 
Germans did not take kindly to the Schadenfreude of 
foreigners who scarcely concealed their pleasure at the bombing of Germany and the 
land invasion by Soviet and Allied troops. 
In some parts of Berlin residents began to feel that their neighbourhoods had 
been inundated with foreigners. The writer Felix Hartlaub described the 
transformation that had taken place in some parts of Berlin, in a letter to his father in 
August 1944: 
As a consequence of the great transfer of people [from Berlin], the presence 
of the foreign element has become disproportionately conspicuous. In some 
streets and public houses one really hears not a single word of German 
spoken and so one has the feeling of strolling through a peculiar Babylon; a 
Babel of rubble and labour and tremendous expectations ... In some 
neighbourhoods in which hardly any of the street signs are still standing, one 
gets a whiff of the atmosphere of the Parisian banlieue, the Italian piazza or 
the Ukrainian village square. 107 
The departure of men conscripted into the armed forces and the evacuation of 
children, the elderly and those who were not working brought a major demographic 
shift in Berlin. Germans living in districts that housed large numbers of foreigners 
began to feel increasingly threatened: 
In the Rosenthal district there are large foreign workers' camps. All the 
streets and public transport there are teeming with foreigners. According to 
more recent reports from the local population, forei~ners are particularly 
insolent and brazen, above all during the evening. 10 
The impending closure of the local police branch in the Rosenthal district of Berlin-
Pankow due to staff shortages left residents feeling exposed. Many Germans began 
to have grave misgivings about the number of foreigners in their midst. Berliner 
Ursula von Kardorff recorded in her diary entry of 30 November 1944: 
106 Wehrmacht Mood Report(Nr.9: 4.12.-I0.12.1944)quoted in Ibid., 179. 
107 Felix Hartlaub and Ema Krauss, Felix Hartlaub in seinen Brie/en (Ttibingen: R. Wunderlich, 
1958), 219-20. 
108 Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.20: 21.2.-27.2.1945) quoted in Wette, Bremer, and Vogel, Das letzte 
ha/be Jahr, 289. 
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The foreign workers are apparently exceptionally well organised. It is 
suggested that there are officers amongst them, sent by the various 
underground movements, who are well-equipped with weapons, as well as 
radios ... There are twelve million foreign workers in Germany. Their own 
army. Some people call them the Trojan horse of today's war.
109 
Rumours that foreigners were armed abounded in Berlin and the fear that foreigners 
were a Trojan horse.who would seek to destroy Germany from within is echoed in 
other accounts from the wartime period. Wehrmacht propaganda officers reported 
that towards the end of the war the population became increasingly concerned that 
firearms were in the hands of civilians, especially foreigners, and that "the many 
foreigners in Berlin could one day attack". It was a threat officers took seriously, 
urging that weapons searches be carried out amongst foreigners. 
110 
While many 
foreign workers were to be found amongst the ranks of the underground movement, 
the uprising of foreigners Berliners feared never came. In spite of the general 
suspicion of foreigners, some Germans did look upon foreigners more positively. 
Officials noted that they had frequently observed Germans discussing the recruitment 
of foreigners to the Waffen-SS. Germans apparently suggested that many foreigners, 
' who had not necessarily been exactly positively disposed towards the Nazi regime 
upon their arrival in Germany, had joined the ranks of the Waffen-SS after hearing of 
how the Anglo-Americans were treating their fellow countrymen in the occupied 
territories in the west (see Appendix 18 on page 343 for information regarding the 
recruitment for Belgian fascist formations ). 111 By contrast with those who regarded 
foreigners as a threat, some Germans came to regard western Europeans as fellow 
members of their community of fate. 
In some cases individual Germans showed genuine empathy and 
understanding for the plight of foreigners. Erich Neumann recalled: 
Mother covered up the forbidden escapades of the two [Belgian women she 
employed] where she could. It was her duty to immediately provide a report 
to the police if one of the women did not arrive at work punctually ... At some 
point neither came to work anymore. Mother and I were very sad. She 
delayed reporting the matter to the police from one day to the next. She 
109 Ursula von Kardorffand Peter Hartl, Berliner Aufzeichnungen, 1942-1945 (Mtinchen: CH Beck, 
1992), 265. 
110 Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.7: 20.11.-26.11.1944 & Nr.16: 22.1.-29.1.1945) quoted in Wette, 
Bremer, and Vogel, Das letzte ha/be Jahr, 163 & 234. 
111 Wehrmacht Mood Report (Nr.3: 24. 10-31.10. 1944) quoted in ibid., 143. 
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wanted to allow the two women enough time and a head start in case they 
were attempting to flee to their homeland. 112 
In an act of selflessness, Neumann's mother sought to aid the women in their flight, 
in spite of her obligation to report their flight and the potential consequences. The 
elder of the two Belgians remained in Berlin and returned to visit her former· 
employer at the end of the war, the two women rejoicing when they were reunited. 
8. Relations between Belgians and other foreign workers 
The postwar accounts of Belgian workers point to close relations between Belgians 
and other foreigners. Many accounts point to relationships between western 
Europeans and Poles and Ostarbeiter, illustrating that foreigners paid little heed to 
the strictures of the Nazi racial hierarchy. Lucien B recalled how he and a colleague 
were sent to deliver coal by horse and cart. They passed a farm where a Polish 
woman working as a servant brought them a handful of apples from the orchard. The 
apples were taken back to the camp and shared between the men - it was the only 
apple Lucien Bate during his time in Germany. 113 The woman's kindness was a 
ciierished memory of his time in Germany. Alfons L also emphasised the strong 
relationships that developed between camp residents, "All the wonderful friendships, 
all the fondness [that developed] in the camps was overwhelming". 114 The portraits 
Willem L drew during his time in Berlin are a testament to the warm friendships that 
developed between Belgian men and Ostarbeiter women (see Figure 13 on page 216. 
Photographs from the period also indicate that Belgian men often had close contact 
with Polish and Russian women during their free time. A photograph taken in June 
1943 shows a group of Belgians from a camp in Eberswalde, north-east of Berlin, 
taking a walk with some Russian women (see Figure 14 on page 217). Some 
Belgians developed committed relationships with other foreign workers. Following 
the lifting of the marriage ban, a number of Belgians married women from Poland, 
Yugoslavia, Russia, Croatia and the Ukraine in May 1945. 115 Around 4,000 
112 Erich Neumann, unpublished memoir. A copy of page 30 of this unpublished memoir was kindly 
~rovided by Richard Moorhouse. 
13 CEGES/SOMA, AB 1102, Lucien B, "Temoignage 1943- 1945", 5. 
114 Ibid., AA 1260/50, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Willem L, 40. 
115 SVG/DO, R. 149/Tr.4.086, List of forty-two Belgians who married in Berlin Standesamt 6 (registry 
office). 
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Ostarbeiterinnen women of Ukrainian. Russian and Belorussian descent settled 
in Belgium after the end of the war. 116 
Figure 13: Portrait of a Yugoslavian deportee by Willem L 
Source: CEGES/SOMA AA 12 16/50, Enqucte Travail Ob ligatoirc, Willem L . 
116 Machteld Venken, "'Signing a Meaning to War Memory', [abstract from Paper titled given at the 
' ovember 1948 and All That: Soviet Music, Ideology and Power' Conference, 27-8 November 
2009]," The Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, Cambridge University, 
http://www.crassh.cam.ac.uk/page/468/machteld-venken.htm. Also see Venken's work on Polish and 
Ostarbeiter women who settled in Belgium after the war: Machteld Venken, "Gemengd huwen, 
nationaliteit en de verschi llen voor mannen en vrouwen: Poolse oudgedienden en Ostarbeiterinnen in 
Belgie tijdens de Koude Oorlog," Tijdschrifl voor Sociale en £conomische Geschiedenis 5, no. I 
(2008). 
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Relations between Belgians and other foreigners were often also underpinned 
by laws of barter and exchange. Alfons L recalled how he and his friend Casimir 
made the acquaintance of Estonian twins. The men spent the evening in the company 
of the twins sitting on a bench, holding hands and looking up at the stars. r he 
Belgians shared their Belgian gingerbread with the twins and felt very happy. A fe\.\ 
days later he saw one of the twins in the company of a f renchman who was sharing 
meat paste that he had received from home. 11 7 '[his sight brought the realisation that 
the women had exploited their naivety in order to obtain additional food and that 
their affections were only feigned. 
Figure 14: Eberswalde camp. Group of Belgians and Russian women on a walk 
CEGES/SOMA: image database, Nr.5 181 
9. Social and cultural life 
Many young Belgians lived with their families before they left for Germany and 
came from provincial towns and villages, so their departure for Germany provided 
their first taste of freedom. Liberated from the yoke of their families and Belgium's 
strict Catholic culture, many young Belgians welcomed their new freedoms and 
independence and relished the opportunities that life in a big city had to offer. 
11 7 CEGES SOMA, AB2 I 79, Alfons L. "'Bommen op Berlin'·, 2 1. 
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Belgians recalled life in Berlin: the cafes, theatre, cabaret, cinema, dance halls, 
attending the circus, visiting the sights of the capital, swimming at Wannsee or 
Mi.iggelsee, the bordellos in the city's red-light district, and their first amorous 
relationships. One Belgian woman later recalled that her time in wartime Berlin was 
"the best time of her life": her wages were good, she could go out and there was 
much pleasure to be had. 118 Notwithstanding the privations Belgian workers suffered 
and the Allied bombing raids that became an enduring memory of their time in 
Germany, Belgians also pointed to more positive aspects of life in Berlin, 
particularly during the early war years before bombing began to take a heavy toll on 
the city. Activities were also organised in larger camps where workers held theatrical 
and musical evenings, boxing matches and sporting events. The DAF also organised 
a range of activities for Belgian workers in Berlin. Figures 15-18 on pages 220-221 
show a social event organised for French-speaking Walloons in Berlin. The Franco-
Belgian club Le Pont was also active in Berlin from 1940 to 1945, organising social 
gatherings for francophones. Figure shows a performance held at the club's facilities 
in the Tiergarten in the heart of Berlin. The Gfrman authorities also catered for 
Belgian tastes in entertainment, organising performances by Belgian performers in 
Germany. The account of Dutch conscripted worker Anne's time in Berlin has been 
recounted in Marloes van Westrienen's historical-anthropological st_udy of young 
Dutch men who were deported to Nazi Germany, "Anne thinks it's wonderful: film, 
theatre, brothels and pubs, but after six months he has seen enough. He takes photos 
with the boys. They put up a sign 'Berlin, how long to go?' and they all stand around 
it". 119 While the city initially offered much entertainment, some western Europeans 
soon tired of it and longed for home. As the war wore on it is doubtful that foreign 
workers had the energy or inclination to participate in Berlin's rich social and 
cultural offerings, engage in educational programs or play sport, especially as their 
work hours were extended and the bombing of the city made daily life increasingly 
difficult. 
118 Gerlinda Swillen, Koekkoekskind: door de vijandve1wekt [1940-1945) (Antwerp: 
Meulenhoff/Manteau, 2009), 42. Interview with war child Julian V who recounted her mother's 
experiences in Berlin. 
119 Marloes van Westrienen, Dwang Arbeiders: Nederlandse jongens tewerkgesteld in het Derde Rijk 
(Amsterdam; Antwerp: Uitgeverij Contact, 2008), I 0 I. 
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Figure 15: Group of Wallonian workers at the Delphi in Berlin, where the Brussels 
Orchestra is fronted by Jean Omer 
CEGES/SOMA, image database, Nr. 504 1. 
Figure 16: Group of Walloons at a cate at Berlin Alexanderplatz 
CEGEStSOMA. image database, Nr.5042 . 
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Figure 17: French and Belgians on a steamboat trip on the Muggelberge 
CEGES/SOMA, image database, Nr. 5235. 
Figure 18: A Performance at the Le Pont club in Berlin 
' 
CEGES SOMA, image database, Nr.5235. 
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10. Industrial management and discipline 
AELs served the dual purposes of racial and political persecution and enforcing 
industrial discipline. Himmler released a decree on 28 May 1941 providing for the 
imprisonment of those who refused to work, as well as workers who broke their 
labour contracts. He elucidated the intentions behind the decree, "The prisoners 
should be required to work to show them the detrimental effect their behaviour has 
on the people, to train them for regular work and to set an example that serves as a 
warning and a deterrent for others". 120 The first AELs were established in the spring 
and summer of 1940, including the AEL Wuhlheide in Berlin, and the network of 
AELs expanded rapidly. The initial eight AELs could accommodate 2,000 prisoners~ 
however, by the final stages of the war there were over 200 AELs across Germany 
and the occupied territories, housing approximately 40,000 prisoners. 121 A former 
employee of the Gestapo coordinating office in Berlin later recalled that the majority 
of those transferred to AELs were foreign workers. 122 The most common reason for 
imprisonment in an AEL was leaving one's workplace without permission, with 
around 40,000 cases of absconding every month. 123 Other reasons for imprisonment 
in an AEL included arguments with one's boss or work colleagues, as well as 
political offences. 
Daily life at AELs was characterised by constant hunger, unheated and 
overcrowded bug-ridden barracks, inadequate medical care, hard labour, brutal 
maltreatment and frequent roll-calls cruelly intended to make life harder for 
prisoners. Conditions in AELs were on a par with those in German concentration 
camps. As a testament to the brutal treatment to which AEL prisoners were 
subjected, in May 1944 Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Head of the Security Police and 
Security Service reported to Hanns Albin Rauter, Higher SS and Police Leader in the 
occupied Netherlands: 
The Security Police's AELs are anything but a holiday. The inmates' working 
conditions and living conditions are generally harder than in a concentration 
120 Quoted in Cord Pagenstecher, "Arbeitserziehungslager," in Der Ort des Terrors. Geschichte der 
nat ionalsozial isl ischen Konzen/rat ions/ ager: A rbeitserziehungsl ager, Ghettos, Jungendschutzl ager, 
Polizeihaftlager, Sander/ager, Zigeuner/ager, Zwangsarbeitslager, ed. Wolfgang Benz and Barbara 
Distel (Munich: CH Beck 2009), 76. 
121 Ibid., 85. . 
122 Quoted in ibid., 83. 
123 Gabriele Lotti, KZ der Gestapo: Arbeitserziehungslager im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 2000), 229. 
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camp. This is necessary in order to achieve the desired effect and is possible 
because the individual prisoner's stay only lasts a few weeks, or a few 
months at most. 124 
Mortality rates remained lower at AELs only by virtue of the fact that prisoners were 
imprisoned for a limited period - rather than indefinitely. 125 The official maximum 
term of imprisonment for those sent to an AEL was generally fifty-six days because 
labour shortages meant that employers wanted their workers to return to work, 
although this was frequently exceeded. 126 The constant turnover of prisoners 
inhibited the building of group solidarity within the prisoner population and also 
meant that resisters within the prisoner population were soon betrayed. 
127 
Former 
inmate of the AEL Fehrbellin, Maria Andrzejewska poignantly described the effect 
the harsh regime at AELs had on the mind and body: 
In the first days in the camp I lived in constant fear. I tried to adhere to the 
camp rules in order to avoid being hit with a truncheon; they usually hit you 
in the head with the truncheon. Later a kind of internal paralysis followed, 
simply a renunciation of life. The pain in the hands with the open blisters and 
feet full of wounds clouded my senses. I was without thoughts. I lived as in a 
trance, and it did not matter to me whether I survived to see the next day. 
Even on the day of release I did not feel any joy. 128 " 
Belgians recalled that colleagues who were sent to an AEL returned physically and 
mentally broken. The physical transformation AEL inmates underwent served as a 
deterrent to other workers. AELs therefore proved to be a very effective instrument 
for disciplining both Germans and foreigners. 
Three AELs were established in Berlin: the AEL Wuhlheide in the south east 
of Berlin; the AEL Grossbeeren in the district of Teltow-Flaming south west of 
Berlin in early September 1942; and the AEL Fehrbellin 50km north-west of Berlin. 
Estimates of the number of workers who passed through the AEL Wuhlheide 
indicate that as many as 25,000 prisoners were imprisoned at the camp during the 
war. 129 The camp housed around a thousand male prisoners - the overwhelming 
majority of whom were Ostarbeiter, while French, Dutch, Belgian and German 
124 Quoted in ibid., 227. 
125 Pagenstecher, "Arbeitserziehungslager," 85-6. 
126 Christine Steer, "Das Arbeitserziehungslager Wuhlheide," in Versklavt undfast vergessen. 
Zwangsarbeit im Berliner Bezirk Lichtenberg 1939-1945, ed. Bezirksamt Lichtenberg von Berlin 
(Berlin: Trafo-Verlag, 2001), 15. 
127 Pagenstecher, "Arbeitserziehungslager," 86. 
128 Quoted in Cord Pagenstecher, "AEL Fehrbellin. Ein Frauen-Stratlager flir Berliner 
Zwangsarbeiterinnen," in Abgeschlossene Kapitel, ed. Sabine Moller, Studien zum 
Nationalsozialismus in der Edition discord {TUbingen: 2002), 39. 
P9 - Steer, "Versklavt und fast vergessen," 48. 
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nationals made up a smaller proportion of inmates. 130 The camp was established at a 
vacant premises that had housed railway workers at the goods yard at the 
Grossbeeren railway station. Prisoners at the camp were put to work principally for 
the German railways laying tracks, bunkers, levees, air-raid trenches and completed 
concreting, as well as on the construction of canals. The AEL Fehrbellin housed 
exclusively women - both foreign workers and German women - and held between 
300 and 500 prisoners. There were seventy Belgian inmates at the camp on 8 April 
1945.
131 
Conditions in the camp were typical of the conditions in other AELs. 
Even seemingly minor misdemeanours could result in imprisonment at an 
AEL. Belgian technical draftsman Marcel G was entranced by the spectacle of aerial 
bombing, taking a photograph, which he planned to keep as a souvenir. However, he 
was subsequently denounced by fellow Belgian Barthelemy C and arrested on 
12 September 1943 and was transferred to the AEL Grossbeeren. 132 With Berlin 
under attack from Allied bombing, seemingly insignificant acts were politicised. As a 
testament to the harsh regime at AELs, Marcel G died from sepsis just two months 
after his arrival at Grossbeeren on 15 November 1943. He was one of fifty-six 
Belgians who died at the camp between February 1943 and April 1945. With the 
exception of Marcel G, the cause of death of Belgians who died at the AEL was not 
recorded. According to the account of a Dutch prisoner who worked as a nurse in the 
camp infirmary, many of the prisoners succumbed to illnesses such as typhoid, 
influenza and pneumonia. 133 Brutal treatment and physical exhaustion were clearly 
factors in the high mortality rates. 
As the war continued the network of AELs expanded even further, 
culminating in the establishment of new categories of AEL: reception camp and the 
"education" camp run by large companies or municipal authorities. These camps 
were generally established on factory grounds or in empty municipal buildings and 
were run by the police authorities rather than the Gestapo. 134 The Gestapo was 
130 Lotti, KZ der Gestapo, 191. 
131 Pagenstecher, "AEL Fehrbellin," 36. 
132 SVG/DO, SOR 62719, Dad 517 /304748 and PP ad 6462/53226. After the war Barthelemy C was 
tried by a military court in Liege and condemned for his denunciation of Marcel G. After the war 
Marcel G's mother petitioned for her son to be officially recognised as a political prisoner. The 
Belgian authorities rejected this claim on the basis that his offence was not a political act. He was, 
however, subsequently recognised as a conscript. 
133 ITS/ ARCH/ Arbeitserziehungslager Ordner I, S34-7. List of prisoner deaths at the AEL 
G rossbeeren. 
134 Lotti, KZ der Gestapo, 237. 
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increasingly overburdened and an internal report from the firm Osram GmbH dating 
from October I 942 notes that "the Gestapo is so heavily burdened that it can only act 
in the most blatant cases". 135 Unable to obtain assistance from the Gestapo, except in 
the most serious cases, companies also increasingly resorted to dealing with problem 
employees internally. Punishment camps or "arrest rooms" were set up by Berlin 
companies in order to deal with problem employees expeditiously. AEG set up two 
"arrest rooms", one for women and one for men, at the Johannisthal camp in I 944, 
with the approval of Commissioner Rothfeldt at the Gestapo headquarters. 136 
Workers were imprisoned in the "arrest rooms" for one to five days. According to 
company officials, most of the workers held in the arrest rooms were locked up as a 
punishment for loafing. The Berlin City Administration also established an 
"education" camp in Berlin-Frohnau. Little is known about such camps or "arrest 
rooms", although references spread across various sources indicate that the 
introduction of such measures were a widespread phenomenon. 137 The benefit for 
employers of establishing their own punishment camps or "arrest rooms" was that 
they did not relinquish control of employees to the Gestapo and could mo;ve swiftly 
to deal with problem employees. The accounts of some Belgians also indicate that 
forced recruitment for Belgian units deployed on the Eastern Front was used as a 
disciplinary measure to punish refusal to work or troublesome employees. It is likely 
that increasing overcrowding in disciplinary camps and the deteriorating military 
situation in the east led to the forced recruitment of Belgians for German military and 
paramilitary units. This recruitment drive was largely ineffectual and few workers 
were convinced to sign up on a voluntary basis; officials therefore applied coercive 
measures to sign up Belgian workers. 
11. Crime and punishment 
Law and order was particularly important for the civilian population in wartime 
Germany. Indeed, police log books from the final days of the war show that German 
citizens continued to report minor crimes even as the artillery of the Red Army 
approached Berlin in I 945. Using post-war lists compiled by BLOs and records held 
135 Layer-Jung, "Uberwachung und Bestrafung," 86. 
136 LAB, A Rep. 227-02: Nr.53, letter sent by AEG Apparatebaufabrik Berlin-Treptow to 
Commissioner Rothfeldt at the Gestapo headquarters, Department (Referat) IV 3b, Berlin C2 (dated 
14.09.1944). 
137 Brautigam, "Zwangsarbeit in Berlin," 49. 
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at the Red Cross International Tracing Service, I have compiled a database of 
approximately 900 individual records relating to crimes committed by Belgians in 
Berlin. We can probably safely assume that the available police, judicial and prison 
records are by no means complete because many records were destroyed by bombing 
in Berlin.
138 
While the information recorded about the crimes committed is not 
always complete, 341 records contain details of the offence and therefore provide a 
good sample of the offences. Secondly, I have examined the prosecution and 
imprisonment records of individual Belgians in Berlin, using police files and judicial 
records from the Berlin State Archive and copies of judicial files relating to the 
prosecution of Belgians collected by BLOs after the war. 
The Reich Statistics Office reported a significant increase in the number of 
crimes committed by foreigners in Berlin from the first years of the war: the number 
of crimes committed by foreigners as a percentage of overall crime rose from 2.5 
percent in 1939 to 13.4 percent in 1941. 139. This increase in the number of crimes 
committed by foreigners in Berlin was a quite natural consequence of the increasing 
number of foreigners who had been mobilised to power Germany's war economy. 
The report's authors noted, however, that theft represented a much higher percentage 
of offences committed by foreigners when compared with the crimes committed by 
Germans: theft represented 58.3 percent of recorded crimes committed by foreigners, 
compared with 44.5 percent for Germans. 140 Herbert emphasises: 
The entire complex of barter, black marketeering and petty crime should be 
seen.as part of the spread of a social substructure among foreign workers that 
eluded the control of the German authorities. It did not function in accordance 
with the principles of political resistance and solidarity, but rather with the 
dicta of the marketplace, of national and social hierarchies, of force. 141 
Indeed, Herbert observes that this social substructure may have assured the survival 
of many Ostarbeiter whose meagre rations scarcely covered the level needed to 
sustain life. 
The crimes committed by Belgians in Berlin fall into a range of categories; 
however, it is clear that theft, burglary and the receipt of stolen goods constitute the 
largest number of offences committed (see Appendix 20 on page 355). I will 
138 Notable gaps appear in the records include prison records for the remand prisons in Berlin-
Lichtenberg and Berlin-Neukolln, which were occupied by the Red Army after the war. 
139 ITS/ARCH/Inform. Justizvollzuganstalten Ordner 47 (I - 487, - NG 908), reference on page 142. 
140 Ibid., 162-3. 
141 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 329. 
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therefore focus on theft. It is worth commenting briefly on the issue of offences 
related to industrial matters, such as refusal to work and sabotage. While workers 
were prosecuted and imprisoned due to breach of contract and refusal to work in a 
small number of cases, these offences were usually handled outside the judicial 
process and thus do not appear in the judicial or prison records.
142 
Police log books 
for Order Police Station 145 at Berlin-Siemensstadt, for example, show that 
Siemens' factory police referred twenty-two Belgians to the Order Police between 
June and December 1941. 143 In cases where an employer called upon the police or 
Gestapo to deal with a recalcitrant worker they might only receive an official 
warning. 
Theft represented 49 percent of the recorded crimes committed by Belgians 
(54 percent and 40 percent for men and women respectively). Burglary represented a 
further 5.28 percent of the recorded crimes committed by Belgians, including some 
that were carried out by men and women working in gangs. Receiving stolen goods 
accounted for a further 3 .81 percent. While the percentage of recorded crimes 
represented by theft was higher amongst Belgians than the German population, it was 
also lower than the percentage that theft represented for Berlin's foreign population 
as a whole. The privileged position Belgians occupied in the Nazi racial hierarchy 
meant that they were paid wages on a par with their German counterparts. 
Additionally, many Belgians were able to supplement their rations with foodstuffs 
sent by relatives in Belgium and also often received tobacco, which was a useful 
commodity that could be traded on the black market. Belgians did not share the same 
desperate plight as their Soviet counterparts, and as a consequence were less likely to 
resort to petty crime. Finally, while one might expect that the number of convictions 
for theft would increase over the course of the war as living conditions worsened, the 
number of Belgians convicted of theft peaked in 1942/1943. 
In February 1933 the Nazis appointed new Police Presidents in a number of 
German cities including Berlin, where Nazi hardliners declared war on crime. 144 
During the war Berlin officials were ordered by Goebbels to issue harsh punishments 
to those caught plundering goods. He claimed in his diary to have support from 
142 It is notable that none of the Belgians who died at the AEL Grossbeeren, for example, had criminal 
records. 
143 LAB, B Rep 020, Nr.6939. 
144 Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: consent and coercion in Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 200 I), 35. 
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Hitler for these measures: "I report to the Filhrer about my harsh punishment 
measures against individual cases of plundering in Berlin. The Filhrer gives me his 
approval".
145 
Robert Gellately has emphasised that the "Nazi approach to crime was 
not to search out its deeper social causes, but to enforce the existing laws more 
vigorously".
146 
Many Belgians lived in fear of Nazi terror and this terror naturally 
intensified, as increasingly arbitrary and draconian punishments were meted out by 
Berlin's courts. Foreigners were conscious that relatively minor crimes could have 
serious consequences. This was especially true of theft. Thefts were frequently 
carried out by workers who had particular opportunities by virtue of their jobs, such 
as postal and railway workers who often had access to packages. Others carried out 
opportunistic thefts in camps, the workplace or places such as railway stations. The 
looting of bombed out buildings was considered a particularly serious crime because 
of the impact it had on the population's morale. Those who were caught looting were 
regarded as Volksschadlinge or individuals who were harmful to the people. Police 
and judicial files reveal that many crimes were committed by Belgians who were no 
longer part of the labour process. Some, for example, had' gone on the run after 
committing a crime, others had begun to earn a living through illegitimate means 
soon after their arrival in Berlin. Indeed, in response to negative public opinion 
following the introduction of conscription in October 1942, the Military 
Administration targeted known black market traders. The conscription of black 
market traders was probably a miscalculation, as conscripts who had not been 
integrated into the Belgian workforce probably resisted integration into the German 
labour force and simply reverted to their usual method of earning a living. A growing 
number of Belgians became part of Berlin's criminal subculture. 
One of the central questions of my study of prison and judicial records is the 
question whether Belgians were more harshly treated as the war progressed. Analysis 
of the sentences imposed upon Belgians for the crime of theft shows that the prison 
sentences issued by the courts varied enormously, ranging from one month to four 
years hard labour. Some Belgians convicted of theft by Berlin courts were sentenced 
to death and executed. There is no apparent link between the point during the war 
when the offender was convicted and the severity of the sentence imposed. This was 
145 Elke Frohlich, ed., Die Tagebiicher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. 7: Tei I 2, Diktate 1941-45, Januar -
Marz 1943 (Munich; New Providence; London; Paris K.G. Sauer Verlag, 1993), I 0 I. 
146 Gellately, Backing Hitler, 35. 
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all part of the arbitrary and unpredictable way the penal system worked - for 
Germans too. What is clear is that the sentences issued by the courts were more 
punitive in cases where the crime was deemed to have a detrimental effect on the 
people, such as looting. Belgian Jean La led an eighteen strong criminal gang that 
carried out a series of burglaries in Berlin and was also accused of procurement. He 
had previously been· convicted for theft and burglary in 1942 and had been sentenced 
to a year in prison as a minor. The gang was predominantly made up of Belgian men, 
but also included a Belgian woman and a German woman. Some members of the 
group had previously been convicted of theft and burglary, while others had been 
imprisoned in AELs and concentration camps for breaches of labour contract. 
Regarded as an "asocial" who was harmful to the people, Jean La was sent directly to 
the Neuengamme Concentration Camp near Hamburg following his arrest in October 
1944, while other gang members were also sent to concentration camps. 147 
Individuals who committed a series of offences received tougher sentences 
than those who had perhaps committed only one opportunistic theft, as multiple 
offences were seen to establish a pattern of behaviour. Repeat offenders, as well as 
those who were not engaged in gainful employment and instead earned a Ii ving 
through crime, were branded as "asocial" by the German authorities and tended to 
face more punitive sentences. Turning to the question of whether Walloons and 
Flemings were treated any differently by the German authorities, no apparent 
differences in the treatment of the two groups can be discerned from the police and 
judicial records. Firstly, the German authorities listed the nationality of offenders as 
"Belgian" and I found no references to "Walloons" or "Flemings" in the police or 
judicial records. Moreover, the examination of the sentences imposed by the courts 
provides no evidence to suggest that the two groups were treated differently. It is 
therefore clear that social criteria were far more important than racial distinctions 
between Flemings and Walloons in determining the sentencing of Belgian offenders. 
After sentencing, most Belgians saw out their prison sentences in Berlin. 
Convicts had often already served much of their sentence while on remand. Belgian 
convicts serving longer sentences were often transferred to penal institutions outside 
Berlin, probably due to overcrowding. These institutions included the Brandenburg-
Gorden penitentiary, the Luckau penitentiary in Brandenburg and the prison camp at 
147 LAB, A Pr.Br.Rep. 030-02-04: Nr.20. 
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Rodgau, in Hesse. A number of Belgians were also transferred to the Sonnenburg 
Concentration Camp, which served as a satellite institution for the Berlin police 
authorities. Belgian convicts were undoubtedly subject to a harsh disciplinary regime 
during their imprisonment. Nikolaus Wachsmann emphasises, however, that, by 
contrast with concentration camp inmates, most convicts survived their 
imprisonment.
148 
This conclusion is borne out in the records relating to Belgians who 
were imprisoned in Berlin, which do not show significant numbers of deaths in 
Berlin's prisons. 
Looting carried particularly heavy penalties, especially during the final stages 
of the war when those caught looting could be shot on the spot. Thousands of 
foreigners - overwhelmingly Poles and Ostarbeiter - ·were executed by the security 
services during the final weeks of the war for looting. 149 The case of Belgian Fernand 
B and Frenchman Marcel Be who were convicted of theft by the Berlin State Court 
in mid February 1945 and executed on 9 March 1945 illustrates that western 
Europeans could also face a similar fate in the final weeks of the war. 150 Although 
justice was swift, the men were not executed summarily and were still afforded a 
"trial" to determine their guilt. 151 This case illustrates that western Europeans were 
afforded due process - as far as this still existed within Germany's court system. A 
closer examination of Belgian deaths provides little evidence that substantial 
numbers of Belgians were subject to summary executions as the war drew to a close. 
Interestingly, while the number of Belgians who were convicted of looting remained 
relatively low, a closer reading of the police and judicial files leads to the conclusion 
that many Belgians who had been caught looting were actually prosecuted for the 
lesser crime of theft. In such cases judges did nevertheless issue harsher sentences. 
The decision by the judicial authorities to prosecute many Belgians who had been 
caught looting for the lesser crime of theft is further evidence of the more lenient 
treatment they received from the judicial authorities. All this leads to the conclusion 
that, even during the final stages of the war, the German authorities continued to treat 
western European offenders much more leniently than Ostarbeiter. 
148 Nikolaus Wachsmann, Hitler's prisons: legal terror in Nazi Germany (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), 228. 
149 Spoerer, Zwangsarbeft unter dem Hakenkreuz, 210. 




The analysis of seventy-eight death sentences imposed upon Belgians by 
Berlin's courts during the war shows that forty-two Belgians were sentenced to death 
for high treason, spying during wartime or other oppositional activities. The 
execution records for Berlin are somewhat deceptive because a number of Belgians 
who stood accused of high treason or oppositional activities were transported from 
Belgium or other parts of Germany to Berlin to face trial. Prisoners from western 
Europe began arriving in the Reich from 1941. These prisoners were initially 
sentenced by military courts in the occupied territories before they were transferred 
to German penal institutions. However, from 1942 the ordinary court system in 
Germany became more involved in the terror against civilian populations in western 
and northern Europe. The German authorities in occupied western Europe instituted 
a policy of transferring those who were arrested for involvement in the resistance to 
Germany. In September 1942 Hitler ordered that arrested civilians who could not be 
quickly condemned to death by military courts in occupied territories within one 
week of their arrest should be transferred to Germany for trial. Political opponents 
were transferred to Germany where they awaited trial before the People's Court or 
Special Court for crimes including sabotage, spying in wartime and high treason. By 
late March 1943 there were some 12,013 prisoners in penal institutions inside 
Germany from western European states ( 10,804 men; 1,209 women). 152 Civilian 
opponents to Nazi rule in occupied western Europe were secretly deported to 
Germany. The Nazis intended that opponents of the Military Administration would 
disappear, and their friends and family would never hear from them again. This cloak 
of secrecy surrounding "Night and Fog" prisoners was maintained and was not lifted 
even after their deaths: relatives were not informed, farewell letters were suppressed; 
and their bodies were buried secretly. 153 This policy was intended to engender 
uncertainty and fear in the occupied territories and to act as a deterrent against anti-
Nazi activity. German courts imposed death sentences upon 258 Belgian "Night and 
Fog" prisoners. The People's Court in Berlin handed down 225 of these death 
sentences, while the Essen Special Court and the Oppeln Special Court handed down 
152 Wachsmann, Hitler's prisons, 272. 
153 Excerpt of letter from SS-Sturmbannflihrer Erich Deppner, Head of Department IV (Gestapo), 
Security Police and Security Service Command in the occupied Netherlands to all branches, posts and 
camps (dated 12.07.1943) in Ludwig Nestler, Die Faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Belgien, 
Luxemburg und den Niederlanden (1940-1945), Europa unterm Hakenkreuz (Berlin: Deutscher 
Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1990), 219. 
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thirty-one and two death sentences respectively. 154 Eleven Belgians were executed in 
Berlin for membership of terrorist gangs. Finally, twenty-one Belgians, or over a 
quarter of those who were sentenced to death, had been convicted of theft or looting. 
The examination of those who were executed for theft shows that executions were 
carried out throughout the war - not simply during the last years of the war. Indeed, 
the majority of Belgians who were sentenced to death for theft were sentenced in 
1943, coinciding with the peak in the number of Belgians convicted of theft. Thus 
perhaps these punitive sentences were a response to an increasing wave of thefts 
committed by foreigners. Of course, not all of those who were caught committing a 
crime were afforded due legal process. Some foreign workers were subject to 
summary justice. Willem L recounted that a Ukrainian who was caught stealing 
potatoes was shot dead. 155 The Nazi authorities used summary justice to terrorise and 
instil fear into Germans and foreigners alike. 
Goebbels feared that Berlin's foreign workers might revolt. He wrote on 
9 March 1943, "Should it ever come to attempts to start a revolt amongst the foreign 
workers in Berlin, the Fi.ihrer will send the SS Bodyguard Regiment [Adolf Hitler] to 
the capital; they set an example that will curb the passion for such excess amongst 
enthusiasts". 156 Herbert emphasises, "Those who feared that foreigners might set up a 
kind of 'internal front' failed to comprehend their desperate plight, especially that of 
eastern workers. It is not surprising that there were virtually no western workers 
among the bandits, although the number of Belgian, Dutch and French workers in the 
Rhineland was especially large". 157 By contrast, some of those Belgians sent to the 
city to work became part of the criminal subculture that developed in Berlin. A 
number of Belgians workers sent to Germany abandoned their jobs and went 
underground, earning their living through crime, in some cases forming criminal 
gangs. Some Belgian women turned to prostitution, plying their trade in clubs and 
bars; some lived solely from prostitution, while others used prostitution to 
supplement their meagre wages. Police records for the period also indicate that 
Belgian men were accused of acting as pimps. The Hotel International and the Zurn 
Panther became known haunts for those looking to buy black market goods or solicit 
prostitutes. This criminal subculture formed in part as a reaction to the treatment they 
154 Ibid., 70. 
155 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1216/50, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Willem L, 31. 
156 Frohlich, ed., Die Tagebiicher von Joseph Goebbels, 514. 
157 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 368. 
231 
received as foreigners in Nazi Germany and the harsh conditions in which they lived 
and worked. Berlin's geographical location in relation to Belgium also helps to 
explain why a number of Belgians became part of the criminal subculture in Berlin. 
By contrast with Belgians who were deployed in western regions such as the Ruhr, 
Belgians deployed in Berlin had no real chance of making their way back to Belgium 
if they breached their labour contract. However, Berlin was a large city and it was 
possible for individuals to go underground, evading the authorities. 
12. End of hostilities 
In the final chaotic weeks of the war as the Battle for Berlin waged around them, any 
semblance of normal life had become impossible for Berlin's inhabitants. Residents 
lived day-to-day. With the city' under siege and without water, gas or electricity, 
many Berliners took to cellars or public bunkers, occasionally venturing out to search 
for food in the ruins of the city when there was a break in the fighting. Those who 
emerged witnessed a shocking scene: the city was in ruins and death all around them. 
After the din that accompanied the Battle of Berlin, a deathly silence finally fell over 
the city when hostilities concluded on 2 May 1945. Much to the frustration of 
Belgians who had been working in Berlin, repatriation took some time due to 
damage to bridges and the rail network. Some headed off in the direction of the Elbe 
on foot with their belongings in a cart. Most Belgians who had been deployed in 
Berlin were repatriated between late May and August, while a few returned as late as 
1947 or 1948. 
13. Conclusions 
This study of the experiences of Belgian workers in Berlin demonstrates that their 
privileged status as western Europeans brought many material advantages and 
ensured that they enjoyed better living conditions and health services. As a result 
western Europeans had greater prospects of survival compared to their counterparts 
from eastern Europe and Poland. The preferential treatment afforded to western 
Europeans was maintained even during the final stages of the war. An important 
distinction must be made, however, in relation to the material advantages western 
Europeans enjoyed due to their elevated position in the Nazi racial hierarchy and the 
benefits individual foreigners were able to secure by virtue of their linguistic skills. 
As speakers of a Germanic language, Flemish and Dutch workers, in particular, 
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readily learned the German language. A command of German brought a number of 
advantages. In the workplace, foreign workers who could speak German were easier 
to train and oversee. They were also more likely to be assigned skilled technical jobs 
that attracted higher wages. Workers who had a good command of German were also 
able to secure better jobs, such as translators in the workplace or in camps. As the 
individual stories clearly illustrate, even a basic command of German could 
significantly improve relations between foreign workers and their overseers. A 
command of the German language also brought many advantages because it enabled 
foreign workers to try to improve their situation pro-actively: they could defend their 
rights and raise complaints about their living or working conditions; they could seek 
private accommodation; the ability to communicate with the German population also 
provided greater opportunities to purchase additional food or work in exchange for 
food. These opportunities were, of course, also available to western Europeans 
because they were afforded greater freedom of movement. Finally, the consequences 
of not being able to speak German played out with tragic results in the case of Jules 
H.1ss 
Turning to the distinction made between Flemings and Walloons, there is 
little concrete evidence to confirm that their differing positions within the Nazi racial 
hierarchy brought substantive differences in their living and working conditions or 
the treatment they received. The study of the accommodation of Belgian workers in 
Berlin has illustrated that the living conditions of Belgian workers varied greatly. 
Most employers arranged housing for their foreign workers and employers therefore 
played a key role in determining the living conditions of foreign workers. Foreign 
employees were generally housed together with workers of the same nationality and 
this segregation was maintained even in the last months of the war; however, the 
approach adopted by German employers in relation to the housing of foreign 
employees varied from company to company. AEG, for example, housed many 
Belgian employees in private accommodation or in foreign workers' homes rather 
than in large camps, whereas some employers housed their employees almost 
exclusively in large camps that housed hundreds of residents. While different 
national groups were segregated, and Flemings and Walloons were not housed 
together, there is little evidence to suggest that there were substantive differences in 
158 See pages 196-7 and Appendix 16 on page 339. 
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the living conditions of the different national groupings from western Europe. The 
examination of the sentencing of Belgian offenders has also shown there is little 
evidence that Flemings were afforded better treatment than Walloons by the judicial 
authorities or that the judicial authorities even distinguished between Walloons and 
Flemings. It is clear that the nature of the crime and social criteria were far more 
important in the sentencing of Belgian offenders than any alleged racial distinctions 
between Flemings and Walloons. 
Interactions between foreign workers and ordinary Germans were not 
necessarily shaped by racial policy. Nazi ideology was not all-pervasive and the Nazi 
authorities' reach did not extend into the interactions between ordinary Germans and 
foreigners. The approach adopted by ordinary Germans in their dealings with 
foreigners was shaped by a complex range of factors including Nazi racial policies, 
past military conflicts, racial stereotyping, and personal experiences, and in some 
cases genuine compassion. Fear of how their behaviour might be perceived by the 
Nazi authorities also influenced the behaviour of ordinary German: some Berliners 
avoided close contact with foreigners, while others had good relations with foreign 
colleagues and assisted them in whatever ways they could despite the risks. The 
accounts of Belgian workers also illustrate how encounters between Germans and 
foreigners could also erode racial stereotypes and dispel preconceptions about 
foreigners. The attitudes. of Germans towards their foreign counterparts underwent a 
sea change, and in many cases friendships and relationships developed between 
Germans and foreign workers. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Belgian workers in Dlisseldorf 
-------------------------------·------------
At the outbreak of the Second World War the west German city of Dtisseldorf was a 
key industrial and trade city at the heart of the predominantly Catholic Rhine-Ruhr 
region. 1 Dtisseldorf was one of the largest cities in the region with a population of 
516,000 in 1937,2 while neighbouring Cologne was the fourth largest city in the 
Reich with a population of 769,300.3 Dtisseldorf served as the gateway to Germany's 
Ruhr region - the most important industrial area of Germany from the nineteenth 
century onward. A wide-ranging industrial sector developed in Dtisseldorf, in part 
around the processing of products from the Ruhr and Wupper regions, including iron 
foundries, glass, leather, machinery and locomotive manufacturing, brewing, and the 
steel, textile and chemical industries. The city was home to major armaments 
factories such as Rheinmetall-Borsig AG and Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG, as 
well as industrial concerns such as Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG and chemical 
manufacturer Henkel & Cie AG. Additionally, there were orchards and vegetable 
growing on the southern outskirts of the city. Dtisseldorf also served as a key 
transport hub in the Rhine-Ruhr region. The docks to the south west of the city on the 
banks of the Rhine linked Dtisseldorf to harbours in England, northern Europe and 
Italy, and the city also served as the principal interchange in the Duisburg-Cologne 
rail line. 
Germany's Rhine-Ruhr region was traditionally a region with a high number 
of immigrants. Economic migration had seen Belgian and Dutch workers, as well as 
Polish workers, settle in the Rhine-Ruhr region long before the Second World War.4 
Foreign workers were employed in a range of industries prior to the outbreak of the 
war. The Dtisseldorf rail company Rheinische Bahngesellschaft AG, for example, 
1 Germany's Rhineland was a predominantly Catholic region, while approximately a third of 
Diisseldorf s population identified as members of the Evangelical Church in the late 1930s. At/eyers 
lexikon. 7th ed., s.v. "Dtisseldorf'. 
2 Meyers Lexikon, 8th ed., s.v. "Dtisseldorf'. 
3 Ibid .. "Koln''. 
4 For a study of the history of foreign labour in Germany see Herbert, A Hist01y of Foreign labour in 
Germany.; and Klaus J Bade, Migration in European histolJ', The making of Europe. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). 
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had employed workers from neighbouring countries to the west as conductors and 
train drivers from the 1920s.5 In the wider Rhine-Ruhr region foreign workers from 
neighbouring western European countries and Russian Poland had been drawn to 
jobs in the Ruhr coalmines and industry. Foreign labour had also been used in brick-
making and construction. The employment patterns of Belgians working in the 
Rhine-Ruhr region varied a great deal. In areas close to the border like Aachen so-
called •'Grenzganger", or workers from border regions, crossed the border to travel 
to work in Germany each day.6 While some Belgians went to Germany for a limited 
period of time in order to support their families with the intention of returning home 
after they had earned enough money, others had settled in the Rhine-Ruhr on a more 
permanent basis and some Belgian families had been based in Germany for a number 
of years. The 1911 annual report for the Office for Industrial Inspection in the south 
German region of Baden made the following observations regarding the employment 
patterns of foreign workers: 
Generally speaking, they do not seek permanent employment in German 
indus,try. Rather, it is their intention to spend only a limited number of years 
among us, saving their earnings in order to return to their homeland, there to 
utilise their extra savings (if these were not already expended to support their 
families back home) to embark upon some new venture ... At certain intervals 
during the year, usually in the winter, the emigrants return home on a visit. 
They therefore prefer to be employed in branches dependent on the weather, 
such as construction, stone quarries, or brick manufacture. They often arrange 
a work contract for the duration of a specified season right from the start. 7 
The return of foreign workers to their homelands during the winter months was in 
keeping with the economic interests of employers and the objectives of the German 
authorities who wished to ensure that foreign workers did not settle in Germany 
permanently.8 The return of foreign workers during the winter months also helped 
reduce unemployment in seasonal industries. Flexible employment was an important 
factor for many foreign workers who went to Germany on a temporary basis. Greater 
restrictions on the movement after the outbreak of the Second World War became a 
source of friction between foreign workers and the Nazi authorities who sought to 
5 Reinhard Manter, "Zwangsarbeit bei der Rheinischen Bahngesellschaft AG zwischen 1940 und 
1945," in Zwangsarbeit in Diisseldorf, 381. 
6 Nazi labour administrators noted "Gren=giinger" in the employment books of Belgian and Dutch 
workers who travelled back and forth to Germany for work. 
7 Quoted in Herbert, A Hist01y of Foreign labour in Germany, 57. 
8 The Prussian authorities introduced the seasonal closure period in 1891 obliging foreigners to return 
to their native country in the winter months. This policy was intended to prevent workers settling in 
Germany more permanently. 
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break traditional employment patterns. There was a gradual increase in the number of 
Belgians working in Germany during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century (see Table 9). The statistics on the number of foreign workers employed in 
Germany in 1907 indicate that 6,627 Belgians were employed in industry in the 
Rhine Province and Westphalia, and a further 687 Belgians were working in 
agriculture.9 These statistics show that roughly half of the Belgians working in 
Germany in the early twentieth century were employed in industry in the Rhine 
Province and Westphalia. 
Table 9: The employment of Belgians in Germany, 1871-1910 
1871 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 
5,097 4,561 6,638 7,132 8,947 12,122 12,421 13,455 
Source: Herbert, A Hist01y of Foreign labour in Germany, 20. 
1. The Dimensions of the Ausliindereinsatz in Dusseldorf 
The outbreak of the Second World War did not bring an immediate expansion in the 
deployment of foreign workers in the Rhine-Ruhr. A representative of the German 
coalmining industry who visited Belgium in the first months of the German 
occupation suggested that there was little to be gained from transferring workers to 
Germany: "It would ... be inadvisable to bring large numbers of miners from the 
Compiegne or Liege area to the Ruhr'~. 10 High-level Nazi officials in the Rhineland 
and Westphalia were also opposed to the deployment of foreign workers on a large 
scale, as they wished to prevent a "second invasion of foreigners" in the region, 
which traditionally hosted a high number of immigrants. 11 Since the arrival of large 
numbers of Poles in the second half of the nineteenth century there had been fears of 
imminent Polonisation in the region. 12 The first foreigners to arrive in DUsseldorf 
after the outbreak of the Second World War were Polish POWs who arrived in the 
autumn of 1939, while the second group of foreigners to arrive in the city in the 
9 Herbert, A Hist01y of Foreign labour in Germany, 54. 
10 "Reisebericht ftir Bergswerksdirektor Dr Knepper Gelsenkirchner Bergwerks AG'', in '"Reisen im 
besetzten Holland, Belgien und Nordfrankreich btr. Montanindustrie 1938-1941" [travel report dated 
22.07.1940 written by a member of industry delegation that inspected industrial concerns in Belgium, 
the Netherlands and northern France] quoted in Watts, "'Just like free labourers, but under police 
supervision", 113. 
11 Lotti, KZ der Gestapo, 82. 
12 In 1910 Poles represented 36.7 percent of the entire workforce in the Oberbergamtbe=irk Dortmund, 
while during the same time period Poles represented 40 percent of the residents in Gelsenkirchen-
Horst, 35 percent in Bottrop and 23 percent in Recklinghausen. Ibid., 341. 
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spring of 1940 were from neighbouring countries such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands, as well as Italy. A total of 6,274 foreign civilian workers were 
registered with the labour office in Dilsseldorf in January 1941; however, by January 
1942 this number had risen to 9,618. In September 1941 Belgian workers - mostly 
from Flanders - represented the largest contingent of civilian workers from western 
Europe employed in the Reich. 13 There was no large-scale deployment of foreign 
workers in Dilsseldorf until 1942. By the autumn of 1944 there were around 35,000 
foreign civilians living in Dilsseldorf, as well as a few thousand POWs and 
concentration camp inmates - a figure that equated to roughly 10 percent of the 
city's total pre-war population. 14 This is, however, a much smaller number when 
compared to Berlin where there were approximately 400,000 foreign workers in late 
1944 15 and foreign workers represented 10-17 percent of the population in some 
parts of the city by the end of the war. 16 The lower proportion of foreign workers in 
Dilsseldorf probably enabled the local authorities to keep foreigners under greater 
control, compared with cities where they were deployed on a wider scale. We will 
see that there were key differences in how employers, labour administrators and the 
security services handled foreign workers in Dilsseldorf compared to Berlin. 
The demands of war industry ensured that Belgian workers were concentrated 
in industries critical to the war effort. In Dilsseldorf, the goods produced by Persil 
Henkel & Cie GmbH, chemical manufacturer and producer of the first self-acting 
washing powder, were not regarded as critical to the war industry and the company 
therefore struggled to maintain its workforce. The number of foreign civilians 
employed in the company's plant in Dilsseldorf-Holthausen reached its highpoint in 
1943 when 13.3 percent of the company's workers were foreign civilians. By 
contrast, labour shortages caused by the rearmament program prompted 
Mannesmann to begin recruiting foreign civilian workers as early as 1938. By 1943 
29.2 percent of the employees at company's plant in Dtisseldorf-Reisholz were 
foreign civilians. 17 Manufacturer of cannons, engine parts for aeroplanes, propellers 
13 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 98. 
14 Rafael R Leissa and Joachim Schroder, "Zwangsarbeit in Diisseldorf: Struktur, Organisation und 
Alltag im Arbeitseinsatz von Auslandern im nationalsozialistischen Diisseldorf," in Zwangsarbeit in 
Diisse/dorf, 26. 
15 Layer-Jung, "Uberwachung und Bestrafung," 85. 
16 Cord Pagenstecher, "Lagerlisten und Erinnerungsberichte", I 04. 
17 Horst A Wessel, "Auslandische Mitarbeiter in den Mannesmann-Betrieben," in Zwangsarbeit in 
Diisseldorf, 43 I . 
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and anti-magnetic heads and tubes for missiles, Rheinmetall-Borsig employed a total 
of 14,839 workers in its plants in Dilsseldorf-Rath and Dilsseldorf-Derendorf in 
1939.
18 
The number of foreign workers employed by the company rapidly expanded 
from 1.8 percent of all employees in 1941 to 24.72 percent of all employees in 1942, 
22.99 percent of employees in 1943 19 and to 29.1 percent of employees in 1944.20 
While no specific statistics are available in relation to the composition of 
Dilsseldorf s foreign population itself, the statistics for the Rhineland regional labour 
office provide a useful indication. At the beginning of 1942 Dutch and Belgian 
workers represented 29.5 percent and 12.6 percent of the foreigner population 
respectively in the Rhineland, while Polish workers represented 28.8 percent. 21 
French workers were, on the other hand, underrepresented in the Ruhr when 
compared to other parts of Germany.22 
By contrast with the Polish civilian workers, most of whom were conscripts, 
the overwhelming majority of workers from western and southern Europe amongst 
the first waves of foreign workers deployed in Dilsseldorf were volunteers. This 
pattern did, however, change after the introduction of conscription in occupied 
countries, including the Netherlands and Belgium.23 A similar pattern can be 
observed in Aachen. The construction firm Derichs & Konertz employed a 
substantial number of workers from the annexed region in eastern Belgium. In the 
first two years of the war almost all Belgians employed by the company were 
'"Grenzgiinger" - a practice that continued until the end of the occupation. The 
introduction of conscription in the Netherlands and Belgium brought an influx of 
new workers, resulting in a drop in the proportion of German workers employed by 
the firm from 37 percent in 1942 to 22 percent in 1943. During the same time period, 
the proportion of Belgians employed by the company rose from 9 percent to 16 
percent - largely due to the conscription of workers for Organisation Todt.24 OT was 
a civil and military engineering group that was responsible for engineering projects 
18 Christian Leitzbach, "Der Einsatz auslandischer Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter bei Rheinmetall-Borsig 
wahrend des Zweiten Weltkriegses," in ibid., 405. 
19 Leissa and SchrOder, "Zwangsarbeit in Dilsseldorf: Struktur, Organisation und Alltag," 96. 
20 Leitzbach, "Der Einsatz auslandischer Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter bei Rheinmetall-Borsig wahrend 
des Zweiten Weltkriegses," 406. 
21 Leissa and SchrOder, "Zwangsarbeit in Dilsseldorf: Struktur, Organisation und Alltag," 96. 
22 Patrice Arnaud, Les STO: 1-listoire des Franr;ais requis en Allemagne na=ie (CNRS, 20 l 0), 46. 
23 Leissa and SchrOder, ·~zwangsarbeit in Dilsseldorf: Struktur, Organisation und Alltag," 26. 
24 Marc Engels et al., Zwangsarbeit in der Stadt Aachen: Ausliindereinsat= in einer westdeutschen 
Gren=stadt wiihrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Aachen: Mayer, 2002), 66-7. 
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within the Reich and the occupied territories. OT had 780,000 employees in 
September 1944 and its ranks burgeoned to 1.4 million by November 1944 following 
the withdrawal from occupied territories and the large scale round up of workers by 
the retreating military. Foreign nationals from occupied territories represented 80 
percent of the workers employed by OT, and included foreign volunteers, 
conscripted worke~s, military internees and concentration camp inmates. 25 OT 
employees were also deployed extensively in Dtisseldorf, completing urgent 
construction and repair work in the wake of bombing raids. 
2. Demographic profile of Belgians working in Dusseldorf 
After the war BLO Lieutenant Leonard de Maen compiled a list of 5,633 Beigians 
who were resident in Dtisseldorf between 1939 and 1945, using information 
extracted from the city's population register. This list is a key source of information 
and provides a basis to analyse the demographic profile of the Belgians who were 
deployed in the city during the Second World War.26 While this list records how 
many Belgians lived in the city during the war years, as well as data such as their 
date and place of birth and marital status in the case of women, it provides no 
information about the time of their arrival and departure or whether these Belgians 
had been working in Dtisseldorf prior to the outbreak of the war.27 A sample of2,371 
Belgians from this list has been used to analyse the demographic profile of the 
Belgians who lived in the city during the war, deepening understanding of those who 
went to Germany and the patterns of their employment. The sample includes a total 
of 344 women and 1,909 men.28 The sample indicates that men represented 84. 7 
percent of the city's Belgian population, while women represented 15.3 percent - a 
figure that is slightly higher than the national average. In the case of women it is also 
possible to examine marital status, as officials recorded both maiden and married 
names. A total of202 or 58.72 percent of the women in the sample were married. 
Many of these women probably accompanied their husbands or other relatives or 
joined those who were already working in Dtisseldorf. This is significant because 
25 Leissa and Schroder, "Zwangsarbeit in Dlisseldorf: Struktur, Organisation und Alltag," 89. 
26 SVG/DO, R.451 /Tr.24.324, List of Belgians resident in the Stadtkreis (city district) Dlisseldorf 
1939-1945. 
27 Nationality was determined by the nationality ofone's father, thus Belgian nationality was 
conferred upon those born in Germany to Belgian fathers. 
28 A total of2,253 records have been used to analyse the gender breakdown of Belgians who were 
resident in the city, as in a small number of cases it is not possible to distinguish the gender of a 
resident. 
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married women were not liable for labour conscription and thus the high number of 
married women points to the conclusion that a high proportion of the Belgian women 
deployed in Dilsseldorf were volunteers. 
Analysis by year of birth also provides valuable insights into the 
characteristics of Belgians who worked in Dilsseldorf (see Figure 19 on page 242. 
There is a wide distribution in the years of birth, showing that Belgian men and 
women of almost all ages were resident in Dilsseldorf during the war .. Looking firstly 
at the women's years of birth, the majority were born in the years 1918-1925 and 
many were probably in their late teens or early twenties at the time of their departure 
for Germany. However, a number of older women also figure amongst the Belgian 
women who lived in Dilsseldorf during the war. Looking at the cohort as a whole, the 
women's median year of birth was 1918, indicating that median age at the time of 
their arrival in Germany was probably twenty-four. The median year of birth 
amongst Belgian men deployed in Dilsseldorfwas 1913 indicating that Belgian men 
were older when they departed for Germany.29 Given that male departures peaked in 
1941, it is likely that the median age of the men departing for Germany for the first 
time was twenty-eight. Following a similar pattern to the women deployed in 
Dilsseldorf, the highest numbers of men were born in the years 1920-1924. Patrice 
Arnaud's study of French workers in Germany also shows that French voluntary 
departures follow a similar pattern, with the median age of twenty-seven amongst 
women and thirty-three amongst men.30 Residence records also indicate that, in 
addition to the working-age Belgians who were resident in Dilsseldorf during the war 
years, a number of Belgian children were resident in the city. Most of the young 
Belgians born in the years 1930-1939 living in Dilsseldorf during the Second World 
War were born in Germany, indicating that they were probably living in Germany 
prior to the outbreak of war, whereas most of those who were born in the years 1928-
1929 had been born in Belgium. This group was of working-age and probably 
working in Germany. Some younger workers accompanied parents or other relatives 
who were working in Germany, while Belgian teenagers as young as fourteen also 
went to Germany unaccompanied. 
29 These conclusions are based on the analysis of the year of the first departure for Germany of those 
in the sample of eighty-hine. The analysis of the sample shows that the men and women's departures 
peaked in 1941 and 1942 respectively. 
30 Arnaud, Les STO: /-listoire des Fram;ais requis en Allemagne na=ie, 5. 
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Figure 19: 
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The Belgians employed in Diisseldorf came from across Belgium. There is, 
however, a strong correlation between the region of origin and the parts of Belgium 
where the economic effects of the German occupation were felt most acutely. Figure 
20 on page 244 shows a breakdown of the region of birth of Belgians employed in 
Diisseldorf (also see Appendix 21 on page 357). Close to half of the Belgians living 
in Diisseldorf came from Antwerp, where there were 122,630 unemployed workers 
in the wake of Belgium's surrender in 1940.31 Unable to find work at home, many of 
these workers probably departed for Germany in the first years of the German 
occupation, accepting jobs in regions that were closer to home. A further I 0 percent 
of Belgians registered in Diisseldorf during the war came from Liege, close to the 
Belgian-German border. A total of 83 Belgians or 3 .5 percent of those registered in 
the city had been born in Germany, indicating that they and their families had 
probably resided in Germany before the outbreak of the Second World War.32 The 
comparison of the region of birth of Belgians employed in Diisseldorf with those 
employed in Berlin's Kreuzberg and Neukolln districts shows that 23 percent of the 
Belgians deployed in these districts came from Antwerp - a much smaller 
proportion, approximately half, when compared with Diisseldorf (see Figure 7 on 
page 182). In spite of the greater distance, many Belgians deployed in Berlin came 
from further afield. Almost 22 percent of the workers deployed in Berlin came from 
east and west Flanders and a further 13 percent came from Brussels. 
31 CEGES/SOMA, BALI 3.1/9-11, Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr.8, Anlage 5. Article from the BriJsseler 
Zeitung (3.9.1940). [Figures based on unemployment levels recorded on 13.07.1940]. 
32 Some of these individuals were probably German-born and had acquired Belgian nationality 
through marriage. 
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Figure 20: Belgians working in Dusseldorf by region of birth, 1939-1945 
• Antwerp (47 7%1 
• Brab.lnt • Brussels <4 4%) 
Brabant Flemish 11.4,.I 
• Brab.lnt Walloon C0.5%) 
• East F IMders n 5.a• > 
• Hainaut C4.t>%1 
• Liege (9 2%) 
• Limburg (2.1 %1 
Luxembourg Province (0.t>%l 
t-4amur <0.9%) 
• France (1%) 
Germany (3.5%l 
The Netherlands (0.8'°.I 
Unclear (7.2%1 
Other <0.5~.l 
Source: Author' lo s t.at1s11cs based on the list of Belgian~ resident in the Stadtkre1s oa.,scldorf in the 
period 1939-1945· SV(, DO R.451 f l r.24.324 
3. Employment patterns of Belgians deployed in Dusseldorf 
Detailed research into the Belgians deployed in Dtisseldorf has led to the conclusion 
that a high proportion of those working in the city were volunteers. The first 
indications pointing to this conclusion came from responses to the Enquete Travail 
Obliga1oire. A survey of hundreds of responses to identify questionnaires submitted 
by Belgians who had been deployed in Dtisseldorf, including the responses returned 
by Belgians from the regions of Antwerp and Liege where large numbers of those 
who were deployed in Dtisseldorf were recruited. produced a total of just four 
responses. The conclusion that most Belgians deployed in tbe city were vol unteers 
was further reinforced by the first random sample of approximately thirty personal 
files of Belgians who had lived in Dlisseldorf during the war requested from the 
SVG!DO. Amongst the first sample of personal files requested just one individual 
had sought formal recognition as a labour deportee, and subsequent requests for the 
individual files of Belgians who worked in Dtisseldorf produced similar results. 
Amongst a sample of eighty-nine Belgian men and women wbo worked in 
Dtisseldorf during the war just six had sought fonnaJ recognition as labour deportees 
from the Belgian state after the war: all of these applications were rejected on the 
basis that the workers went to Germany voluntarily. One other Belgian who had 
worked in Dtisseldorf sought recognition under the Statute for Labour Draft Evaders 
claiming that he had been forced to go into hiding in order to avoid returning to 
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Germany after he returned home due to illness in 1944. The Belgian authorities 
rejected the application on the basis that there was no evidence that the applicant had 
been forced to go to Germany. 
Using the individual files of these eighty-nine Belgians who worked in 
Dilsseldorf between 1940 and 1945, analysis has been undertaken into the 
circumstances of each individual's departure/s for Germany and each worker has 
been categorised on the basis of the available information. The Belgian postwar 
authorities applied stringent criteria when assessing Statute applications, and a 
previous voluntary departure usually dictated that the applicant would not be 
recognised as a labour deportee, irrespective of the circumstances of any subsequent 
departures. In this respect the criteria applied by the Belgian authorities to assess 
Statute applications can be regarded as punitive: punishing those who departed 
voluntarily - an act that was regarded as collaboration. Less stringent criteria have 
been applied here to evaluate the circumstances of a worker's departure for 
Germany. The signing of an employment contract, for example, is not taken as 
confirmation that a worker went to Germany vo~untari ly, as conscripted workers 
were pressured to sign contracts or forfeit the much needed 750bfrs payment. Table 
10 on page 246 shows a breakdown of the categories into which the individuals in 
the sample fell. A total of seventy-four workers can be categorised as volunteers, 
while five can be categorised as conscripted workers. The records indicate that a 
further two workers had worked in Germany on a voluntary basis initially and were 
subsequently forced to return. Seven of the eight women in the sample were 
volunteers, and all but one had gone to Germany prior to the introduction of 
conscription. None of the women sought official recognition as labour deportees. In 
view of the fact that Belgian labour recruits probably had limited influence over 
where labour offices sent them to work in Germany, it is apparent that labour 
administrators employed a policy of sending volunteers to Dilsseldorf. The most 
obvious explanation for this apparent unwritten policy is the city's proximity to the 
Belgian-German border and the concern that conscripts deployed in Dilsseldorf 
would be tempted to breach their labour contracts and attempt to make their way 
home illegally. Perhaps officials also regarded deployment in regions close to the 
German-Belgian border as a privilege to be afforded to those who agreed to depart 
voluntarily? Dilsseldorf and other west German cities were probably also a preferred 
destination for Belgian volunteers, as they could visit home more easily. 
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Table 10: Categorisation of Belgians deployed in Dusseldorf based on a sample of 
eighty-nine files 
Categmy Men Percentage Women Percentage Total Percentage 
Conscript 5 6.17 0 0 5 
Economic migrant (living 1 1.23 I 12.5 2 
in Germany befor~ 1940) 
Political prisoner 1 1.23 0 0 I 
Volunteer 67 82.72 7 87.5 74 
Volunteer/conscript 2 2.47 0 0 2 
Unclear 5 6.17 0 0 5 
Total 81 8 89 
Source: Author's statistics based on research into individual files from SVG/DO. 
The year workers commenced their first labour assignment in Germany also 
offers useful insights into the wartime employment patterns of Belgians who worked 
in Dtisseldorf. Table 11 on page 247 shows the year of those in the sample took up 
their first labour assignment in Germany. It is clear that the majority of the Belgians 
deployed in the city departed for Germany in 1941I1942 - most before the 
introduction of labour conscription in October 1942. While the greatest number of 
men commenced their first labour assignment in Germany in 1941, the women 
tended to commence employment in Germany later with their arrivals peaking in 
1942 (see Figure 21 on page 247). Many of the Belgian workers who arrived in 
Dtisseldorf had previously undertaken a labour assignment in another part of 
Germany. The statistics in relation to the year of first departure clearly support the 
conclusion that many of the Belgians .deployed in Dtisseldorf were volunteers. This 
conclusion has significant implications for this study. Statute applications and the 
Enquete Travail Obligatoire survey are the principal sources providing primary 
source accounts' information about the circumstances of a worker's departure and 
their experiences in Germany. Thus the virtual absence of Statut Deporte files and 
survey responses means that there are almost no primary accounts provided by 
Belgians who worked in Dtisseldorf and their stories must be reconstructed 
impressionistically using official documents. In view of the lack of first-hand 
accounts from Belgians deployed in Dtisseldorf, the Gestapo files from the 








Table 11: Year of first labour assignment in Germany 
Year Men Women f'o1a/ 
1940 9 0 9 
1941 34 1 35 
1942 16 5 21 
1943 11 I 12 
1944 3 0 3 
1945 0 0 0 
Source. Aulhor's statistics based on research of individual files from SVGtDO 




1940 1941 1942 194.3 1944 1945 
Turning to the question of whether Belgians who worked in Dlisseldorf took 
up labour assignments of limited duration or remained in Germany for the duration 
of the war. it is clear that many of the Belgian volunteers worked in Gem1any for 
most of the war years. While each worker's transfer papers provide an indication of 
when they commenced a labour assignment in Gem1any, the labour authorities in 
Belgium did not maintain records of when a worker returned home to Belgium. Thus 
in many cases it is not possible to determine whether the worker remained in 
Germany or had travelled back and forth over a gi.,,en period. ll However, it is clear 
that fev .. of the workers included in the sample continued to work for the same 
employer for the duration of their time in Germany. A smal 1 number of workers 
changed employer when they were re-assigned to new employers by the labour 
11 Where 1lw. 111fonna1ion •~ arnilahle it 1s usually found 111 the medical records ma1111amed by 1he 
doctor' engaged by the Milnary Administration in cases where a worker ren1mcd home due to illness 
nnd the luhour :1uthontics were monitoring. their health for the purpose of sending I hem back to 
(ic1 many Other ind1cut1on!i are provided by correspondence between German employer~ and labour 
adm1mstraton. in Belgmm 111 caf.cs where a worker breached their labour contract 
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office: howe' er. more typically workers returned home when a labour assignment 
came to an end and' isited the local labour recruitment office m Belgmm when they 
were ready to resume employment in Gennany. Instead of resummg work with their 
old employer. returning workers were generally assigned a job with a new employer, 
often in another part Germany Thus It 1s clear that loyalty to one's employer 
probably played little role in shaping the employment patterns of Belgians 
volunteers. 
Aside from pro\ 1dmg breaks from work in Gennany at regular intervals. 
returning home at the end of a labour assignment also enabled workers to seek a 
better job with a new employer or perhaps seek to join friends or fami ly members 
who were working in another part of Germany. Forty-two of the workers included in 
the sample close to half worked in more tban one part of Germany during the 
war. Most of this group worked in two different regions, although some Belgians 
undertook as many as four or five labour assignments in different parts of Germany 
over the war. Some spent periods working in Germany that were interspersed with 
periods working in Belgium. Figure 22 shows the month of commencement of labour 
assignments in Germany. ' 4 Recruitment numbers fluctuated significantly over the 
course of the occupation. It is notable that many workers commenced new labour 
assignments in January following the Christmas period. Recruitment officials noted a 
drop in recruitment numbers in December because workers did not wish to leave 
their famil ies shortly before the festive season.35 ln this respect their employment 
patterns are not dissimilar to those of Belgians who worked in Germany from the late 
nineteenth century. 
Figure 22: Labour assignment commencements by_month, 1940-1944 
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The employment records of Belgian volunteers who departed during the first 
years of the occupation also illustrate that some German employers were flexible 
with their foreign employees. The Nazis introduced a ban on weekend trips after the 
outbreak of war in 1939, provoking anger from foreign workers. A report from the 
Security Service in November 1939 observed that foreign workers objected to these 
restrictions on the grounds that such a ban had not been applied to Germans, and that 
they had concluded private contracts with their employer that could not be altered 
without their agreement.36 A closer examination of the leave granted to Belgian 
workers indicates that German employers did not always apply Nazi regulations. 
Belgian couple Louis G and Helene R from Liege commenced employment with the 
firm Mannesmann in Di.isseldorf in January 1941 and May 1941 respectively. In the 
seven-month period from January to July 1941 Louis G was granted twenty-five days 
leave, visiting his family in Belgium regularly. After Helene Rjoined Louis Gin 
Germany the couple were granted leave simultaneously allowing them to return to 
Liege together. Workers who came from eastern regions of Belgium could take the 
opportunity to visit home for short periods of perhaps two to three days. Regular 
leave in Belgium also allowed workers to obtain goods such as food and clothing that 
were not available in Germany. Louis G and Helene R were employed in Germany 
on a voluntary basis and their employer's willingness to grant regular leave periods 
allowing them to return home to Liege was probably a key factor in their decision to 
continue working in Germany. 37 In many respects the flexible arrangements between 
German employers and Belgian volunteers, especially in the first years of the 
German occupation, represents a continuation of earlier employment trends, with 
German employers and Belgian employees coming to mutually acceptable 
arrangements regarding leave - in spite of the regulations introduced by Nazi 
officials. 
Following the same pattern as Belgian volunteers during the first World War, 
Belgian volunteers accepted employment in Nazi Germany provided that the living 
and working conditions in Germany were satisfactory. Young worker Marcel M gave 
up his job in the textile industry in Kortrijk to pursue better job prospects in 
Germany, later telling Gestapo officials that he volunteered for work in Germany 
because his wages were low and there was very little food in Belgium. In May 1941 
36 Boberach, ed., Meldungenausdem Reich, vol. 6, 465., Nr.16 (15.11.1939) 
37 Belgian couple came to the attention of the Gestapo in July 1941 when they were denounced by 
another Belgian who wished to cause trouble for the couple. HStAD, RW58/l 9.534. 
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Marcel M commenced work at the Rheinischen Kunstseide textile factory in Krefeld. 
However, in June 1941, just weeks after commencing employment in Germany, 
Marcel M and a group of fellow Belgians left their workplace and tried to return 
home. The men were arrested in Eupen, the German-speaking region of Belgium that 
had been incorporated into the Reich after 1918, and were detained by police for two 
days until they were returned to their employer. Marcel M explained in a letter to his 
family that was picked up by the postal censor, "I must advise that we want to escape 
because we can't bear it in the factory anymore. In recent days there has been almost 
no food and [we have had] such heavy work". When questioned about his letter he 
told the Gestapo interrogators: 
If I wrote about poor food and heavy labour in my letter, I still stand by the 
content of the letter today. Such is the mood amongst foreign workers. I must 
say, however, that I am much more satisfied of late because I am earning 
substantially more money and the food at the Rheinischen Kunstseide has 
also improved.38 
Volunteers who felt that their employer had failed to keep the promises that were 
made with respect to wages and living conditions in Germany, and was exploiting 
them, quickly sought to end their labour assignment - often by any means. However, 
Marcel M did not begrudge his employer and once his wages and food provisions 
improved he was content to continue working for him. Belgian volunteer Madeleine 
D was employed as kitchen-hand at the Hotel Graf Adolf hospice in DUsseldorf. In 
August 1942 Madeleine D and her French colleague, Marie B, received an official 
warning from Gestapo officials due to their defiant and undisciplined behaviour. 
Madeleine D's German supervisor had asked that she work late and Madeleine D 
refused on the basis that the tasks that were given to her had been assigned to another 
employee. Refusing to work overtime, Madeleine D sought to defend her right to 
work her rostered hours and leave at the end of her shift. Despite a warning from 
Gestapo officials that her indiscipline could bring more serious consequences, 
including transfer to a concentration camp, Madeleine D continued to defy her 
employer, overstaying when her employer granted her leave to return Belgium when 
her child was sick and failing to return when a second period of leave was granted.39 
A group of twelve Belgian women commenced employment at the 
Gerresheimer GlashUttewerke (glass works) in DUsseldorf in July 1941. Although the 
women went to Germany voluntarily, they rebelled against their employer just a 
38 Ibid., R W58/27. I 33. 
39 Ibid., R W58/48.489 
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couple of weeks after their arrival. The women refused to go to work for a whole day 
and were also heard singing "Deutschland, Deutschland unter alles". Company 
officials reported the women to the Gestapo, requesting that action be taken. 
Company officials identified Gabrielle T as the ringleader and sought permission to 
send her back to Belgium. When Gestapo officers gave the women an official 
warning about the consequences of their behaviour, Gabrielle T acted as the group's 
spokesperson, continuing in her recalcitrant stance. Fearing that Gabrielle T would 
continue to be a negative influence upon her colleagues, Gestapo officials agreed that 
Gabrielle Twas unsuitable for deployment in Germany and arranged with the labour 
office for her to be sent back to Belgium, after spending twenty-one days in custody 
as punishment.
40 
While male workers who refused to work were often transferred to 
an AEL to punish them and teach them a lesson, Gestapo officials did not consider 
sending Gabrielle Tor her Belgian co-workers to an AEL. This clearly demonstrates 
that Gestapo officials in Dilsseldorf were reluctant to take the step of sending 
western European women to an AEL - a step officials did not hesitate to take in the 
case of recalcitrant male workers. There is no indication as to why the women 
rebelled against their employer, but it is highly likely that they were dissatisfied with 
their living and working conditions. Gabrielle T's continued defiance, even in the 
face a warning from Gestapo officers, indicates that it was probably her intent to be 
such a thorn in the side of her employer that the company would acquiesce and allow 
her to return home. The approach adopted by Belgian volunteers was underpinned by 
the notion that the relationship between employers and employees was a two-way 
street and both parties were required to abide by their end of the bargain. Belgians 
expected that normative employment rights would be upheld, including the right to 
strike. 
4. Accommodation 
Foreign workers' camps were establish~d across Dilsseldorf and were concentrated 
near places of work in the more industrial parts of the city. Klaudia Wehofen has 
documented over 400 camps in Dilsseldorf.41 Often little is known about camps other 
than their location. A closer examination of the camps with greater than 500 
residents reveals many of these larger camps fell into the category of POW camp. 
40 Ibid., R W58/5 I. I 76. 
41 Klaudia Wehofen, "Nachweis der Lager, Haftstatten und Wohnplatze auslandischer Arbeiterinnen 
und Arbeiter in Dilsseldorf," in Zwangsarbeit in Diisse/d01:f, 543-633. 
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Other large camps included camps for workers employed by Organisation Todt and 
satellite camps for the Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald concentration camps. Several 
of the larger camps were also designated as Ostarbeiter camps. It is therefore 
apparent that western European civilian workers were less likely to be housed in 
large complexes. The records indicate that there was a large number of smaller 
camps with fewer than I 00 residents, as well as many camps with between I 00 and 
500 residents in DUsseldorf. Comparing the size of camps in Berlin and Dlisseldorf, 
it is clear that camps in DUsseldorf were generally smaller in size. While a number of 
massive camp complexes housing around 2,500 residents were established in Berlin, 
the camps established in DUsseldorf for western European civilian workers were 
generally smaller. 
A sample of 2,452 records taken from BLO de Maen's list of Belgians who 
were resident in DUsseldorf during the Second World War has been used to analyse 
the accommodation of Belgian residents.42 De Maen's list provides only the last 
recorded address where a Belgian resided, and previous addresses were not recorded 
in cases where a resident had lived in multiple locations during the war. Closer 
analysis and cross-referencing reveals that many Belgians lived at addresses where 
there are no records to indicate the existence of a camp during the war, suggesting 
many Belgians lived in private accommodation. This conclusion is supported by the 
fact that some employers housed a significant proportion of their workers outside 
camps in private accommodation. These workers were probably housed in private 
accommodation either as a lodger or in a rented room. The Klockner-Werk AG 
employed around 500 foreign workers. Only some of the company's employees 
(most likely POWs) were accommodated at the Lager "'Otto" at Fichtenstrasse 36-38 
in Flingern Slid, while another 120 employees lived in private accommodation.43 
This example illustrates that some employers elected to house a significant 
proportion of employees outside camps. A similar pattern can be observed in other 
Rhine-Ruhr cities. According to a Security Service report from March 1943 a quarter 
of Essen's foreign workers were living in private accommodation.44 Many medium-
sized enterprises preferred to house their workers in private accommodation in order 
to avoid the expense of building barracks.45 Private accommodation was often also 
42 SVG/DO, R.451 /Tr.24324, List of Belgians resident in DUsseldorf 1939-1945. 
43 Wehofen, "Nachweis der Lager, Haftstatten und Wohnplatze," 556. 
44 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, I 06. 
45 Leissa and Schroder, "Die Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen der auslandischen Arbeitskrafte in 
DUsseldorf," in Zwangsarbeit in Diisseld01f. 166. 
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an easier solution to the problem of housing foreign workers because shortages of 
manpower and building materials made it difficult to establish camps. At the camp 
run by Di.isseldorf s Firma Theodor Kiepe Elektrotechnische Fabrik, for example, 
'"Belgian workers were only housed temporarily until they could be housed in private 
quarters". By contrast Russian and Ukrainian workers employed by the company 
were lodged in two stone barracks next to the factory grounds. 46 Racial policy 
ensured priority was given to housing Ostarbeiter in camps in cases where 
companies had limited capacity to house foreign workers in company 
accommodation. Many Belgian workers, especially those who were employed by 
smaller companies, therefore enjoyed a privileged position with respect to the 
al location of housing. With few exceptions, the privilege of private accommodation 
was limited to western Europeans who were not subject to a strict surveillance 
regime. Heinrich Bangert, the OAF Regional Chief for Dtisseldorf, advised on 
16 December 1942, ~·Residence in private lodgings ... is always the reward for 
particular industriousness, diligence, discipline, loyalty and character''.47 Through the 
introduction of a permit system for workers who wished to live outside camps 
officials sought to vet workers to ensure they were politically reliable and to enforce 
Nazi racial policies. 
Married couples and families who went to Germany together invariably 
represented an administrative problem for German officials, as they quite naturally 
wished to find accommodation together. The official policy on the accommodation 
of foreign workers stipulated that the sexes should be housed separately in camp 
accommodation, and this would therefore apparently preclude the option of couples 
or families living together. According to the records of steel manufacturer Hille & 
MUiier GmbH, two couples worked for the company and were accommodated at the 
company work home for civilian workers at Am Trippelsberg 48, Dtisseldorf-
Reisholz. In both cases, the husband commenced work in Germany and was later 
joined by his wife. Franz W took up a position as an unskilled worker with the 
company in January 1943 and was joined by his wife Louise in July 1943. Her 
husband's employer assigned Louise W work as a kitchen-hand. The couple initially 
lived together in the company work home and subsequently secured private 
lodgings.48 These cases demonstrate that German employers endeavoured to find 
46 SVG/DO, SDR 300.867 and SDR 302.639. 
47 Leissa and Schroder, "Die Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen der auslandischen Arbeitskrafte", 165. 
48 SVG/DO, SDR 300.867 and SDR 302.639. 
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work together for couples and for the relatives of existing employees. This case also 
illustrates that, despite the Nazis' policy of housing men and women separately, in 
practice some companies housed both male and female workers together. Heusler 
emphasises that most directives, guidelines and decrees published by central agencies 
with respect to the requirements for living standards for foreigners were adhered to 
broadly, but often took into account the limitations due to the wartime conditions. 
Local authorities, company officials and camp administrators could therefore 
exercise a significant degree of discretion.49 Local conditions and the approach of the 
local authorities led to wide variations in the living conditions - both across 
Germany and even within the same region or city. 
Security at camps in Dilsseldorf varied significantly depending on the type 
and size of camp and the residents' nationality. Smaller camps often had no security 
in place and residents were free to come and go, whereas surveillance was usually 
more rigorous in larger camps where curfews were commonly enforced, guard posts 
erected and regular patrols undertaken. A strict security regime was established at the 
Rheinmetall-Borsig's civilian workers' camp in Grashofstrasse to the south of the 
city. The camp grounds were surrounded by a fence, which included a barbed-wire 
section. Armed members of the company's factory police maintained constant 
surveillance at the camp. Separate rules applied to western and Ostarbeiter: western 
Europeans were completely free, whereas Ostarbeiter were only permitted to leave 
the camp if they were granted a leave pass. Greater surveillance limited Russian 
workers' freedom of movement and denied them opportunities to improve their 
situation. 
BLO de Maen conducted a survey in relation to sites in Dilsseldorf where 
camps were believed to have been located during the Second World War. The 
information provided by the Bohler Werke AG, which ran the "Am Miihlenweg'· 
camp for foreign civilian workers in Dilsseldorf-Heerdt, offers insights into the 
differing circumstances of western Europeans compared with their counterparts from 
the Soviet Union. The camp was divided into two separate sections: the 
Ostarbeiterlager "Alie Miihle" housed an average of 542 Ostarbeiter between 1942 
and 1945; and the Westarbeiterlager "A/te Muhle" housed an average of 241 
workers between l 94 l and l 945. Company officials noted that "'in most respects [the 
Westarbeiterlager] essentially corresponds with Ostarbeiterlager ". However, 
49 Heusler, Zwangsarbeitfiir die Miinchner Kriegswirtschafi, 238. 
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notable differences in the two camps included the provision of larger green spaces, 
rockeries, two concrete dance floors and the planting of fir trees in the 
Westarbeiterlager. Thus western European residents enjoyed recreational facilities, 
as well as more space and aesthetically pleasing features. A nursery for the children 
of Ostarbeiter women was also established at the Ostarbeiterlager in September 
1943.
50 
Such nurseries were notorious places, where children who were regarded as 
racially worthless died in large numbers due to starvation and infectious disease. The 
whole camp was surrounded by a wire mesh fence and guard posts that were 
permanently manned were also established. Housing was a crucial factor in the lives 
of foreign workers and affected their day-to-day existence in myriad ways. The fact 
that a significant proportion of Belgian workers lived outside camps or lived in 
smaller camps where there was less survei !lance and more freedom of movement 
gave them much greater room to manoeuvre. 
5. Illness and mortality 
The inequalities in the treatment of foreign workers are thrown into sharp relief by 
the vastly different standards of medical care afforded to foreigners in Dtisseldorf. 
Frank Sparing has emphasised that •·a central element of Nazi social policy was the 
exclusion of entire groups of people on the basis of race. This applied particularly to 
access to medical treatment". 51 Hospital records indicate that Belgians were admitted 
to hospitals across the city and were generally afforded a comparatively high 
standard of care. By contrast, Ostarbeiter were, as a general rule, denied hospital 
treatment. In December l 94 l the Reich Labour Minister ordered foreign workers' 
camps be equipped with sick bays and that Ostarbeiter should only be admitted to 
hospital in exceptional circumstances. However, the Dtisseldorf Industrial 
Inspectorate noted that sick bays and isolation rooms had been established in few 
camps in March 1944.52 Shortages of labour and construction materials, and the need 
to repair and rebuild industrial plants and accommodation that had been destroyed by 
bombing, meant that other building work took precedence over the construction of 
health facilities for foreigners. The tragic consequences of this policy are illustrated 
by the case of two Ukrainian workers suffering from methanol poisoning who were 
taken to the hospital in Dtisseldorf-Heerdt and who were denied admission to 
50 SVG/DO, BUR71, Camps Douteux, Reg. Bez. Dilsseldorf, 406, Nr.12. Accompanying information 
to Enquete sw· les prisons el /es camps douteux (Mod. 96) questionnaire. 
51 Sparing, "Die medizinische Behandlung von Zwangsarbeitern," 266. 
52 Ibid., 277. 
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hospital in an hour of dire need in February 1944. Hospital officials refused to admit 
the men because they were Ukrainian and there was no room free, stating that they 
could not accommodate Ukrainians in beds alongside German patients. One of the 
two men died a short time later. The second man was finally admitted to the 
Grafenberg State Mental Hospital and Nursing Home, but also died soon after.53 
Hospital staff adhered strictly to Nazi racial policies even in life-threatening 
circumstances with tragic results. Sparing suggests that this refusal to admit the 
Ukrainian workers to hospital was not an isolated case and by that stage had long 
been the usual practice in Dilsseldorf.54 The refusal to admit Ostarbeiter to hospital 
in cases where no isolation facilities were available and the failure of the authorities 
to ensure that sickbays were established in foreign workers' camps meant that, by 
contrast with western Europeans, very few Ostarbeiter had access to suitable medical 
treatment. By contrast, Belgians were admitted to the same medical institutions as 
Germans and were accommodated in beds alongside German patients in Dilsseldorf. 
While health officials were ordered to admit Ostarbeiter only in the most serious 
circumstances and to limit their stay to a maximum of three weeks, it is clear that no 
such limits were imposed on the hospitalisation of Belgians who were permitted to 
remain in hospital until they had recovered. A number of Belgians spent long periods 
in Dilsseldorf hospitals indicating that many of them suffered serious illness during 
their stay in Germany. As the war continued the length of hospitalisations also 
increased. The average hospital stay in 1941 was twenty days; however, by 1945 the 
average hospital stay had increased to forty-four days (see Table 12 on page 257). 
While these statistics point to worsening health amongst Belgians who suffered more 
serious bouts of ill health as the war continued, lengthy hospitalisations are also an 
index of the comparatively good treatment Belgians received. But hospital admission 
records tell only one part of the story. Health services were also dispensed through 
doctors' surgeries and camp doctors; however, little is known about foreign workers' 
access to private doctors or the extent to which medical services were provided to 
camp residents. 
Belgians received hospital treatment in Di.isseldorf for a range of medical 
conditions (Appendix 22 on page 358). Many were hospitalised for the treatment of 
injuries such as contusions, fractured limbs, bums and the amputation of fingers or 




limbs. These injuries are typical of the heavy industrial work in which many of them 
were engaged, and follow a similar pattern to those employed at Deutsche Werft. 
Stomach conditions, such as ulcers and gastritis, also resulted in a number of 
hospitalisations. Respiratory infections such as influenza, bronchitis, pneumonia and 
tonsillitis were also key causes of hospitalisation. Another common cause of 
hospitalisation was medical conditions such as infected wounds, abscesses, boils, 
skin infections and scabies that flourished due to poor hygiene and living conditions. 
Dtisseldorf's proximity to Belgium also meant it was possible for health officials to 
send Belgians home if they were likely to suffer an extended period of incapacity. 
Leonard A suffered from stomach ulcers during his stay in Germany. He was initially 
given leave from his job on medical grounds on 6 October 1942; however, when it 
became clear that he would be unable to work for some time, Leonard A was sent 
home to Belgium on 19 October 1942. Leonard A was treated in Belgium where his 
medical bills and sickness benefits were paid through the Central German Health 
Insurance Fund for Belgium and Northern France. Upon his recovery in mid-
December 1942 Leonard A returned to Germany where he continued to work until 
the end of the war. 55 Sick workers who were well enough to travel were often sent 
home for medical treatment. Upon their recovery they often returned to Germany -
either under pressure from labour administrators in Belgium or out of financial 
necessity. 
Table 12: Average period of hospitalisation of Belgian patients in Dusseldorf (in 
days), 1941-1945 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
20 21 26 28 44 
Source: Statistics based on lists of Belgian patients for various Dilsseldorf hospitals: 
SVG/00, R.45 l/Tr.24.322. 
Belgian hospitalisations in Dtisseldorf included relatively few for life-
threatening infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis and diphtheria. This is perhaps 
an indicator that the workers' living conditions in Dtisseldorf were less cramped and 
therefore less prone to outbreaks of infectious diseases. There were just six Belgian 
deaths in Dtisseldorf attributed to tuberculosis. By contrast the number of Ostarbeiter 
afflicted with tuberculosis rose rapidly due to the miserable living conditions and the 
fact that medical officials did not, as a general rule, carry out screening of 
55 SVG/DO, SDR 560. 
257 
Ostarbeiter.56 Tuberculosis spread amongst Ostarbeiler on a catastrophic scale in 
Dtisseldorf. At the beginning of 1944 medical officials in neighbouring Neuss-
Grevenbroich warned of the "'alarming spread of the tuberculosis epidemic amongst 
male and female Ostarbeiter··. Officials observed that at some workplaces in 
Dtisseldorf-Ratingen the number of tuberculosis cases amongst deceased Ostarbeiter 
had more than doubled.57 While the rate of tuberculosis infection reached epidemic 
proportions amongst Ostarbeiter, the rate of tuberculosis infection amongst western 
Europeans was apparently comparatively low. There are no records indicating that 
Belgians were admitted to hospitals in Dtisseldorf for the treatment of tuberculosis. 
The screening of Belgian workers for infectious diseases such as tuberculosis prior to 
their departure for Germany, the provision of relatively good standards of medical 
care to western Europeans and the return of western European workers who were 
expected to suffer an extended period of incapacity to their home countries all helped 
to limit the spread of infectious diseases amongst Belgian workers in Dtisseldorf. 
Of course, Belgian workers enjoyed better living conditions and food 
provisions than their counterparts from the Soviet Union. In general, western 
Europeans were in better physical health and were therefore less susceptible to 
infection. In many respects the Nazis' appalling treatment of Ostarbeiter was a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Ostarbeiter were regarded as sub-human and lived in crowded 
conditions with very limited access to washing facilities. This inevitably led to 
outbreaks of infectious disease such scabies, typhus and tuberculosis. Ironically, 
while the Nazi authorities created the conditions in which infectious diseases could 
flourish amongst foreign workers, Nazi doctors considered typhus, for example, as a 
community disease and blamed members of inferior races, who were regarded as the 
carriers of disease, for the spread of epidemics. The notion that foreigners were 
carriers of disease also took hold amongst the German population. German patients 
at the Catholic hospital in nearby Krefeld's Uerdingen district objected to Poles and 
Ostarbeiter being accommodated in the same hospital wards, not because of racial 
prejudices, but rather due to a genuine fear that they might contract an infectious 
disease from these patients.58 According to a report by the Security Service, the 
accommodation of racial aliens in German hospitals was common cause for 
complaint across Germany, particularly with respect to German patients being forced 
56 Sparing, "Die medizinische Behandlung von Zwangsarbeitern," 284. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 280. 
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to wait to see a doctor alongside POWs and Poles they considered unclean and a 
health risk.
59 
There are also notable differences in the specific health issues faced by 
Belgians in Berlin compared with those who were deployed in Di.isseldorf. There 
were comparatively lower rates of tuberculosis mortality amongst Belgians in 
Dilsseldorf, while in Berlin, by contrast, a number of Belgians were admitted to 
hospitals for the treatment of tuberculosis, and tuberculosis was a leading cause of 
death amongst Belgians deployed in the city. The reasons behind the lower rates of 
tuberculosis infection and mortality in Di.isseldorf remain unclear; however, possible 
explanations might include better living standards in Di.isseldorf, greater numbers 
living outside camps in private accommodation and the city's closer proximity to 
Belgium which meant that sick workers could be sent home more easily. 
Hospital admission records indicate that at least seven Belgian mothers gave 
birth in Dtisseldorf hospitals between 1942 and 1945. Pregnant Belgian women were 
allowed to return home for the birth of their child, even in the later stages of the war. 
Thus it is likely that these mothers had elected to remain in Germany for the birth -
1 perhaps due to the social stigma attached to unwed mothers or simply because they 
did not want to be parted from the father of their child. Illustrating the good standard 
of postnatal care afforded to Belgian mothers, the new mothers spent several days, 
and in some cases weeks, in hospital after the birth. Despite shortages of hospital 
beds and the Nazis' demand that precedence be given to German mothers, Belgian 
mothers could expect a similar level of postnatal care. In an apparent anomaly, 
pregnant Ostarbeiter women were admitted to the women's clinic in Dtisseldorf for 
childbirth until at least May 1943.60 However, it is likely that these women were 
under pressure to return to work as soon as possible after the birth. Coinciding with 
the ban on Ostarbeiter women returning home, a nursery for the children of 
Ostarbeiter was established in September 1943 at the Ostarbeiterlager "A/te Miihle '' 
in Dilsseldorf-Heerdt. This home was most likely established by the Bohler & Co 
AG Edelstahlwerk, which ran the camp, in order to return pregnant employees to 
work as soon as possible after childbirth. The home could house thirty to forty 
children and there were facilities for a German and Russian attendant who oversaw 
the children. Little is known about the treatment or fate of children who lived there.61 
However, ifthe mortality rates at other children's homes are an indicator, we can 
59 Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich. vol 13, 4026-7. Nr.304 (30.07.1942). 
60 Sparing, "Die medizinische Behandlung von Zwangsarbeitern," 262. 
61 SVG/DO, BUR 71, Camps Douteux, Reg. Bez. DUsseldorf, 406. 
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probably safely assume that the care provided at the home was very rudimentary. 
Krupp in Essen set up the '"Buschmannshof' children's home in Voerde near 
Dinslaken for the children of Ostarbeiter employed at the Gussstahlfabrik plant. Of 
the 120 children who were housed at the home, at least 48 died in a diphtheria 
epidemic in the autumn and winter of 1944, apparently due to their poor diet. There 
is much to suggest that the children of Ostarbeiter were treated as "useless eaters".62 
The level of care afforded to the children of Ostarbeiter at the Ostarbeiterlager ''Alte 
Muhle" was almost certainly determined by the dictates of the Nazi racial doctrine. 
Using the records of Group VI I and the reports of the BLOs, a total of 21 I 
Belgians who died in DUsseldorf during the Second World War have been 
identified.63 This figure represents 3.7 percent of the Belgians who were deployed in 
the city. The cause of death was unrecorded in almost a third of cases. Belgian 
civilians died in DUsseldorf from a broad range of causes over the course of the war 
(see Figure 23 on page 261 ). Like other German industrial centres Dilsseldorf was 
subject to heavy bombing during the Second World War. Bombing was the biggest 
killer amongst Belgians in Dilsseldorf and represents a third of all deaths in the city. 
Medical illness claimed a total of 49 Belgian lives. Interestingly, a total of 25 percent 
of deaths in Dusseldorf resulted from illness - a smaller proportion when compared 
to Berlin (see Table 13 on page 261 and Table 14 on page 262 and Table 7 on page 
199). The deaths in Di.isseldorf also include eight Belgians who died from illness 
whilst in custody and four Belgians who were killed when a bomb hit the 
Dusseldorf-Derendorf prison on 23 April 1944. 
62 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 271-2. 
63 SVG/00, R. I 84/Tr.39.157, Marburg Collection, I I 41-8, 6081-5915 - 6082 (Film 21 ). 
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Source: Statistics compiled by the author using records from the SVG/DO: R. l 84frr.39. l 57 and BUR 
Ds-Dz (Acts de deces). 
Figure 1: Cause of death amongst Belgians in Dusseldorf, 1940-1945 
•Accident (1 89%) 
•Bombing (33.02%) 
Died shortly after birth (0 47%) 
•Drowning (2 36%) 
Illness (25.47%) 
Old age (1 42%) 
Suicide (0.47%) 
Workplace accident (3.3%) 
Unknown (31 .6%) 
<>-1 Includes three Belgian deaths where the date of death was uni..nown. 
65 Includes one Belgian' death where the date of death was unknown. 
'-.<' Includes three Belgian deaths where the date of death was unknown. 
07 Includes one Belgian death where the date of death was uni..nown. 
<>H Includes seventeen Belgian deaths where the date o f death was unknown. 
26 1 
Table 14: Belgian deaths resulting from illness in Dusseldorf, 1940-1945 
Cause 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
Infectious diseases 
Influenza I I* 
Pneumonia I 5 I 7* 
Tuberculosis I 3 I I 6 
Other medical illnesses 
Erysipelas (acute 
streptococcal skin I I 
infection) 
Arteriosclerosis I I I 3* 
Cancer 2 I I 4 
Cirrhosis of the liver I I 
Died after an operation I I 
to treat pyloric stenosis 
Fever (cerebral) I I 
Food poisoning I 
Frostbite on two legs I I 
and gangrene 
Heart attack I I I 2 5* 
Heart weakness I I 4 6* 
Infection resulting from I 
a thigh fracture (bone I I 
pierced skin) 
Intestinal complaint I I I 3* 
Kidney inflammation I I 
Phlegmon/abscess and 
I 2 I 3 sepsis69 
Poisoning I I* 
Stroke I I 2 
Weak constitution I I 
* Individual listed under multiple categories. 
Source: Statistics compiled by the author using records from the SVG/DO: 
R. I 84/Tr.39.157 and BUR Os-Dz (Acts de deces). 
6. Crime 
Extensive police, judicial and Gestapo records relating to the war period in 
DUsseldorf survived the war and are available to researchers. These records form a 
key source of information regarding the experiences of Belgians in Germany and 
how Belgians were treated in their interactions with the German authorities. Postwar 
officials at the DUsseldorf State Attorney's Office compiled a list of all Belgians held 
at the DUsseldorf-Derendorf prison between February 1939 and March 194 7. 70 The 
registration cards of prisoners held at the DUsseldorf-Derendorf prison during the 
69 Includes case where two different dates of death are indicated, one in 1942 and one in 1943. 























Second World War were also deposited at the ITS in Bad Arolsen after the end of the 
war.
71 
A total of 329 Belgians were detained at the institution between May I 940 and 
April 1945, including 63 women and 266 men. As illustrated by Appendix 23 on 
page 360, the prisoners held at the Dtisseldorf-Derendorf prison included those 
arrested in Dtisseldorf, prisoners transferred to the institution by the police and 
judicial authorities in the wider Rhine-Ruhr region, as well as places further afield 
including Bavaria, Lower Saxony and Berlin. Those held at the institution also 
included Belgians who had been arrested in occupied Belgium. These prisoners were 
most likely '"Night and Fog" prisoners and generally came to the Dtisseldorf-
Derendorf prison via other penal institutions. A number of prisoners also arrived 
from Aachen and Cologne close to the German-Belgian border. Those transferred 
from Aachen included several who were accused of falsifying documents - most 
likely the falsification of travel and leave documents in order to return home to 
Belgium. 
The criminal police and Gestapo played an integral role in repression 
throughout the Nazi era and worked hand-in-hand with penal authorities. The web of 
Nazi terror spread dramatically following the Reichstag fire of 27 February I 933. 
The Decree for the Protection of People and State (popularly known as the Reichstag 
Fire Decree) was passed at a meeting of the cabinet on 28 February I 933. This 
decree suspended civil liberties under the Weimar Constitution indefinitely. The 
decree brought an intensification of police intimidation, on the pretext of combating 
the alleged threat of a Communist uprising, and marked the beginning of the 
systematic repression of the political opposition. The police were granted extensive 
new powers including the authority to place suspects in protective custody. The 
decree provided for the arrest and incarceration of political opponents indefinitely 
without trial. Wachsmann has therefore observed: •·At times the police operated 
parallel to the legal system".72 Thousands of people were arrested in the months that 
followed and the German police soon expanded the net of those held in police 
custody, applying the provisions of the decree to arrest suspected criminals and 
••asociar' deviants, such as the homeless and beggars. On I 3 November I 933 the 
Prussian Interior Ministry introduced protective police custody against "'professional 
71 Prisoners serving shorter sentences generally served their time in prison, while prisoners serving 
longer sentences and those sentenced to hard labour generally commuted their sentences in a 
r:enitentiary. I bid., Ordner 1450-1506. 
2 Wachsmann, Hitler's prisons, l 65. 
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criminals" and certain sex offenders who had not committed any new offence. Thus 
it is clear that in the months following the Nazis' seizure of power the police were 
given wide-ranging new powers to arrest and detain political opponents and those 
regarded as detrimental to the Volksgemeinschaft indefinitely without trial even 
before they had committed a new offence. De Maen completed a survey of the files 
and subsequently. reported to the Ministry for Reconstruction in Brussels that 90 
percent of Belgian nationals detained by the Gestapo were Jewish emigres who had 
fled to Belgium in J 938/J 939, 5 percent stood accused of espionage and a further 
5 percent were civilian workers.73 Demonstrating the extensive use of the protective 
custody provisions, many of the Belgians held at the DUsseldorf-Derendorf prison 
had been detained by Gestapo or police officers under the protective custody 
provisions.74 On 16 September J 943 the prison authorities at DUsseldorf-Derendorf 
prison raised concerns with the Gestapo regarding the arrival of prisoners who had 
been placed in protective custody. Prison officials noted the "transfer of foreigners 
during the night, who are collected again in the morning". 75 It is apparent that 
foreigners were frequently detained by the Gestapo for a short period of time as a 
warning and to instil fear. Arrests often took place in the workplace or camps and 
were witnessed by work colleagues or fellow residents, reinforcing fear amongst the 
wider population. 
Gestapo case files pertaining to Belgians illustrate the ways in which terror 
was frequently used to regulate relations between DUsseldorf s German residents and 
foreign workers. Relationships between the wives of German servicemen and foreign 
men were subject to particular scrutiny by the security services who followed up 
denunciations made by members of the public - often work colleagues or 
neighbours. Robert Gellately places heavy emphasis on denunciations to the Gestapo 
made willingly by members of the public, arguing that the "regime's dreaded 
enforcer would have been seriously hampered without a considerable degree of 
73 SVG/DO, R.45 l/Tr.47662, Letter sent by de Maen, Head of the Belgian Search Mission in Bad 
Salzuflen, to the Belgian Ministry for Reconstruction (dated 21.03.1950). Reinhard Mann undertook a 
study of the files of the Diisseldorf Gestapo, examining 825 cases drawn randomly from the 70,000 
surviving files. However, Mann excluded certain categories of Gestapo case-files, including those 
pertaining to foreigners, such as Jews and foreign workers. Reinhard Mann, Protest und Kontrolle im 
Drillen Reich: Nationalso=ialistische Herrschaft im Al/tag einer rheinischen Grojlstadt, Studien zur 
historischen Sozialwissenschaft (Frankfurt; New York: Campus Verlag, 1987). 
74 Gestapo case files are not available in all cases where a Belgian had been held in protective 
custody. 
75 Quoted in Leissa and Schroder, "Die Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen der auslandischen 




From the end of 1940 on. "forbidden contact" with foreign 
civilians and POWs became a new mass criminal offence. Half of the Gestapo 
personal tiles in Dtisseldorf deal with "'forbidden contact" with foreigners, and 
Gestapo officers were busier with cases involving foreigners than anything else. 77 
While German men were discouraged from such contact with foreign women they 
were often not punished for it, whereas the German authorities showed particular 
interest in "forbidden contact" between German women and foreign men. Affairs 
between the wives of German servicemen and foreigners were regarded as 
particularly serious because these affairs were regarded as a threat to the morale of 
the armed forces and moral indignation about improper conduct of German women 
and foreign men could lead to tensions in the workplace. 
The relationship between a Belgian and a German woman whose husband 
was fighting on the front became common knowledge at the Klockner-Werke AG in 
Dtisseldorf. Tensions spilled over after Martha K reportedly gloated that "she had 
spent more enjoyable hours with [Belgian civilian worker] Julius P than with her 
husband during their honeymoon" and ••would like to divorce her husband". It was 
also suggested that Martha K had also stated that "'she would be happy to see her 
husband fall [fighting on the front]". Martha Kand Julius P were both called up by 
the workplace overseer who confronted the two lovers over their adulterous 
relationship, reproaching them for their conduct. Angered by her treatment Martha K 
slapped the workplace overseer in the face. The overseer became so incensed that he 
responded by grabbing Martha K by the throat, thereby provoking Julius P to step in. 
Martha K was sacked by her employer after the incident, while Julius P was 
suspended and subsequently took up employment with a new employer. The two 
lovers were both questioned by the Gestapo and received an official warning about 
their adultery. The relationship soon came to an end after Julius P's wife arrived 
from Belgium to take up employment in Dtisseldorf. In an interesting final twist, a 
German employee spoke to the overseer after the incident to report that she had 
overheard three foreigners saying that they "would bump off the workplace overseer" 
prompting him to write to the local branch of the Security Service to request 
protection or permission to carry a weapon. 78 This incident demonstrates that 
76 Robert Gellately, The 'Gestapo and German Society: enforcing racial policy, 1933-1945 (Oxford; 
New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1990), 135-6. 
77 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 125-7. 
78 HStAD, RW58/53.086, Bl.4. 
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sometimes foreigners even managed to turn the tables on their German overseers and 
highlights the growing sense of unease some Germans must have felt with the large 
numbers of foreigners in their midst - especially once the I ikel ihood of Germany's 
military defeat became evident. 
With thousands of foreign workers deployed in DUsseldorf, security officials 
relied increasingly upon members of the public, including foreign workers, to act as 
the eyes and ears of the Security Service. The authorities recognised that the 
Germans often reported cases of sexual contact with Poles or POWs out of the base 
motives of jealousy, revenge, resentment or disputes between neighbours. 79 Others 
denounced fellow Germans for perceived transgressions of the moral and racial 
codes. In July 1940 the Security Service reported on the growing criticism of the 
''undignified behaviour of German women towards racially alien foreigners". 80 Nazi 
officials regarded sexual intercourse with foreigners as a great crime and sought to 
stamp it out. The Reich Propaganda Head Office embarked on a campaign 
encouraging the "protection of one's own blood" and numerous verdicts against 
German women, particularly for sexual intercourse with foreigners, were published 
to act as a deterrent. This warning about the "protection of one's blood" extended to 
foreigners of ''Germanic" origin and contradicted the racial code which did not 
forbid sexual relations between foreigners of "Germanic" origin, including Dutch 
and Flemish civilians. 
In the Rhine-Ruhr the Gestapo also sought to restrict non-sexual contact 
between Germans and foreigners. Germans who were seen to be fraternising too 
closely with foreigners - even those who were not regarded as racial aliens - came 
under scrutiny from the Gestapo. In Essen, German Max G was interrogated by the 
Gestapo in April 1942.81 Max G befriended Belgian Gilles Vat a local pub. Gilles V 
spoke good German and Max G invited the Belgian to his apartment. The Belgian 
frequently visited his family in Brussels returning with goods that were rationed in 
Germany, including tobacco, clothing and shoes. Gilles V gave Max G, his wife and 
child each a pair of shoes, while he received payment for other goods. Challenged by 
Gestapo officers regarding his "improper dealings with foreigners" and "undignified 
conduct", Max G responded by claiming that "until now I had not thought about it, in 
part because the Belgian is employed in a position of trust by the German railways". 
79 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 129. 
80 Boberach, ed., Me/dungen aus dem Reich, vol. 5, 1354. Nr. I 03: 08.07.1940). 
81 HStAD, RW58/15.062. 
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While social contact between Belgians and Germans was not strictly forbidden, 
zealous Gestapo officials actively discouraged friendships between Germans and 
foreigners, which they regarded as inappropriate. The Gestapo interrogators made it 
very clear that such close contact between Germans and foreigners would not be 
tolerated. It is difficult to assess the nature of the two men's friendship on the basis 
of Max G's interrogation. There were clearly mutual benefits for both men, but Max 
G's account also provides indications that a genuine friendship developed between 
them. However, admonished by Gestapo officials for his inappropriate dealings with 
a foreigner, Max G agreed to break off his friendship with the Belgian worker, 
probably fearing that the failure to do so would bring serious consequences. This 
case illustrates how practice often contradicted policy and how practice was shaped 
by local authorities. Herbert observes that the dictates of Nazi racial policies, and 
specifically the differential treatment of foreign workers according to racial ideology 
and foreign policy, were not always accepted by the German populace. 82 Pre-existing 
ideas about foreigners persisted and many Germans probably simply regarded 
workers recruited outside Germany as foreigners without differentiating between 
different national groups. 
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The prisoners transferred to the Dtisseldorf-Derendorf prison included 
twenty-two Belgians who had been arrested in occupied Belgium for oppositional 
activities, including ·distributing anti-German materials, Bolshevist activities, 
82 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, I 06. 
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possessing illegal weapons, sabotage and high treason. Most ""Night and Fog" 
prisoners came to the Dilsseldorf-Derendorf prison via other penal institutions, 
including the Wittlich prison in Cologne and the Rheinbach penitentiary. One 
Belgian prisoner was transferred to the Dilsseldorf-Derendorf prison from as far 
afield as the Kaisheim penitentiary in Bavaria. With just one exception, "Night and 
Fog" prisoners were subsequently transferred from the Dilsseldorf-Derendorf prison 
to other penal institutions - their stay at the institution ranging from just a few days 
to eighteen months. ""Night and Fog" prisoners were transferred to institutions 
including the Wittlich prison, Wuppertal prison, Werl prison east of Dortmund, 
Remscheid-Lilttringhausen penitentiary and the Oberems prison camp in Giltersloh. 
Certain prisons and penitentiaries were designated as sites for capital punishment 
during the Nazi era. In 193 7 capital punishment was carried out in a total of eleven 
institutions; however, a huge increase in the number of death sentences imposed by 
the German judiciary during the war meant that this number had risen to 21 by 1945. 
Executions were not carried out at the Dilsseldorf-Derendorf prison and thus Belgian 
prisoners who stood accused of capital offences were probably transferred to penal 
institutions where executions could be carried out. 
The month of arrest of those imprisoned at the Dilsseldorf-Derendorf prison 
shows that arrests peaked in mid-1942 mirroring the pattern in Berlin (see Figure 24 
on page 267 and Table 15 on page 270). Not all Belgians held at the Dilsseldorf-
Derendorf prison had been convicted by Germany's courts. The institution also 
served as a remand prison for those who were being held pending further 
investigation. Appendix 24 on page 361 shows the reason for the detention of those 
held at the Diisseldorf-Derendorf prison. Matching the pattern in Berlin, a high 
proportion of the offences committed by Belgians were property offences, including 
theft, burglary, looting and receiving stolen goods. These offences accounted for 
38.24 percent of the crimes allegedly committed by the Belgians held at the 
institution. This percentage was notably lower than in Berlin where 49 percent of 
prisoners were accused of theft. Individual case files indicate that most thefts were 
minor in nature and usually involved the pilfering of food. These thefts were 
probably opportunistic acts carried out by individuals suffering from hunger. 
Economic offences, such as breaches of the law in relation to black-marketeering, 
also represent a significant proportion of offences. Others fell foul of the law by 
seeking to supplement their meagre rations through illegally fishing or trapping wild 
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animals such as rabbits. While the police and judicial records for Berlin show that 
Belgians living in the city were involved in gangs that carried out organised crime, 
there is no evidence of such activity in Dilsseldorf. 
Across Germany, theft was the most common crime committed by foreigners. 
According to statistics produced by the Reich Statistics Office, theft represented 58.3 
percent of the offences committed by foreigners in the first half of 1943, compared 
with 44.5 percent of those committed by Germans.83 The sentences imposed by 
Dilsseldorf' s courts for theft convictions during the first years of the war tended to be 
more lenient, although heavy penalties were also imposed in some cases. Comparing 
the available information in relation to the sentencing of those convicted of theft in 
Berlin with the sentencing in Dilsseldorf (see Table 16 on page 270), it is evident that 
sentencing tended to be harsher in Berlin from the first years of the war. While a 
number of those convicted of theft in Dilsseldorf in 1941I1942 received sentences of 
less than twenty-eight days, in Berlin the shortest sentence imposed was one month. 
Judges in Berlin and Dilsseldorf imposed lengthier sentences for theft as the war 
progressed. However, there are no indications that the Dilsseldorf courts sentenced 
Belgians convicted of theft or the plundering of goods to death, as was the case in 
Berlin during the latter stages of the war. While property offences might seem minor, 
German judges who wished to set an example and deter looting often treated those 
who were convicted very harshly. A total of 1,621 individuals received the death 
penalty for property offences in the Reich in 1943 alone. This figure represents a 
third of the death sentences imposed in that year. 84 Certainly, the fear that Berlin's 
large foreigner population would rise up prompted Berlin's judiciary to impose 
harsher sentences upon foreigners. Perhaps Goebbels' demand that the authorities 
adopt a harsh stance against foreigners who committed crimes led to harsher 
sentencing and more executions in Berlin. Belgians were generally treated more 
leniently. The stark contrast between the treatment of Belgians and Ostarbeiter is 
illustrated clearly by the case of young Walloon Fran9ois D who was convicted of 
trapping a rabbit in contravention of the hunting laws. Fran9ois D was sentenced to 
four months imprisonment at the Wittlich youth prison.85 Poles who were convicted 
of the same crime faced the death sentence in a number of cases. Poles were many 
times more likely to be sentenced to death than Germans and represented half of all 
83 ITS/ARCH/Inform. Justizvollzuganstalten Ordner 47 (I - 487 - NG 908), pages 162-3. 
84 Wachsmann, Hitler's prisons, 315. 
85 SVG/DO, SDR 165054. 
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death sentences imposed in the first half of 1942, including twenty Poles found guilty 
of the '"illegal slaughter of animals".86 Thus while the court's sentencing may seem 
harsh, Fran9ois D's status as a western European worker ensured that he was 
protected from an even more severe punishment. 
Table 15: . Belgians detained for theft in Dusseldorf, 1940-1945 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
9 30 16 16 5 
Source: Author's statistics based on research into ITS/ ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450-
1506 and ITS/ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450, pages 6-33. 
Table 16: Sentences imposed upon Belgians convicted of theft in Dusseldorf, 
1940-1945 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
7 days I I 
IO days 5 I 6 
14 days I 6 I 3 11 
21 days 3 I I 5 
28 days 6 I '7 
35 days I I 
42 days I I 2 
56 days 7 I 2 IO 
84 days I 2 3 
98 days 1 1 
112 days I 3 4 
140 days I I 
168 days 2 I I 4 
252 days I I 
365 days 3 I 2 4 IO 
449 days I I 
477 days I I 
533 days I I 
730 days I 3 I 5 
1,095 days I I 
1,825 days I I 
Source: Author's statistics based on research into ITS/ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450-1506 and 
ITS/ A RCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450, pages 6-33. 
The judicial system struggled to cope with its heavy caseload in the final 
chaotic months of the war. Alfred M was arrested for theft in January 1945. He was 
accused of stealing ten pounds of rice and some wine - perhaps from a bombed out 
shop during an air-raid alann. Alfred M was initially transferred to the Wuppertal 
86 Wachsmann, Hiller's prisons, 315. This law was mainly aimed at farmers and butchers. 
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prison, but was subsequently transferred to the Diisseldorf-Derendorf prison on 
5 March 1945 and the Remscheid-Liittringhausen penitentiary on 29 March 1945. He 
was finally released by the Allies on 9 May 1945.87 Those arrested in the final 
months of the war could spend months in prison awaiting trial even for a relatively 
minor offence. Alfred M was, however, more fortunate than some Belgians in other 
parts of Germany who were executed for theft or looting in the final months of the 
war. While the judicial authorities could carry out executions readily in Berlin where 
condemned prisoners could be executed at more than one institution, executions 
could not be carried out in Diisseldorf and thus those who were condemned to death 
were transferred to Cologne-Klingelpiitz until 1945 and Wolfenbiittel in the final 
months of the war. The Diisseldorf Special Court sentenced ninety-two people to 
death during the war, including seventeen foreigners. 88 It is notable that there are no 
indications that Belgians fell victim to summary executions in the final months of the 
war in Dilsseldorf. 
In December 1944 three young Belgian men, Armand C, Josef V and Jean 
Va, were tried for attempted murder by the Dilsseldorf Special Court. Armand C, 
Josef V and Jean Va had been arrested by the Gestapo in Belgium in May 1944 and 
transported to an AEL run by the Deutsche Rohrenwerke in Oberhausen. The men 
arrived at the camp in June 1944 and escaped just days later with the intent of 
making their way home. When the men came to the Rhine they stole a rowing boat 
and crossed the river. In the Moers district the men stopped in some woods and lit a 
fire to dry their clothes. They were spotted and when police sought to apprehend 
them they resisted, seizing a pistol and slightly injuring a policeman. The men's 
experience was probably typical of those who sought to return home illegally. While 
regular checks on trains ensured that few Belgians managed to make it home by 
stowing away on trains, patrols also ensured that those who attempted the journey on 
foot also had little prospect of success even when seeking to return from regions 
close to the Belgian-German border. The three men were convicted of aggravated 
robbery and grievous bodily harm. Armand C was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment, while Josef V and Jean Va were both sentenced to six years 
imprisonment. While Annand C had avoided the death penalty, he paid a heavy toll 
as a result of his detention. Armand C was detained in the DUsseldorf-Derendorf 
87 SVG/DO, SDR 157311. 
88 Rafael R Leissa and Joachim Schroder, "Uberwachung und Disziplinierung der auslandischen 
Arbeitskrafte," 329. 
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prison from 5 July 1944 until 29 September 1944 when he was transferred to the 
Wuppertal prison and finally, as the Allied land invasion neared, to Remscheid-
Ltittringhausen penitentiary on 12 February 1945. As defeat loomed. prison 
evacuations became a common occurrence, with some prisoners facing a series of 
transfers as the Allies and Red Army approached. In November 1944 Reich Justice 
Minister Otto-Georg Thierack ordered the evacuation of prisons on the left bank of 
the Rhine. In Dilsseldorf, these were vacated by March 1945. As the Allies 
approached Dtisseldorf several Belgian prisoners were transferred to the Remscheid-
Ltittringhausen penitentiary and the Wuppertal prison. By the time of his arrival at 
the Remscheid-Ltittringhausen penitentiary Armand C weighed just 50kg and his 
physical condition was described as poor. On 9 May 1945 Armand C was pardoned 
and released by the prison review board instituted by Allies following Germany's 
defeat and arrived back in Belgium on 1 I May 1945. The medical examination 
carried out by the repatriation authorities upon his return to Belgium showed he was 
afflicted with tuberculosis and pleurisy and was also suffering from heart cachexia.89 
Those who spent the final chaotic months of the war in prison paid a particularly 
heavy price and many died due to deteriorating health or infectious disease, or were 
killed in massacres carried out by Nazi officials who wished to ensure that convicted 
criminals did not survive Germany's defeat. Wachsmann observes that while killing 
was often random in the final months of the war, societal groups, such as foreigners, 
who had always been targeted, continued to bear the brunt of Nazi violence.90 
Belgians like Armand C who spent the final months of the war in prison experienced 
a significant deterioration in their health and could suffer long-lasting and even 
permanent effects on their health. The fate of his two partners in fortune is not 
known. Twelve Belgians died in the Dilsseldorf-Derendorf prison. As a testament to 
the harsh treatment of prisoners and the inadequacy of the medical treatment 
prisoners received, eight Belgians died from illness whilst in custody. Three of these 
deaths resulted from a phlegmon which developed into sepsis, while the remaining 
cases included one case of renal failure and sepsis, one case of tuberculosis, stomach 
cancer and a heart attack. 
89 SVG/DO, SOR 18834. 
90 Wachsmann, Hitler's prisons, 320. 
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7. Conclusions 
The experiences of Belgian civilian workers who were deployed in the Rhine-Ruhr 
city of Di.isseldorf have been examined closely using issues surrounding housing, 
health, mortality and crime as a baseline to analyse their experiences and treatment 
by the German authorities. These measures have allowed for the comparison of the 
experiences of those deployed in Di.isseldorf versus Berlin. The first finding of this 
study of Belgians who were deployed in Di.isseldorf is that a high proportion went to 
Germany on a voluntary basis. Their employment patterns frequently mirrored those 
of their forebears who went to Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
in pursuit of employment. In a close parallel to the seasonal employment patterns of 
Belgian migrant workers, many volunteers took up a series of labour assignments in 
Germany. These workers often completed labour assignments and returned to 
Belgium in the winter months or delayed the commencement of a labour assignment 
until after winter had passed. 
Di.isseldorf s proximity to Belgium brought significant advantages and 
probably ensured that the city was a preferred destination for many Belgian \ 
volunteers. As individual cases have illustrated, some Di.isseldorf employers 
permitted Belgian employees to make frequent short visits home. Some conscripted 
workers suggested that only volunteers were granted leave. It is highly likely that 
employers regarded volunteers as less of a flight risk and more likely to return if they 
were granted leave to return home. These cases have also illustrated that employers 
used their own discretion in granting leave to foreign employees and did not strictly 
adhere to the Nazis' rules with respect to the granting of leave. In many respects the 
flexible arrangements between German employers and Belgian volunteers, especially 
in the first years of the occupation, represent a continuation of earlier employment 
trends. Visits home provided the opportunity to source foodstuffs, clothing and other 
goods that were not available in Germany. The opportunity to make regular visits 
home therefore made a real material difference in the day-to-day existence of foreign 
workers in Germany. Dtisseldorfs proximity to Belgium also allowed those 
deployed in the city to maintain closer familial ties with loved ones in Belgium. 
Those who were ill could also return home to Belgium more readily, as the shorter 
journey was less arduous for sick workers. By contrast, the longer journey to Berlin 
meant that Belgian workers returned home less frequently and were generally 
granted longer periods of leave. Indeed, many conscripted workers in Berl in never 
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had the opportunity to return home, with some spending up to thirty months in 
Germany without visiting home. Finally, DUsseldorf was liberated on 16 April 1945 
when the Allies occupied Benrath and other southern parts of the city. By contrast 
with the delays in the repatriation of foreign workers who were stranded for weeks in 
Berlin after the city's liberation in May 1945, Belgians who were in Di.isseldorf at the 
conclusion of hostilities quickly returned home with some departing as early as 
18 April 1945. 
Turning to the question of how Belgians were treated in DUsseldorf, it is clear 
that Belgians received preferential treatment and this made a measurable difference 
in their daily lives. Housing was a key factor in the workers' daily life and Belgians 
enjoyed distinct benefits over their counterparts from the Soviet Union. While it is 
difficult to determine what percentage of Belgian workers lived outside camps, 
closer analysis of residence records indicates that a significant proportion of Belgians 
lived in private accommodation. Anecdotal evidence indicates that DUsseldorf 
employers housed a significant proportion of their western European employees 
privately, reserving camp accommodation for Ostarbeiter and POWs. Lodging in 
private accommodation allowed Belgian workers greater freedom and provided 
greater opportunities to improve one's material position. Living in private 
accommodation - either as a boarder or in rented accommodation - made for more 
comfortable domestic conditions, and those living outside camps were also less 
exposed to infectious diseases. The availability of private accommodation in 
DUsseldorf also encouraged Belgians to bring other family members to join them. 
The comparison of the size of foreign workers' camps in DUsseldorf and Berlin 
would suggest that there were fewer large camp complexes for western European 
civilian workers in Di.isseldorf. Belgians who were accommodated in camps in 
DUsseldorf tended to live in smaller camps. While the German authorities often 
implemented security measures such as guard posts, patrols and curfews in larger 
camps, especially those housing Ostarbeiter, surveillance tended to be less pervasive 
in smaller camps and residents therefore enjoyed greater freedom of movement, 
being able to utilise social and other facilities used by Germans. Health services are 
another area where substantive differences can be discerned in the treatment of 
foreign workers. Hospital admission records show that Belgians had a high level of 
access to medical services and the health authorities admitted western Europeans to 
the same hospital wards as German patients. Despite shortages of hospital beds, 
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many Belgians were also allowed to remain in hospital until they had recovered fully 
and many spent lengthy periods in hospital. This contrasts starkly with the treatment 
of Ostarbeiter who were often refused hospital admission on the grounds that there 
were no isolation rooms to accommodate them, sometimes with tragic results .. 
Police, Gestapo and judicial records have also provided an avenue through 
which to compare the treatment of Belgian workers in Dtisseldorf and Berlin, as well 
as that of their counterparts from eastern Europe. The analysis of sentencing in 
relation to theft convictions has shown that the judicial authorities in Berlin generally 
imposed more severe penalties than their colleagues in Dtisseldorf. No Belgians were 
executed in Dtisseldorf, whereas a total of seventy-eight Belgians were executed in 
Berlin during the war - twenty-one of these death sentences were imposed for theft 
convictions. Many of these death sentences were imposed in 1943 and were most 
likely a response to an increasing wave of thefts committed by foreign workers in 
Berlin. Faced with an increasing problem of criminality amongst the foreign 
population, Berlin's judiciary adopted a more heavy-handed approach applying more 
punitive sentences even for low-level crimes such as theft. 
The extensive Gestapo records in Dtisseldorf offer valuable insights into 
everyday terror and the treatment of Belgians in their interactions with their 
employers and the German authorities. Belgian civilian workers in Dtisseldorf, most 
of whom were volunteers, defended their rights as employees and sought to ensure 
that promises with respect to living conditions were upheld. Western European 
women proved to be particularly problematic for the Dtisseldorf authorities. Like 
their male counterparts, a significant proportion of the Belgian women deployed in 
Dtisseldorf went to Germany on a voluntary basis and quickly withdrew their labour 
if they were dissatisfied with their living or working conditions. While the German 
authorities issued Belgian women with warnings about their conduct, the Gestapo 
and other officials seemed reluctant to institute severe penalties against Belgian 
women. Gestapo cases relating to "forbidden contact" between Belgian civilians and 
Germans have highlighted inconsistencies in the treatment of Belgian workers. 
Belgians, especially Flemings who were regarded as ·"Germanic" people, were 
generally afforded better treatment than their counterparts from the Soviet Union. 
However, individual cases have shown that German officials often regarded all 





The Nazi labour recruitment program in Belgium enjoyed great success in the first 
years of the German occupation. By September 1941 Belgian civilians constituted 
the largest single group of workers from the west. 1 The German Military 
Administration introduced economic policies intended to encourage Belgians to take 
up employment in Germany. However, despite chronic unemployment, the Belgian 
authorities did not compel Belgian civilians to take up labour assignments in 
Germany and those who departed for Germany during the first years of the 
occupation went voluntarily. In the Netherlands, by contrast, there was a much 
greater degree of collaboration on the part of the authorities and the majority of those 
who departed for Germany in the first years of the occupation were unemployed 
workers who were forced to accept labour assignments in Germany under penalty of 
having their unemployment benefits withdrawn. The Dutch authorities also 
intervened with charitable and relief organisations, ensuring that all forms of 
charitable and poor relief were withheld from the families of those who refused to 
accept work in Germany. Dutch historian BA Sijes has therefore argued that 
unemployed Dutch workers were compelled to choose between accepting work in 
Germany or starvation. Faced with limited job prospects in Belgium and finding 
themselves in very straitened circumstances many Belgians accepted voluntary 
labour assignments in Germany. 
By drawing upon a broad range of historical records relating to the 
deployment of Belgians in Germany, this thesis has broadened our understanding of 
the employment patterns of Belgians during the Second World War. Statistical 
analysis of residence records from Berlin and Diisseldorf has provided a picture of 
the demographic profile of the Belgians deployed in Germany and has been 
combined with examination of the personal files of around 400 Belgians. This thesis 
has illustrated that the employment patterns of Belgian volunteers frequently 
mirrored those of Belgian migrant workers who went to Germany during the 
1 Herbert, Hitler's Foreign Workers, 98. 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century in pursuit of seasonal work. Like their 
forbears, many Belgians accepted labour assignments in parts of Germany that were 
close to Belgium. In areas close to the German-Belgian border like the Rhine-Ruhr, 
volunteers made up a high proportion of Belgian civilian workers. In a close parallel 
to the seasonal employment patterns of Belgian migrant workers, many Belgian 
workers completed labour assignments and returned to Belgium in the winter months 
or delayed the commencement of a labour assignment until after the winter passed, 
while others would take up a series of labour assignments in Germany over the 
course of the occupation. More enlightened employers recognised that flexible 
employment arrangements, such as the granting of regular leave to return home, 
fostered good relations with foreign employees and helped to secure their willingness 
to continue working in Germany; whereas the refusal to grant leave to return home 
prompted many Belgians to leave Germany at the end of an employment contract or 
breach their employment contracts. German employers often used their discretion 
when it came to employment arrangements and the granting of leave to foreign 
employees and did not strictly adhere to the Nazis' rules and regulations. In many 
respects flexible arrangements between German employers and Belgian volunteers 
represent a continuation of earlier employment trends, especially during the first 
years of the German occupation. The periodisation or the division of Nazi labour 
policies into distinct phases, characterised by voluntary and compulsory labour 
recruitment, is challenged by the analysis of the employment patterns of Belgians 
who worked in Dtisseldorf and Berlin. The work histories of Belgian civilian workers 
are very often variegated. The nature of a foreign worker's employment could also 
change over the course of the war. Those who initially went to Germany voluntarily 
might find that they were prevented from ending their employment and were 
therefore forced to remain in Germany against their will effectively as forced 
labourers. Belgians who had worked in Germany on a voluntary basis before 
returning to Belgium were in some cases subsequently conscripted and forced to go 
back to Germany. 
Acceptance of a voluntary labour assignment in Germany came with the 
expectation that one also had the right to end one's employment and return home. 
The introduction of compulsory labour assignments prompted some Belgian 
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volunteers to reconsider their decision to accept work in Germany and led many to 
seek to return home while they still could. Thus the introduction of conscription 
jeopardised the German recruitment campaign in Belgium, which had hitherto 
enjoyed significant success. Belgians who departed for Germany as volunteers went 
on their own terms and also expected that promises they had received with respect to 
living conditions and wages would be upheld and their rights would be safeguarded. 
Some of the volunteers' expectations resulted from promises made by labour 
administrators in Belgium, while others stemmed from their own perceptions about 
their position and rights. Later conscripts would also have a sense of their greater 
rights as western Europeans and would also assert these rights in the face of 
perceived encroachments by employers and German labour officials. Tensions arose 
between Belgian workers who refused to accept a subordinate position and German 
employers and labour officials. Perhaps the Belgians' high expectations were also a 
sign of the tacit acceptance of the new order in Europe and the more privileged 
position of Belgians within the Nazi racial hierarchy. The privileged status bestowed 
upon western European workers was empowering. Belgians who went to Germany 
expected that they would enjoy the same rights as German citizens and asserted their 
rights when it came to issues such as freedom of movement, the entitlement to live in 
private accommodation or joint accommodation with their spouse, wages, working 
conditions and food provisions. The rights and privileges Belgians enjoyed were 
protected until the end of the war, even in the face of vociferous objections from 
Germans who increasingly felt that western European workers took advantage of 
their position to the detriment of German citizens. While Belgians defended their 
rights and protested against unfair treatment, fear of the consequences of sabotage or 
resistance ensured that most Belgian workers generally tended to avoid higher risk 
activities and joint actions. Belgians did not face the same desperate plight 
experienced by their counterparts from eastern Europe. With very good prospects of 
surviving the war and returning home, most Belgians were reluctant to participate in 
high risk activities fearing that they might be transferred to a labour education or 
concentration camp. The Nazis' use of terror to control the population succeeded to a 
considerable degree in preventing foreign workers' opposition from coalescing into 
forms of behaviour that might have posed a fundamental challenge to the regime. 
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Through a strong focus on the Belgian women's experiences, this thesis has 
contributed to a greater understanding of the specificity of their experiences. Western 
European women proved especially problematic for employers and the German 
authorities. A significant number of Belgian women departed for Germany, 
especially during the early years of the occupation when many took up voluntary 
labour assignments .. Few Belgian women came forward to tell their story after the 
war and historical accounts have largely focussed on men's experiences and have 
ignored women's wartime experiences. The analysis of women's departures reveals a 
complex picture. In spite of the economic constraints and conscription for 
Arbeitseinsatz that compelled many women to depart for Germany, the experiences 
of Belgian women show that they still had some room to manoeuvre and many 
women made the choice to go to Germany for their own reasons. Belgian women 
enjoyed a privileged status as western European workers, which brought greater 
confidence. The public outrage in Belgium that surrounded the deployment of 
Belgian women in German industry ensured that the German labour administration 
and employers were forced to make concessions to Belgian women - concessions 
that they readily exploited. Women who were conscripted worked pro-actively to 
secure their return to Belgium, a number using pregnancy- feigned or real - as an 
avenue to obtain leave to return home. Whatever the circumstances of their 
departure, Belgian women were not simply at the mercy of the German employers 
and labour authorities. Their departure for Germany even proved a liberating 
experience for some women. Belgian women helped to shape their own destinies and 
were not simply victims of the occupier's labour policies. 
The final sections of this thesis have explored the experiences of Belgian 
workers in the cities of Berlin and Di.isseldorf. By drawing upon case studies of the 
cities of Berlin and Di.isseldorf, as well as the accounts of Belgians who were 
deployed in other parts of the Reich, this social history of Belgians deployed in 
Germany has provided a nuanced picture of their experiences. This thesis has shown 
that policies were not applied uniformly across Germany and the role of officials at 
regional and local level has also been emphasised. In some regions officials sought to 
prohibit Belgian workers from living in private accommodation, whereas many 
Belgians, both Flemings and Walloons, lived in private accommodation in Berlin and 
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Dtisseldorf, even as bombing destroyed housing and Germans struggled to secure 
accommodation. In Berlin, foreigners represented a larger proportion of the 
population, especially after many Berliners were evacuated from the city. The sheer 
number of foreign workers deployed in Berlin loomed large in the minds of Berlin 
officials and German inhabitants alike, and many began to fear that foreigners would 
revolt. The Berlin police and judiciary adopted a harsh stance towards foreigners 
accused of committing crimes and therefore threatening law and order in the city. 
The examination of the sentencing of Belgians by German courts has shown that, by 
comparison with the sentences imposed on Belgians in Dtisseldorf, those handed 
down by Berlin's judiciary were particularly punitive. The harsh approach adopted 
by officials in Berlin was a direct response to local conditions and imperatives. 
Leading Nazi Joseph Goebbels was also an influential figure in Berlin and exhorted 
Berlin's law enforcement agencies to treat the city's foreign inhabitants harshly. The 
privileged status of Belgians did, however, spare them from the worst excesses of 
Berlin authorities, with few Belgians subject to extra-legal summary executions 
during the final stages of the war. 
Health and medical records have also provided great insights into the 
treatment of foreign workers and the implementation of Nazi racial policies. The 
shortage of doctors and pharmacists during the war meant Germans often found it 
difficult to access a doctor, and for many foreign workers access to health services 
was even more limited. The examination of hospital, medical and health insurance 
records has illustrated, however, that Belgians nevertheless enjoyed a comparatively 
good standard of medical care. Those who were seriously ill were generally sent 
home or hospitalized if they were unable to travel. By contrast with Ostarbeiter who 
were treated as expendable, chronically ill Belgians might spend weeks or months in 
German hospitals. In keeping with their elevated position in the Nazi racial 
hierarchy, sick Belgians admitted to German hospitals were accommodated in beds 
alongside German patients and were afforded a similar level of care. The 
examination of health insurance records has, nevertheless, shown a steady increase in 
the number of Belgian workers suffering from medical illnesses towards the end of 
the war, indicating that the health of Belgians deployed deteriorated as the war 
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continued. Despite enjoying better standards of medical care, mortality records show 
that illness claimed the lives of many Belgians in Germany. 
This thesis has looked beyond Nazi racial policies in order to provide greater 
understanding of the factors that shaped the experiences of Belgian civilians in 
Germany. It has been argued that an important distinction must be made in relation to 
the material advantages western European workers enjoyed due to their elevated 
position in the Nazi racial hierarchy and the benefits individual foreign workers were 
able to secure by virtue of their employment skills, linguistic skills and greater 
confidence. In addition to the preferential treatment they enjoyed, other factors also 
served further to cement the advantages Belgians enjoyed. Many Belgians were able 
to secure better jobs because they were skilled workers. A high proportion of 
Belgians were employed in German industry, with jobs in the industrial sector, and in 
particular the armaments industry, paying higher wages. It has also been argued that 
language played a key role in shaping the experiences of many Belgian workers. As 
speakers of a Germanic language, Flemings often learned the German language more 
readily. A good command of German brought the ability to communicate with the 
German population and therefore helped foreign workers secure better jobs, as well 
as opportunities to improve their situation proactively by seeking out additional food 
or private accommodation. Packages sent by family members in Belgium and items 
that Belgians who returned home on leave brought back to Germany, including a 
wide array of foodstuffs, clothing, shoes and tobacco, supplemented their rations in 
Germany. Tobacco, in particular, provided Belgians with a high demand item that 
could be traded on the black market in Germany. For Germans with a spare room to 
rent western Europeans were a popular choice because they had access to goods 
unavailable in Germany. 
This thesis has also emphasised the key role played by individual Germans in 
shaping the experiences of foreign workers. Looking at the question of the Nazis' 
distinguishing between Flemings and Walloons, there is little concrete evidence to 
confirm that their differing positions within the Nazi racial hierarchy brought 
substantive differences in their living and working conditions or the treatment they 
received at the hands of the German authorities. The examination of the sentences 
imposed by German judges, for example, provides no evidence to suggest that 
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Flemings and Walloons were treated differently. Indeed, social criteria were clearly 
more important than racial distinctions in determining the sentencing of Belgian 
offenders. Similarly, interactions between foreign workers and ordinary Germans 
were not necessarily influenced by Nazi racial policies. Nazi ideology was not all-
pervasive and the reach of the Nazi authorities did not extend into the interactions 
between ordinary Germans and foreigners. Close contact between foreigners and 
Germans, in particular sexual relations between German women and foreign men, 
drew the attention of zealous Gestapo officers who often regarded all social contact 
between Germans and foreigners as morally unacceptable. This is not surprising 
given that Nazi propaganda lauded Germans as the master race. Many Germans, 
however, formed their own views about foreign workers and their own personal 
experiences helped dispel Nazi racial stereotypes. The approach adopted by 
individual Germans in their dealings with foreign workers was shaped by a complex 
range of factors including Nazi racial policies, past military conflicts, racial 
stereotyping, and personal experiences and in some cases genuine compassion. Fear 
of how their behaviour might be perceived by the Nazi authorities was also an 
influential factor, with some Germans eschewing close contact with foreign workers. 
Many Germans were in a position to assist foreign workers and helped in whatever 
ways they could because they saw foreigners as colleagues, fellow Christians or good 
workers; in shor, they recognised them as fellow human beings and treated them with 
decency. 
By focussing on the social history of the Auslandereinsatz and the stories of 
individual Belgians, this thesis has mapped the varied experiences of Belgians in 
Germany during the Second World War, illustrating convergence and divergence 
from Nazi racial policy and the fundamental role ordinary Germans played. More 
importantly, however, this thesis has shown that Belgian civilian workers were not 
just passive victims of the German occupation of Belgium. In wartime, as in 
peacetime, the decision to go to Germany to work was often a personal one for 
Belgian volunteers, based on individual circumstances. In difficult economic times 
and with no end to the war in sight, Belgians sought to navigate the best course for 
themselves and their families and many probably felt that going to Germany to work 
represented the best way to secure their financial future - at least in the short term. 
283 
While Belgian conscripts were by definition not free, as western Europeans they 
were afforded greater rights and legal protection. Despite the difficulties they 
encountered, the privileged status Belgians enjoyed ensured that they had a great deal 
of room for manoeuvre and were able to exercise a significant degree of control over 




Appendix 1: German Recruitment Offices 
Main Office Branches Staff 
all. ind. 
FK520-Antwerp 
Antwerp 39 145 
Boom 6 
Herentals 1 6 
Mechel en 3 10 
Turnhout 6 5 
OFK672 - Brabant 
Brussels 49 152 
Hasselt (FK681) 7 11 
Leuven 4 17 
Nivelles 5 12 
OFK570 - Gent 
Gent 24 26 
Gent 8 46 
A al st 3 11 
Oudenaarde 2 13 
Brugge 4 16 
Termonde 3 13 
Eecloo 2 9 
Kortrijk 6 17 
St. Nicolas 6 20 
Oostende 3 6 
Roese I are 4 11 
Tie It 2 5 
Veurne 3 6 
Ypres 3 11 
OFK589 - Lie2e 
Liege 33 204 




Huy 5 35 
Waremme 
Verviers 6 44 
Stave lot 
OFK520 - Hainaut 
Mons 12 14 
Mons 6 17 
Charleroi 10 86 
Dinant 5 17 
La Louviere 4 14 
Namur 4 18 
Tournai 5 16 
Source: Culot, "Le travail obligatoire des Beiges". 14-5. 
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Appendix 2: Recruitment targets for 16.1.1943 - 24.4.1943 
I. Registration of 18-25 year olds 
FK520 OFK672 OFK570 OFK589 OFK520 Total 
Antwerp Brussels Gent Liege Mons 
Proposed quota 80,000 130,000 140,000 60,000 90,000 500,000 
I . Registered by the 
67,384 98,154 119,709 61,683 66,657 413,587 municipality: 
2. Records compiled: 44,384 61,054 99,406 52,815 45,112 302,588 
a. Metal workers 5,671 3,321 4,147 4,172 3,923 21,234 
b. Semi-skilled workers 3,461 1,963 2,045 3,052 1,608 12,129 
c. Construction workers 1,631 813 1,902 348 423 5,135 
d. Other skilled workers 4,244 15,766 17,071 10,806 9,290 67,177 
e. Independent workers 
1,433 2,669 3,007 3,135 1,306 11,550 (unemployed) 
f. Unemployed 1,065 1,055 2,304 1,285 454 6,163 
g. Students 4,827 5,311 6,879 5,266 4,682 26,965 
h. Total records compiled 10,901 3,881 27,527 12,701 2,898 57,808 
3. How many workers listed 
7,671 15,251 21,793 5,077 8,390 58,182 under 2. conscripted 
as a percentage 17.3 25 21.9 9.6 18.6 19.2 
2. Registration of agricultural businesses 
FK520 OFK672 OFK570 OFK589 OFK520 Total 
Antwerp Brussels Gent Liege Mons 
Participating Businesses 4,329 11,356 9,579 6,177 7,968 39,409 
I. How many checked: 4,632 6,927 6,339 2,971 6,232 27,101 
2. How many employees 
21,867 12,380 9,084 3,382 7,961 54,674 
involved 
3. How many for the Reich 2,218 1,357 1,857 655 1,052 7,139 
4. How many for Belgium 1,706 3,624 962 742 2,127 9,161 
3. Recruitment from the hospitality industry 
FK520 OFK672 OFK570 OFK589 OFK520 Total 
Antwerp Brussels Gent Liege /vlons 
I. How many checked 2,307 1,965 1,113 1,131 1,634 8,150 
2. How many employees 
4,067 3,093 1,001 - 2,483 10,644 
involved 
3. How many for German 
730 973 408 217 151 2,479 
restaurants ( Gaststiille) 
4. How many for the Reich 192 166 164 114 318 954 
5. How many for Belgium 373 269 9 63 199 913 
Source: SVG/DO, R.184/Tr.37.023, Marburg Collection, 8/430-440 ( 1) (Film 12) 
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Appendix 3: Weekly recruitment quotas for each 
respective OFK/FK 1 
Overall Area Quota 
Quota 
OFK672 Brussels 1,300 Greater Brussels 900 
Leuven 150 
Hasselt (Limburg) 150 
Nivelles 100 




St. Niklaas 150 
Dendermonde 100 
A al st 100 
Kortrijk 150 
Roeselaere 200 
FK520 Antwerp 900 Antwerp 500 
Mechel en 200 
Turnhout 200 
OFK520 Mons 800 Mons 150 
Charleroi 200 
Tournai 150 
La Louviere 100 
Namur 100 
Dinant 100 





Source: SVG/00, R.184/Tr.37.023, Marburg Collection, 8/430-440 ( 1) (Film 12) 
1 Issued 14.9.1943 
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Appendix 4: Belgian workers with contracts and Belgian workers in 
Germany 
Date With labour contracts In Germany 
7 December 1940 90,423 
18 January 1941 100,000 
25 April 1941 86.349 
20 August 1941 200,000 
15 January 1942 250,000 
20 January 1942 131,000 
31 May 1942 300,376 
31 August 1942 325,235 
19 December 1942 398,270 
14 January 1943 250,000 
20 May 1943 500,000 
July 1943 310,000 
Autumn 1943 228,000 
15 November 1943 220,621 
1 December 1943 548,937 
Mid-August 1944 586,746 
Total number of workers repatriated 215,000 
to Belgium to May 1945 
Source: Haupt, "Der• Arbeitseinsatz' der belgischen Bevolkerung", 82-5. 
289 
290 
Appendix 5: Medical problems suffered by Belgian employees of 



















Catarrh (upper respiratory tract) 


































































Eye complaint 4 
Eye flashes 2 
Eye injury 5 
Eye irritation 
Feverish illness 1 
Foot complaint 2 
Foot complaint (High foot arches) 2 
Foreign body in eye 11 
Fractures 14 





Glandular infection 4 
Gonorrhoea 
Grastalgia (stomach ache) 1 




Heart (valve defect) 
Heart (weak) 1 
Heart condition 4 
Illness (nail) 
Impetigo 2 
Infected wound 4 
Inflammation (various parts of body) 32 
Influenza 146 




Kidney stones 1 
Laceration (head) 2 
Laryngitis 
Leg complaint 1 
Leg injury 2 
Leg wound 1 
Lumbago (lower back pain) 26 
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Lung complaint I 
Lymphangitis 3 
Middle ear infection 5 
Miscarriage 
Myalgia (muscle pain) 7 















Pulled muscle 2 









Spasms (large intestine) 
Spastic paralysis (hand) 
Sprains 23 
Stab wound 3 
Stiff neck 
Stomach complaint 
Stomach flu 2 

















Ulcer (digestive system) 16 
Ulcer (limbs) 12 
Urticaria (hives) 
Varicose veins 2 
Warts (feet) 
Wounds 24 
Source: Author's statistics based on the company health insurance fund records for 
the Firma Deutsche Werft Hamburg: SVG/00, R.219/Tr.26.686. 
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Appendix 6: The distribution of foreign civilian and native workers across the 
economic sectors (August 1944) 
Agriculture Mining Industry Construction Service 
and Forestry % % % % 
% 
Belgians 2 I 72 10 14 
Croatians 8 5 62 15 11 
Czechs 5 5 58 16 17 
Dutch 9 2 59 12 19 
French 9 I 72 6 13 
Italians JO 4 50 23 13 
Poles 68 3 18 4 6 
Serbians 15 8 51 8 17 
Soviets 35 4 45 4 12 
Foreigners 36 3 43 6 12 
Total 18 4 42 5 32 
Workforce 
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Appendix 8: Belgian men's hourly earnings2 
Job 
Hourly earnings Work hours 
Name (Reichmark) (weekly) 
ules B Semi-skilled worker 0.56 48 
Henri C Semi-skilled worker 0.56 48 
Frans G Trainee 0.57 
Pieter D Trainee 0.57 
Alfons A 0.60 60 
Jacques C 
Metal worker (armaments 
0.60 
industry) 
Maurice D Semi-skilled worker 0.60 
Andre B Semi-skilled worker 0.63 54 
Theophile B Worker 0.64 
Joachim B 
Maintenance worker (Deutsche 
0.64 
Reichsbahn) 
JosefM Worker 0.65 
Jan-Baptist H Worker (vehicle manufacturing) 0.65 
JeanD Lifting (construction industry) 0.66 
Frans K Excavation worker 0.68 
Alexandre B Worker (Deutsche Reichsbahn) 0.70 54 





Stephanus B Cutter 0.70 
Samuel G Worker (German railways) 0.70 54 
Pieter H Worker (manufacture of radios) 0.70 
JosefM 




Delivery driver (Organisation 
0.70 
Todt) 
Jean P Worker 0.71 52 o/.i 
Joannes K Hall attendant 0.72 
Josef L Skilled worker 0.72 60 
Gilbert G 0.73 
Marcel Th Semi-skilled worker 0.73 60 
Ernest W Semi-skilled metalworker 0.74 60 
Raphael D Barber (semi-skilled worker) 0.74 
Albert Cr Cable maker 0.75 
Victor L 
Factory worker (food 
0.75 manufacturing) 
Louis Li Unskilled worker (Deutsche 0.75 59 Reichspost) 
Marcel SI Skilled Postal worker 0.75 
(Postfacharbeiter) 
2 In cases where a worker undertook more than one labour assignment in Germany each labour 
assignment is recorded separately in the sample. 
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Roger H Mechanic (Monteur) 0.76 48/60 
Armand Be Barber 0.78 
Louis Ce Semi-skilled worker 0.78 
Pierre M Machinist 0.78 
Alfons C Builder 0.79 
Louis A Semi-skilled milling-machine 0.80 operator 
Marcel Ba Metal worker (Junkers aviation 
manufacturing) 0.80 
Henri B Cable worker 0.80 
Lifting (manufacture of 
Henri C precision parts for aviation 0.80 
industry) 
Jean S Electrician 0.80 56 
Robert H Trainee 0.80 48 
Josef F Worker (aviation 0.80 manufacturing) 
Petrus V Metal worker (armaments 0.80 industry) 
Paul A Semi-skilled driller 0.81 48/60 
Lodewijk B Metalworker 0.82 54160 
Gustave D Worker 0.82 60 
Moritz L Worker 0.82 
Pierre L Railway wagon cleaner 0.83 
Roger H Mechanic (Monteur) 0.84 
Lucien C Mechanic (Monteur) 0.85 
Georges D Metal worker (Schlosser) 0.85 
Adolphe K Wire-drawer (Drahtzieher) 0.85 
Herman L Engine fitter/metal worker 0.85 (Maschinenschlosser) 
Martyn V Lifting goods (vehicle 0.85 manufacturing factory) 
Henri Cr Painter 0.86 
Joseph A Polisher (Junkers aviation 0.90 manufacturing) 
Marcel C Worker (railways) 0.90 
Josef W Schreiner 0.90 
Jean Baptiste D Plumber/welder 0.90 
Maurice D Semi-skilled worker 0.90 
Herman L Driller 0.90 




Andre J Metal worker 0.93 56 
Karel L Worker(aviation manufacturing) 0.95 
Marcel Ba 
Metal worker (aviation 
1.00 manufacturing) 
Josef W Carpenter 1.00 
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Adrian D Worker 1.00 
Armand D Worker (Armaments industry) 1.00 
Julian H Painter 1.00 
Frans So 
Metal worker (aviation 1.00 
manufacturing) 
Fran~ois S 
Spray painter (machinery 1.00 
manufacturing) 
Charles T 
Technical draughtsman 1.00 
(electrical goods manufacturing) 
Gustave Po Metalworker 1.00 
Martin H Shunter on railways 1.00 
Albert V Setter (printing industry) 1.00 48/60 
Josef Co Driller · 1.05 
Benedictus V Carpenter 1.08 
Benedictus V Camp administrator 1.08 
Jean A 
Carpenter (air-raid protection 1.10 48 
office) 
Louis LA 
Maurer (maintained buildings 1.10 
and ovens) 
Marcel C 
Worker (chemical 1.10 
manufacturing) 
Arthur Du 
Postal worker (Deutsche 
1.10 
Reichspost) 
Josef Mi Caster 1.10 
Johann Baptiste T Loader (German railways) 1.10 
Gerardus G Quartz cutter 1.15 
Lodwewyk V Bookbinder 1.15 
Adolphe C Metalworker/ fitter 1.16 54 
Petrus V Metal worker (armaments 1.20 
industry) 
Henri B 1.25 
Jacob B Riveter (Nieter) 1.25 
Hubert J Machine fitter 1.25 




Julius D Engraver (printing industry) 1.36 
Josef Fr Foreman/ Carpenter 1.50 
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Appendix 10: Belgian. women's hourly earnings3 
Name Job Earnings 
Rosa A Machinist (Automatenhilfer) 0.40 
Andrienne B Camp worker 0.50 
Andrienne 8 Domestic assistant (Hausmadchen) 0.50 
Nelly D Worker 0.50 
Pauline H Worker 0.46 Yi 
Georgine F Worker 0.50 
Georgine F Worker 0.50 
Virginie F Worker 0.48 
Joanna G Worker 0.50 
Marguerite G Packer 0.50 
Wilhelmina G Canteen assistant 0.42 
Adolphine H Worker 0.49 
Adolphine H Machinist 0.50 
Florentina H Worker 0.50 
Simonne H 0.59 
Paula H Worker 0.50 
Suzanna H Semi-skilled worker 0.48 
Helene L Worker 0.50 
Henriette M Worker 0.53 
Suzanne E Worker 0.50 
Rachel L Worker (armaments manufacturing) 0.50 
Source: Figures taken from individual SVG/DO files. 
3 
In cases where a worker undertook more than one labour assignment in Germany each labour 

















Appendix 11: Year of first labour assignment in Germany 
Year Men* Women Total 
1940 16 2 18 
1941 65 19 84 
1942 47 20 67 
1943 23 8 31 
1944 1 0 1 
1945 0 0 0 
* In two cases the year of the first labour assignment in Germany is unclear and one migrant worker 
is not taken into account. 
Appendix 12: The distribution of foreign civilian and native workers across 
the economic sectors in August 1944 
Agriculture Mining Industry Construction Service 
and Fores try % % % % 
% 
Belgians 2 1 72 10 14 
Croatians 8 5 62 15 11 
Czechs 5 5 58 16 17 
Dutch 9 2 59 12 19 
French 9 1 72 6 13 
Italians 10 4 50 23 13 
Poles 68 3 18 4 6 
Serbians 15 8 51 8 17 
Soviets 35 4 45 4 12 
Foreigners 36 3 43 6 12 
Total 18 4 42 5 32 
Workforce 
Source: Spoerer, Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz, 225. 
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Appendix 13: Number of foreign workers housed in camps at the end of 1942/beginning 
of 1943, percentage of the overall population represented by foreign 
workers in 1939 and 1945 and the number and average size of camps in 
each district 
District Number of Total Percentage Number Percentage of Number Average 
foreign number of residents of foreign population of camps si=e of 
residents of represented workers represented camps 
. in 1942/ residents by foreign in 1945 by foreign 
1943 in 19421 workers in workers in 
1943 194211943 1945 
Rein i ckendorf 20,461 200,531 10.2 162,951 12.6 83 247 
Spandau 18,722 170,384 11.0 139,875 13.4 IOI 185 
Tempelhof 15,652 125.360 12.5 93,340 16.8 58 270 
Kopenick 10,213 120,446 8.5 104,624 9.8 65 157 
Treptow 10.137 118,159 8.6 97,920 10.4 56 181 
Neukolln 9,555 303, 170 3.2 247,070 3.9 85 112 
Lichtenberg 8,744 196,811 4.4 145,388 6.0 27 324 
Pankow 7,946 154,725 5.1 130,143 6.1 34 234 
Tiergarten 6,611 213.572 3.1 92,476 7.1 82 81 
Wilmersdorf 6,467 206,779 3.1 104,242 6.2 14 462 
Mitte 6,330 263,555 2.4 120,816 5.2 148 43 
Charlottenburg 4,490 299,955 1.5 174,153 2.6 50 90 
WeiBensee 3,968 90,277 4.4 74,139 5.4 40 99 
Kreuzberg 3,915 332,635 1.2 185,764 2.1 55 71 
Wedding 3,252 325,099 1.0 213,748 1.5 13 250 
Schone berg 3,186 277,948 I. I 149,339 2,1 11 290 
Zehlendorf 2,457 81,141 3.0 65,738 3.7 9 273 
Steglitz 2,240 213,920 1.0 104,910 2.1 25 90 
Prenzlauer 1,874 298,025 0.6 226,144 0.8 14 134 
Friedrichshain 1,232 346,264 0.4 174,625 0.7 40 31 
Total 147,452 
4,338,75 
3.4 2,807 5.3 1,011 146 
6 
Source: Pagenstecher, "Lager Listen und Errinerungsberichte", 104. 
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Appendix 14: Largest camps in Berlin at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 
Camp Number of residents 
Fritz Werner AG, Daimlerstrasse, Tempelhof 
DWM, Lunalager, Pankow-Schonholz 
Argus Motoren, Graf Roedern-Allee 32, Reinickendorf 
Arbeiterstadt Grosse Halle, Spandau-West 
Weserflug, Hindenburgstrasse 63, Wilmersdorf 
Weserflug, Columbiastrasse, Tempelhof 
Deutsche Reichsbahn, Kaulsdorfer Strasse 90, Lichtenberg 
Deutsche lndustriewerke, Heidereuterstrasse, Spandau 
OT-Lager, Jagen 57/58, Wilmersdorf (Deutsche) 
Siemens & Schuckert, Gartenfelderstrasse, Spandau 
Rheinmetall-Borsig, Strasse 1, Reinickendorf 
Verschiedene, Seestrasse 78/83, Wedding 
AEG Kabelwerk, Wendenschlossstrasse 304, Kopenick 
Luftanlagengesellschaft, Alboinstrasse 82/102, Schoneberg 
Stadt Berlin, Arnimstrasse, Weissensee 
RAB, am Strandbad Wannsee, Zehlendorf (v.a. Deutsche) 
Reichspost, Steinstrasse, Tempelhof 
Generalbauinspektor, Zabel-Kri.iger-Damm 38, Reinickendorf 
Siemens & Halske, Bahnhof Jungfernheide, Charlottenburg 
Generalbauinspektor, Weissenhoher Strasse, Lichenberg 
Knorr-Bremse, Roederstrasse/Wolfgangstrasse, Lichtenberg 
Arbeitsamt, Durchgangslager Wilhelmshagen, Kopenick 
Maget, Krumpuhler Weg, Reinickendorf 
Daimler-Benz, Santisstrasse, Tempelhof 
Nordbau, Hartriegelstrasse, Treptow 
Siemens & Schuckert, Rhenaniastrasse, Spandau 
Wehrersatzinspektion, Am Adlersgestell, Treptow 





























Appendix 15: AEG - Apparatefabriken Berlin-Treptow company 
accommodation for Belgian employees 
Berlin-Friedrich ha in 
Berlin 017, AEG-AT Auslanderheim established at rented premises. Two 
Breslauerstr. 3 floors of the hotel and adjoining rooms were rented by AEG-AT. 
Hotel Butter Earliest reference to the home: I July 1941, destroyed by bomb on 
3 February 1945. 
Size of rented premises: I 95 2m 
Number of Belgian residents: 3M, IF 
Nationality of other residents: Italian 
Berlin 017, Number of Belgian residents: IF 
Koppenstr. I 00 
Berlin 017, Langstr. Number of Belgian residents: IF 
110 
017, Milhlenstr. 45, Number of Belgian residents: IM 
b/Meminges (or 55) 
Bezirk-Kopernick 
Schmokwitz, Am Number of Belgian residents: IF 
Seddinsee 17 
Berlin-Kreuzberg 
Berlin SO 36, AEG-AT Auslanderheim established in rented factory building. 
Manteuffelstr. 81 Rented accommodation included the first, third and fourth floors 
of the building. Lease began on I May 1942. 
Size of rented premises: 5402m 
Number of Belgian residents: 8M 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch, Polish, French 
Berlin SO 36, AEG-AT Auslanderheim established at Darings Festsale. Rented 
Naunynstr. 27 accommodation included one hall with gallerie, washrooms and 
Darings Festsale toilets. Earliest reference to the home I April 1941. 
Size of rented premises: 5772m 
Number of Belgian residents: I 4M 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch, French 
SO 36, Schlesische Number of Belgian residents: IM 
Str. 35 Size of rented premises: I 552m 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch 
Berlin SO 36, AEG-A T Auslanderheim for established at premises rented from 
Hochbahn-Gebaude I 0 October 1941. Rented premises included a hall with adjoining 
Schlesisches Tor rooms, as well as rooms on the first floor. 
Restaurant Torkrug Size of rented premises: 8002m 











Berlin, Schlesisches Number of Belgian residents: 2F, 3M AH 
Tor 3 Nationality of other residents: French 
Berlin SO 36, AEG-A T Ausliinderheim established at rented premises. Earliest AH 
Waldemarstr. 20 record I October 1942. Completely destroyed in a bombing raid 
Hotel Stadt Gorlitz on 14 April 1945. 
Size of rented premises: 5802m 
Number of Belgian residents: 3F, 2M 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch 
Berlin SO 36, Number of Belgian residents: 1 F PA 
Kottbusser Damm 
10, bei Langheim 
Berlin-Lich ten berg 
Berlin-Lichtenberg, AEG-AT Ausliinderheim. Accommodation rented included a hall AH 
Kynastr. 19 and adjoining rooms. Earliest record of the home 16 November 
Schonert Gaststatte 1940. On 8 March 1943 the 102 French female workers were 
moved to barracks 1 at the Lager Johannisthal. Total of ten 
residents registered on 26 May 1943. Company correspondence 
from May 1944 indicates that ten workers were still living at the 
premises even though the home had been seriously damaged by 
bombing in January 1944. 
Size of rented premises: 5582m 
Number of Belgian residents: 4F, IM 
Rilmmelsburg, AEG-A T Ausliinderwohnheim. First reference on I February AH 
Tilrrschmidstr. 45 1944.Completely destroyed in a bombing raid on 26 February 
Kerns Festsale 1945. 
Number of Belgian residents: IM 
Bezirk Mitte 
Berlin N31, Ackerstr. AEG-AT Ausliinderheim established at a rented business premises AH 
50 (also referred to (Gewerberaum). Earliest reference 1 October 1942. On 8 February 
as N4) 1943 there were 128 female workers living in the home. The 
Bezirk Mitte building destroyed in bombing in April 1945. 
Size of rented premises: 6952m 
Number of Belgian residents: 6M, 1 F 
Berlin-Neukolln 
Berlin-Neukolln (SO AEG-A T Ausliinderheim established in rented premises. Earliest AH 
36), Weigandufer 9 record 1 October 1942. 
Size of rented premises: 9?2m 
Number of Belgian residents: 2M 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch 
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Ber Ii n-Neukoll n, AEG-A T Ausliinderheim was established in rented premises from AH 
Jagerstrasse 11 I July 1942. Rented accommodation had been a furniture 
business. The home housed approximately twenty-five couples of 
different nationalities and was run by Frau Kijersgaard. 
Size of rented premises: 3302m 
Number of Belgian residents: 3F, IM 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch, French, Italian 
Berlin-Neukolln, AEG-A T Ausliinderheim established in rented premises. AH 
Jagerstrasse 3 Accommodation included rooms, a billiard and clubrooms, plus 
toilets. Accommodation was used for twenty female workers. 
Earliest record IS November 1941. Number of residents on 
30 April 1943. 
Size of rented premises: 902m 
Number of Belgian residents: 1 F, 1 M 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch, Polish, French, Italian 
Berlin-Neukolln, Number of Belgian residents: IM PA 
Weise Str. S7 bei 
Schul el 
Berlin Neukolln, AEG-AT Ausliinderheim at r.ented premises 136-7 Bergstrasse. AH 
Bergstr. 136-137 Earliest record of the home 1 S February 1941. Totally destroyed 
Deutsches Wirtshaus by bombing on 29 December 1943. One large hall, one small hall, 
one adjoining room, as well as bathrooms and toilets. From June 
1941 the company rented an additional hall at the premises. 
Size of rented premises: 2162m & 6S2m 
Number of Belgian residents: 4M 
Berlin-Neukolln, SO Number of Belgian residents: 1 M AH 
36, Maybach Ufer 7 
Bezirk Prenzlauer Berg 




Ber Ii n-H ermsdorf, Number of Belgian residents: 1 M PA 
Dorfstr. 23 
Bezirk Schoneberg 
Berlin-Schone berg, Number of Belgian residents: 1 M PA 
Bahnstr. 48/Jahnstr. 
bei Schmolke 




Lager Johannisthal, A uslanderlager for A EG Transformatorenwerk Oberspree. The L 
Gross Berliner Damm plans for the Lager Johannisthal, Gross Berliner Damm, are dated 
20 March 1942. In September 1944 600 workers were housed at 
the camp in three barracks. In each barracks there were individual 
rooms that could accommodate twelve workers. Company · 
correspondence dated 14 September 1944 indicates that due to 
damage to many of the company's homes for foreign workers the 
company had been forced to housed different nationalities in the 
same barracks room. Correspondence also indicates that the 
company set up "arrest rooms" with the approval of the Gestapo 
Commissioner Rothfeldt in 1944. Workers were locked up in 
these rooms for between one to five days for misdemeanours such 
as loafing on the job (Bummelei). 
Number of Belgian residents: 14F, 7M 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch, Polish, French, Italian, 
Russian 
Berlin-Treptow, Alt AEG-AT Auslanderheim established at rented premises. Rooms AH 
Treptow 4/5 rented included hall, toilets and adjoining rooms. Premises rented 
Pa rad i esgarten from 1 May 1941. Destroyed in a bombing raid on 23 November 
1943. 
Size of rented premises: 8152m 
Number of Belgian residents: 7M 
Nationality of other residents: French, Hungarian and Italian 
Berlin-Treptow, Alt- AEG-AT Auslanderheim was established at the rented premises. AH 
Treptow 2/3 The rooms leased included the hall and three adjoining rooms. 
Deutscher Garten Earliest record of the home was 1 October 1942. Destroyed in a 
bombing raid on 26 February 1945. 
Size of rented premises: 1502m 
Number of Belgian residents: 4M 
Nationality of other residents: Dutch, French 
Berlin-Treptow, Number of Belgian residents: 1 M PA 
Kietholzstr. 16, bei 
Kruger 
Berlin-Treptow, Neue AEG-AT Auslanderheim established at rented premises. The lease AH 
Krug Allee 33 stipulated that male workers from the Protectorate were not to be 
Neu-Tivoli housed at the home. The lease also included the cleaning of the 
rooms rented by AEG. The lease of the property commenced on 
1 January 1941. Destroyed in a bombing raid on 26 February 
1945. 
Size of rented premises: I 362m 
Number of Belgian residents: 3 F, 1 M 
Berlin-Wittena u 
Berlin-Wittenau, Number of Belgian residents: 1 M PA 
Oranienburgerstr. 95 
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Various and unclear addresses 
Berlin. Karlstr. Number of Belgian residents: IM 
Erkstr. 19, bei Erler Number of Belgian residents: IM 
Ges und brunnen, Number of Belgian residents: IM 
Ramlerstr. 36, bei 
Ewald 
Hotel Stadt Posen Number of Belgian residents: 1 M 
J ohannisthal brilcke Number of Belgian residents: 1 F 
Langenstr. 110 bei 
van der Broeck 
Kanaertstr. I 9 Number of Belgian residents: 1 M 
Konigsheideweg 244, Number of Belgian residents: IF 
bei Seidel 
N20 GrUnthalerstr. 59 Number of Belgian residents: IF 
&54 
N65 A ntwerpenerstr. Number of Belgian residents: IF 
38 bei Bleckermann 
Neanderstr. 30 Number of Belgian residents: IF 
Niederschoneweide, Number of Belgian residents: 1 F, 1 F 
Gross Berliner Damm 
Storkow, Burgstr. 4 Number of Belgian residents: IM, IM 
Wernsdorf bei Berlin, Number of Belgian residents: IF 
Dorfstr. 23 bei 
Lankwitz 
ZUhldorf, Wandlitz Number of Belgian residents: IM 
Dorfstr. 21 
Sources: Landesarchiv Berlin, A Rep. 227-02: Nr.2-65 & 77. 
Key: 





















Appendix 16: Jules H 
Flemish volunteer Jules H was admitted to the Wittenauer Heilstdllen psychiatric institution 
in Berlin-Wittenau on 24 January 1944 and died at the institution on 27 June 1944 . .i His case 
raises intriguing questions regarding the medical assessments carried out in occupied 
Belgium. While illnesses of the nervous system were medical conditions medical assessors 
considered when determining whether a worker was fit to work in Germany, epilepsy 
apparently did not preclude Jules H from deployment in the Reich. Perhaps he had elected 
not divulge this information when he volunteered to work in the Reich, fearing that he would 
not be permitted to go to Germany. On 24 January 1944 Jules H was transferred from the 
Gemeinschqfislager Fliegerhorst Staaken, Nennhauserdamm 139~ Berlin-Staaken, where he 
had been resident since May 1942. His admission record indicates that he was transferred to 
the Wittenauer Heilstallen because he was suspected of suffering from an organic psychosis 
that necessitated his confinement in a closed institution. However, the medical diagnosis 
upon his admission to the Wittenauer Heilstallen indicates that Jules H was suffering from 
epilepsy and tuberculosis. It was not uncommon for epileptics to be committed to psychiatric 
institutions during this era in Germany and there were those who advocated •·euthanasia" for 
epileptics. Staff noted that it was barely possible to understand him because he spoke very 
poor German. Institution staff repeatedly referred to him as Frenchman and recorded in his 
medical notes that they were puzzled because he did not respond to questions posed in 
French. At the time of his arrival at the institution, staff recorded that Jules H frequently 
suffered from severe epileptic fits and headaches. While his admission record indicates that 
staff at the Wittenauer Heilstallen anticipated a period of hospitalisation of two to three 
months, Jules H's health deteriorated steadily. Staff described him as a "'big strong man with 
well developed musculature" when he arrived at the institution; however, his hospital record 
documents his marked physical deterioration within the space of just a few months. Jules H's 
weight dropped from 65.8kg on 1 March, 61 kg on 1 April, 61.3 on 1 May 1944 and 53kg on 
2 June 1944. This weight loss was a common indicator of tuberculosis. Tests were 
undertaken to assess the extent of his tuberculosis infection. In spite of his affliction with 
tuberculosis and epilepsy, staff employed Jules H in the institution work gang from 
7 February 1944. This was a common practice in German psychiatric institutions, as 
institutional patients, like other members of society, were expected to contribute to the 
general good. On 27 April staff recorded that he was calm and his work in the institution was 
4 SVG/DO, SDR 176091 and Dad. 4074/374892. 
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satisfactory. The final record in Jules H's file indicates that he died from tuberculosis and the 
accompanying mental disturbance on 27 June 1944. Tragically. the request that he be 
admitted to a closed institution probably meant that he was not sent home to Belgium and 
was instead left to languish in a German psychiatric institution until his death. The distress 
and misery Jules H experienced is quite unimaginable. He was committed to a closed 
psychiatric institution where he struggled to communicate with staff even on a basic level. 
The medical record provides no indication that he received visitors and he most likely spent 
the final months of his life alone in Germany and apart from his friends and family in 
Belgium. 
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Appendix 17: Bombing Raids on Berlin 
Number 
Year Bombing carried out 
of 




1940 26/27 August Royal Air Force 
28/29 August Royal Air Force 
31 August Royal Air Force 
314 September Royal Air Force 
415 September Royal Air Force 
I 0/ I I September Royal Air Force 
23/24 September Royal Air Force 
7/8 October Royal Air Force 
14/ 15 October Royal Air Force 
20/21 October Royal Air Force 
I /2 November Royal Air Force 
617 November Royal Air Force 
14/15 November Royal Air Force 
15/ 16 December Royal Air Force 
20/2 I December Royal Air Force 
1941 12/13 March Royal Air Force 
23/24 March Royal Air Force 
9/10 April Royal Air Force 
17/18 April Royal Air Force 
2/3 June Royal Air Force 
2/3 August Royal Air Force 
12/13 August Royal Air Force 
2/3 September Royal Air Force 
7 /8 September Royal Air Force 
20/2 I September Royal Air Force 
7/8 November Royal Air Force 
1943 16/17 January Royal Air Force 
17/18 January Royal Air Force 
1/2 March Royal Air Force 709 64,909 
27/28 March Royal Air Force 
29/30 March Royal Air Force 
23/24 August Royal Air Force 899 103,558 
31 August/1 Royal Air Force 
September 
3/4 September Royal Air Force 623 39,844 
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18/19 November Royal Air Force Commencement 
of the Battle of 
Berlin. 
22/23 November Royal Air Force 2.000 175.000 
23/24 November Royal Air Force 1,000 100,000 
26/27 November Royal Air Force 
2/3 December Royal Air Force 
16/ 1 7 December Royal Air Force 628 30.063 
23/24 December Royal Air Force 
29/30 December Royal Air Force 
1944 1/2 January Royal Air Force 
2/3 January Royal Air Force 
20/21 January Royal Air Force 306 20,938 
27 /28 January Royal Air Force 426 19,945 
28/29 January Royal Air Force 531 69,466 
30/31 January Royal Air Force 582 82,980 
15/16 January Royal Air Force 320 
6 March US Army Air Force 
8 March US Army Air Force 
9 March US Army Air Force 
Royal Air Force 
End of the 
24/25 March Battle of Berlin 
I 29 April US Army Air Force 
7 May US Army Air Force 
8 May US Army Air Force 
19 May US Army Air Force 
24 May US Army Air Force 
21 June US Army Air Force 
6 August US Army Air Force 
5 December US Army Air Force 
1945 3 February US Army Air Force 2,541 119,057 
26 February US Army Air Force 636 71,283 
18 March US Army Air Force 336 79,785 
14/15 April Royal Air Force 5,000 40,000 Potsdam 
20/21 April Royal Air Force 
Source: Kucklick, Feuersturm, 136-47. 
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Appendix 18: Recruitment for Rex, Wallonische Arbeitsdienst and the SS 
Langemarck Brigade 
During the latter stages of the war, leaders from Belgian fascist organisations, Rex 
and the Flemish Duits-Vlaamse Arbeidf)gemeenschap (German-Flemish Association) 
or DeVlag, visited camps and workplaces across Germany to recruit Belgians for 
military and paramilitary units to fight on the Eastern Front and defend Germany 
against the approaching Red Army. The Rexist Legion Wallonie was created in the 
aftermath of Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Rexist leader Leon 
Degre lie claimed that the future structure of Europe would be decided on battlefields 
of the East, and by fighting shoulder to shoulder with German troops the 
legionnaires would win the respect of the Nazi leaders and would thereby guarantee 
their country's place in the New Europe.5 Most Belgians did not, however, share 
Degrelle's view, and the initial recruitment for the Legion Wallonie was a categorical 
failure.
6 
The accounts of Belgians indicate that the Legion Wallonie organised events 
to recruit Belgians working in Germany. A concert was held at the Berlin Zoo in the 
centre of city by the Legion Wallonie in early 1943. The Legion Wallonie had 
sustained heavy losses during the escape from the Soviet armies after the Battle of 
the Korsun-Cherkasy Pocket in January/February 1944 and was redu~ed to a virtual 
rump, making it imperative to enrol a substantial number of new recruits as rapidly 
as possible. During the spring of 1944 Rexist leader Degre lie devoted much o.f his 
energies to a propaganda campaign to recruit Belgians to join the ranks of the Legion 
Wallonie. Martin Conway observes, "One of Degrelle's obstinate beliefs during the 
latter years of the war was that those Belgian men working in factories in Germany 
were more eager than their compatriots in Belgium to serve in the Legion Wallonie". 7 
The accounts of Belgians who attended these recruitment sessions indicate, however, 
that efforts to recruit Belgian workers for German military and paramilitary units met 
with little success. Conscripted worker Raymond V recalled an information session 
held in Bremen: 
5 Conway, Collaboration i11 /3e/gium, 100. 
6 Ibid., 97. 
7 Ibid., 253. 
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The Belgians had to attend two information sessions encouraging them to join 
(the fighting) on the Eastern Front. They were given by Rex and De Vlag. The 
second was organised because the first one was not compulsory and had very 
I ittle success despite the packets of cigarettes that were distributed. 
8 
Despite the offer of incentives such as better rations and cigarettes, efforts to recruit 
Belgians to join military and paramilitary units on a voluntary basis largely failed. 
Volunteers who had gone to Germany out of economic necessity and conscripted 
workers who had been deported to Germany generally did not share Nazi 
sympathies. Moreover, the Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944 gave 
Belgians working in Germany hope that the war would soon be over and most 
Belgians were therefore focussed on surviving the last months of the war until their 
liberation. The unwillingness of Belgian workers to sign up for service with military 
and paramilitary units is understandable - many regarded Germany's defeat as 
inevitable and military service on the Eastern Front clearly carried great risks. 
Additionally, those working in Germany were well aware that those regarded as 
collaborators would face reprisals in the wake of Germany's defeat. Willem L 
reported that, while efforts to recruit Belgian workers to the ranks of the SS were 
treated with derision, some workers suddenly disappeared from his camp following 
the recruitment sessions, apparently lured in by the promise of better rations. Those 
from his camp who joined the ranks of the SS kept their decision secret probably 
fearing that their fellow workers would brand them as traitors. Fascist organisations 
therefore turned to more coercive measures to recruit workers. Willem L recalled, 
''The black market flourished notwithstanding the fact that it could have life-
threatening consequences. Those who were caught were given the choice: either go 
to the prison at Berlin Alexanderplatz or sign up for the Waffen-SS and serve on the 
Eastern Front".9 Alfons L similarly recalled how his companion Ursmar van Vooren, 
who was the youngest Belgian in their barracks and was given the nickname Casimir, 
was forced to join the SS Brigade Langemarck in Berlin: 
Even Casimir left me in the lurch. He did not show up at work for four days 
and that spelt trouble for him. Then he came back one day and looked at me 
as if he wanted to say what have I done? He had no other choice: to be locked 
up in a disciplinary camp or to sign up with the SS Brigade Langemarck. He 
8 CEGES/SOMA, AA I 2 I 611, Enquete Travail Obligatoire - Raymond V. 
9 Ibid., AA I 2 I 6/50, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Willem L. 
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chose the second option. When he departed I could not even look at him, 
even though he acted out of necessity. 10 
Most of the men in his barracks, who also included the KAJ leader Jef Vyncke, 
departed Belgium on the same transport on 19 March 1943 and came from the same 
part of Belgium. Alfons Land Ursmar V had shared a bunk and it was with anger 
and great sadness that Alfons L watched his close friend Casimir depart for the SS 
Brigade Langemarck. Ursmar departed just as others from the close-knit group were 
transferred from the Deutsche Kabelwerke in Berlin-Ostkreuz to a sister factory sixty 
kilometres outside Berlin in Ketsendorf in 1944. The departures hit van Laere 
particularly hard: "'After sharing joys and sorrows of all the months together, I was 
overcome with grief as my friends departed for an unknown fate". 11 The men had 
become a substitute family during their time in Berlin and it was with great sadness 
that groups were broken up in the latter half of the war as industrial plants and 
workers were transferred outside Berlin. Other accounts also indicate that 
recruitment was not always voluntary. Another worker recalled that he and a fellow 
worker from his camp received a mobilisation order for the Wallonische 
Arbeitsdienst/Service Travail Wallon (Wallonian Labour Service) instructing them to 
report to a registration point near Wolfenbuttel on 1 November 1944, ""We knew 
nothing at all about what would await us or about what we would find there, nothing 
at all. Nothing had prepared us for the terrible surprise that awaited us: having to put 
on a German uniform". 12 The symbolic importance of donning the uniform of the 
conqueror cannot be underestimated. Most Belgians regarded the creation of the 
Legion Wallonie as a monstrous act for which there could be no excuse, and joining 
the Legion Wallonie was widely regarded as an act of treason. 13 Even those who had 
joined the ranks of the Legion Wallonie voluntarily were reluctant to return to 
Belgium wearing a German uniform. Soon after his arrival in Germany in April 1943 
Lucien B met a young man wearing a Legion Wallonie uniform on the way back to 
his barracks after work. The young man asked him whether he was Belgian and 
explained that he had been granted a leave pass to return to Belgium, but did not 
want to return home to Belgium wearing his uniform, and besides had met a girl in 
10 Ibid., BA J 5.654, Alfons L, ''Bommen op Berlin"'. 27. 
II Ibid., 26. 
1 ~ Ibid., AA J 216/1, Enquete Travail Obligatoire - Pierre Jean Louis Clemens. 
13 Conway, ('ol/aboration in Belgium, I 00. 
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Berlin. The man offered to give him his leave pass in exchange for money or clothes 
that he could sell on the black market. Lucien B made arrangements to meet the 
legionnaire the following day. After thinking about the offer overnight and speaking 
to his comrades he decided against taking up the offer because he did not want to 
return home in a German uniform. 14 This would prove to be his only opportunity to 
return to Belgium - he was later refused leave after another worker for whom he 
acted as a guarantor failed to return to Germany. Lucien B's account also points to 
enforced conscription of Belgian workers in the Reich. On 24 December 1944 
Boskin was called to speak to the factory director. According to his account he and a 
Frenchman were told that he had to go to a Wallonische Arbeitsdienst camp. The 
men departed for the camp near Wolfenbtittel on 31 December 1944. At the end of 
March 1945, after they had spent three months at the training camp, the recruits 
received a visit from a dozen men in black uniforms and civilian clothing. These men 
told the recruits that they were representatives of the new Belgian government and 
that Germany needs combatants. After the liberation of Belgium in September 1944 
some Belgian collaborators fled to Germany. Embryonic exile governments for 
Flanders and Wallonia were· established in Germany following Belgium's liberation. 
Collaborators found a means of legitimating their existence in propaganda work to 
win Belgians working in Germany over to the Nazi cause. Lucien B recalled how the 
men were forced to join the ranks of the armed Wqffen-SS. After the men completed 
their training they were told by officials that they would be departing on I April 
1945. Each of the men was asked: 
"Do you agree to swear the oath of loyalty to the Fuhrer?" "No". "Do you 
agree to join the Waffen-SS?" With the exception of one person, we all 
responded with a concerted "NO". Then they told us: 'That does not matter 
in any event, you have been mobilised". 15 
There was much talk after the war about enforced mobilisation of Belgian workers in 
the Reich for German military and paramilitary units. Records gathered by Belgian 
Liaison Officers in Germany include lists of Belgian men between the ages of 
eighteen and thirty-five compiled by local police for Waffen-SS recruitment officers, 
indicating that systematic efforts to recruit Belgian workers to the ranks of the 
Waffen-SS. It is notable that lists dating to March 1943 suggest that efforts to recruit 
14 CEGES/SOMA, AB 1202, Lucien B, ··nmoignage 1943-1945", 5-6. 
15 Ibid., 19. 
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Belgian workers to German military formations were not limited to the final stages of 
the war.
16 
It is difficult to offer any indication of the number of Belgians civilian 
workers who were recruited or their nature of their service in these armed units. 
16 SVG/DO, R.547/Tr.18622, Lists of Belgian nationals registered in Dilsseldorf prepared by 
commissioners in police districts for the Waffen-SS recruitment officer at the Germanische SS-
Sturmbanne, Sonders/ab West, Dtisseldorf. 
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Appendix 19: Activity of the Young Christian Workers in Berlin 
The privileges enjoyed by western European workers also extended to the treatment 
they received from representatives of the Catholic and Protestant churches in 
Germany. Seventy-one percent of Berlin's population were Protestant, while 
Catholics represented ten percent of the city's population. 17 By contrast with Poles 
who were forbidden to attend the same church services as Germans in the Polish 
Decrees published by Himmler on 8 March 1940, Belgian Catholics were able to 
worship alongside German parishioners at churches across Berlin. There were, 
however, sometimes tensions between Belgian Catholics and Protestant clergymen in 
Germany. In Altenburg south of Leipzig, for example, ten members of the KAJ left 
the church after the pastor stated that the Bible - rather than the rosary - was the way 
to prayer. Belgian Catholics did not, as a general rule, use Protestant churches as a 
place to gather or worship. 18 Belgian Catholics who had no opportunity to worship in 
a Catholic church sometimes sought to create a space to worship in their barracks, for 
example putting up religious etchings and praying at the end of their bed. Such 
efforts by residents who were perhaps the only observant Catholics in their barracks 
sometimes met with mockery and derision from other residents. Others sought to 
ensure that religious holidays such as Easter were observed in their camps. At one 
camp Catholic residents requested that others maintain a minute of silence, while at 
another camp residents were asked to refrain from using the piano on Good Friday. 
The KAJ organisers worked actively in Berlin to assist Belgian Catholics. 
While the treatment western European workers received from the churches in 
Germany was not formally set out by the Nazi authorities, certainly the approach of 
religious leaders was shaped by fear of how the Nazi authorities might perceive their 
behaviour and how officials might react. After their arrival at the Gemeinschaftslager 
Egelftihlstrasse in Berlin-Spandau, Jan A and his friends attended mass every Sunday 
morning and also attended church services on Christian holidays such as Easter. 19 
Flemish Catholics had the opportunity to attend confession with Dutch-speaking 
17 Meyers lexikon, 8th ed., s.v. "Berlin". 
18 Frans Selleslagh, 11 De klandestiene K AJ, 11 91. 
19 
CEGES/SOMA: AA 1260/60, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jan A diary. 
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priest Father Veuens on Saturdays at 20.30 at the Saint Pius Church on 
Palissadestrasse 73-74, Berlin NO 18.20 However, it was probably difficult for most 
Flemish Catholics living in Berlin to attend confession with a Flemish-speaking 
cleric due to their long working hours and the distance they needed to travel. No 
information has been recorded regarding the availability of francophone priests in 
Berlin. 
The Young Christian Workers (KAJ/JOC) was also active in Germany. The 
organisation had been established by Brussels priest Jozef Cardijn in 1924-1925 and 
was made up of four branches: the Kristelijke Arbeidersjeugd (KAJ); the Vrouwelijke 
Kristelijke Arbeidersjeugd (VKAJ); the Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne (JOC); and 
the Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne Feminine (JOCF). At the beginning of the Second 
World War the Young Christian Workers had a membership of roughly 90,000 and 
aimed to Christianise or re-Christianise Belgian youth and the working class. 21 One 
of the organisation's founding principles was Christian charity.22 The introduction of 
labour conscription on 6 October 1942 brought an intensification of the 
organisation's activities. Placing the organisation in direct opposition to the Military 
Administration's conscription of Belgian workers, the KAJ/JOC counselled its 
members to refuse to sign the labour contract agreeing to go to Germany and not to 
depart if they were conscripted. Spontaneous efforts to assist conscripted workers 
and their families sprang up across Belgium in the immediate aftermath of the 
introduction of conscription. Priests and KAJ/JOC leaders went to the homes of 
conscripted workers and advised conscripts to show courage and provided religious 
and material support to the families of departing workers. The urgency of 
establishing efficient support in Germany was underscored at an emergency meeting 
convened by Jozef Cardijn and attended by Cardijn's adjunct priest Magnus and the 
chairmen of the KAJ and JOC respectively, Jef Deschuyffeleer and Victor Michel. 
Representatives of the four branches of the KAJ/JOC wrote a joint letter to Cardinal 
20 Ibid., undated postcard sent by Marcel Y to Jan A. 
21 In the period 1890-1950 the Church hierarchy and leading Catholics attached ever greater 
importance to a coherent class vision and well-developed class organisations. Priest Jozef Cardijn's 
organisation was linked to the Catholic workers' movement and Catholic Action. Jan de Meyer, "The 
Formation of a Christian Workers' Culture in the Pillarized Societies: Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands ( 1850-1950)," in Befll'een Cross and Class: Comparative Histories of Christian labour 
in Europe / 8./0-2000, ed. Lex Heerma van Voss, Patrick Pasture, and Jan de Maeyer (Bern: Peter 
Lang,2005~99-100. 
22 Selleslagh, "De klandestiene KAJ", 88. 
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van Roey on 19 December 1942 calling for unified action to provide religious and 
moral support the Belgian labour deportees. Belgian Cardinal van Roey gave his 
support to the establishment of Aid for Workers Abroad in late December 1942. This 
organisation included representatives of the KAJ/JOC, Catholic employers' groups, 
scouting organisations, student groups and Caritas Catholica. The KAJ/JOC focussed 
on establishing lo.cal branches in Germany that would act as service centres where 
young Belgian conscripts could go to seek advice and assistance. This work would 
further intensify in the months that followed in response to the hundreds of letters 
written by Belgian conscripts decrying the situation in Germany. 
The work of the Flemish wing of the Young Christian Workers has been well 
documented through the work of Selleslagh who surveyed KAJ organisers in the 
early 1970s. The activities of the KAJ will be drawn upon to illustrate the work of 
the KAJ/JOC in Germany. The KAJ had groups in many German cities where 
Belgians were deployed, including Bad-Blankenburg, Berlin, Brunswick, Bremen,· 
Chemnitz, Cologne, Danzig, Darmstadt, Dessau, Dresden, Goslar, Gotha, Grabow, 
Hamburg, Hannover, Kassel, Kiel, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Munich, Osnabruck, 
Stuttgart, Wetzlar, as well as the Austrian capital Vienna. There were major groups 
in Berlin, Magdeburg and Leipzig, which were led by Jef Vyncke, Eugeen Coine and 
Pol Victoor respectively. The broad directives of the KAJ in Germany were 
determined by the organisation's national leaders in Belgium and communicated to 
the leaders of the Ausland-KAJ (KAJ Abroad) in Germany. KAJ leaders from 
various German cities also worked together and held a meeting on 13 June 1943 in 
Leipzig, and further meetings were held in Dessau on 22 August 1943 and 
12 September 1943. The purpose of these meetings was to determine directives, 
which local leaders then implemented directives according to local conditions and 
needs. It is highly significant that KAJ leaders from across Germany managed to 
hold meetings in Germany. The fact that the KAJ central leadership managed to hold 
meetings is probably a testament to the lower level of surveillance to which Belgians 
were subject. 
The first steps towards organising the KAJ in Berlin were made by Gommaar 
Buts in Berlin-Neukolln. Buts reported on 18 April 1943 that he had obtained a list 
of KAJ members in Berlin and had written to all members in Berlin in order to 
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establish contact. Buts received a response from Karel Spoormans who had already 
started building a KAJ group in Berlin-Friedrichshagen. On 26 May 1943 Buts 
advised the KAJ central leadership in Brussels that he was handing over the 
leadership of the KAJ in Berlin to Jef Vyncke. On 15 June 1943 Vyncke sent a 
detailed report on the how the KAJ was functioning to the KAJ central leadership in 
Brussels with a KAJ member who had returned to Belgium. The introduction to the 
report is characterized by great optimism. Vyncke reported that KAJ organisers had 
established an association in Berlin and that within a short period of time - a couple 
of months - organisers expected to establish a national association. Vycke reported 
that through the help of some French Jocisten - members of the French-speaking 
wing of Young Christian Workers - he had established contact with Belgian Albert 
Verhelst, the leader of the JOC in Berlin. Vyncke reported that Verhelst had 
succeeded in organising an event that was attended by around sixty Jocisten. Initially 
efforts by Vyncke to establish close cooperation between the French JOC, Belgian 
JOC and the KAJ in Berlin failed. However, a solution was eventually found. The 
movement was divided into three wings: the Flemish KAJ, the Walloon JOC, while 
Maria Brugmans headed a joint association of the Christian Workers' Youth 
women's organisations the VKAJ and the JOCF. Each group was represented on a 
governing board. 
KAJ leadership in Berlin was led by Jef Vyncke and was divided into sectors, 
which were looked after by district leaders who came together for a meeting once a 
month on Sundays. The regular meetings held by the organisation are noteworthy, as 
the Nazi authorities did not like German citizens holding meetings other than those 
that were organised under the auspices of the Nazi Party. Each sector consisted of 
two or three camps or branches of between three to five members. KAJ groups 
generally formed in individual camps around a KAJ leader and then reached out to 
Belgians at other camps in the surrounding area. Members of the KAJ worked 
actively to make contact with Belgian Catholics. Upon leaving the Friedrichstrasse 
Bahnhof in the centre of Berlin, Jan A and his friends were approached by a group of 
KAJ members from Antwerp. After making their acquaintance, the KAJ members 
suggested they meet again on a Sunday and said they would write to them at their 
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camp.23 The postcards retained by Jan A from his time in Berlin offer an insight into 
how KAJ members organised activities. With members spread across different parts 
of the city and living in different camps, organisers also used the postal service as a 
means of communicating with Flemish Catholics in the city. Organisers sent 
postcards to friends advising the time and place that they would meet on weekends. 
Others sent postcards to advise the date on which they would come to visit their 
friends in another camp. Organisers in Belgium sent lists of names and addresses of 
KAJ members who had gone to a specific German city to the local Ausland-KAJ 
leaders, enabling them to make contact with KAJ members. Figure 25 provides a 
snapshot of the organisation and membership of the KAJ in the Berlin-Brandenburg 
region in October 1943 ~just a few months after the organisation began its active 
campaign to establish KAJ branches in Germany. Notwithstanding efforts to reach 
out to Catholics in other camps and the active campaign to make contact with 
Belgians Catholics working in Berlin, some Belgians reported after the war that they 
never heard about the KAJ while they were in Germany, indicating that the 
organisation did not manage to reach all Belgian Catholics in the city.24 
Figure 25: KAJ members in Berlin-Brandenburg October 1943 
Number of members Organisers 
Berlin 235 Gommaar Buts 
Karel Buzeyne 
Frans Cools 
Marcel de Blander 





Brandenburg 18 Karel Spoormans 
Fi now Fewer than ten Georges van Dorpe 






Source: Selleslagh, De Klandestiene KAJ in Duitsland, 112. 
23 CEGES/SOMA: AA 1260/60, Enquete Travail Obligatoire, Jan A, diary entry 21.04.1943. 
24 Ibid., AA 1216/50, Enquete li'avail Obligatoire, Willem L, 8. 
352 
While Belgian Christian organisations decried the conscription of Belgian 
workers and sought to protect workers from the dangers of moral temptation and 
spiritual degradation, the work of KAJ leaders in Germany was very much focussed 
on the day-to-day trials and tribulations Belgian workers faced in Germany - above 
all their material well-being. Marcel Gu. who was a KAJ leader in Berlin-Wannsee 
recalled that the aims of the group were "to give the men courage and to help them to 
remain true to their wives, fiances and [religious] beliefs". 25 Joris D was a KAJ 
leader in Kortrijk before he was conscripted and sent to Germany in November 1942. 
Joris D lived in the camp at Nennhauserdamm 139 in Berlin-Staaken. Asked whether 
it was possible to do evangelistic work in Germany, he observed: ""Yes, by building 
friendships and [providing] assistance where this was possible". Joris D emphasised 
the important role the provision of support played in the work of the KAJ in 
Germany: "'Through the stomach it was possible for us to succeed with our 
evangelistic work".26 Andre D who was a KAJ organiser in Dessau similarly 
emphasised: "We had to keep an eye on the material and spiritual well-being of our 
workmates and in my view the second could not come without the first". 27 Joris D 
shared the higher rations he received as a heavy manual labourer. Joris D and other 
KAJ members who lived in the outlying suburb Berlin-Staaken also managed to steal 
from local vegetable patches. He later recalled that he also focussed on the morale of 
workers by "fostering camaraderie in the camp and encouraged [workers] to stay 
positive and set up a library in the camp". Sporting activities and group outings were 
organised as a means of channelling workers into positive activities and to keep them 
away from moral temptation. According to Marcel Gu., the KAJ also organised 
gatherings and bible study groups in Berlin. A group outing to the woods of Berlin 
attracted around fifty participants, while more than two hundred KAJ members 
attended a Christmas party held at a parish hall. KAJ members also visited the sick. 
Karel Spoormans took responsibility for organising sporting activities. 
KAJ members reported varied experiences in their dealings with German 
church leaders. Joris D observed: "'We were well-known through our weekly 
attendance at Sunday church services, but the local priest never wished to start a 
25 Ibid., AA 1797, Enquete KAJ, Marcel Gu. 
20 I bid., Enquete KAJ, Joris D. 
27 Ibid., Enquete KAJ, Andre D 
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personal conversation with us". His account indicates that, while Belgians were 
permitted to attend church services, some German clergymen maintained their 
distance from foreign parishioners - perhaps fearing that appearing to be too friendly 
with foreign workers might lead to unwanted scrutiny from the Nazi authorities. By 
contrast with the experiences of Joris Din Berlin, Andre D praised the efforts of the 
local pastor in Dessau and emphasised: "Contact with the local cleric was frequent 
due to the need to make use of the local school, as well as his writing materials and 
copying machine". The local pastor took risks to help KAJ members despite the 
serious consequences he would face if the Gestapo became aware of their activities. 
Boskin also attended churches services each Sunday at a church that was located 
between his camp and the factory in Berlin-Henningsdorf. The services were run by 
an old priest and were attended by old Germans, a number of Poles and others like 
himself. The priest organised a small procession for a Christian festival in which 
foreign workers also participated. Afterwards members of the Hit I er Youth were 
waiting outside the church and followed the men back to the camp throwing stones 
and shouting '"Jude, Jude". It is apparent that the term "Jude" or Jew was used as a 
general insult during the Nazi era and could be used to taunt Jews and foreigners 
alike. The parish priest was arrested as a consequence of the incident and was 
unrecognisable when he returned several months later. 28 This incident reveals the 
ways in which some young Germans, in this case members of the Hitler Youth, 
sought to intimidate foreign workers and thereby reinforce their own superior 
position in the Nazi hierarchy. This account accords with John J Delaney's research 
clerical opposition to Nazi anti-Polish policies in rural Bavaria. Delaney observes 
that the "unwillingness of priests and parishioners to enforce racial separation at 
Mass was actually a large social conspiracy that encompassed entire villages''. 
Through the integration of Polish workers into village religious life, argues Delaney, 
clerical leadership demonstrated that Poles belonged to the religious community and 
also set the foundation for social relations between Germans and foreigners. 29 The 
sympathetic approach adopted by some German clergymen and their willingness to 
assist Belgian Catholics demonstrates that many clergymen treated foreign workers 
first and foremost as fellow Christians. 
28 Ibid., AB 1202, Lucien B, ''Temoignage 1943-1945", 5-6. 
29 Delaney, "Racial Values vs. Religious Values," 288-9. 
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The KAJ operated as a clandestine organisation in Germany. Nevertheless, 
the activities of the KAJ in Germany did not escape the attention of the Nazi 
authorities. The KAJ leader in Berlin Jef Vyncke was arrested by the police and 
questioned for fourteen days. 3° KAJ organisers and members living in other parts of 
Germany also report similar experiences. Andre D recalled that the group in Dessau 
encountered problems after the Werkschutz was informed of their activities: ••A few 
other Kc{jollers and I were taken from our workplaces and taken in for questioning. 
After being locked up in a bunker for a few hours and receiving a beating with a 
whip, we were could return to our workplaces".31 It is apparent that in cases where 
German employers or the Nazi authorities became aware of the activities of the KAJ 
members they were interrogated and subjected to disciplinary measures that were 
probably intended to engender fear and discourage them from engaging in 
oppositional activities. 
Jo Vyncke had unfortunately already passed away by the time CEGES-~OMA researcher Frans 
Selleslagh conducted a survey of KAJ members who went to Germany tn the early 1970s. 
J1 CEGES/SOMA, AA 1797, Enquete KAJ, Andre D. Memb~rs ~f ~he KAJ often re!e~red ~? . 
themselves as Kajollers and signed off letters or postcards with Ka1011ersgroeten (Ka1ot1e1 s greeting). 
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Appendix 20: Recorded crime committed by Belgians in Berlin, 1939-1945 
Crime Men Women Total Asa 
percentage 
of total crime 
Abandonment of child 0 I I 0.29 
Aiding the escape of a POW I 0 I 0.29 
Aiding the escape.of a prisoner 2 0 2 0.59 
Arms offence 4 0 4 1.17 
Arson I 0 I 0.29 
Assault I 0 I 0.29 
Bolshevist activities 6 I 7 2.05 
Breach of employment contract 2 3 5 1.47 
Bribery 0 I I 0.29 
Burglary 13 5 18 5.28 
- Burglary (as a member of a gang) 3 3 6 1.76 
Crime in relation to the war economy 11 9 20 5.87 
(Illegal) crossing of border I 0 I 0.29 
Distribution of pornographic material I 0 I 0.29 
Embezzlement 4 I 5 1.47 
Forbidden contact with POWs 0 8 8 2.35 
Forgery of official documents 3 I 4 1.17 
Fraud I 4 5 1.47 
High treason I 0 I 0.29 
Hoarding of gold 0 I I 0.29 
Homosexual act (in accordance with 
I 0 I 0.29 
§175 & §175a) 
Hunting offence I 0 I 0.29 
Inciting and acting as an accomplice 
0 I 1 0.29 
to murder 
Listening to foreign radio broadcast 0 1 1 0.29 
Murder in the course of robbery 2 0 2 0.59 
Offence in relation to currency 
6 2 8 2.35 exchange 
Offence in relation to law on 
1 4 5 1.47 malicious acts (Heimlucke) 
Offence in relation to the black 
6 1 7 market (Schleichhandel) 2.05 
Oppositional activity 1 1 2 0.59 
Looting 0 1 1 0.29 
Political 0 1 1 0.29 
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Possession and or distribution of anti-
2 German propaganda material* 0 2 0.59 
Preparation for high treason 0 2 2 0.59 
Procurement (pimping) 1 1 2 0.59 
Protest 0 1 1 0.29 
Public order offence 1 0 1 . 0.29 
Receiving stolen goods 9 4 13 3.81 
Refusal to work 
(Arbeitsverweigerung) 0 1 1 0.29 
Sabotage of ship 0 1 1 0.29 
Smuggling 6 0 6 1.76 
Spying 1 12 13 3.81 
Theft 113 54 167 48.97 
- Theft (carried out in a gang) 4 1 5 1.47 
Treason (Verra!) 1 12 13 3.81 
Unnatural sexual acts 1 0 1 0.29 
Wearing an SS-uniform 1 0 1 0.29 
Total 206 135 341 
* Failure to remit anti-German propaganda material. 
Source: Author's statistics based on research into the lists of Belgians imprisoned at various 
Berlin prisons: ITS/ ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 153 
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Appendix 21: Belgians deployed in Dusseldorf 1939-1945 by 
region of birth 
Region Number of Percentage 
workers 
Antwerp 1130 . 47.66 
Brabant(Brussels) 105 4.43 
Brabant (Flemish) 33 1.39 
Brabant (Walloon) 11 0.46 
East Flanders 374 15.77 
Hainaut 109 4.6 
Liege 217 9.15 
Limburg 50 2.11 
Luxembourg 15 0.63 
Namur 21 0.89 
The Netherlands 19 0.8 
France 23 0.97 
Germany 83 3.5 
Other 11 0.46 
Unclear 170 7.17 
Total 2,371 
Source: Author's statistics based on the list of Belgians resident in the Stadtkreis Diisseldorf in the 
period 1939-1945: SVG/DO, R.451 rrr.24.324. 
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Appendix 22: Belgian hospitalisations in Dusseldorf, 1940-1945 
Cause of admission 
Abscess 


































Impetigo (contagious bacterial skin infection) 
Infected wound 
Infected knee joint 
Influenza 
Injury sustained in bombing raid 
Injury sustained in the workplace 
Kidney infection 
Laparotomy (incision into abdominal wall for 
diagnostic purpose) 
Leg injury 




















































Nasal septum deviation 
Nutritional disturbance 
Observation 











Serious contusion of the sacral bone and 










Threat to pregnancy 
Throat infection 
Wound 






























Source: Statistics based on lists of Belgian patients for various Dilsseldorf hospitals: 
SVG/DO, R.45 l/Tr.24.322. 
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Appendix 23: Prisoners transferred to the Dilsseldorf-Derendorf 
Prison, 1940-1945 
Tramjerred from Total Tram/erred by 
Gestapo 
Aachen 13 2 
Anrath, near Krefeld 5 
Berlin 1 
Boch um 2 
Brussels I 
Celle 1 
Cologne 5 2 
Dortmund 2 
Duisburg 4 
Dlisseldorf 187 49 
Emmerich 1 
Essen 2 
Kaisheim Penitentiary (Zuchthaus) 2 
Kleve 1 
Krefeld 11 














Gestapo (branch not named) 3 3 
Unknown 17 
Total 329 56 
Source: Author's statistics based on research into ITS/ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450-
1506 and ITS/ ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450, pages 6-33. 
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Appendix 24: Reason for detention of Belgians detained at Dusseldorf-
Derendorf Prison, 1940-1945 
Crime Women Men Total Percentage 
Assisting with espionage 1 0 1 0.29 
Aiding the enemy (Feindeshegiinstigung) 1 5 6 1.76 
Aiding desertion. 2 0 2 0.59 
Aiding the escape of a POW 0 1 1 0.29 
Animal cruelty 0 I I 0.29 
Attempted abortion 1 0 1 0.29 
Attempted murder 0 3 3 0.88 
Begging 0 1 1 0.29 
Breach of currency exchange rules 0 2 2 0.59 
A reach of labour contract 
(Arbeitsvertragsbruch) 0 6 6 1.76 
Bribing an official 0 1 I 0.29 
Burglary (Einbruchdiebstahl) 0 3 3 0.88 
Communist activity 0 I 1 0.29 
Creating a public nuisance 0 2 2 0.59 
Deception (Betrug) 2 5 7 2.06 
Desertion of SS 0 1 1 0.29 
Disrupting the military 1 2 3 0.88 
Disruption of Feldpost (army postal 
service) 0 1 1 0.29 
Distribution of anti-German material 0 2 2 0.59 
Embezzlement 1 0 1 0.29 
Failure to pay customs duty 0 1 1 0.29 
Falsifying documents ( Urkundenftilschung) 2 23 25 7.35 
Fraud ( Unterschlagung) 0 1 1 0.29 
Forbidden contact with POWs 6 7 13 3.82 
High treason 0 1 1 0.29 
Illegal possession of weapons 0 4 4 1.18 
Listening to foreign radio broadcasts 0 2 2 0.59 
Malicious acts (Heimtilcke) 1 11 12 3.53 
Malicious damage to the Wehrmacht 0 1 1 0.29 
Offence in relation to the law on individuals 
harmful to the community 0 3 3 0.88 
Offence in relation to the war economy 1 17 18 5.29 
Passport forgery 1 0 1 0.29 
Procuring abortion 1 0 I 0.29 
Plunder 0 9 9 2.65 
Procurement 0 I 1 0.29 
Receiving stolen goods 1 6 7 2.06 
Resistance against the state 0 I 1 0.29 
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Sabotage 0 I I 0.29 
Sex offence (Silllichkeilsverbrechen) 0 I I 0.29 
Smuggling 0 2 2 0.59 
Spreading of horror stories 0 I I 0.29 
Spying 0 I I 0.29 
Theft 13 84 97 . 28.53 
Theft (aggravated) 0 14 14 4.12 
Treason I 4 5 1.47 
Using a false document 0 I I 0.29 
Breach of camp rules I 0 I 0.29 
Protective custody (Schutzhafl) 26 26 52 15.29 
Reason for detention not recorded 3 14 17 5.00 
Total 66 274 340* 
* One individual detained in relation to more than one offence. 
Source: Author's statistics based on research into ITS/ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450-
1506 and ITS/ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450, pages 6-33. 
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GLOSSARY AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Administration Division 
Aid for Workers Abroad 
Amendment to the Decree on the 




Belgian Commission for Repatriation 
Belgian Liaison Officers (BLOs) 
Belgian National Employment Office 
(ONT/RAA) 
Belgian National Employment Service 
Berlin State Archive 
Breach of labour contract 
Camp commander 
Camp infirmary 
Central German Health Insurance Fund for 
Belgium and Northern France 
Centre for Research and Documentation on 
War and Contemporary Society 
(CEGES/SOMA) 
Certificates of release 
City health department 
City hospital 
"Collection camps" (camps where the sick 
were transferred) 




Company health insurance fund 




Decree on the Protection of Recognised 
Veni·altungsableilung 
Hulp aan de Arbeiders in de Vreemde/Aide 
aw; Travailleurs a l'Etranger 
Verordnung zur Anderung der Verordnung 
iiber die Sicherstellung des Krdflebedw:fsfi"ir 
Arbeilen van besonderer Bedeulung 
Riislungskommandos 
Riislungsinspektion 
Commissariat Beige au Repatriation 
Office Nalionale du Travail/ Rijksarbeidmmbt 





Deutsche Zentral Krankenkasse fiir Belgien 
und Nordfrankreich 
Centre D 'Eludes el de Documentation Guerre 
el Sociele Conlemporaines/Studie- en 
Documenlaliecentrum Oorlog en 
Hedendaagse Maalschappji 













Verordnung iiber die Sicherslellung des Kriifle 
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Enterprises 
Decree on the Provision of Financial Aid to 
People in Need 
Decree on Work Identity Documents and 
the Obligation to be Registered 
Department of Labour and Social Welfare 
Deployment of foreigners 
District administrative command posts 
District Court 
Service Documentation and Research file 
Statute Deportee file 




External or sate II ite camps 
Factory police 
Forced labour camp 
Foreign workers' camp 
Foreign workers' home 
Foreigners' hospital 
Gau Chief 
Gau Labour Office 
Gau representative 
German Labour Front (OAF) 
German Railways 
Governor 
Group VII - Welfare and Labour 
Deployment 
Group XI - Medical Division 
Guerri Ila fighters 
Head of the Military Administration 
Head of the regional government 
Health insurance fund 
Higher SS and Police Chief 
Industrial inspectorate 
Interim financial support for families 
bedarfsfiir Arbeiten von Besonderer 
Bedeutung 
Arrete relatif a I 'allocation de secours aux 
personnes en eta/ de besoin 
Verordnung.Uber die Arbeitsausweis- und 
Meldepflicht 





Dossier Service Documentation et Recherches 
(SDR) 

















Gruppe VII - Sozialwesen und Arbeitseinsatz 
or Absoz 
Gruppe XI - Medizinalwesen 
Francs-Ii reurs 
Militarverwaltungschef 
Regi erungspras i den I 
Krankenkasse 




Labour draft evader 
Labour Education Camp 
Labour office 
Labour office 
Law for the Protection of Mothers in 
Gainful Employment 
Leave pass 
Local group leader 
Local labour office 
Main Health Office 
Malicious acts 
Medical assessor 
Medical Examination Service 
Military field headquarters (FK/OFK) 
Military police 
Minister for Armaments and War 
Production 
National Employment Office (ONT/RAA) 
National Labour Service 
National Office for Labour Deployment 
and Unemployment (ONPC), later renamed 
the National Office for Labour Deployment 
and Inspection 
National Socialist Party Overseas-
Organisation, Belgian National Committee 
Nazi People's Welfare 
Netherlands Red Cross 
Night and Fog 
























Reichsministerfiir Beivaffnung und Munition 
O.fflce National du Travail!R{jksarbeidaml 
Reichsarbeitsdiensl 
O.fflce National du Placement el du Chomage 




Landesgruppe in Belgien 
NS-Volkswohlfahrt 
Nederlandsche Roode Kruis 









Plenipotentiary General for the Utilisation 




Polish workers' camp 
Population register 










Ministry of Reconstruction 
Record cards 
Recruitment office branch 
Red Cross 
Refusal to work 
Regional labour office 
Regional representative 
Registry of labour books that had been 
issued 
Reich Commissioner 
Reich Defence Commissioner of Defence 
District VI 
Reich Interior Ministry (RMdI) 
Reich Labour Minister 
Reich Labour Ministry (RAM) 
Reich Labour Service 
Reich Labour Trustee for the Brandenburg 
economic area as Special Trustee 
Reich Main Security Office 
Reich Statistics Office 
Reich Transport Minister 
Release papers 






Ei nwohnerme Ide register 
























Reichstreuhdnder der Arbeit fiir das 








Representative of the Chief of the Security 
Police and the Security Service for the ... 
Representative of the head of the Security 
Police and Security Service in Belgium and 
Northern France 
Resistance 
Ruhr Coalmining Regional Group 
Russian workers' camp 
Seasonal closure period 









Social welfare officer 
Special Court 
Special transport trains scheduled for 
workers going on leave 
State attorney's office 
State health insurance fund 
State labour office 
State Mental Hospital and Nursing Home 
Statute for Civilian Resisters 
Statute for Political Prisoners 
Statute for Resistance through the 
Clandestine Press 
Statute for Labour Deportees 
Statute for Labour Draft Evaders 







Beaz!firagter des Che.f.\· der Sicherheitspolizei 
und des Sicherheitsdienstfi'ir den Bereich des 
Militdrbefehlshabers in Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich 
Beauftragte des Che.f.\· der Sicherheitspolizei 
und des Sicherheitsdienst fur den Bereich des 
Militdrbefehlshabers in Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich 
Widerstand 








Service Public Federal Securite Sociale. 









Landesheil- und Pflegeanstalt 
Statut du Resistant civil 
Statut du Prisonnier Politique 
Statut du Resistant par presse clandestine 
Statut des Deportes 
Statut du Refractaire au Travail Obligatoire 




Transfer of orders to companies in Belgium 
Transfer papers 
Transit camp 
Union of Manual Workers and White-collar 
Workers 
University gynaecological hospital 
Unmarried workers' home 
Weekend trips 
Winter Relief Aid 
Women's camp 
Women's clinic 
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Archival Sources 
Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde (German Federal Archive) 
NS 5 l/vorl.270, fol. I. 
Centre D'Etudes et de Documentation Guerre et Societe Contemporaines (Centre 
for Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary Society or 
CEGES/SOMA) 
BALI 3.119-11: Militarverwaltung beim Militiirbejehlshaber Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich, Tatigkeitsberichte: 
Allgemeine Obersicht flir die Zeit 1.12.1941-15.3.1942 ( 16.3.1942) 
10-Tage-Bericht Nr. 2: ( 13.8.1940) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 8: August 1940 (3.9.1940) 
Tatigkeitsberiht Nr. 9: September 1940 (1.10.1940) 
TatigkeitsberichtNr. 13: January 1941 (2.2.1941) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 16, April 1941 (9.5.1941) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 17: 1.6.1941-1.9.1941 (22.9.1941) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 21: 1.6.1942 - 1.9.1942 (15.9.1942) 
Tatigkeitsbericht N r. 22, 1. 9.1942-1.12.1942 (31.12.1942) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 23, January- March 1943 (15.4.1943) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 24: April-June 1943 (1.8.1943) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 25: July to September 1943 (15.11.1943) 
Tatigkeitsbericht N r. 26: October - December 1943 ( 1.3.1944) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 27: March 1944 (10.4.1944) 
Tatigkeitsbericht N r. 28: April 1944 ( 10.5.1944) 
Tatigkeitsbericht, Nr. 29: May 1944 (10.6.1944) 
Tatigkeitsbericht Nr. 30: June 1944 (10.7.1944) 
AA553: Der Beauftragte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des 
Sicherheitsdienst flir den Bereich des Militarbefehlshabers i'n Belgien 
und Nordfrankreich, BrGssel. Meldungen aus Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich, 1943-1944 (Originals Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 70 
Belgien 5): 
Bericht 1/43 (15.1.1943) 
Bericht 2/43 ( 1.2.1943) 
Bericht 4/43 ( 1.3.1943) 
Bericht 5/43 ( 15.3. I 943) 
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E "t 'I nque e trava1 obligatoire en Allemagne et refractaires 1943-1975 
(survey of Belgian forced workers and labour draft evaders). 
AAl216: 
AA 1797: 
Enquete du CEGES concernant la JOC ('"De KAJ-aktie in Duitsland 
en Noord-Frankrijk"), 1971. 
Al:ons ~' "Bommen op Berlijn". [Account of time spent in Germany 
written tn 1994.] 
AA2179: 
ABl202: Luc~en B, "!emoi~nage 1943-1945: memoires, 1943-1945'~. (Memoir 
of his experiences tn Germany written by Lucien Boskin in 1988.) 
BC R 292 GR:L'Effort Wallon 
BCR 335 GR: De Ylaamsche Post. Weekblad voor de Vlaamsche Arbeiders in 
Duitschland 
Image Nr.: 4962, 4992, 5041, 5042, 5064, 5085 and 5181. 
Landesarchiv Berlin (LAB) 
A Pr.Br.Rep. 030-02-04: Nr. 3, 20 and 31 
A Rep. 227-02: Nr. 1-77 
A Rep. 358-02: Nr. 111910 










Red Cross International Tracing Service (ITS) 
ITS/ ARCH/Sheet number 5.55-9.74, inventory number 1615, Az.: Berlin. [Disabled 
persons' insurance cards from the insurance payroll and tax cards of the AEG Berlin 
(various nationalities), 1939-1945]. 
ITS/ ARCH/ Arbeitserziehunglager Ordner 1, S.34-7. List of prisoner deaths at the 
AEL Grossbeeren provided to the Nederlandsche Roode Kruis (Netherlands Red 
Cross) by the Dutch national Jan Prins who had been imprisoned at the AEL 
Grossbeeren and had worked as a nurse at the camp infirmary. 
ITS/ARCH/Inform. Justizvollzuganstalten Ordner 47 (I - 487, - NG 908). 
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ITS/ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 153. Lists of Belgians imprisoned at the 
Frauengefiingnis Berlin-Moabit, Gefiingnis Berlin-Charlottenburg (Kantstrasse), 
Gefiingnis Berlin-Charlottenburg (Konigsdamm), Gerichtsgefiingnis Berlin-
Lichterfelde and the Zellengefiingnis Berlin Lehrterstrasse. 
ITS/ ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450, pages 6-33. List of Belgian nationals held at 
the Dtisseldorf-Derendorf Prison between August 1939 and May 1945. 
ITS/ ARCH/Gruppe PP, Ordner 1450-1506. Individual Prisoner Record Cards from 
the Dtisseldorf-Derendorf Prison. 
Service des Victimes de la Guerre - Service Archives et Documentation (Service 
for the Victims of the War or SVG/DO) 
R. I 49/Tr.13.221: Translation of Guillaume T's medical record from the Charite 
hospital. 
R. I 84/Tr.33.462: Marburg Collection 
4/1800 2 (3) (Film I) 
411836.1 (2) (Film I) 
4/1836.1 7 (Film I) 
4/1836.1 (2) (Film 2) 
14/5091 (Film 6) 
14/5092 (Film 6) 
14/5095.5 (Film 8) 
R.184/Tr.37.023: Marburg Collection - Group XI Health Division 
(Medizinalwesen) records and statistics regarding medical 
examinations for Belgian workers departing for Germany, 1941-
1944 
8/430-440 ( 1) (Film 12) 
R. I 84/Tr.39.157: Marburg Collection - Telegrams and Reports from German 
Labour Offices to Group VII regarding the Belgian deaths in 
Germany, 1943-1944 
6081-5915-6082 (Film 21) 
R.497/Tr.22.832: Yerordnungsblatter der Militarbefehlshaber in Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich, 1940-1944 (Military Administration decrees) 
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Nr. 67 - 5: Verordnung Uber den Arbeitseinsatz bei deutschen 
Dienststellen und bei den von der Militarverwaltung 
anerkannten Betrieben und Arbeitsvorhaben vom 29. Januar 
1942 
Nr. 100-7: Zweite Yerordnung zur Anderung der Verordnung 
Gber die Sicherstellung des Kraftebedarfs flir Arbeiten von 
besonderer Bedeutung vom 30. April 1943 
N.r. I 04-!: Yerordnung iiber die Sicherstellung des Kraftebedarfs 
fur Arbe1ten vom besonderer Bedeutung vom 28. Juni 1943. 
R.2 I 9/Tr.26.686: Betriebskrankenkasse der Firma Deutsche Werft Hamburg. 
R.219/Tr.27.678: Flemish translation of court transcript, Abteilung 132, case ref. 
132 Cs 187 /43, Hamburg District Court 
R.429/Tr.8.797: List of Belgians registered with the Polizeirevier 161 during the 
Second World War. 
R.429/Tr.54.854: List of Belgian nationals resident in Berlin-Neukolln and Berlin-
Kreuzberg during the Second World War (prepared by the 
International Tracing Service using the social security records, 
labour office records and the records of Nazi organisations from 
the Verwaltungsbezirk Berlin-Kreuzberg). 
R.429/Tr.64.271: List of judicial cases involving Belgians in Berlin prepared by a 
BLO in 1950. 
Belgian Liaison Officer's report on Belgians prosecuted in 
Berlin, dated 12 December 1950 
R.451 /Tr.24.322: Lists of Belgians hospitalised at the Augusta Krankenhaus 
Dtisseldorf-Rath, Diakonissen-Krankenhaus Dtisseldorf 
Kaiserwerth, Evangelisches Krankenhaus Dilsseldorf, 
Krankenhaus der Dominikanerinnen Dtisseldorf-Heerdt, 
Privatklinik Golzheim, St. Martinus Krankenhaus, St. Vinzenz-
Krankenhaus, Stadtischen Krankenhaus Dtisseldorf-Benrath and 
the Westdeutsche Kieferklinik between 1940 and 1945. 
R.451 /Tr.24.324: List of Belgians resident in the Stadtkreis Dilsseldorf 1939-1945 
R.451/Tr.47 .034: French translation of court transcript, case ref. 7 Os 500/41 A, 
Brunswick District Court 
R.451/Tr.47 .662: Letter sent by LH de Maen, Head of the Belgian Search Mission 
in Bad Salzutlen, to the Ministere de la Reconstruction in 
Brussels, dated 21 March 1950 
R.451/Tr.75.702: Letter from the Drahtwerke Eidelstedt GmbH in Hamburg to 
Belgian Liaison Officer de Maen, dated 9 February 1951 
List of Belgian employees at Norddeutsche Htitte AG in 
Bremen-Oslebshausen, dated 23 May 1951 
R.54 7 /Tr.18.622 Lists of Belgian nationals registered in Dtisseldorf prepared by 
commissioners in police districts for the Waffen-SS recruitment 
officer at the Germanische SS-Sturmbanne, Sonders/ab West, 
Dtisseldorf. 
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R.696/Tr.238.190: Lists of the worker transports to Germany from Kortrijk for the 
period 1940-1944 from Public Assistance Commission 
(Commission d' Assistance Publique). 
BUR 5: Fin de Mission Berlin: Camps Douteux A-L Rinskopf I 194 
Fin de Mission Berlin: Camps Douteux K-Z I 271 
BUR 71: Camp Douteux. Reg. Bez. Dilsseldorf I /406 
BUR Berlin: Actes des deces 
BUR Os-Dz: Actes de deces 
Documentatie Werbestelle - Originaux: Az 5000-Az 5552 
Documentatie Werbestelle - Originaux Az 5600-Az 5930 
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List of personal files consulted 
Name Archive Reference 
Achille H SVG/00 SOR 50666 
Adolf I SVG/00 SOR 285706 
Adolf J SVG/00 SOR 381131 
Adolphe C SVG/00 SOR 188619 
Adolphe K SVG/00 R.451 /Tr.168975/6 
Adolphine H SVG/00 059178/337134 
Adrian 0 CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/38 
Adrian L SVG/00 SOR 269577 
Albert C SVG/00 062212/373941 
SOR 178100 
Albert Cr SVG/00 R.451 /Tr.168.172 
Albert H HStAO RW58/37.286 
Albert R SVG/00 SOR 160905 
Albert S CEGES/SOMA AA1216/39 
Albert T SVG/00 SOR 315578 
Albert V SVG/00 SOR 34082 
Albrecht J SVG/00 SOR 237721 
Albrecht 0 SVG/00 03 13 12/341454 
SVG/00 SOR 147469 
Aldo F SVG/00 SOR381415 
Alexandre B SVG/00 SOR214471 
Alfons A CEGES/SOMA AA1216/36 
Alfons C CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/38 
Alfons G SVG/00 SOR 340502 
Alfons L CEGES/SOMA AA2179 
Alfons P CEGES/SOMA AA1216/13 
Alfons S SVG/00 SOR 309699 
Alfons W SVG/00 SOR 253243 
Alfred H SVG/00 0 ad 4356/374648 
Alfred M SVG/00 SOR 157311 
Alice 0 SVG/00 065031/376249 
Aloysia H SVG/00 063463/377581 
Amandus A SVG/00 SOR 356222 
Amata L CEGES/SOMA AA1216/12 
Amelie E SVG/00 SOR 383150 
Andre B CEGES/SOMA AA1216/1 
Andre o CEGES/SOMA AA 1797 
Andre J SVG/00 SOR 861118 
Andre T SVG/00 0361857 /524468 
SOR 105975 
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Andreas D SVG/DO 0305954/38949 
R559416/491 I 7 
SOR 54903 
Andreas Dr SVG/DO 039768/339940 
SOR 149212 
Andree B LAB A Rep.358-02: 
Nr.111910 
SYG/DO SOR 382428 
Andrienne B SYG/DO SOR 4423 
Angela W SYG/DO SOR 381435 
Angelina S SVG/DO SOR 381115 
Anna B LAB A Pr.Br.Rep.030-02-
04: Nr.3 
Anna Be SYG/DO SOR 382042 
Anna P SVG/DO SOR 336222 
Anna R SYG/DO 043057/354336 
Annas SVG/DO 051971/369194 
Anna V SYG/DO SOR 382038 
Anni P SYG/DO SOR 336222 
Antoine B SYG/DO SOR 243802 
Antoine R SVG/DO R.451/Tr.47.034 
Antoinette L SVG/DO SOR 180566 
0383601 
Anton K SVG/DO 0364449/51043 
SOR 167141 
Armand B SVG/DO SOR 311884 
Armand Be CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/37 
Armand C SVG/DO SOR 18834 
PP 14423/21887 
Armand D CEGES/SOMA AA 121611 
Arsene C SVG/DO R. 184/Tr.33462 
Arthur D SVG/DO SDR381437 
Arthur Du SVG/DO R.451 /Tr.168.172 
Arthur L SYG/DO SOR 383176 
August G SVG/DO SOR 336680 
August H SVG/DO SOR 381420 
August M SVG/DO SOR 187133 
August 0 · SVG/DO SOR 187136 
Augustina K SVG/DO ALPHA 
Balthasar P SYG/DO SOR 264165 
Barthelemy C SYG/DO Dad 517/304748 
PP ad 6462/53226 
SOR 62719 
Marcel Be SVG/DO R.429/Tr.64271 
Benedictus V SYG/DO R.451/Tr.170199/4 
Benjamin A SVG/DO SOR 1676 
Bertha G SVG/DO SOR 383205 
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Camie) L SVG/DO SDR 130266 
Carolus A SVG/DO SDR 261264 
Carolus B SVG/DO SDR 251564 
Celestin L SVG/DO R.451/Tr.47.034 
Celestina R SVG/DO 041829/341859 
Cesar G SVG/DO R.451 /Tr.168.172 
Charles L SVG/DO SDR 151552 
Charles T CEGES/SOMA AA1216/11 
Clement C SVG/DO SDR 352775 
Clementina V SYG/DO 073500/390120 
Clementine D SYG/DO SDR 308095 
Constantia B SYG/DO SDR 289106 
Cornelius B SYG/DO SDR 280176 
Cornelius E SYG/DO SDR 302639 
Daniel G CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/39 
Delphina D SYG/DO 060847/374128 
Denise G SYG/DO SDR 314820 
Denise S SYG/DO SDR 303973 
Domenique T SYG/DO SOR 215667 
Edith V SYG/DO SOR 44123 
Edmondus M SYG/DO SDR 325685 
Eduard M SYG/DO SDR381143 
Eduard S SVG/DO SDR 383153 
Elisabeth D SYG/DO 066045/380257 
Elisabeth S SVG/DO SOR 333497 
Elisabeth V SYG/DO 055655/338372 
Elodie D SYG/DO 068449/382071 
Elvira V SYG/DO SOR 343665 
Elvire R SYG/DO 0270032/248828 
Ernie) S SVG/DO SOR 382058 
EmilK SYG/DO SOR 225450 
Emil V SVG/DO SOR 382404 
Emile A SYG/DO SOR 363554 
EmileH SYG/DO SOR 269958 
EmileS CEGES/SOMA AA1216/1 
Emilia A SVG/DO SOR 178568 
EmmaW SVG/DO SDR 333686 
Ernest W CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/39 
Ernestus D SYG/DO SOR 316795 
0560317/51801 
Estelle D SVG/DO SOR 381402 
Eugene H SVG/DO R. 149/Tr. 14021 
F Joly CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/1 
Fanny B .SVG/DO SOR 234488 
Felicien C SVG/DO R.184/Tr.33462 
FelixG CEGES/SOMA AA 1260/13 
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Ferdinand P SVG/00 SOR 160276 
Fernand B SVG/00 R.429/Tr.64271 
SOR 112.822 
Fernand G CEGES/SOMA AA1216/I 
Fernand K CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/1 
Fernand L CEGES/SOMA AA1216/I 
Fernand Le CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/1 
Fernand W CEGES/SOMA AA1216/1 
Florentina H SVG/00 SOR 383166 
Fran9ois A SVG/00 SOR 1927 
Fran9ois 0 SVG/00 SOR 165054 
Fran9ois M CEGES/SOMA AA 1216/37 
Fran9ois N SVG/00 SOR 10201 
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